Kojeve Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit
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Tlv
Dialecttc
of tfu Real
otd.
tlu
plvrcmerclogical
Method,
in
Hegel
"knowledge"
(Erkenntniss),
"act of chinking',
(Denken),
and
so
on;
and occasionally
"concept"
(Begriff)
in the common
sense
(when
Hegel
saysi nur Begriff).
But
these rwo aspecs
are
insepa-
rable
and
complementary,
and
it
is
of little importance
to know
which of
the
two must be
called
Whsen
or Begriff
(in
the common
sense),
and which
Gegenstand.
What
is
of
importance
is
that-
in
the Truth-there
is
perfect
coincidence
of the Begriff and
the
Gegenstand,
and
that-in
the
Truth-Knowledge
is
purely
passiae
adequation
to
essential-Reality.
And that is
why
the true
Scientist
or
the Wise
Man must
reduce
his
existence
to
simple contqnpla-
tion
(reines
Zusehen)
of
the
Real
and of
Being,
and of
their
"dialectical
movement."
He
looks
at everything that
iJ
and verbally
describes
everything
thar he
sees:
therefore, hl
has
nothing
to
do,
for
he
modifies nothing,
adds nothing,
and takes
nothing
away.
This, at least, is
what Hegel says
in the
Introduction
to the
Pbenomenology
(page
7r,
Iine
z7-puge
72,
line
rr):
lf.by
concept
we mean knoasledge (Wissen),
and by the
essential-
reality (Wesen)
or rhe mte-entity
(Wahre)
we
mean entity
existing
as
a
given-being
(Seiende)
or object (Gegennand),
it
follows that
verification
(Prilfung)
consists in
seeing
(wru.seben)
if
the concept
corresponds
to the
object. But
if by
concept
we mean the
essential-
redlity
of the
In-itself
(Anich)
of the
object
and by
object,
on
the
other
hand, we understand
the
object
[taken]
as
object,
namely, as
it
is
for
another
[i.e.,
for
the
knowing
Subject],
it follows
that
verification
consists in
our
seeing if the
object corresponds
to
its
concept.
It is easily
seen
rhat both
[expressions
signify]
the same
thing.
But
what
is
essential is
to
keep
[in
mind]
for the whole
study
(Unterruclrung)
that
these
two consrituent-elements
(Momente),
[namelyJ
concept
and object, Being
f
or anotber and Being in itself
,
are
situated
within
the very
knowledge
that we
are
studying, and
that consequently
we
do not need
to bring in
standards
(Masssiibe\
or
to apply our
lownl
intuitions
(Einfiille)
and
ideas
(Gedrnken)
during
the study.
By omitting
these la$er, we
attain
[the
possibilityJ
of
viewing
the thing as
it is in
and
f
or itself .
Now,
any
addition (Zutat)
[comingl
from
us
becomes
superfluous
not only
in
the sense
(nach
dieser
Seire) that
[the]
concept
and
[the]
objecg the
standard
and what
is to
be
veri6ed,
are
present
(oorhanden)
in the
Consciousness
(Bewusstsein)
itself
[which
we, as
philosophers,
snrdy in the Phenornenologyf;
but we are
also
spared
175
INTRODUCTION
TO THE
NEADING
OF NEGEL
the
effort
of comparing
the
two and of aeifying
in
the strict sensc,
so that-since
[studied]
Consciousness
verifies
itself-in
this
reqpect
too, only
pure contemplauon (Zusebeel)
is
left for us
to
do.
When
all is said
and done,
the
"method"
of
the Hegelian
Scien-
tist consists
in
having
no merhod
or wey
of
thinking
peculiar to
his
Science.
The
naive
man, the
vulgar
scientist, even
the
pre-Hegelian
philosopher-*ach
in
his
way
opposes himself
to the
Real and
deforms
it by
opposing
his
own
means of
action
and methods of
thought
ro ir.
