Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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canvassforsupportforthepreferredoption.Ihadprocrastinated,withthe

President’sagreement,becauseIdidnotwantto jeopardizetheprecarious

beginningsofournewChinapolicywithanissuethatwouldbeprovocative

withoutbeingcapableofresolution, andwouldinanyeventbeovertakenbythe

evolutionofourrelationswithPeking.



ItwasareflectiononthetheologicalnatureofourChinadebatethatmany

expertsstillregardedthe“solution”oftheUNissue,liturg ically,astheabsolute

preconditionofanyimprovementinourrelationswithPeking—apointthathad

notbeenmadeinanyChinesecommunicationinanychannel; indeed,noChines e

communicationevenraisedtheUNissue.UnabletoobtainaPresidentialruling,

theStateDepartmentsimplyputforwarditstheoreticalpositionpubliclytogeta

legupinthebureaucraticdebate.OnApril28,theDepartmentspokesman

declaredasourpositionthatsovereigntyoverTaiwanandthePescadoreswas

“anunsettledquestionsubjecttofutureinternationalresolution,”something

bothpartiesoftheChinadisputerejectedsincebothconsideredtheterritoriesas

partofthesovereignstateofChina.Thepurposeofthestatementwastoenable

ustolaythelegalbasisforadmittingPekingtotheUNwhileretainingaseatin

theGeneralAssemblyforTaipei.Tocomplicatemattersfurther,onApril29

SecretaryRogers,inLondonforaSEATOministerialmeeting,appearedon

televisiontoproclaimthatMao’sinvitationtoNixon,asreportedinLifemagazine

byEdgarSnow,was“fairlycasuallymade”;hedidnotbelieveitwas“aserious

invitation.”HewentontosaythatChina’sforeignpolicywas“expansionist”in

manyways;China’spolicyhadbeen“ratherparanoiac”towardtherestofthe

world;andifoureffortstoimproverelationswiththeUSSRandChinastimulated

theirfeud,thatwasa“dividend”—though,headded,notourobjective.ANixon

triptoChina,Rogersadded,followingthelinehisEastAsianBureauhadbeen

pressingforallalong,mightbepossible“downtheroadapiece,”butonly

providedthatChinadecidedtojointheinternationalcommunityinsome

unspecifiedwayandcomplied“withtherulesofinternationallaw.”



ThatRogersdidnotknowofourexchangesexcusedthisconfusiontosome

extent;itdidnotdiminishtheimpactofhisremarks.NixonandIwere

thunderstruck.WewereconcernedthatPekingmightconstrueRogers’s

statementsasourreplytoitsmessageorconcludethatwethoughtChinawas

susceptibletopressuredespiteitswarningsmonthsearliernottotreatits

openingtowardusasasignofweakness—astatementrarelymadebycountries

thatinfactfeelthemselvesstrong.TheChinesewereclearlyworriedthatwe

mightescalateourdemands;inthatcase,wefeared,theymightrevertto

broodingisolationoranotherspellofbelligerentrhetoric,todemonstr atetheir

imperviousnesstopressure.Weneededtosendreassurancebutitseemed

unwisetooverloadthePakistanichannel,asidefromthefactthatitwasnoteasy

toformulateadisavowalofastatementoftheSecretaryofStatethatwouldnot

domoreharmthangood.Nixondidhisbesttorestoresomeperspectiveata

pressconferenceonApril29.Hemadeitclearthatnodecisionhadbeenmadeon

ourUNapproach;helistedthevariousproposalsbeforehim,rangingfromatwo‐

Chinasolutiontoasinglerepresentation.Thiswasthefarthesthecouldgo

withoutpubliclydissociatingfromhisSecretaryofState.Heincludeda

conciliatoryreferencetoapossiblevisittoChina,probablymoremeaningfulin

PekingthaninWashington:“Ihope,and,asamatteroffact,Iexpecttovisit

MainlandChinasometimeinsomecapacity—Idon’tknowwhatcapacity.”Itwas

askillfulperformance.



