Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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Theoutcomeofmytripwasnotforeseeable;wedidnotwanttorisk

inflatingexpectations,generatingpressures,andforcingthetwosidestotake

publicpositionsbeforetheresultswereknown.Theshockeffectofthereversalof

positionswouldhavebeeninevitablenomatterhowthetriphadbeenhandled

(witnessthePing‐Pongexperience).Inanyevent,thereportargued,no

substantivenegotiationswiththeChinesewouldtakeplaceuntilNixon’strip,

beforewhichwewouldhavemonthstoconsultwithourallies—apromise

faithfullycarriedout.



MycolleagueBillSatirefoundaprecedentforourposition:



July19,1971.



MEMORANDUMFOR: HENRYKISSINGER

FROM:   BILLSAFIRE



Hereisaquotationaboutsecrecythatyoumayfindoccasiontouse:



“Themostdangerousofallmoraldilemmas:Whenweareobligedtoconcealtruthin

ordertohelpthetruthtobevictorious.”



‐DagHammarskjold



<<Contents>>



****



“TheChinaCard”



T

riangulardiplomacy,inwhichwewerenowengagedinpublicview,wasnot,

understandably,appreciatedatoncebyeveryone.Itcouldnotbeacrude

attempttoplayoffChinaagainsttheSovietUnion.“The Chinacard”wasnotours

toplay.Sino‐Soviethostilityhadfolloweditsowndynamic.Wehadnotgenerated

it;wewere,infact,unawareofitsintensityfo rthebetterpartofadecade.

NeitherPekingnorMoscowwasquarrelingwiththeothertocurryfavorwithus;

theywerecurryingfavorwithusbecausetheywerequarreling.Wecouldnot

“exploit”thatrivalry; itexploiteditself.Totheextentthatwetriedtoaggravate

rivalrywewouldloseinotherways.Paradoxically,wemightevendisquietPeking

bydoingso:TospeakofaChinacardimpliedthatforapricewemightnotplayit.

TheChineseoftenexpressedthefearthathavingachievedourobjectivewith

MoscowwemightfindPekingexpendable;Maowarnedusagainst“standingon

China’sshoulderstoreachMoscow.”AnyattempttomanipulatePekingmight

driveChinaintodetachingitselffromus,perhapstoreexamineitsoptions with

theSovietUnion,togaincontrolofitsowndestiny.Equally,anymovebyusto

playtheChinesecardmighttempttheSovietstoendtheirnightmareofhostile

powersontwofrontsbystrikingoutinonedirectionbeforeitwastoolate,

probablyagainstChina,whichwasweakerandnotprotectedbyanAmerican

alliancesystem.



Equilibriumwasthenameofthegame.WedidnotseektojoinChinaina

provocativeconfrontationwiththeSovietUnion.Butweagreedonthenecessity

tocurbMoscow’sgeopoliticalambitions.ThesendingofcombattroopstoEgypt,

thecircumstancesthatledtotheSyrianinvasionofJordan,thebuildingofanaval

baseatCienfuegos,andtheclashesalongtheSino‐Sovietborderwerepartofa

uniformchallengetotheglobalequilibriumthathadtoberesisted.Moreover,

bothChinaandtheUnitedStateswantedtobroadentheirdiplomaticoptions:

Peking,toescapetheself‐imposedisolationoftheCulturalRevolution;

Washington,tostrengthensecurityinaninternationalsystemlessdependentfor

stabilityonpermanentAmericanintervention.



ButwhileChinaandtheUnitedStateswerebroughttogetherbyacommon

concern,theydidnotautomaticallyagree onhowtodealwithit;thereinlaythe

seedoffuturedifficulties.PekingconfrontedMoscowwiththesamededicated,

uncompromisingzealwithwhichithadearlierprevailedinitsowncivilwar.

Peking’schallengewaspolemicandphilosophical;itopposednotonlyMoscow’s

geopoliticalaspirationsbutalsoitsideologicalpreeminence.Weagreedonthe

necessityofthwartingthegeopoliticalambitions,butwehadnoreasonto

becomeinvolvedintheideologicaldispute.Also,thepossessionofvastarsenals

ofweaponsofmassdestructionimposedonusafiduciaryresponsibilityfor

hundredsofmillionsoflives.Wehadamoralandapoliticalobligationtostrive

forcoexistenceifitwaspossible;wewouldnotshrinkfromconfrontationif

challengedbutthethermonuclearageevokestheimperativeofmutualrestraint.