The
Wise Man,
on
the
conrrary, is fully
and
defini-
tively
reconciled
with
everything
that is: he enrrusts
himself
with-
out
reserve
to
Being
and opens
himself
entfuely
to
the
Real wirhour
resisting-
it..
His
role
is that
of
a
perfectly
flat and indefinitely
extended
mfuror:
he does
not reflect
on the
Real;
it is the
Real
that
reflects
itself
on him,
is
reflecced
in
his
consciousness,
and is
revealed
in
its
own
dialectical
structure
by the
discourse
of
the Wise
Man
who
describes
it
without
deforming
it.
..
If
.Iol
qlerye,
the
Hegelian
"method"
is
purely
.,empiricel"
or
"positivist":
Hegel
looks
at
the
Real and
discribes
what he
sees,
everything
that
he
sees,
and
nothing
bur what
he
sees.
In other
words,
he has
the
"experience"
(Erfahrung)
of
dialectical
Being
and
the
Real,
and
thui
he
makes
their
,,movement"
pass
into
hi
discourse
which
describes
them.
And
that
is
what
Hegel
says in
the Introduction
to
the
phe-
nomenology
(page
73,lines
7-rr):
TIns
dialectical
movemenr
which
consciousness
carries
out
(mrilbt)
in
(an)
itself,
both in
terms
of
its
knowledge
and
its
object,
to the
extent
rhat
rhe
new
[and]
true
object mises
(entspringt)'
out
of this
movement.{and
appears]
before
Consciousness,
is
suictly
speaking
what
is called erperience
(Erfobrung),
-. To
b.
sure,
this
experience
"strictly
speaking"
is something
quite
difierent
from
the eiperience
of
wlgar
scienle.
The latter-is car-
ried
out
by
a
Subjeic
who
p""t"ni, to be independent
of
the
Object,
and
it is
supposed
to ieveal
the
Obiect
which
exists
inde-
pendently of
the
Subject. Now
in actual
fact the experience
is had
by
a man
who
lives
within
Nature
and is indissolubiy
bound
to
it,
but
is
also
opposed
to
it
and wants
ro transform
it:
stience is
born
from
the
desire
to
transform
the
World in relation
to Men; its
final
end
is
technical
application.
That
is
why
scientific
knowledge
is
'76
Tlro Dlalertb
ol tlv
RenI atd tfu
PlercnercIogbal
Methd.
in
Hegel
never absolutely
passive, nor
purely
contemplative
and descriptive.
Scientific experience
pefturbs
rhe Obiect because of
the active
intervention
of
the
Subject, who
applies
to
the
Object
L
ntetbod
of investigation
that is
his
own
and
io which nothing in
the Obiect
itsclf
corresponds.
What
it
reveals,
therefore, is neither
the Obiect
taken
independently
of
the
Subject,
nor
rhe Subject taken inde-
pendently of
the
Obfect, but only
the result of
the interacion
of
the two
or,
if
you will,
that interaction
itself.
However,
scien-
tifi-c
experience
and
knowledge
ere concerned
with
the
Object as
independent
of
and
isolated
from
the
Subiect. Hence
they
do
not
find what
they
are
looking
for; they
do
not
give
what
they
promise, for
they
do not correctly
reveal
or
describe
what the
Real
is
for
them,
Generally
speaking,
Truth
(:
revealed
Reality)
is
the
coincidence
of
thought
or
descriptive
knowledge
witli the
concrete
real.
Now,
for
vulgar
science,
this
real
is
supposed
to
be
independent
of
the
thought
which
describes
it.
But in
fact this
science
never atrains
this autonomous
real,
this
.,thing
in itself,'
of
Kant-Newton,
because
it incessantly
perturbs
it.
Hence
scientific
thought
does not
attain
its
truth; there
is
no
scientific
tutb
in the
*gog
and
proper
sense of
the
term.
Scientific experience
is
thus
only
a
pse.udo-experience.
And
it
cannot
be
otheriise,
for vulgar
science
is in
fact
concerned
not
with
the concrete
real, but
with-an
abstraction.