AChinesebroadcastofMay4definedthelimitsofChineseacquiescencein

ourbureaucraticshenanigans.TheStateDepartment’sassertionthatTaiwan’s

statuswas“anunsettledquestion”wasdenouncedas“brazeninterference”in

Chineseaffairsandanactof“hostilitytotheChinesepeople.”Pekingdeclared

emphaticallythat“thereisonlyoneChinaintheworld”andthat“Taiwanisan

inalienablepartofChina’ssacredterritory.”ItdescribedthevisitoftheAmerican

tabletennisteamtoChinaasa“newdevelopment”inthefriendshipbetweenthe

AmericanandChinesepeoples,butaddedthattheNixonAdministration’smoves

toimproveUS‐Chinarelationswere“fraudulent”andwereattemptsto“gain

politicalcapitalandextricateitselffromitsisolatedsituation.”Thebroadcastwas

awarningtousnottopresstoofar;itdidnotinfactinterruptourexchanges.



Fortherewereconstraints,too,onChina’sfreedomofaction.Wemightbe

pronetoofficialhiccups,butthedivisionsonChina’sborderswereSoviet. The

SovietshadmovednewmilitaryunitstotheMongolianborder,bringingthetotal

oftheseforcestoforty‐fourdivisions.TheChinesehadsubstantiallyincreased

theirowngroundforces.ThebordertalksbetweentheUSSRandChinawere

stalemated.Brezhnev,inameetingwiththeleadersofaWesternCo mmunist 

Party,hadexpressedconsiderableconcernovertheprogressinUS‐Chinese

relations.ASovietTVcommentatorhaddeclaredonApril25,withrespecttoUS‐

Chineserelations,that“pressurehasnoeffectontheSovietUnion,andsucha

policyisdoomedtofailure.”Countriesthatproclaimthattheyareunaffectedby

pressureareeitherbluffingorhavehadthegoodfortunenevertobeexposedto

it.



IwentaheadwithplanningmytriptoChina.Itookwithmeonmyvacation

inPalmSpringsa bagfulofbooksonChinesephilosophy,history,andart.Winston

Lordhadtheresponsibilityforpreparingthebriefingmaterials,adutymade

excruciatinglypainfulbythenecessitytokeepitsecretfromhisbeautiful,

charming,andintelligentChinese‐Americanwife,Betty,borninShanghai,whose

parents,originallyfromtheMainland,hadclosetieswithTaiwan.Winstonset

abouttoproducevoluminousnotebooksoneverysubjectthatcouldconceivably

comeup.



Tostartthetechnicalarrangements,IsentabackchannelmessageonMay

3toourAmbassadorinPakistan,JosephFarland: 



ForthemostsensitivereasonsknownonlytothePresidentandmyself,thePresident

wishesyoutofindsomepersonal...pretextforundertakinganimmediatetriptotheUnited

Statesinorderthatyoumaybeabletoconferwithme.Ourmeetingwillhavetobecompletely

covert,withitsnaturebeingdivulgedtonoonewiththeexceptionofthePresident,youand

myself…IrecognizethedifficultiesthatthismessagewillentailforyoubutIamsureyourealize

thattheimportancethePresidentattachestoourmeetingistheoverridingconsideration.The

subjectofourmeetingwillnotrequireanypreparationonyourpart.



ThepuzzledbutloyalFarlandflewtoLosAngelesonwhathedescribedto

hissuperiorsas“privatebusiness”;IbroughthimfromtheretoPalmSpringsina

friend’sprivateplane.OnMay7hemetwithmesecretlyattheprivatehome

whereIwasstaying.Wespentthreehourstogether;Farlandthenreturnedtothe

LosAngelesairport;therewasnorecordofFarland’shavingvisitedPalmSprings

atall.



