Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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themtohisownwill.ThroughallthisGromykopreservedanaloofkindofdignity;

hewasloyalandcompliantbutnotobsequious.Andinevitablyapointwouldbe

reachedwherehiscompetencewoulddominatethediscussions.Hebecamethe

indispensabledrive‐wheelofSovietforeignpolicy,theconsummateSoviet

diplomat,well‐briefed,confident,andtenacious.Heneverenteredanegotiation

withouthavingmasteredthesubject.Atfirstheknewlittleofstrategicweapons,

buthelearnedsowellthathewaseventuallyabletoconductdoggedrearguard

actionsevenonthemosttrivialissues.Indeed,forGromykotherewerenominor

issues;everypointwaspressedwithimpartialtenacity,erodingalldividinglines

andpermittinghimtotradewhatshouldneverhavebeenraisedforsomething

essential.Heoncedrewmeintoadaylongdiscussion,onhowtocalculatethe

volumeofSovietmissiles,thathadnorelationshiptoanyknownSovietmissileor

programandwasinfacttechnicallyabsurdthoughlogicallyimpeccable.Itwasa

maddeninglytheoreticalpoint,essentiallyirrelevant,butonewhich,onceraised,

hadtobesearchedincaseofboobytraps.(Thisprovedfreeofthem;it

disappearedfromthenegotiationsatthenextsession.)Onanotheroccasionhe

claimedthateachoftheUnitedStates’newplannedstrategicbombers,theB‐1,

shouldcountasthreeweaponsintheSALTtotals.Whenaskedwhy,hepause d

andthenarguedthatitwasfasterandwouldarriveovertheUSSRbeforetheB ‐

52.Introducingspeedasastrategiccriterionwasabrand‐newthought.Hewas

nonplussedwhenitwaspointedoutthattheB‐1wasmuchslowerthanmissiles

thatcountedonlyasone.Hefinallyabandonedthislineofargument,ina grand

gesture,butstillcontrivedtoclaimthisasavaluableconcessionforwhichhewas

duesomething.



Normally,Gromykokneweveryshadeofasubject;itwassuicidalto

negotiatewithhimwithoutmasteringtherecordortheissues.Hewas

indefatigableandimpertur bable.Whenhelosthistemper,oneknewitwas

carefullyplanned.Curiouslyenough,thisremovedmuchofthesting;itwas

obviouslyneverpersonal.Hehadaprodigiousmemorythatenabledhimtobank

everyconcession,howeverslight,hebelievedwehadmade—orperhapseven

hintedat.Itwouldthenbecomethestartingpointforthenextround.Gromyko

didnotbelieveinthebrilliantstrokeorthedramaticmaneuver.Hisinnate

cautionandMoscow’sdomesticpoliticswereagainstthem.Beforehewas

elevatedtothePolitburoin1973hewasanimplementer,notamaker,ofpolicy.

Afterward,hebecamevisiblymoreinfluentialandself‐confident;towardtheend

ofmyterminoffice,hewouldnothesitatetocorrectevenBrezhnevifhethought

hischiefhadstrayedfromtheestablishedline.



Gromyko’smethodofnegotiationapproacheda stereotype.Itseemeda

reflectionofthenationalcharacterandofRussianhistory.JustasRussia had

expandedoverthecenturiesbygraduallyinundatingtheterritoriesontheflat

plainsurroundingtheoriginalGrandDuchyofMuscovy,soGromykopreferred

steadypressuretotheboldmove.Hepatientlyaccumulatedmarginalgainsuntil

theyamountedtoamajordifference.Hereliedontherestlessnessofhiso pposite

numbertoextractotherwiseunachievableadvantages.Hewouldholdontohis

ownconcessionsuntilthelastpossiblemoment,almostinvariablytowardthe

veryendofthelastschedulednegotiatingsession.Therewasnosensewasting

them,heseemedtoreason,solongastherewastheslightestpossibility thatthe

othersidemightyieldfirst.Againstinexperiencednegotiators—andcompared

withGromykomostnegotiatorswereinexperienced—thistechniquewas

extremelyeffective.Onceonehadcaughtontoit,however,thetactictendedto

beself‐defeating.Eventuallyitdawnedthatifonecouldkeepone’scomposure

longenough,Gromykowouldrevealhehadmoreinhispocketthanhehadbeen

preparedtoadmit.



