Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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caseweheldcardsofwhichthePolitburowasunaware.Moscowsolvedour

problemforus;itspressuretacticsallowedustoproceedwithoutimpedimentto

completetheconstructionofthetriangle.



InmanywaystheweeksfollowingthePing‐Pongdiplomacywerethemost

maddeningoftheentiretortuousprocess.OnlythePresidentandIunderstood

thefullimplicationsofChouEn‐lai’smovebecausewealonewereawareofallthe

communicationsbetweenPekingandWashington.Weknewthatsomethingbig

wasabouttohappen,butwewerebaffledastowhichchannelwouldsurfaceit

andpreciselywhatformitwouldtake.Asoftenontheeveofgreatevents,Nixon

wasassailedbyconflictingpremonitionsandhopes,byhisamalgamofhigh

nationalpurposeandpoliticalandpersonalcalculation.HewasafraidthatChina

wouldpullbackatthelastmoment;thisIthoughtimprobable.Atthesametime

hehadsecondthoughtsaboutwhathadalreadybeendecided—thata

subordinateemissaryshouldvisitPekingbeforeanyPresidentialtrip.Undeterred

bythefactthatwehadneverrespondedtotheChineseoverturefora

Presidentialvisit,henowwantedtoskiptheemissarystagelestittaketheglow

offhisownjourney.Iremindedhimthatwehadnothearddirectlyfromthe

Chineseforthreemonthsabouteitherenterprise,andthatanunprepared

PresidentialtriptoChinawasmuchtoodangerous.Nixonwasexcitedtothepoint

ofeuphoriaabouttheprospectbeforeus; buthealsowasassailedbyhischronic

anxietythatnoenterpriseofhiswouldevercometoatotallysatisfactoryending.



Naturally,IsharedNixon’ssenseoftheoccasion.Ihadfewerdoubtsthan

hedidthattheChinesewouldpullbackorfollowHanoi’spathofpsychological

warfare.Afterall,itsgoalswerequitedifferentfromHanoi’s.Hanoiwantedto

breakourwill;PekingneededusasacounterweighttoMoscow. Hanoiwas

engagedinaceaselessassaultontheauthorityofourgovernment;China’sstake

hadtobeinaWashingtonwiththeauthorityanddeterminationtomaintainthe

globalbalanceofpower.WhatworriedmemorewaswhetherPekinghad

understoodourmethodofgovernmentwellenoughtoknowinwhatchannelto

approachus.



Butwecontrolledournerves,Nixonagreeing thatweshouldpursuethe

overturestoPekingalongtheestablishedlinesandwaitforamessagefromour

enigmaticoppositenumbersontheothersideoftheglobe.Wesentfurther

signalstoshowoursteadycourse.In1970theNSCUnderSecretariesCommittee

hadbeeninstructedtodevelopaprogramtoaugmenttravelandtradewith

China.BythemiddleofMarch1971,ale ngthylisthadbeendeveloped,

cataloguingeveryconceivablestepwithintheadministrativediscretionofthe

PresidentandnotinneedofChineseacceptanceorreciprocity.Carriedawayby

thespiritoftheenterprise,theUnderSecretariesCommitteerecommended

immediateapprovaloftheentirepackage.Iwasdubious.ThoughIhadbeenone

oftheoriginatorsofthepolicyof“unrejectablesteps,”Ididnotfavoramoveof

thismagnitudewithoutreciprocityandbeforeweknewthenatureoftheChinese

response.InamemorandumtothePresidentofMarch25—wellbeforethe

invitationtothePing‐Pongteam—Idividedthelistintothreecomponents.The

firstpackagewouldkeeptradewithChinasomewhatbelowthatwiththeSoviet

Union;StageIIwouldplaceChinatradeonaparwithUS‐Soviettrade;StageIII

wouldgobeyondtheleveloftradewiththeSovietUnion.Irecommendedthat

thefirstpackagebecarriedoutinthenearfutureandunilaterally; 

implementationofthesecondandthirdshouldawaitthedevelopmentofour

relationswithChinaandbebasedonreciprocity.