WewerefortunatethatourAmbassadorinPakistanatthatmomentwasa

manoutsidetheregularForeignServiceEstablishment.Atraditionalistwould

neverhaverespondedwithoutreinsuringhimselfbya“personal”communication

tohisdepartmenta lchiefsinWashington.Farland,moreover,wasasmatter‐of‐

factlyableashewasconscientious. Hehandledthecomplicatedarrangementfor

mytripwithunfailingskillanddiscretion.OnMay7inPalmSprings,Ireviewed

withhimallthecommunicationswithPekingthathadcomethroughthePakistani

channel.Itoldhimthattechnicalarrangementsforthetripshouldbemade

throughhim,toavoidthepossibilityofmisunderstandinginherentinpassing

complexmaterialthroughtoomanyhands.AndFarlandcouldusehisEmbassy

stafftolookintothefeasibilityofsomeofthearrangements,solongashedidnot

tellthemwhattheirrealpurposewas.AtthatpointmyideawastomeetChinese

representativeseitherinPakistanorataconvenientairportinSouthernChina.I

toldFarlandthatIwouldalsokeephiminformedofallmessagesIsenttoYahya

throughHilaly.IwouldcountonhimtocontroltheEmbassypersonnelwhileIwas

inPakistan,andtobackupmy“cover”story.



FarlandrecommendedthatthemeetingbeheldinChina;itwouldbe

bettertobetapedbytheChinese,whowouldkeeparecordanyway,thanbythe

Pakistanis.ItoldFarlandthatIwouldsetupa Navyback‐channelviaournaval

attachéinKarachi;AdmiralElmoR.Zumwalt,Jr.,theChiefofNavalOperations,

hadsetupasimilarchannelformewithsatisfactoryresultsduringtheBerlin

negotiations.(LaterwefoundtheNavychanneltoocumbersome.WithHelms’s

cooperationweworkedoutaneffectivesystemthroughtheCIA.)



Backchannelsinthosedayswereacuriousphenomenon.Forevery

bureaucracytheyexcluded,theymadetheuserhostagetoanother—until

eventuallywewereabletosetupchannelsdirectlyfromtheWhiteHousethat

wentthroughnootheragency.Essentially,aback‐channelisacommunication

systemthatseekstocircumventnormalprocedures;itrequires,however,

somebody’sfacilities.UsuallytheexcludedpartywastheStateDepartment,

whichhadvictimizeditselfbytechno logyandhabit:bytechnologybecauseits

computersautomaticallydistributeeventhemostsensitivecablesthroughthe

buildingbypreestablishedcriteria;byhabitbecausediplomatsliveontrading

information andareinfinitelyingeniousingettingaroundformalrestrictions.This

iswhyeventheStateDepartmenthassetupitsownsystemofinternal

backchannelsandwhyalmosteverymodernPresidenthassoughttoevade

State’sformalcommunicationsmachinery.Helmsknewhowtolimittheflowof

cables;hehandledbackchannelsdiscreetlyandcompetently.



IoutlinedtoFarlandtheitinerarythatIplanned.IwouldleaveWashington

onan“information”triptakingmetoSaigon,Bangkok,New Delhi,Islamabad,and

Paris.AteachstopIwouldschedulemanyorientationmeetingsbutholdnopress

briefings.Iwouldcarrynonewsmenonmyplane.BythetimeIreached

IslamabadaweeklaterIhopedtohaveboredlocaljournaliststosuchapointand

havemadesolittlenewsthattherewouldbenogreatpressinterestleftin

coveringme.FarlandtoldmetherewasonlyoneAmericanstringerstationedin

Islamabad.



FarlandandIagreedthatthemosteffectiveplanwouldbetohaveme

arriveinPakistanonaFridaymorning.Farlandwouldscheduleafulldayof

activitiesbothwiththeEmbassyandwiththePakistanigovernment.IfPresident

Yahyaagreed,hemightinvitemetospendtheweekendinsomesuitableretreat,

saytheKhyberPassorsomehillstation.Iwouldleavemyplaneata conspicuous

locationattheairport.IwouldgotoChinainanAmerican,Pakistani,orChinese

planeprepositionedinPakistan;wewouldmakethefinaldecisionafterweknew

thevenueandhadlookedintothefeasibility.Iwouldconspicuouslyreappear

afteranabsenceofnomorethanthirty‐sixhoursandproceedWestwardtoParis.

Farlandthoughtallthismanageable;hepromisedtocontactYahyaimmediately

uponhisreturn.ItoldhimthatIwouldinformHilalyofFarland’srole.