Wheneverpossible,Gromykotriedtoselleventheopeningofa

negotiation;thatistosay,hewoulddemandaconcessionasapriceforsitting

downatthebargainingtable.Afterthathewouldseektoweardownhisopposite

numberbyendlesshagglingover“generalprinciples.”Oncethesewereagreed,

hewouldgetasecondcrackattheissuebyhagglingoverimplementation;

tentativeagreementsthusoftentendedtodissolveintheexegesisoftheir

meaning.WhateverGromykomightsaydisapprovinglyabout linkageingeneral,

hewasagreatbelieverinlinking everydetailofanegotiationtoeveryother.He

offeredeveryconcessionconditionally,dependentonsomemovementonsome

othersubject.Onlyafterthis laboriousprocesshaddemonstratedtohim—and,

perhapsevenmoreimportant,tohissuperiors—thatthelemonhadbeen

squeezedabsolutelydry,wouldhemovetoasettlement,oftenveryrapidly.



Andtheninnatesuspiciousnesscompoundedbythecongenitalinsecurity

ofthesystemandthebureaucraticstructurewithinwhichhelivedwouldtake

over.Theonlytimethismasternegotiatorwouldbetrayanyemotionwasinthe

lastphaseofanegotiationaftertheagreementwasinessencecomplete.Then

Gromykoseemedtobeseizedbyanundefinableterrorthathisoppositenumber

mightpullsomelast‐minutetrickonhim.Hewouldseektorushthroughthe

signature—showingthatthestolidexertionsoftheprecedingmonthsandyears

hadtakentheirtollonhiscomposureafterall.Orperhapshefearedtheobloquy

ofhiscolleaguesiftheircomplicateddecision‐makingshouldhaveprovedinvain.

Thepreviousbullyingthenemergedastheironicreflectionofa profoundabsence

ofself‐confidence,thefearofbeingtrickedintheenddespiteone’smost

strenuousefforts.



NodoubttheSovietsystemshapedGromyko’sstyle.Hewastoo

experiencednottoknowthatsomepropositionsheadvancedwereunrealizable 

evenwhencoupledwithhisdoggedpersistence.Butmostprobablyhecould

convincehischiefs,andlaterhiscolleaguesonthePolitburo,onlybyasuccession

ofprolongedstalemates.Greaterflexibilitymighthaveseemedsuspiciouslylike

ideologicalimpurit y,ormeresoftness.



Everynegotiatormustdecideatwhatpointmarginalgainsarenolonger

worththelossofconfidencecausedbythekindofhagglingthatmergeswith

sharppractice.Amateursthinkofgreatdiplomatsascrafty;butthewisediplomat

understandsthathecannotaffordtotrickhisopponent;inthelongruna

reputationforreliabilityandfairnessisanimportantasset.Thesamenegotiators

meetoverandoveragain;theirabilitytodealwithoneanotherisunderminedifa

diplomatacquiresareputationforevasionorduplicity.Butthereisnopremium

intheSovietsystemforfarsightedrestraint.SoGromykowouldproceedby

splittingminusculedifferences,sellingeverymarginalchangeofpositio nasdearly

aspossible.Hewasintheretail,notthewholesale,business.ForGromykoevery

negotiationwasatabularasa;itstartedasifithadnohistory,anditestablished

noclaimorobligationforthefuture.Confidence,ifitmeantanythingatall,

dependedonabalanceofintereststhathadtoberedefinedfromscratchineach

negotiation.