Critics—someinPeking—mightsneeratthisquestandproclaimitsfutility;but,

paradoxically,onlybypursuing itwouldwebeabletorallyourpeoplewhenwe

neededtofaceuptomilitarypressures.



FromthebeginningNixonandIwereconvinced—aloneamongsenior

policymakers—thattheUnitedStatescouldnotacceptaSovietmilitaryassaulton

China.Wehadheldthisviewbeforetherewascontactofanysort;weimposed

contingencyplanningonareluctantbureaucracyasearlyasthesummerof1969.

Obviously,thisreflectednoagreementbetweenPekingandWashington—not

eventheWarsawtalksweretakingplaceatthattime.Itwasbasedonasober

geopoliticalassessment.IfMoscowsucceededinhumiliatingPekingandreducing

ittoimpotence,thewholeweightoftheSovietmilitaryeffortcouldbethrown

againsttheWest.SuchademonstrationofSovietruthlessnessandAmerican

impotence(orindifference—theresultwouldbethesame)wouldencourage

accommodationtootherSovietdemandsfromJapantoWesternEurope,notto

speakofthemanysmallercountriesontheSovietperiphery.Clearly,triangular

diplomacyrequiredagility.Wehadsomehownottoflexourownmusclesbut,as

injudo,tousetheweightofanadversarytopropelhiminadesireddirection.If

successfulwewouldhavealargerseriesofoptionstowardeithersidethanthey

hadtowardeachother;therewasalwaystheriskalsoofantagonizingbothsides.

Isummedupthisstrategyinamemorandumto Nixon(inOctober,beforea

secondtriptoChina):



WewantourChinapolicytoshowMoscowthatitcannotspeakforallcommunist

countries,thatitistotheiradvantagetomakeagreementswithus,thattheymusttake

accountofpossibleUS‐PRC[China]cooperation—allthiswithoutoverdoingtheSoviet

paranoia.ThebeneficialimpactontheUSSRisperhapsthesinglebiggestplusthatwegetfrom

theChinainitiative.



Wehavealreadyachievedthis.ThereisnothingtheChineseneeddo.Ourinterestshere

arecongruentandweneedonlytocontinueonthepathwehavesetoutupon.Pressureonthe

Russiansissomethingweobviouslyneverexplicitlypointto.Thefactsspeakforthemselves.



Atthesametimetherewasanaturalcongruenceofinterestsonsome

mattersbetweenusandChina.Contrarytoacademicandotherexpertopinion,

ChinahadnotchangeditspolicytowardussomarkedlymerelytoregainTaiwan,

inspiteofitsmanyprominentmentions.Itwantedtotakeitsplacein

internationalaffairsanddemonstratetotheworlditsprestigeandimportance.

ThiswouldprovidesomesecurityagainstSovietpressuresandreducethedanger

ofaUS‐Sovietcondominium.IwrotetoNixon:



TheChinesewanttorelievethemselvesofthethreatofatwo‐frontwar,introducenew

calculationsinMoscowaboutattackingorleaningonthePRC,andperhapsmaketheUSSR

morepliableinitsdealingwithPeking.SpecificallyfromustheywantassurancesagainstUS‐

USSRcollusion.



Thesewewereabletogive.Theywereinherentinourinitiativeandinour

owninterest.Wewereonatightrope;wehadtobecarefulnevertoleantoone

sideortheother—regardlessofbuffeting—orwemightdropintotheabyss.



FrommyfirstvisitItoldChouthatwewouldcontinuetodealwith

Moscow,butwewouldinformPekingindetailofanyunderstandingaffecting

ChineseintereststhatwemightconsiderwiththeSoviets,andwewouldtake

Chineseviewsintoaccount.Theseassurances wereconfirmedbyNixonina

messagetoChouEn‐laionJuly16;wealsoenclosedthetextofabackground

briefingonmyPekingtripthatIgavereportersonJuly16—a courtesyintendedto

establishourcareinfosteringthenewrelationship.