ThismemorandumwasonNixon’sdeskwhenthenewsofthetabletennis

invitationreachedus.ItoldhimthatthiswastheoptimumtimeforaPresidential

decision.NixonapprovedthebasicstrategyonApril12andorderedthatStageI

beimplementedimmediately. OnApril13Inotifiedthevariousagencies.OnApril

14,theWhiteHousethroughRonZieglerannounced thefirstmajorbreachinthe

decades‐oldtradeembargoagainstChina.Heplacedthenewmeasuresinthe

contextoftheAdministration’sChinapolicyasithadevolvedsince1969,but

acknowledgedonabackgroundbasisthatthePing‐Pongeventshadaffectedthe

timingoftheannouncement.OnthesamedayInotifiedtheagenciesofa

separatePresidentialdecisiontoapprovethesale ofFrenchdumptrucks

containingAmerican‐madeenginesandtransmissionstothePeople’sRepublicof

China.



Triangulardiplomacy,tobeeffective,mustrelyonthenaturalincentive s

andpropensitiesoftheplayers.Itmustavoidtheimpressionthatoneis“using” 

eitherofthecontendersagainsttheother;otherwiseonebecomesvulnerableto

retaliationorblackmail.ThehostilitybetweenChina andtheSovietUnionserved

ourpurposesbestifwemaintainedcloserrelationswitheachsidethantheydid

witheachother.Therestcould belefttothedynamicofevents.



OnApril13IcalledinYuliVorontsov,onceagainSovietchargéd’affaires,

whosedestinyitseemedtobetoreceiveunpleasantnews,togivehimoneday’s

advancewordofourdecisiontoopenupChinatrade.Istressedthatitreflected

noanti‐Sovietintent.Thisistheconventionalpacifierofdiplomacybywhichthe

targetofamaneuverisgivenaformalreassuranceintendedtounnerveasmuch

astocalm,andwhichwoulddefeatitspurposeifitwereactuallybelieved.Soviet

diplomatsarenotknownfortheirgullibility,butIthoughtthattheimplications

spokeforthemselves.IalsourgedZieglerlikewisetodenyanti‐Sovietintentata

WhiteHousebriefing.Thishedid,butasinstructedhebalanceditwitha

statementagreeingwithChouEn‐lai:“Thereisnoquestionaboutthefactthatthe

initiativesofPresidentNixonhaveturnedanewpageinourrelationswithChina.”



“Washingtonwatchers”inPekingmusthavebeenamusedbythesignsof

“factionalfeuding”inWashington.OntheonehandthePresidentrodethewaves

ofeuphoria.AtasessionattheconventionoftheAmericanSocietyofNewspaper

Editors,Nixonwaxedeloquentonhislong‐rangegoalsofnormalizingrelations

betweentheUnitedStatesandthePeople’sRepublicofChina,“theendingofthe

isolationofMainlandChinafromtheworldcommunity.”Hetracedthevarious

stepsthathadbeentakenandnotedthathispolicywasbeginningtobearfruit.

Truetohishabitofwalkingsoclosetotheedgeoftheprecipicethathisadvisers

wouldsquirmwithdiscomfiture,hementionedthathehadrecommendedtohis

daughterTriciaandherfiancé(whoweretobemarriedinJune)thatChinawasa

niceplacetospendahoneymoon.NixonhopedtheycouldseeChinasomeday.

“Asamatteroffact,IhopesometimeIdo.”