Ifafter1973IsoughttokeepMoscowoutofMiddleEastnegotiations,the

reasonwaspartlygeopolitical,partlytheSovietnegotiatingstyle.Iwasconvinced

thatprogressinMiddleEastdiplomacydependedonfluidity,onkeepingthe

parties’positionsrelativelyopenuntiltheyhadexplorednotonlythelegalbutthe

psychologicalmeaningsofwhatwasbeingsaid.ButIknewthatGromyko,once

involved,wouldadvancesomedocumentwithendlesslegalisticclausesandthen

workpedanticallyatgoingthroughthemonebyone.EvenwithSovietgoodwill

(whichIdidnottakeforgranted)thiswastheroadtodeadlock,togivingavetoto

themostradicalelements,andhenceeventuallytoexplosion.



SometimesGromyko’stacticsleftabadtaste.Occasionallyhe—orthose

whomadethepoliticaldecisions—overreachedthemselves.Theabsoluterefusal

totakeanychance,thedesiretosqueezeeverypossible gainfromanegotiation

caused,asIhavealreadyshown,theSovietleaderstomisstheopportunityfora

summitin1970whenourbargainingpositionwasweak,orin1971beforeour

announcementofthePekingsummit.HadtheSovietsrespondedin1970,they

wouldatleasthavecomplicatedourChina initiativeandinhibitedourfreedomof

maneuverintheMiddleEast.HadtheKremlinendeditscat‐and‐mousegame

aboutthesummitinthespringof1971andannouncedadate,itsbargaining

positionwouldhavebeengreatlystrengthened.Ourperennialcrit ics,andsome

Kremlinologists,wouldthenhaveblamedeverynegotiatingdeadlockwith

MoscowonourmovetowardPeking.Bycontinuingtosqueezeus,theKremlin

inadvertentlygaveourdiplomacyextraordinaryscopetowardbothPekingand

Moscow.



Withal,IgrewtolikeandrespectGromyko.Wit hintheframeworkimposed

bythesystemherepresentedhewashonorable.Hewasamanofhisword.It

mightbedifficulttogethimtoagree,buthestucktohisbargains—orifhewas

obligedtochangecourse,hedidsowithvisibleembarrassment.Despitehisdour

countenancehehadanexcellent senseofhumor,thoughtheAmericanstyleof

wisecrackingatfirsteludedhim. Wemetforthefirsttimeatareceptiongivenby

thePresidentforheadsofdelegationsattheUnitedNationsinSeptember1969.

Gromykowalkeduptomeandsaid:“You lookjustlikeHenryKissinger.”Ireplied:

“YoulookjustlikeRichardNixon.”Thistookhimafewsecondstohoistaboard,

especiallyashisentouragewasreluctanttolaughuntilhehadgiventhesignal.By

thenextyearhehadabsorbedthestyle.Whenwediscussedwhichentrancehe

shoulduseforhisWhiteHousemeetingwithNixon, Gromykosaiditdidnotmake

anydifference;theguardswouldsaluteandlethimthroughwhereverhe

presentedhimself;whowouldstopthePresident?Tomakesurethateveryone—

especiallyhisassociates—understoodthatitwasplaytime,hegaveaheartylaugh

reminiscentofastreet‐cornerSantaClaus.



DuringtheMoscowsummitof1972oneofourXeroxmachinesbroke

down.KnowingtheKGB’sreputationforOrwellianubiquity,IaskedGromyko

duringameetingintheelegantSt.Catherine’sHallintheKremlinwhetherhe

couldhavesomecopiesmadeforusifweheldcertaindocumentsuptothe

chandelier.Gromykorepliedwithoutmissingabeatthatunfortunatelythe

cameraswereinstalledbythetsars;theywereadequateforphotographing

peoplebutnotdocuments.