To the
exrent
that
the scientist
thinks
or knows
his
o_!i:o,
.what
really
and
concretely
exists
ls
the entirery
of
the
Objec.known
by
the
Subject
or oi
the
Subject
knowing
the
Ob-
ject.
The
isolated
obfect is
bur
an
abstraction,
and thatls
why
it
has
no
fixed and
stable
continuity (Bestehen)
arnd
is
perpetually
deformed
or
perturbed.
Therefore
it
cannot
serve
as a'uasis
for
a
Truth,
which
!)'definition
is
universally
and erernally
valid.
And
the
same
goes
for
the
"object"
of
vulgar psychologyj gnoseologv,
1d.
philosophy,
which
is
the
subfect-artihcially
i.6i"tJd
fto-
ih"
Object-i.e.,
yet another
abstraction.2
2This
interpretation
of science,
on
which
Hegel
insisted
very
much,
is cur-
rendy
admittcd
by
science
itserf.
In
quencum
ptrysics
ir is
expressed
in mathe-
matical
form
by
Heisenberg's
relations
of
uncertainry.
These
relations
show
on
ft9.one
hend
that
rhe
experience
of
physics
is
nevei
perfecg
because
it
cannoi
achieve
a
description
of
the
"physical
real"
that
is
both
complete
and
adequate
(precise).
on the
other
hand,
the
famous
principle
of
"compiementary
nodons"
follows
from
it, formulated
by
Bohr:
tha-t
of
-th"
-"u"
and
the
pardcle,
for
example.
This
means
that
the
(verbal)
physical
description
of
the
Real
""""o*ity
177
INTAODUCTION
TO
TtIE
READINC
OT
HECEL
_
t{egelian-
experience
is
a difierenr
$ory: it
reveals
concrete
Reality,
and
reveals
it
without
modifying
or
,,pernrrbing"
it.
That
L*ly,
when
this experience
is
desciibed
verbally,
it
rEpresents
a
Trurh
in rhe
strong
sense
of
rhe
term.
And
rhar
is whrir
has
no
specific
method
of
its
own,
as
experience,
thought,'or
verbal
description,
that
is
not
et
the same
iittre
an
"oblediven'
srrucnrre
of
the
concrete
Real
itself
which
it reveals
by
dtscribing
it.
The
conmere
Real
(of
which
we speak)
is
both
Reai revealed
by
a
discourse,
and
Discourse
revealing
t real.
And the
Hegelian
experience
is
related
neither
to
the
Real
nor
to Discourse
iaken
separately,
but
to
their
indissoluble
uniry.
And
since
it is
itserf
a
yvgaling
Discourse,
it is
itself
an aspect
oi
the
concrete
Real which
it
describes.
It therefore
brings
in-nothing
fron
outside,
and
the
thought
or
the
discourse
whiih
is
born
fr6m it
is not
a reflection
on the
Real:
the
Real itself
is
what reflects
itself
or
is
reflected in
the discourse
or
as
thought.
In
particular, if
the
thought and
the
discourse
of
the
Hegelian
Scientist
or the
wise
Man
ari
dialectical,
implies
contredicrions:
the
"physical
real" is
simulaneously
a weve
filling
all of
space
and a
particle
localized
in one
point,
and
so on.
By its own
admission,
Physics
can
never
attain
Truth
in
the strong
sense
of the
tirm-In
fact,
physics
does
not
study
and
describe
the
concrete
Real,
but
only
an artifcialry
isoiated
aspect
of the Real-that
is,
rn abstraction;
namely: the aspect
of the
RLal
which
is
given
to
the
"physical subiecg"
this
subiect being Men
reduced
to his
eye
(which
is, rnoreover,
jdeilized)-i.e.,
yet
another
abitraction.
physics
describes
the Real
to
the
extent
that it
is
given
to this subfect, without
describing
this
Subiect itself.
Physics,
however,
is
obliged
to take accounr
of
the act
which
"gives"
the Real
to
this
Subject,
and
which is
the
act
of seeing
(which
pre-
supposes
the
presence
of
light,
in
the broad
sense).