Ontheotherhand,VicePresidentSpiroAgnewtoldagroupofreporters

thathedisagreedwiththepolicyofnormalizingrelationswithPekingandthathe

hadarguedagainstitatanNSCmeetingbeforethePing‐Pongepisode.The

conversationwassupposedtobeofftherecord,butjournalisticrestrainthasits

limits.TherelationshipbetweenthePresidentandanyVicePresidentisnever

easy;itis,afterall,disconcertingtohaveatone’ssideamanwhoselife’s

ambitionwillbeachievedbyone’sdeath.Nixon’ssenseofbeingsurroundedby

potentialantagonistsneedednosuchencouragement.Hewroteoffthisgaffeas

anotherexampleofAgnew’sunsuitabilityto succeedhim—aviewheheldabout

mostpotentialcandidates—andorderedHaldemantoaskAgnewtodesistfrom

furthercommentsaboutChina.



Anxietiesmultipliedaswewaited;Nixonfrettedthatthewholeenterprise

mightabort.Finally,onApril27wedecidedtoapproachtheChinesedirectly.A

courierwassenttoPariswithaletterforJeanSainteny,urgentlyrequestinghim

todelivertotheChineseAmbassadoraformalproposaltoopenachannelwithus

inParis.WechoseParisbecauseofatleastapossibility thatthelongChinese

silenceinthePakistaniandRomanianchannelsmightmeanthatneitherwas

trusted.Theletter,however,wasneverdelivered.Whileitwasstillenroute,the

Pakistanichannelbecameactiveatlastandwestoppedthemessenger.



Thefirstindicationcameat3:45p.m.onApril27—wordthatHilalyneeded

toseemeurgentlyforfiveminutes.ToldbyHalSaundersthatIwasleavingon

vacationthenextday,Hilalyinsistedthathismessagecouldnotwait.SoI

receivedhimat6:12p.m.Hehandedmeahandwrittentwo‐pageaide‐mémoire

conveyingamessagefromChouEn‐laiinresponsetoPresidentNixon’smessage

ofDecember16(received,wenowlearned,bytheChineseonJanuary5).The

message,ineleganthandwriting,readexactlyasfollows:



MessagefromPremierChouenLai



PremierChouenLaithankedPresidentYahyaforconveyingthemessageofPresident

Nixonon5Jan71.PremierChouenLaiisverygratefultoPresidentYahyaandhewillbe

gratefulifPresidentYahyaconveysthefollowingverbatimmessagetoPresidentNixon:



“Owingtothesituationatthetime,ithasnotbeenpossibletoreplyearliertothe

messagefromthePresidentoftheUSAtothePremierofPeople’sRepublicofChina.



“Atpresent,contactsbetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandtheUnitedStatesare

beingreviewed.However,iftherelationsbetweenChinaandtheUSAaretoberestored

fundamentally,theUSmustwithdrawallitsArmedforcesfromChina’sTaiwanandTaiwan

Straitsarea.Asolutiontothiscrucialquestioncanbefoundonlythroughdirectdiscussions

betweenhighlevelresponsiblepersonsofthetwocountries.Therefore,theChineseGovt

reaffirmsitswillingnesstoreceivepublicallyinPekingaspecialenvoyofthePresidentoftheUS

(forinstance,MrKissinger)ortheUSSecyofStateoreventhePresidentoftheUShimselffora

directmeetinganddiscussions.Ofcourse,iftheUSPresidentconsidersthatthetimeisnotyet

ripe,themattermaybedeferredtoalaterdate.Asforthemodalities,procedureandother

detailsofthehighlevelmeetinganddiscussionsinPeking,astheyareofnosubstantivesignifi‐

cance,itisbelievedthatitisentirelypossibleforproperarrangementstobemadethroughthe

goodofficesofPresidentYahyaKhan.April21,1971”