ThismessagewasthefirstcontactinthenewParischannelagreedtoin

Peking,andwasdeliveredonJuly19byGeneralWalterstoChineseAmbassador

HuangChen.ThemessagesintheParischannelweredraftedbymystaffandme,

approvedbyNixon,carriedbyhandtoParisbyamemberoftheSituationRoom

staffanddeliveredbytheirrepressibleWalters—whopromptlygaveusan

incentiveforadditionalmessagesbysendingbackgraphicaccountsofhis

meetingswiththehospitableChinese.Waltersexceededevenhisownhigh

standardsofhyperbole indetailingatmosphere,setting,personalities,and

cuisine.Amanofprecisetastes,Waltersregaleduswithtalesofexoticdelicacies,

someofwhichhesaidheateonlyoutofasenseofpatrioticduty.HeandHuang

Chen,bothmilitarymen,soonwereswapping warstorieswithenthusiasm 

undampenedbythefactthatinsomecasestheyhadbeeninthesamewaron

oppositesides.



WehadmanyoccasionstousetheParischannel,becauseweweresoon

delugedwithcommunicationsfromMoscow.ContrarytothefearsoftheSoviet

experts,Moscowdidnotreactwithhostility—at leastinitially.MoscowRadioin

itsdomesticservicebrokethenewstoRussianlisteners,closelyfollowingthetext

ofthecommuniquébutomittingthesentence“PresidentNixonhasacceptedthe

invitationwithpleasure.”ThefirstauthoritativeSovietcommentcameninedays

later.WithstudiednonchalancePravdadeclaredonJuly24:“Nobodyhereinthe

SovietUnionseesintheChinese‐Americancontactsanycauseforsensation,”and

wenton:



Ofcourse,thefurtherdevelopmentofeventswillbetterrevealthetrueintentionsof

PekingandWashington.Ourpartyandstatewilltakeintoaccountallthepossible

consequencesoftheChinese‐Americancontacts.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatanydesignstouse

thecontactsbetweenPekingandWashingtonforsome“pressure”ontheSovietUnion,onthe

statesoftheSocialistcommunity,arenothingbuttheresultofalossoftouchwithreality.



Ofcourse,justaspressureisnotachievedbyproclaimingit,soitisnot

endedbydenyingit.



TheauthenticSovietrespo nsewasdiplomatic,notpropagandistic.The

SovietUnionbegantomoveenergeticallyontwofrontstodealwiththenew

internationalreality.Firstitsoughtrapidlytoimproveitsrelationswith

Washington:Itwassuddenlyanxioustocreatetheimpression thatmoreserious

businesscouldbeaccomplishedinMoscowthaninPeking.



OnJuly19DobryninsomewhatplaintivelyinquiredwhethertheSovietnote

ofJuly5,evadingasummit,hadaffectedourChinapolicy.Iavoidedananswer;

thetruth,asIhavenoted,wasthatithadeasedourroadtoPeking;wewould

havetraveleditanywaybutwithmoredetours.Suddenly,theMoscowsummit

wasnotelusive.WouldthePresident,inquiredDobrynin,considervisiting

MoscowbeforePeking?MyanswerwasidenticaltothatgivenChouEn‐lai:The

summitswouldtakeplaceintheorderinwhichtheywereannounced.Other

negotiationsdeadlockedformonthsbeganmagicallytounfreeze:Berlin,for

example,andthetalkstoguardagainstaccidenta lnuclearwar.AsIshalldescribe

elsewhere,boththesenegotiationsmovedrapidlytocompletionwithinweeksof

thePekingannouncement.



Buttherewasalsoanominoussideto Sovietpolicy.InthegrowingIndia‐

PakistanconflicttheSovietUniondiscoveredanopport unitytohumiliateChina

andtopunishPakistanforhavingservedasintermediary.Tensionsinthe

subcontinenthadmultipliedafterPakistan’smilitarygovernmentsoughtto

repressEastPakistan’sattempttosecede.IndiaandtheSovietUnionwere

broughtintoanaturaldefactoalliance.Foritspart,Indiahadinitiallywelcomed

Nixon’sJuly15announcementwithagenerousstatementbyForeignMinister

SwaranSinghthatitwasa“significant,positivedevelopment.”ButbyJuly20,

Indiabegantodisplaysecondthoughts;itstartedtoinvokefictitiousSino‐

Americandesignsonthesubcontinentasapretextforitsownarrangementswith

theSovietUnion.AnsweringquestionsinParliament,SwaranSinghsaid:“We

cannotlookuponit[aSino‐USrapproche ment]withequanimityifitmeans

dominationofthetwocountriesoverthisregion…Wecannotatpresenttotally

ruleoutsuchapossibility…[and]forsometimewehavebeenconsideringways

andmeansofpreventingsucha situationfromarising.”Inareferencetothe

SovietUnion,Singhcontinued:“Inthiswearenotalone.Thereareother

countriesbothbigandsmallwhomaybemoreperturbedthanweare.”