Gromyko’sfavoriteverbaldevicewasthedoubleorevenquadruple

negative.“notoutofthequestion”wasforhimaresounding affirmative.When

thingsweregoingbadly,hisfacewouldtakeonanexpressionofsuchplaintive

dejectionthatonewastemptedintoacompassionateobligationtoyield.But

aboveallhewouldpersistinwhatevercoursehewason,usingwhatever

argumentwasathand.Oncewearguedabouttworelativelyminorparagraphsin

adocument.Gromykoinsistedvociferouslythatparagraphs—allparagraphs—

shouldbestructuredasa crescendorisingtoaclimacticlastsentence.After

lettinghimwinhispoint,Iconfrontedhimwiththeidenticalargumentforthe

nextparagraph.Gromykodrylyrespondedthatsome paragraphsshouldbe

arrangedasadiminuendo.Igavehimhischoice. Hecouldnothaveboth.He

optedforcrescendoinbothparagraphs.



Withoutdoubt,GromykowasoneoftheablestdiplomatswithwhomI

dealt.Atonestagehewashandlingsimultaneouslynegotiationsonstrategicarms

limitations,prevention‐ofaccidentalwar,Berlin,trade,andahostofminor

agreements;heconductedhimselfwithgreatskill,patience,anddiscipline;he

wasontopofallthesesubjects.Hedidnotembodyagreatvisionorputforward

acompellingmodelofaworldorder,butneitherdidthesystemherepresented.

Itwasnothisassignmentorhisconceptionofhisroletoasktheultimate

questions.Andhewouldnothavesurvivedsolongifhehad.ChouEn‐lai,

possessingthesenseofculturalsuperiorityofanancientcivilization,softenedthe

edgesofideologicalhostilitybyaninsinuatingeaseofmannerandaseemingly

effortlessskilltopenetrateto theheartofthematter.Gromyko,asthe

spokesmanofacountrythathadneverprevailedexceptbyrawpower,lacked

thisconfidence;hewasobligedtotesthismettleineveryencounter.Itwaseasy

tounderestimatehim. Hisbulldozingpersistencewasadeliberatemethodof

operation,notagaugeofhissubtlety.Heprotectedhiscountryintimesof

turbulenceandconfusion;hemaskeditsweakness;headvanceditspurposes.

Finalgreatnesseludedhim;butheachievedimportantobjectivesandherarely

madeavoidableerrors.TherearefewForeignMinisterstowhomonecanpay

suchatribute.



InOctober1970,Iwasattheverybeg inningofmyexperiencewith

Gromyko.Hearrivedinwashingtonduringabriefperiodofhope.Aftertheofficial

terminationoftheCienfuegosaffair,itseemedSoviet‐Americanrelationswould

improve.TalksonBerlinandarmscontrolwerescheduled.TheMiddleEastwas

coolingoff.Thereseemedtobeanagreementinprincipleonboththetimingand

agendaofasummit.WhiletheSovietreplyofSeptember25hadpushedthedate

ofasummitmeetinginto1971,this,inNixon’seagerview,didnotneedto

precludethebenefitofanearlyannouncementbeforetheNovemberelections.

Nixonalsowantedtomakesurethattheplanningofaneventualsummitwould

stayintheWhiteHouseChannel.Heaskedmetoexplorethesepossibilitieswith

DobryninbeforehemetGromyko,especiallytoensurethatGromykodidnotlet

slipinfrontofRogers,whowouldbepresent,thatwehadbeenexploringa

summitsinceApril—theSecretaryofStatehadlearneditonlyafewweeksearlier.



Itrapidlybecameapparentthatthesuspicionsandtensionsofthesummer

andautumnhadtakentheirtollonbothsides.Apreliminarymeetingwith

DobryninonOctober17turnedsomewhatacrimonious.Inadditiontohis

customarylitanyofAmericanerrorshesaidthatGromykohadcometofindout

whetherwehadmadeadecisiontoadoptahardline.Itoldhimthathewould

findthePresidentpreparedtoexplorethepros pectsofahappierfuture.Aspeech

thatthePresidentplannedtodelivertotheUnitedNationsinafewdayswould

becastinconciliatoryterms.DobryninindicatedthatGromykowouldbe

preparedtodiscussthesummitwiththePresident.