IaskedHilalywhenthismessagehadbeenreceivedinPakistan.After

returningtohisoffice,hecalledmetosaythatithadarrivedonApril23.The

delaywasduetoitshavingbeensenttoWashingtonbycourier.Onecanonly

speculatewhyChouhadwaitedsolongtocontactus.TheLaotianoperationmay

havemadeitimprudenttodosoearlier;theChine semayhavebeenasperplexed

aswewereaboutthebestchannel.Webothhadcometothesameconclusion

regardingRomania;itwassimplytooexposed,tootemptedbyitsown

necessities,andtoounfortunatelylocatedgeographicallytohandlethelastphase

ofsettingupthecontacts,howeverhelpfulithadbeenatearlierstages. The

ChinesehadtriedNorway;wehadattemptedParis;itwouldbeinterestingto

knowwhyPekingeschewedthelatter.Perhapsithadahighestimateofthe

efficiencyofFrenchintelligence;perhapsitwasworriedaboutSovietpenetration;

perhapsitscommunicationstoPariswerenotadequate.Probablyintheclassic

Chinesemanner,ChouEn‐laiwaitedtoseewhetherhecouldgetthebarbarians

tosolicitaninvitationafterthebroadhintofthePing‐Pongdiplomacy.Hemay

wellhavebeenasmystifiedbyoursilenceaswewerebyhis.Itwasaclosecall,

butouroutwardself‐controltriggeredtheChineseintotheuncharacteristic

postureofhavingtomakethefirstmove.



Sowewereatlastattheendofoneroadandatthebeginningofanother.

ChouEn‐lai’swarmtoneindicatedthatweneededtofearnohumiliation;the

peremptorytoneofpreviouscommunicationshadbeendropped.Thes ubjectof

theproposedmeetingwasstilltobeTaiwan,buttheemphasiswason

withdrawingourforcesratherthanabandoningourrelationship.TheChinese

soughtahigh‐levelmeeting,thepurposeofwhichwastobeafundamental

restorationoftherelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.ThePresidenthadbeen

specificallyinvited,notsimplyinadisavowableoralasidebutinaformal

communication.NordidChouEn‐laiwanttorisksubordinates’thwartingofour

commondesignbytheirhagglingover“modalities.”‘Bykeepingtechnical

arrangementsinthePakistanichannel,heensureddiscretion,high‐level

consideration,andexpeditiousdecisions.



Hilalyleftmyofficeafterabaretwentyminutes.Iimmediatelywenttosee

thePresident.IfoundhimintheLincolnSittingRoomandreadhimthemessage.

Therewaslittleneedforconversation.Themessagespokeforitself.



Withinanhour,Nixoncalledmebackonthetelephone.Evengreatevents

ultimatelyreducethemselvestooperationalquestions;ourfirstwaswhomto

sendtoChina.Originally,therewasnothought ofsendingme.Weagreedthat

DavidBrucewouldbetheidealemissary;Iindeedbroachedthesubjectwith

BruceinlateMayforthecontingencyofalatermission.Butwecametorealize

thatBruce’sroleasheadofourdelegationtotheParispeacetalksonVietnam

couldcausehischoicetoberegardedbytheChineseasatransparentploy;we

wantednobackfireatsoformativeastage.(Thisjudgmentturnedouttobe

correct.PekingrejectedBruceaspartofmydelegationforthesecondtripto

ChinainOctober.Later,theywouldchangetheirmindsandwelcomehimasthe

firstheadofourLiaisonOfficeinPeking.)Wediscussed alonglistofother

candidates,includingGeorgeBushandElliotRichardson.Therewasanextended

considerationofNelsonRockefeller,perhapsaccompaniedbyAlHaig.Eachwas

foundtopresentproblemsinarrangingasecrettrip,eitherbecausetheywere

insufficientlyfamiliarwiththenuancesofNixon’sthinkingorbecausetheymight

detracttoomuchattentionfromNixon’sowntrip.Nixonevenraisedthenameof

TomDeweyseveraltimesandwaxedeloquentabouthisabilities;unfortunately,

Deweywasnolongeravailable,havingdiedafew monthspreviously.Rogers’s

namedidnotcomeup;norcouldithave,givenNixon’sdeterminationthathe,

nottheStateDepartment,shouldbeseen—justly—astheoriginatorofChina

policy.



Restrainingourexcitement,wetalkedofthesignificanceoftheoccasion.