WhatSinghhadinmindbecamepubliconAugust9whenIndiaandthe

SovietUnionsignedaFriendshipTreaty,whichforallpracticalpurposesgave

IndiaaSovietguaranteeagainstChineseinterventionifIndiawenttowarwith

Pakistan.BythisactiontheSovietUniondeliberatelyopenedthedoortowaron

thesubcontinent;itwasthefirstofaseriesofmovesthroughouttheSeventies

wherebytheSovietsfueledconflictsbygivingarmsandassurancestocountries

withhighincentivetoresorttoforce.I agreedwithHalSonnenfeldt’sandBill

Hyland’sperceptiveanalysis:



Theescalatoryaspectsofthisareobvious:iftheChinesecomeunderpressurefrom

PakistantocountertheSovietmove,whatwilltheydo?IftheydonothingtheSovietshave

madeanimportantgain—certainlyoneoftheirobjectivesistoexposetheChineseasweak

allies.If,ontheotherhand,theChineseraisetheante,thentheSovietsmustalsorespondto

maintaintheircredibility,acredibilitywhichwouldhavetobebackedwithatleastmore

sophisticatedSovietweaponry,etc…



Thus,theIndia‐PakistanconflictbecomesasortofSino‐Sovietclashbyproxy.



SonnenfeldtandHylandalsopredictedthattheSovietsmightseekto

humiliateRomania,whichhadbeenafriendofChina.Infact,theSovietsbeganto

wageawarofnervesagainstthatcountryinlatesummer.Weprotested

vigorouslyandmayhavehelpedbringanendtotheharassment.



TheonlywaytoprotectthetendershootofourChinapolicyfrombeing

crushedbythiscombinationofSovietembraceandmenacewastomakesure

Pekingunderstoodouractions.Weaccordinglyincreasedourcontactswiththe

ChinesethroughParis.BetweenAugust1andtheendofSeptemberwe

exchangedmoremessagesthanwehadintheprevioustwentyyears.Iusedmy

visitstoParisforsecretnegotiationswithLeDucThoto meet,alsosecretly,three

timeswithAmbassadorHuangChen.Anable,affableveteranoftheLongMarch,

HuangChenlaterbecamethefirstChiefoftheChineseLiaisonOfficein

Washington.ItookgreatpainstokeeptheChineseinformedofallourmoves

withMoscowandofourassessmentofSovietintentions.WekeptPekingposted

aboutthesuddenSovieteagernessforasummit;wegavethemafour‐week

advancewarningofthecontentsofboththeaccidental‐warandtheBerlin

agreements.Bothsidesexchangedviewsonthedeterioratingsituationonthe

Indiansubcontinent.KnowingofChina’sunwillingnesstojoinaconferenceofthe

fivenuclearpowers,werejectedBrezhnev’sproposalforsuchaconferenceon

thegroundthatitwouldmakesenseonlyifallpartiesattended.



Peking,ofcourse,wasofferednovetooverourpolicyorouractions;nor

wasonesought.OurobjectivewastoensurethattheChineseleadersunderstood

whatwedidandwhy,andhowwesaw theinternationalsituation.TheChinese

leadersaffectedunconcernabouttheinformationtheyweregiven,acorrect

posturetowarddevelopment stheycouldnotalter.ThoughnodoubtPeking

wouldhavepreferredustotakeanopenlyantagonisticstancetowardMoscow,it

learnedthatourapproachtoforeignpolicywasunsentimentalandgeopolitical.

Wewerenotpreparedtopayforcoexistenceinthecoinofthebalanceofpower.

Wewerereadyfordétente—inthefaceofdomesticorforeignopposition—but

onlyiftheSovietsgaveupmilitarypressureandexercisedpoliticalrestraint.