Now this abstact
description
is made
not with
words
having
a meaning
(Logos),
but with
the
help
of
algorithms:
if
concrete
M,nr
speaks
of
the
Real,
the
abstract
physical
Sullect
uses a
mathematicd
"language."
on
the
level of
algorithm,
there
is neither
un-
certainty
nor contrediction.
But
neither
is there
any
Ttwth
in the
proper
sense,
since there
is
no
genuine
Discoune
(Logos)
that
reveals the Real. And
as soon
as
one
wants to move
from
algorithm
to
pbysical
Discourse,
one
introduces
con-
tradictions
and an
element
of uncertainty,
Hence there
is no
Truth in
the
domain
of
Physics
(and
of science
in
general).
Only
philosophic
Discourse
can
achieve
Truth,
for it alone
is related
to
the
concrete
Real-that
is,
to the tmalit!
of the
reality
of Being.
The various
sciences
are
always
concerned
with
abstractions:
on
the one
hand, because
they relate
the
Reel not to living mrn, but
to a more
or
less
simplified,
or
bener,
abstract,
"lmowing
Subject";
on
the other
hand,
becruse
they neglect
in
their descriptions
either
the
(ebstract)
Sublect which
corresponds
to the
(abstract)
Object which
they describe, or
the
(abstract)
Obiect
which
is
givetr
to the
(abstract)
Subject which
they
study. And that is
why
they
heve
their
own
peculier
zretDadr
of
thought
and of
ection.
r78
TIE AaIccUa
of tI|e lleal
atd
tlro Plwtomenoloebot
Methd
h Hegel
it is only
because
they faithfully
reflect
the
"dialecticel
move-
ment"
of
the Real of
which
they are a
part
and which
they etpni-
ence
adeguetely
by
giving themselves
to
it withour eny
precon-
ceived method.
Hegel's
metbod,
then,
is
nor er
all dialectical,
and Dialectic
for
him is
quite different
from
a method
of
thought or exposition.
And
we
can even
say
that,
in e certain
way,
Hegel was
the
first to
abandon
Dialecric
as a
philosophic method.
He
was, er leasr,
the
first to
do so
voluntarily
and
with
full knowledge
of what he
was
doing.
The
dialectical
method
was
consciously
and systematically
used
for the
6rst
time by
Socrates-Plato.
But in fact it
is
as old as
phil.oso-phy itself.
For
the
dialecical
method is
nothing but
the
method
of dialogue-that
is,
of
discusion.
Everything
seems
to indicate
that
Science
was
born in
the form
o{
Myth.
A
Myth
is a
theory-that
is,
a
discursive
revelation
of
the real.
Of course,
ir is supposed
ro be
in
agreemenr
with
the
given
real.
But in
fact,
it
always
goes
beyond
its
girrens,
and once
beyond
them,
it
only has
to
be
co-herentli.".,
free"of
iniernal
con-
tradictions-in
order
to
make
a
show of
truth.
The
period
of
Myth
is
a
period
of
monologue,
and in
this
period
oie
demonstrites
nothing
because
one
"discusses"
nothing,
iince
one is
not
yet
faced
with
a.contrary
or
simply
difterent
opinion.
And
that is
precisely
why
there is
true
or
false
"tnyth', or
,,opinion,,
(dora)',
but
nb
"science" or
"truth"
properly
so-called.
-
Then,
by
-chance,
the
man
who
has
an opinion,
or
who
has
crerted
or
adopted
a
_myth,
comes
up
against
i
difierent
myth
or
:
coTrar.y
opinion.
This man
will firsr
try to
get
rid of
it:'either
by
pluggrng
up
his
ears
in
some
wey,
by
an internal
or external
"censoring";
or
by
overcoming (in
the
nondia,lectical
sense
of
the
term)
the
adverse
myrh
or
opinion,
by
putting to
death
or
banish-
mg
lts
propagetors,
for
example,
or by
acts
of violence
that
will
force
the
others
l?
toy
the
same
thingas
he
(even
if
they
do not
think
the
same
thing).