NixonthoughtthatourfirmnessonVietnamhadpavedthewaystrategicallyeven

ifhereandthereitcausedabriefdelay.OnlyanAmericathatwasstronginAsia

couldbetakenseriouslybytheChinese.ItoldthePresidentthatthetidewas

turning;wewerebeginningtoseetheoutline ofanewinternationalorder.We

had,infact,linkedthevariousstrandsofourpolicyaswehadintended:“Wehave

doneitnow,wehavegotitallhookedtogether.”Andso wehad,inEurope,

Berlin,SALT,andtheMiddleEast.Nixonraisedthequestionwhethera

forthcomingannouncementon SALT(theMay20agreementtoconsider

offensiveanddefensivelimitationssimultaneously)wouldupsettheChinese.I

doubtedit;theywereplayingabiggergame.Nixonaskediftheannouncementof

aSovietsummitforSeptember—whichwestillconsideredpossible—wouldhurt

ourChinainitiative.IdidnotbelievetheSovietleaderscouldmovethisrapidly;

theywerestillwaitingfortheVietnamprotestsinthiscountrytoweakenus

further;theyhadnotyetdonewithtryingtosqueezeusintofurtherconcessions

asanadmissionpricetoasummit.ChouEn‐lai,I felt,hadmade“amore

sophisticatedanalysis.”ButifIwereprovedwrong,wewouldsimplybefaced

withchoosingthepriorityoftwosummits,anembarrassmentofriches.These

weregoodproblemstohave—aluxurywehadmissedfortwoyears.



Highofficeofteninvolvesharassments,frustrations,pettycalculation.

Ratherthanthedramaticpeaksofthepublicimaginationitusuallymeansan

accumulationofseeminglyendlesspressuresandtensionsinwhichevery

apparentsolutionprovestobeonlyatickettoanewsetofproblems.The

characterofleadersistestedbytheirwillingnesstopersevereinthefaceof

uncertaintyandtobuildforafuturetheycanneitherdemonstratenorfully

discern.Buteveryonceinawhileafortunatefewcanparticipateinaneventthat

theyknowwillmakeadifference.Iwenthomealittlelaterthanusualthat

eveningandsatalonereflectivelyinmystudy.Forovertwoyearsmynightmare

hadbeenthatVietnamwouldsapournation’sself‐confidenceanddrainitofits

crucialcapacitytopreservethefreenationsandtosustainallhopesforprogres s. 

Whilethepostwarworldwascrumblingandourcreativecontributionwasmore

thaneverindispensable,westoodindangerofconsumingournationalsubstance

inbitterdomesticstrifeoveracornerofSouthEastAsia.Whateverhappenedin

Indochina,wewouldhavetobeginaneweraofinternationalrelations—agoal

unachievablewithoutnationaldedicationandnationalconsensus.Themessage

fromPekingtoldusaboveallthatdespiteIndochinawehadachancetoraisethe

sightsoftheAmericanpeopletoafutureofopportunity.Therewasnow,for

once,theprospectthatAmericanscouldatlastbegintounitebehindavisionofa

moreconstructiveandpeacefulworld,andwouldbegivenhopebythe

demonstrationthateveninadversityAmericastillhadtheinwardstrengthfor

greatenterprises.ForthefirsttimeintwoyearsIexperienced,amidthe

excitement,amomentofelationandinnerpeace.



NixonandImetagainthenextmorningintheOvalOffice.Nixonaskedme

toreadouttheChinesenotetoHaldemanandtoexplainitssignificance.Itwas

notthatNixondidnotunderstandit;itwasratherthathewantedtosavorthe

momentofaccomplishmentbyhearingitdescribedtoanoldassociatefromthe

lonelydaysofexile.Itwasakindofvindication,proofthatthesolitudeandtravail

ofthoseyearshadnotbeeninvain.