BeforehismeetingwithGromyko,Iwrotea memorandumtothePresident

ontheprincipalissues.Themeetingwastakingplace,Ipointedout,atamoment

ofunusualsensitivityinUS‐Sovietrelations.Wewereboundtoaskourselves

abouttheSoviets’performanceintheMiddleEast,theirmilitaryforayinto Cuba,

theircontinuingstrategicbuildup,thepolicyofselectivedétenteseekingtodivide

usfromtheEuropeans.Wehadnogoodevidenceconcerningtheattitudesof

Sovietleaders,thejockeyingthatmustbegoingonamongtheminanticipationof

thePartyCongress,andthedistributionofpowerwithintheSovietleadership.I

counseledagainstanyattempttoplayofffactionsintheKremlinagainsteach

other;wedidnotknowenoughtopitdovesagainsthawks.Wedidbestinour

relationshipwiththeSovietUnionwhenwelookedafterourowninterestsandlet

theSovietsdefinetheirs.ItwasstillearlyenoughinthePresident’stermto

achievefundamentalprogress,butthis,weshouldmakeclear,wasincompatible

withtheunremittingpressureforunilatera ladvantageandconstanteffortsto

exploittroublespotsthathadcharacterizedrecentSovietpolicy.



ThemeetingofOctober22betweenGromykoandNixonwasattendedby

Rogers,me,andDobrynin(andinterpretersfrombothsides).Gromykovoicedthe

samecomplaintsthatDobryninhadoutlinedonOctober17.Nixon—partly

becausehewantedtokeepopenthesummitoption,partlybecauseitwashis

style—rebuttedinamoregeneralway,stressingtheimportanceofseekingareas

foragreement,especiallyonSALTandtrade.TherewasareviewoftheMiddle

East,Berlin,europeansecurity,andVietnam.Gromykointroducednothingnew

andNixonrestatedtheAmericanposition.Themeetingprovidedamorecordial

atmosphere,butnoturningpointofsubstance.



Towardtheend,however,GromykoraisedthesubjectforwhichNixonhad

beenwaitingeagerly:theideaofasummit.Withhisusualmasteryofthedouble

negative,GromykoallowedthatthePresident’sthoughtsonthissubjectwerenot

inconsistentwiththoseoftheSovietleadership.Hesuggestedthatthemeeting

bearrangedforsometimeafterApril1971,inMoscow.Nixon,forthebenefitof

theStateDepartmentnote‐taker,pretendedtoweighthisasanewand

momentousproposition.NixonagreedthatasummitinMoscowwouldbea

dramaticevent;indeed,itwassosubjecttomisinterpretationthatthedecisionto

holditshouldnotbesprungonanunwarypublicandtheCongressthrougha

leak.Hethereforerecommendedanearlyannouncement.ButGromykohadnot

maintainedhimselffornearlyfifteenyearsasForeignMinisterbygivingaway

thingsfornothing.Heintendedtousetheprospectofthesummittopressus

furtheronmattersofconcerntotheSovietUnion,suchasBerlin.Hedemurred.

Hehadnotmeanttoimplythatasummitannouncementshouldbemadetoday

ortomorrow.HewouldbereturningtoMoscowonOctober29.Soonafterward

thetimingoftheannouncementcouldbeagreedbetweenthem.Nixon,not

wantingtopursuethesubjectinfrontofalargegroup,offeredtoshowGromyko

hishideawayintheExecutiveOfficeBuilding.There,safelyawayfromthegroup

intheOvalOffice,heexplaine dtoGromykothatallpreparations forthesummit

shouldtakeplacebetweenDobryninand me.