But it
can happen (and
we
know
that
this actually
did
happen
one
day,
somewhere)
that
the
man
begins
to
dbeuss
witti'tris
adversary.
By
an
act
of
freedom
he can
tecide
to
want to
,,con-
vince"
him,
by_"refyting,
him
and
by
,,demonstrating,'
his own
point of view.
To
this
end
he
speoks
*itt
his
advenary,"he
engeges
L7g
INTRODUCTTON
TO THE
RTADINC
OF
IIECEL
in
e dialogue
with him:
he
vw a.
dialectical
metboiL
And it
is by
becoming
a dialectician
that
the
man
of
myth
or opinion
becomes
a scientist
or
a
philosopher.
In Plato
(and
probably
already
in
Socrates) all
this
beceme
conscious.
If
Plato has
Socrates
say
that
not
the
uees,
bur only
the
men
jn
the ciry
can
teach
him
something, it is
because
he
under-
stood
that,
staning
from
(false
or truef
m;rth and opinion,
one
can
attain
science
and
truth
only
by way of
discussion-that
is,
!I
*tI
of
-dialogue
or
dialectic.
In fine, according
to Socrates-
Plato,
it
is from
the
collision
of
diverse and edverse
opinions
that
the
spark
of
the one
and the
only
truth is finally
struck A
.,thesis"
is
opposed
to
an
"and-rhesis,"
which,
by the way,
the thesis
gen-
erally
provokes.
They
confront
each other,
coirect one
anoiher
mutually-that
is,
destroy
each other-but
also combine
and
fnally
engender
a
"s)mthetic"
truth.
But
this
latter
is
still
iust
one
opinion
among
many
others.
It is
a new
thesis that
will
find or arouse
a
new
anti-thesis,
in
order
to asociate
itself
with it by
negating it-
i.e.,
by
modifying
it-in
a
new synthesis, in
which it will
G dif-
ferent
from what
it
was
at
the
starr.
And
so
on, until
one achieves
a
"rynthesis"
that will
no
longer
be
the
thesis of a discussion
or
a
"thesis"
that
can be
discussed;
an indisputable
"truth"
that will no
long-e1
be a simple
"opinion"
or
one of
the
possible
opinions; or,
speakilg
objectively,
the single
One
which is
not in opposition
to
an
Other because
it
is
the
Whole-the
Idea of the ideas,
or the
Good.
In
philosophy or
science
born
from
discusion-thar is, in
dia-
lectical
(or
synrhetic)
truth
which realizes
the
Good
in man by
verbally
revealing
the
One-Whole-the
intermediate theses,
anti-
theses,
and syntheses
rre aaf
gehobnt,
as
Hegel will
later
say.
They
are
"overcome," in
the
threefold
sense of the
German word
Aafheben-that
is,
"overcome dialectically." In
the
first
place, they
are oaercotne
or annulled
with respect
to whatever
is
fragmentary,
relative,
partial,
or one-sided
in them-that
is, with
respect
to what
makes
them false
when one
of
them is taken not for
az
opinion,
but
as
tbe
truth.
Secondly,
they are ^lso
preseraed
or
safeguarded
with
respect
to
whatever
is essential
or
universal
in
them-that
is, with
respect
to
what in
each
of
them
reveals
one
of
the manifold
aspecrs
of the
total
and
single realiry.
Finally, they are sablimated-tizt
ts,
raised
to a zuperior
level
of knowledge
and
of
reality,
and
there-
r80
Tle
Dioleab ol the Real
ard
tlp Phenomcrcbgtcal
Methoil tn Hegel
fore
of
truth;
for by completing
one enother, the
thesis and
the
antithesis
get
rid
of
their
one-sided
and limited
or,
beffer,
"subjec-
tive" character,
and
as
synrhesis
they reveal
a more comprehensive
and hence
e more
comprehensible
aspect
of the
"objective"
real.