TwoothersubjectsoccupiedthenewchannelthroughParis— one explicit,

theotherunspoken.Thesubjectofformalexchangeswasasecondtripbymeto 

ChinatopreparethePekingsummit.Itwassoonoversha dowedbyasubject

whichwasneverdiscussed,butofwhichwewereextremelyconscious:the

overthrowofLinPiaoinChina.Theupheavalwasinalllikelihoodinducedbythe

sharpnewturninChina’spolicytowardus;soMaotoldNixon inFebruary1972.It

clearlyreflecteddeep‐seatedstrainsinChinesepolitics.Butweneverraisedthe

subject.AsecondjourneytoChinabymehadbeendiscusse dinourexchanges

evenbeforemyJulyvisit.InJuly,ChouEn‐laiwaseagerforthis,perhapsto

removeanypossiblestigmaattachedto thesecrecyofthefirstvisit,perhaps

becausehewasexperiencedenoughtounderstandthataPresidentialtripwas

tooriskyunlessthemajorissueshadbeensettledinadvance.



Nixonwasstilleagertomakethenextvisithimself,butneedsoon

overcamevanity.Nixonneverleftsummitmeetingstochance;allhisweresettled

intheirmainpartsbeforehearrived.Hewouldnotparticipateinone—untilhis

desperatelastmonths—withouthavinga reasonableideaofitsoutcome.Itisthe

onlyresponsiblecourseforaPresident.Headsofgovernmenthavetoomuchat

staketobeprincipalnegotiators.Theyusuallyaretoobusytomasterallthe

manifolddetailsonwhichsuccessfulnegotiationsdepend.Theyaretooself‐

centeredtosubmitgracefullytotheinevitablepressuresofaprotracted

negotiation.Ifthereisadeadlock,thereisnorecourse.Summitsare,moreover,

toobrieftopermitthemeticulousanalysisthatassuresthedurabilityofan

agreement.Nixonunderstoodthisandapprovedpreparationsformysecondvisit.



ExchangeswithPekingleadingtomysecondvisitwerenotwithouttheir

testymoments.Foronething,eveninthemillenniaoftheirhistorytheChinese

hadneverencounteredaPresidentialadvanceparty,especiallyonewhoseskills

hadbeenhonedbythehectictripsofacandidateintheheartlandofAmericaand

disciplinedbythemonomaniacalobsessionoftheNixonWhiteHousewithpublic

relations.WhenIwarnedChouEn‐laithatChinahadsurvive dbarbarianinvasions

beforebuthadneverencounteredadvancemen,itwasonlypartlyajoke.One

messagehadtobedevotedtoexplainingjustwhatanadvancepartydidandwhy

itssizeneededtobealmostequaltowhatinmynaïvetéIhadtoldChouEn‐lai

wouldbethewholePresidentialcontingent.Also,wehadneverflownan

AmericanplaneintoChina;thisinvolvedbothpoliticalandtechnical

complications.Finally,theChineserejectedmysuggestionthatIbeaccompanied

byDavidBruce,despiteChou’shavingagreedtothisinJuly.Pekingnowpleaded

“understandablereasons,”whichwasfairenoughconsideringHanoi’sirritation

andMoscowRadio’sincessantaccusationsthatPekinghadmadeadealon

Indochina.



Alltheseexchangesweretakingplaceagainstthebackgroundofominousif

mystifyingreportsoutofPeking.InSeptemberwesuddenlybecameawarethat

allofChina’sleadershaddisappearedfrompublicviewforfivedays;allChinese

planeshadbeengroundedforthesametime.Asthemonthworeon,itbecame

clearthatseveralkeyleadershadbeenremovedfromoffice,includingmuchof

thetopleadershipofthearmedforces.Foremostamongthesuddenlymissing

wasLinPiao:MinisterofDefense,VicePremieroftheStateCouncil,Vice

ChairmanoftheCommunistPartyPolitburo,ChairmanofthePolitburoMilitary

AffairsCommittee;anddesignatedbytheNinthPartyCongressinApril1969as

theheirandsuccessortoChairmanMaoTse‐tung.OnSeptember12aChinese

militaryplanecrashedmysteriouslyinMongolia.OnSeptember20theannual

paradetocelebratetheChineseRevolutiononOctober1wascanceled.Clearly,

somethingmassivewastakingplaceinChina.



Wehadnofirsthandinformation.TheChinesecommunicationstouson

othersubjectscontinued;theywereunfailinglycrisp.Therewasnointerruptionin

planningmytripnortheslightesthint—except inourpress—thatthePresident’s

visitwasinanyjeopardy.TherewasanoccasionaltartnessfromthePekingendof

theline,buttherewasusuallyanadequateexplanationforit.Foronething,there

wereoursuddenlybloomingrelationswiththeSovietUnion.Notonlywerethe

Berlinandaccidental‐waragreementsconcluded,butGromyko visited

WashingtontobringaformalinvitationtothePresidenttovisitMoscow.