ThenextdayNixondeliveredamajorspeechattheUnitedNations,

focusingonUS‐Sovietrelations.Whilenotminimizingdifferences,Nixontooka

conciliatoryandhopefulline,asIhadtoldDobryninhewould.Nixonstressedour

perennialthemes:thatinthenuclearagetheclassicpatternofexploitingtensions

forunilateralgainwastoodangerous,thattheUnitedStateswishedtomove

fromaeraofconfrontationtoaneraofnegotiation,thatwewerereadytosettle

outstandingissuesonthebasisofreciprocity.Moscowwasgiventhechoice

betweenconfrontationandnegotiation;Nixon’sstrongpreferencewasforthe

latter.



ThatdayNixonsentmeto Dobrynin,whowasinNewYorkaccompanying

GromykototheUnitedNations,tomakeonemoretryatasummit

announcement.WewouldliketoannouncethesummitonOctober29or30from

SanClemente,ItoldDobrynin.Onedidnothavetobetoowellversedin

Americanpoliticstounderstandthisrathertransparentmaneuversoclosetoour

Congressionalelections.Dobryninimmediatelywarnedofpoorcommunications

(anamazingclaimforasuperpower)andslowdecision‐making.Buthefinally

relentedandpromisedtoreporttoGromykoandtoMoscowwitha viewto

speedingupareply.



Nixon’sconciliatoryUNspeech,inthemeantime,waswellreceived.The

ChristianScienceMonitorofOctober24puttheburdenontheSoviets:“The

PresidentisstatingtheessentialthinkingofcurrentAmericandiplomacy.We

applaudhisresponsible,highlevelappeal.WeurgeMoscow’sleaderstorespond

inkind.”TheNewYorkTimesofOctober25,notingthatwewereata

“crossroads,”saidMoscow’sresponsetoNixon’snewquestioning“holdsthe

answernotonlytodétentebuttothefutureofworldpeace.”



Butrelationswerenotdestinedtoimprovesodramatically.Minorissues

seemedtoarisealmostspontaneouslyto sourthings.First,twoAmerican

generalsinasmallBeechcraftairplanewanderedovertheTurkish‐Sovietborder

onOctober21andlandedinsidetheSovietUnion.Therewasnodisputethatthe

haplessofficershadmadeanhonestmistake.TheSovietleaders,however,not

onlylookedgifthorsesinthemouthbutwouldconsidergivingthemuponlyfor

cashonthebarrelhead.Dobryninwasinstructedtoraisethequestionofthe

releaseofaconvictedSovietespionageagent,IgorIvanov.Theideaoftrading

twogeneralswhohadnothingtodowithintelligenceforaconvictedspywas

galling,allthemoresoasDobryninknewthattheUnitedStateswasalready

consideringreleasingIvanov.TheninNovemberaLithuanianseaman,Simas

Kudirka,attemptedtodefectfromhisSoviettrawlerontoaUSCoastGuardship

duringafisheriesnegotiationoffthecoastofMassachusetts.Thebem usedCoast

GuardcommanderpermittedSovietseamentocomeonboardanddragKudirka

back.ThisenragedNixonandme,butitwasalloverlongbeforeanyhighofficials

wereawareoftheincidentorcouldintervene.(ItlaterturnedoutthatKudirka

hadavalidclaimtoUScitizenship.Hewasper‐mittedtoemigratetotheUnited

StatesafterPresidentfordintercededprivatelyonhisbehalfwithBrezhnev.)