Therewasanotherinconclusivediscussionofpossibleemissaries,thistime

inHaldeman’spresence.NixonwasstillconcernedthattheChinesemightusethe

sametacticsasHanoiandbringpressureonusbyinvitingotherAmericanpolitical

figuresinoppositiontous(anapprehensionheneverconquered).Iquestioned

that;Peking’sstrategicrequirementsdidnotcoincidewithHanoi’s.Itwouldnot

wanttheopeningtoChinatoappearextorted;areluctantAdministrationwould

notsatisfyChina’sneedforinsuranceinanemergency.Washingtonwasbeing

broughtintoplayasacounterweighttoSovietpressures,andfromtheChinese

pointofviewitwasdesirablethatthisweightbeheavyandspontaneous.Nixon

neverthelessaskedmeto discourageanytemptationforPekingtodealwithhis

politicalopponents;itwaseasytoexpressmyacquiescence,muchmoredifficult

toknowwhattodoaboutit.



LaterinthemorningNixontoldmethathehaddecidedonmeasthe

emissary;Ishouldstartpreparationsatonce.Hismotivesweremixed,asisalways

thecasewithpoliticalleaders.Onlyromanticoutsidersbelievethatme nwho

haveprevailedinahardstruggleforpowermakedecisionsexclusivelyonthe

basisofanalyt icalideas.Nixon’soverridingmotivewasundoubtedlythatI

understoodourpolicybest,andthatbeingfamiliarwithmycomplicatedchiefI

wouldbeabletoarrangethesortofPekingvisitforhimwithwhichNixonwould

bemostcomfortable.Hecouldaskmewithoutembarrassmenttoraisethepublic

relationsrequirementsofhisinsistentlyeageradvancemen.Anotherfactorwas

undoubtedlythatofallthepotentialemissariesIwasthemostsubjecttohis

control.IwasontheWhiteHousestaff;Ihadnomeansofpublicizingmy

activitiesexceptthroughtheWhiteHousepressoffice;mysuccesswouldbea

Presidentialsuccess. Iwassubstantiallyunknowntothegeneralpublic;intwo

andahalfyearsinofficeIhadnevergivenanon‐the‐recordpressconference.



Atthatmoment,IcannotsaythatIwasvastlysurprised.Ifelt,rather,an

immensereliefthataftersolo ngapreoccupationwithitsdesignIwouldbeable

tobringtheenterprisetofruition.AsforNixon,whateverhiscomplex

motivations,heisowedthetributeforcourageinrevolutionizingourpostwar

foreignpolicyinspiteoftheprofoundshockthatheknewmanyofhistraditional

supporterswouldfeel.Assistedonlybyhissecurityadviser,withoutthealibi

providedbynormalprocessesofbureaucratic clearance,heauthorizedamission

that,haditfailed,wouldsurelyhaveproducedapoliticalcatastropheforhimand

aninternationalcatastropheforhiscountry.Thattheoddswereinourfavoris

irrelevanttothelonelinessofthechoicewhenitwasmade;thatNixonwasnot

normallyconfidingdoesnotchangethefactthatittookaresolutemantowalk

alongtheedgeofaprecipice withonlyasingleassociate.



<<Contents>>

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****



PlansandAberrations



avingbeenkeptwaitingforfourmonths,wedidnotwishtoreturnaformal

responseimmediately,lestweappeartooeager.Butthedecisionhadtobe

translatedrapidlyintooperationalterms,especiallysincebothNixonandIwere

goingonvacation,hetoSanClemente,ItoPalmSprings.

H



IcalledinAghaHilalyonApril28togivehimaninterimreply.Ourme ssages

totheChinesewerefirstdraftedbymebyhandafterdiscussionwiththe

President.Theythenwentgenerallythroughseveraladditionaldraftsto take

accountofcommentsbyAlHaigandWinstonLordandmyownsecondthoughts.

TheywerethentypedandshownagaintoNixon;myrecordsshowthathe

approvedthemwithoutchange.