WhereastheyearbeforetheSovietswenttoelaboratelengthstoavoidanypress

speculationaboutthesummit,theynowcouldnotrushapublicannouncement

fastenough.Weheldthemofflongenoughtogiveourselvestimetoannounce

mysecondtriptoPekingonOctober5.Exactlyaweeklaterweannouncedthe

summitforMoscow,scheduledforsometimeinMay1972.Whatevertheir

privatethoughts,theChinesegrittedtheirteethandsaidnot hing.



<<Contents>>



****



ChinaattheUnitedNations



HepreparationsformyOctobertripcoincidedwiththeannualdebateon

whetherTaipeiorPekingshouldrepresentchinaintheUnitedNations.Our

openingtoPekingeffectivelydeterminedtheoutcomeoftheundebate,although

wedidnotrealizethisimmediately.Evenbefore1971wehadbeenengagedinan

essentiallydoomedrearguardaction.Nowalltheseprocessesaccelerated.

T

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TheRepublicofChinawasoneofthefoundersoftheUnitedNations;itwas

anoriginalpermanentmembe roftheSecurityCouncil.AftertheRevolutionof

1949,avotewastakenalmosteveryyearintheGeneralAssemblyonthe

questionofwhichgovernment—theRepublicofChinaonTaiwanorthePeople’s

RepublicofChinainPeking—wasthe“real”representativeofChina.Atfirstthere

wasamajorityagainstPeking’sadmission.Butwiththeadmissionofdozensof

newAfricanandAsiannations,thenumberofcountriesfavoringPekingincreased

witheveryyear.TheUnitedStatesretreatedtoaproceduraldefenseofTaiwan’s

position.From1961onward,weandagroupofalliesannuallysubmitteda

resolutionmakinganyproposaltochangetherepre sentationofChinaan

“ImportantQuestion,”requiringatwo‐thirdsmajorityoftheGeneralAssembly

forapproval.Aslongaswecouldmusterasimplemajorityforthefirstvote,we

couldthenblockPekingbymusteringone‐thirdplusonevotesonthesecond.

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In1969theImportantQuestionresolutionhadpassedbyawidemarginof

71infavor,48against,and4abstentions.TheAlba nianresolutiontoseatPeking

andexpelTaiwanwasthendefeatedby48‐56‐21;inopposingitwehada

pluralityofonlyeigh tvotes,comparedwiththefourteen‐votepluralityofthe

yearbefore.WhilethedecisiontoadmitthePeople’sRepublicwouldstillbe

defeatedbyfailingtoobtainatwo‐thirdsmajority,thepro‐Pekingforceswere

clearlyheadingtow ardthepsychological breakthroughofasimplemajority.Not

onlyweremorenewnationsbeingadmittedtotheUnitedNationseveryyear,but

trendyThirdWorldismwascuttingintoourusualLatinAmeric anblocofsupport

andevenourNATOalliesweregrowingrestive.

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OnJune19,1970,secretaryRogershadsentthePresidentamemorandum

analyzingthelineupintheGeneralAssemblyasthe1970voteapproached.

Rogersspeculated(correctly)thatthestatusquocouldprobablybemaintainedin

1970butwaserodingfast.HeforewarnedthePresidentofthepossibleneedto

shifttactics,perhapstowardsomeformulafor“dualrepresentation.”Rogers

madenorecommendationandimpliedthathefavoredmaintaining thestandard

USoppositiontoPeking’sadmissionfor1970;noPresidentialdecisionwas

sought.

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Eventualdefeatwasbecomingincreasinglylikely,however.Canada

recognizedPekingonOctober13,1970.OttawainformedusthatCanadawould

continuetovotewithusontheImportantQuestionresolutionbutwould

probablyvotefortheAlbanianresolutionforseatingPeking.AstheGeneral

Assemblyvoteapproached,pressuresmounted.SenatorJacobJavits,amember

ofourdelegationtotheGeneralAssembly,urgedtheAdministrationto“takea

morepositiveline,” tochangeouremphasisfromkeepingPekingoutto

maintainingTaiwanintheUnitedNations.TheUnitedStatesmadeasignificant

shiftinthatdirectionwhenonOctober25RonZieglerimpliedthatweobjectedto

theexpulsionofTaiwan,nottotheadmissionofPeking:“TheUSopposesthe