MayandJuneprovidedopportunitiestomoveanotherstepforwardinour

economicrelationswithChinaandalsotosendencouragingsignals.OnMay7the

DepartmentsofState,Comme rce,Treasury,andTransportationpublished

regulationsimplementingtheWhiteHouseannouncementofApril14that

liberalizedeconomicrelationswithChina.TheTreasuryDepartmentremovedall

controlsontheuseofUSdollarsordollarinstruments(exceptthoseinblocked

accounts)intransactionswithPeking.Asaresult,Chinese‐Americanswerenow

permittedtosenddollarstorelativesontheMainland.American‐ownedships

underforeignflagswerealsopermittedtostopatMainlandChinaports.United

StatesflagvesselscouldhenceforthtransportgoodsdestinedfortheMainland

fromUStonon‐Chineseports,orfromonenon‐Communistporttoanother.



OnMay9Ireturnedto WashingtonfrommyPalmSpringsvacation,having

draftedareplytoChouEn‐lai’slastmessage.Nixonapproveditnextmorningand

atnoonIhandedittoHilaly,unsigned:



PresidentNixonhascarefullystudiedthemessageofApril21,1971,fromPremierChou

En‐LaiconveyedthroughthecourtesyofPresidentYahyaKhan.PresidentNixonagreesthat

directhigh‐levelnegotiationsarenecessarytoresolvetheissuesdividingtheUnitedStatesof

AmericaandthePeople’sRepublicofChina.Becauseoftheimportanceheattachesto

normalizingrelationsbetweenourtwocountries,PresidentNixonispreparedtoacceptthe

suggestionofPremierChouEn‐LaithathevisitPekingfordirectconversationswiththeleaders

ofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.Atsuchameetingeachsidewouldbefreetoraisetheissue

ofprincipalconcerntoit.



InordertopreparethevisitbyPresidentNixonandtoestablishreliablecontactwiththe

leadersoftheChinesePeople’sRepublic,PresidentNixonproposesapreliminarysecret

meetingbetweenhisAssistantforNationalSecurityAffairs,Dr.Kissinger,andPremierChouEn‐

Laioranotherappropriatehigh‐levelChineseofficial.Dr.Kissingerwouldbepreparedtoattend

suchameetingonChinesesoilpreferablyatsomelocationwithinconvenientflyingdistance

fromPakistantobesuggestedbythePeople’sRepublicofChina.Dr.Kissingerwouldbe

authorizedtodiscussthecircumstanceswhichwouldmakeavisitbyPresidentNixonmost

useful,theagendaofsuchameeting,thetimeofsuchavisitandtobeginapreliminary

exchangeofviewsonallsubjectsofmutualinterest.Ifitshouldbethoughtdesirablethata

specialemissarycometoPekingpubliclybetweenthesecretvisittothePeople’sRepublicof

ChinaofDr.KissingerandthearrivalofPresidentNixon,Dr.Kissingerwillbeauthorizedto

arrangeit.ItisanticipatedthatthevisitofPresidentNixontoPekingcouldbeannounced

withinashorttimeofthesecretmeetingbetweenDr.KissingerandPremierChouEn‐lai.Dr.

KissingerwillbepreparedtocomefromJune15onward.



ItisproposedthattheprecisedetailsofDr.Kissinger’stripincludinglocation,duration

ofstay,communicationandsimilarmattersbediscussedthroughthegoodofficesofPresident

YahyaKhan.Forsecrecy,itisessentialthatnootherchannelbeused.Itisalsounderstoodthat

thisfirstmeetingbetweenDr.KissingerandhighofficialsofthePeople’sRepublicofChinabe

strictlysecret[emphasisinoriginal].



WelearnedlaterthattheChinesewereextremelysuspiciousofourdesire

forsecrecy;perhapstheysawitasadevicetoallowustoreversecoursequickly.

Chinesewarinesswascompoundedbydoubtsofourabilitytomaintain

confidences.[

EdgarSnowlaterwrote:“OnlyonethingmayhavesurprisedtheChinese:Mr.