ButtherealcauseofSovietaloofnesswaselsewhere.Nixon’smotivein

seekinganearlyannouncementwastooobviousandpolitical;theSovietswere

notwronginconsideringitill‐timedfromaforeignpolicypointofview.The

Politburodidnotwanta summituntiltheBerlinissuewassettled,anditwas

afraidthatoncethesummitwasagreedwewouldnothaveanadequate

incentivetoproceed.AnotherandprobablydecisivecauseofSoviethesitation

wastheunsettlednatureoftheinte rnalrelationsoftheSovietleadership.After

Khrushchev’soverthrowin1964theSovietUnionwasgovernedbyatroikaof

Brezhnev,Kosygin,andPodgorny.Untilwellinto1971allourhigh‐level

communicationswiththeSovietUnionwerewithKosygin.AsthePartyCongress

approached,Brezhnevwasclearlybecomingdominant,butwewerestill

assumingthatPrimeMinisterKosyginwouldbeNixon’shost.Gromykodidnot

demurwhenNixonmentionedKosygin’snameinthatcontext.UntilMoscowhad

sortedoutitsinternalpriorities,thePolitburowouldbecarefulnottoriskits

cohesionatasummit.



Finally,theSovietleadershiphadstillnotexhaustedtheopportunitiesfor

selectivedétenteinEurope.ByeasingtensionswithWesternEuropeanallies

whilemaintainingahardlinetowardus,Moscowhopedtoencouragedivisions

withintheWesternalliance.Totheextentthatwewereblamedfortensions,

NATOcouldbemadetoappearinEuropeasanobstacletopeacethatturned

friendshipwiththeUnitedStatesintoasourceofdangerratherthanofsecurity.

SelectivedétentewasawayofencouragingEuropeanneutralism.



FivedaysaftertheGromyko‐Nixontalk,Dobryningavemethereplytothe

propositionofanearlyannouncement.ItreaffirmedtheSovietdesirefora

summit.ItagreedwiththePresidentthatasummithadtobecarefullyprepared.

DobryninandIshouldgettoworkonthesubjectimmediately.Aspartofthese

preparationsthetimingofthevisitandanappropriateannouncementcould,of

course,bediscusse d.ButOctober30wasclearlyprematureforsuchanevent.

TheSovietleadershiprejectedNixon’s“fear”ofaleak;itwasconvincedthatwith

sofewpeopleawareofthesummitdiscussionstherecouldbenosuchdanger.In

thissomewhatdisdainfulmannerdidtheSovietsevadeNixon’soverture.



ButiftheSovietleadersbelievedthattimewasontheirside,theyhadnot

calculatedcorrectly.TheycouldnotcompletetheirGermanpolicywithout

cooperationfromus,becausetheGermanParliamentwoulddragitsfeeton

ratificationoftheEasterntreatieswithoutaBerlinsettlement,andwehadmade

thatdependentuponanimprovementinrelationsbetweenMoscowand

Washington.AfewweekslatertheKremlinbegantorealizethatitsstrategyof

selectivedétentewouldnotworkeither.InthemiddleofDecember1970it

suddenlyfacedthedangerofanupheavalinitsownbackyard.



<<Contents>>



****



ThePolishRiots



hefolklorepersiststhatrevolutionsoccurwhenconditionsaredesperate.The

reality,perceivedsinceTocqueville,isthatmostupheavalshavetakenplace

whenconditionsseemtobeimproving.Thecompletelydowntroddenareusually

toodemoralizedto revolt.Violentchangeismorelikelywhengovernments

becomeoverconfident,whenthepopulationsensesthatithassomemarginfor

maneuver,andwhenthereissomeprogre ssthatconfirmsthisexpectation.

T



SoitwasinPoland.OnDecember7,1970,Brandtrecognizedthenew

bordersofPolandandrelinquishedGermany’sclaimtorecovertheterritories

EastoftheOder‐Neisseline.HewenttoWarsawforthesigningofthetreaty,

kneltattheWarsawGhettomonument,andpaidamovingandhistoricvisitto

Auschwitz.ThePolishPartyleader,WladyslawGomulka,calculated—correctly—

thatthetreatywithBonnwouldeasethePolishpeople’sperennialnightmareof

anirredentistGermany.Hethought—wrongly—thathecouldusehisne wfound