OurinterimreplyexpressedourappreciationtoPresidentYahyaKhanfor

hisdelicacyandtact,andtha nkedChouEn‐laiforhiscommunication,whichwe

evaluatedaspositive,constructive,andforthcoming.Wewouldrespondinthe

samespirit.PekingcouldexpectaformalreplyduringtheweekofMay10.To

takeaccountofthePresident’sconcernthatChinamightapproachother

Americanpoliticalfigures,andtopreventChinesenervousness,whichmightlead

totheopeningofnewandcomplicatingchannels,Iaddedsomepersonal—and

thereforedisavowable—observations.IsuggestedthatYahyacommunicateto

ChouEn‐laiashisownviewtheimportanceofconfiningUS‐Chineseexchangesto

thischanneluntilanofficiallinkwassecurelyinplace.WehopedthattheChinese

wouldmakenootherinitiatives untilwehadreturnedaformalreplyand

designatedanemissary.Thiswaswithoutprejudicetotheintensificationof

people‐to‐peopleexchanges—students,reporters,scholars—whichwewould

greatlywelcome.Istressedthatthisshouldbecommunicatednotasanofficial

AmericanpositionbutasYahya’spersonalassessmentofourattitude.Ididnot

doubtthatChouEn‐laiwouldgetthepoint.OnMay5thePakistanisinformedus

thatallmessageshadbeenpassedtotheChineseonMay1—theverydaythat

disruptivedemonstrationssought toparalyzeWashingtoninorder,sothe

organizersclaimed,topersuadethegovernmentofthenecessityofworkingfor

peace.



ButbeforethemessagecouldreachPeking,ourcurioussystemof

governmentproducedanaberrationthatcomplicatedtheentireenterprise;

indeed,thatitdidnotdomoredamagewasatestimonytothedetermination

withwhichtheChineseleadershipwasseekingarapprochementwithus.The

StateDepartmentwas,ofcourse,unawareofthemessagesbeingpassed—

thoughitmightwellhavesensedthatsomethingwasafootfromthePing‐Pong

diplomacyandthemanystudymemorandaonChinapolicywithwhichwe

burdenedtheNSCsystem.TheoneaspectofChinapolicyunambiguouslyunder

itscontrolwastheissueofChineserepresentationintheUnitedNations.Andthis

topicwaspursuedwiththeintensityofinjuredprerogative.



TheDepartment,correctlycalculatingthatsupportintheUNforour

traditionalpositionwasebbing,waseagertoengineertheadmissionofthe

People’sRepublicofChinaintotheUnited Nationsinsomeformwithout

producingtheexpulsionofTaiwan.Itsoughttopleasetheliberalwingofthe

Congress,whichwastormentingusonVietnam,withoutantagonizingthe

conservatives,nottospeakofaPresidentwhohadderivedmuchearlysupport

fromthe“Chinalobby.”Itthereforecameupwithanumberofschemesthathad

thecommonfeatureofbeingopposedbybothTaiwanandthePeople’sRepublic;

theywerefavoredonlybyasmallgroupofjournalistsandmembersofCongress.

Onewas“universality”:thatbothportionsofalldividedcountriesshouldbe

admittedseparatelytotheUN.Thiswasclosetothetwo‐Chinasolutionalways

vehementlyrejectedbybothTaipeiandPeking;italsowouldhaveprovokedthe

oppositionatthattimeofSouthKoreaandWestGermany.Anotherschemewas

toadmitthePeople’sRepublicbymajorityvoteandgiveittheSecurityCouncil

seat,whileTaiwanremainedinsomeundefinedstatusintheGeneralAssembly

(underaproceduraldevicethatexpulsionrequiredatwo‐thirdsvote).This,too,

wasunacceptabletobothTaiwanandthePeople’sRepublic;itwasacceptable,

however,tomanydomesticcriticsofourChinapolicyanditmightgetusthrough

ayearortwoattheGeneralAssembly.Statehadbeenpressingformonthsfora

Presidentialdecision onwhatapproachtopursuebecauseitneededtimeto