Kissinger’ssuccessinkeepinghisvisitsecret.ExperiencewithAmericandiplomatsduringWorld

WarIIhadconvincedChineseleadersthatAmericanscouldnotkeepsecrets.”

]Itisdifficult

torecapturenowthesenseofmutualignoranceoftheUnitedStatesandChinain

thosedays.ExceptfortheformalisticpresentationsattheWarsawtalks,wehad

hadnocontactofanysortwiththeChineseleadership.Themessagescitedinthis

volumewerequiteliterallyoursolecommunication.SinceChineseleadersdonot

believeinidlechatter,mostoftheWesterndiplomatsinPekingwouldgofor

monthswithoutseeinganyimportantChineseofficial;fewofthemever

encounteredaseniorChineseleaderexceptonpurelyceremonialoccasions.Thus

welackedeventhetidbitsthatareoccasionallyexchangedbetweenfriendly

governments;wehadnoideawhatwewouldfindinPeking.



Inaddition,weknewthatifanannouncementweremadebeforeavisitwe

wouldbecaughtbetweenthosewhowantedacatalogueofconcessionsand

otherswhowantedguaranteesofourintransigence.Foreigncountrieswouldask

forbriefingsandreassurancesaboutameetingwhoseagendaconsistedof

nothingotherthanpermittingeachsidetoraisetheissuesofimportancetoit.All

thiswouldbecomepublicandberecitedbacktoacapitalwith whichwewere

abletocommunicateonlyviathirdparties.Somecountriesmighthaveattempted

topreemptourvisit;otherstothwartit.Thetendershootsopainstak ingly

nurturedformorethantwoyearsmightwellhavebeenkilled.IntimetheChinese

cametounderstandourreasons;Ihavenodoubtnowthatthesecrecyofthefirst

tripturnedintoaguaranteeofasolidandwell‐managedimprovementof

relations.



Themostsignificantpartofthenotewasourformalacceptanceofthe

invitationtothePresidenttovisitPeking.Westressedsecrecybutsoughttoallay

Chineseconcernsbyagreeingthatthetripcouldbeannouncedimmediately

afterwardandthatasecond,publicvisitbyanemissarycouldbearrangedpriorto

theNixonvisit.WestressedthatwecouldnotagreetotalkonlyaboutTaiwan;

eachsidewouldbefreeto“raisetheissueofprincipalconcerntoit.”This

messagewasreceivedinPekingonMay17.



OnMay20,aftermonthsofhaggling,theUnitedStatesandtheSoviet

UnionannouncedaproceduralbreakthroughintheSALTnegotiations.

Heretofore,theSovietshadinsistedthatSALTdealonlywithlimitingABM;now

MoscowandWashingtonagreedtodealsimultaneouslywithoffensiveand

defensivelimitationsaswedesired.Nixonhadworriedthatthismightdisturbthe

Chinese.Iwaslessconcerned—thedemonstrationofoptionsisalmostalwaysan

asset—butthoughtitanoccasiontodemonstratetoPekingtheadvantageofthe

Americanconnection;wecouldassuretheChinesedirectlythattheSALT

announcementdidnotimplyaUS‐Sovietcondominium.WiththePresident’s

approvalIsentanadvancecopyoftheofficialannouncementtoFarlandtogive

toYahyafortheChinese.Anaccompanyingmessageassuredthemthatwewould

“concludenoagreementwhichwouldbedirectedagainstthePeople’sRepublic

ofChina,”andthatIwouldbepreparedtodiscuss“thisissueandrelated

questions”onmyforthcomingsecrettrip.



WhilewewerewaitingforPeking’sreply,wefoundthatwewerenotthe

onlyoneswithanaberrantbureaucracy.OnMay26anoldcolleaguefrom

HarvardcalleduptosayexcitedlythathehadbeeninOttawathedaybeforeand

thatmembersofthenewlyestablishedChinesemissiontherehadcomplained

thatPresidentNixonhadbeeninvitedtovisitChinabutwouldnotcome.Itwasan

oddsignal—halfonthemark;aChineseofficialcognizantofthefullstorywould

haveknownthattheUnitedStateshadrespondedfavorablytotheinvitation.It

wasalsoawarning—whetheritwassointendedornot—ofwhattheChinese

coulddotouspubliclyiftheinitiativefaltered. Wewouldsoonfindourselveson

thepublicdefensiveforhavingfailedtoseizetheopportunityofimprovingSino‐

USrelations.IdecidedtomakelightofthepossibilityofaPresidentialvisitandto

occupytheprofessor’senergiesbysuggestingthathemighttrytoarrangea

meetingformewiththenewChineseAmbassadorinCanadawhenhearrived.



OnMay31wereceivedanexcitedbutcrypticmessagefromHilary:Along

messagefromPekingwasonitswaybycourierfromPakistan;Hilalyhadbeen

givenonlyellipticalhintsofitscontents.Apparentlyitwasencouraging;Hilalywas

prettysurethattheChineseacceptedtheessenceofourproposal. Wespentan

impatienttwodaysawaitingthePakistanimessenger.TheStateDepartment,

unawareofourdesignandunderstandablyanxioustobegincanvassingforthe

UNvoteonChineserepresentation,chosethatmomenttopressforaPresidential

decisiononamodifiedversionofitstwo‐Chinaformula.Theproposedvehicle

wasaspeechbytheSecretaryofStatetowardtheendofJune.Noworsetiming

couldhavebeenimagined,anditillustratedthepitfallsofourtwo‐channelstyle

ofgovernment.ButNixonwasnotabouttoconfronthisSecretaryinasetting

wherehewouldhavetogiveexplanations.Hethereforesimplyannouncedata

pressconferenceonJune1thathewouldnotmakeadecisionontheChinese

representationissuebeforeJuly15.Thedatewasnotchosenaccidentally.Finally

themessengerfromIslamabadarrived.HilalyhurriedintoseemewithChouEn‐

lai’sreplyat8:10p.m.onJune2:



PremierChouEnLaihasseriouslystudiedPresidentNixon’smessagesofApril29,May

17thandMay22nd1971,andhasreportedwithmuchpleasuretoChairmanMaoTseTungthat

PresidentNixonispreparedtoaccepthissuggestiontovisitPekingfordirectconversations

withtheleadersofthePeoplesRepublicofChina.ChairmanMaoTseTunghasindicatedthat

hewelcomesPresidentNixon’svisitandlooksforwardtothatoccasionwhenhemayhave

directconversationswithHisExcellencythePresident,inwhicheachsidewouldbefreetoraise

theprincipalissueofconcerntoit.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthefirstquestiontobesettledis

thecrucialissuebetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateswhichisthequestionoftheconcrete

wayofthewithdrawalofalltheU.S.ArmedForcesfromTaiwanandTaiwanStraitsarea.



PremierChouEnLaiwelcomesDr.KissingertoChinaastheU.S.representativewhowill

comeinadvanceforapreliminarysecretmeetingwithhighlevelChineseofficialstoprepare

andmakenecessaryarrangementsforPresidentNixon’svisittoPeking.



PremierChouEnLaisuggeststhatitwouldbepreferableforDr.Kissingertosetadate

betweenJune15and20thforhisarrivalinChina,andthathemayflydirectfromIslamabadto

aChineseairportnotopentothepublic.Asfortheflight,hemaytakeaPakistanBoeingaircraft

oraChinesespecialplanecanbesenttoflyhimtoandfromChina,ifneeded…PremierChou

EnLaiwarmlylooksforwardtothemeetingwithDr.KissingerinChinainthenearfuture.



ItwouldbedifficulttoexaggeratethereliefIfelt.Chouhadacceptedour

proposalthateachsideshouldbefreetoraisetheissuesofmostconcerntoit;

thisguaranteedadiscussionofglobalissuesthatinterestedusmost.Chouhad

againframedtheTaiwanprobleminamannermostsusceptibletosolution:the

withdrawalofUSforces.TheChineseleaderscouldnothave gonesofarwere

theynotwilling,eveneager,forafundamentalreappraisaloftheSino‐American

relationship.



IwalkedfrommyofficeintheWestWingovertothemansiontoinform

thePresident.NixonwashostingadinnerforPresidentAnastasioSomozaof

Nicaragua.ItoldthemilitaryaidestandingoutsidetheStateDiningRoomthatit

wasimperativeforthePresidenttoseemeforafewminutesassoonashecould.

Ipacedthehallforseveralminutes,waiting.Around9:30thePresidentcameout.

Itoldhimaboutthemessage;buoyantlyhetookmetotheLincolnSittingRoom,

foundsomebrandyandtwoglasses,andproposedatoastto whathadbeenand

whatremainedyettobedone.Nixo nremembersthetoast:“Henry,weare

drinkingatoastnottoourselvespersonallyortooursuccess,ortoour

administration’spolicieswhichhavemadethismessageandmadetonight

possible.Letusdrink togenerationstocomewhomayhaveabet terchanceto

liveinpeacebecauseofwhatwehavedone.”

Myrecollectionisnotsoprecise;

itwasprobablyfartooearlytomakesuchexaltedclaims.Butthequotation

reflectsaccuratelytheemotionandtherekindledhopethatoutofthebitterness

anddivisionofafrustratingwarwecouldemergewithanewnationalconfidence

inourcountry’sfuture.



IhandedourreplytoPeking—composedbyWinstonLordandmeafter

manydrafts—toHilalytwodayslaterintheafternoonofJune4.InitPresident

Nixonexpressedappreciationforthewarmwelcomeextendedtomyvisit.

“Becauseoftheshortnessoftimeavailableandtheneedtoarrangeasuitable

pretextforhistravel,Dr.KissingernowfindsitimpossibletoleaveWashington

beforethefirstweekofJuly.Accordingly,PresidentNixonproposesthatDr.

KissingerarriveinChinaonJuly9andleaveonJuly11,flyinginaPakistaniBoeing

aircraftfromIslamabadtoPeking.”(Thisschedulewaskept.)Ourmessage

appreciatedChinesewillingnesstoobservesecrecyandrepeatedthatIwouldbe

empoweredtosettleonacommuniquétobeissuedshortlyafterward“ifthisis

mutuallydesired.”WechosetheweekendofJuly9becauseRogersplannedto be

inLondonlaterinJulyandwecouldnotmakeanannouncementofaPresidential

triptoPekingwhiletheSecretaryofStatewastraveling.



OnJune11ChouEn‐laiacceptedtheJuly9dateinabriefnote;welearned

onlylaterthatthiswasatsomeconsiderableinconvenienceandembarrassment,

becauseavisitbyNorthKoreanPremierKimIl‐sungwasscheduledforthesame

days.YahyaKhan,whohadlittletobecheerfulaboutamidhistravailsinEast

Pakistan,wascarriedawaybythespiritofthemission.Hilalybroughta

handwrittennotefromYahyaonJune19:“TheabovemessagefromPeking

seemstoclinchtheissuefinally.Pleaseassureourfriendthatabsolutelyfoolproof

arrangementswillbemadebyusandheneedhavenoanxietyonthiscount.”



Wewerenowcommitted;allthatremainedwastheact.Thefirstproblem

wastoconvincetheSecretaryofStateoftheneedformetotakealengthy

“informationtrip”throughAsia—thefirstforeigntripIwouldtakeonmyownas

securityadviser.Hewasunderstandablyreluctant.Itwaspainfulenoughtosee

meandtheNSCstaffdominatethepolicyprocessinWashington;itwasharder

stilltoacceptthepropositionthatImightbeginto intrudeontheconductof

foreignpolicyoverseas.Theobjectionwas,infact,welltaken.TheState

Departmentshouldbethevisiblefocusofourforeignpolicy;ifthePresidenthas

noconfidenceinhisSecretaryofStateheshouldreplacehim,notsubstitutethe

securityadviserforhim.IfhedoesnottrusttheStateDepartment,thePresident

shouldenforcecompliancewithhisdirectives,notcircumventitwiththeNSC

machinery.Yet,whilethesepostulatesarebeyondargumentasamatterof

theory,theyarenoteasytocarryout.Toachievetheessentialcoherenceof

policythereisneedforastrongSecretaryofStatewhoisatthesametimequite