But
if dialectic
finally
attains
the adequation
of
discursive
thought
to Realiry
and
Being, nothing
in
Realiry and
Being cor-
responds
to dielectic.
The
dialectical
movement is
a movemint
of
hlman
thought
and discourse;
bur
the
realiry itself
which one
thinks
and
of
which
one talks
is
in no
way diaiectical.
Dialectic is
but
a
method
of
philosophic
research
and-exposition.
And we
see,
by
the v/ay,
that
the method
ts dialecical
only
because it
implies
a negative
or
negadng
elemenr:
n{mely,
the anrirhesis
which- op-
poses
the
thesis in
a
verbal
fight
and calls
for
an effort
of demon-
stradon,
an effort,
moreover,
indistinguishable
from
t refutation.
Thele
is truth
properly
so-called-that
is,
scientific
or
philosophic
truth,
or
better,
dialectical
or
synthetical
truth<nlv
*het"
tir"r"
hes
been
discussion
or
dialogue-that
is,
antithesis
orgoAoga
thesis.
In Plato,
the
dialectical
method
is
still
quite close
to its historical
ottg.t* (the
sophistic
discusions).
In hir
writings
we
:ue
dealing
with
genuine
dialogues,
in
which
the thesis
and-the antithesis
ari
presented
by
different
persons
(socrates
generally incarnates
the
antithesis
of
all
rheses-
asserted
by
his
intlrlocutors
or
expressed
suc.cesively
by
one
of
them).
And
as for
rhe synthesis,
it
is
gen-
erally
the
auditor
who
must
make
it-th"
"odito,
who
is-the
philosopher
properly
so-called:
plato
himself
or
that disciple
who
is
capable
of-
understanding
him.
This auditor
finaly
attains
the
absolute
trurh
which
resulti
from
the
entirery
of
thi
dialectic
or
from
the
coordinated
movement
of
all
the dialogues,
a
truth that
reveals
rhe
"roral"
or
"synthetical"
Good
which
i capable oI
fully
and
definitively
"satisfying',
the
one
who
knows
ii
and
who L
consequently
beyond
discussion
or
dialectic.s
s
For
Plato,
it
must
be
added,
there
is a
gap,
a break
in
continuity.
Dielectic
only
prepares
the
vision
of the
Good,
uut
aocs not
necessarily
lead to
it:
this
vision
is
a sort
of
mystic
irluminarion
or
ecstasy.
(cf.
the
scventh
l*acr).
perhaps
the
vision
is
silent,
rnd
the
Good inefiable
(in
which
case
plato
would
be'a
!If-stic),
In
any
case,
it is more
than,
and
different
from, the
integradon
of
the
dielectical
movement
of thought:
ir
is
an
intuition
mi
generb,
obiJctively
speak-
ing'
God or
the
one
is
something
other
than
the
Totality
* h,.
i"i,
-i
i,
beyond
Being;
it
'rs
z ttanscendent
God.
plato
is
certainly
e
Theologirn,
(cf.
above,
the
Course
of
thc
year
r93g-r9,
Note
on
Eterniry,
Time,
and
.t.
-Con".pi.)
r8r
INTRODUCTION
TO
THE
READINC
OF
HECEL
In
Aristotle
the
dialectical
method
is
les
apparent
than
in
plato.
But it
continues
to
be applied.
It becomes
the aporetic
method:
the
solution
of
the
problem-results
from
a discusion
(and
sometimes
from
a simple
iuxtaposition)
of
all
possible
opinions-that
is, of
all
oplruons
that
are
coherent
and
do not
contradict
themselves.
And
che
dialecrical
method
was
preserved in
this
"schorasric" form
until
our
time in
both
the
sciences
and
philosophy.
But
along
a
parallel
line
there
was
something
else.
,
Like
all
opinion,
the Myth
arises
spontaneoisly
and is accepted
(o.r.reiected)
in
the
same
way.
Man
cieates it in
and by
his
(,,poeti-
cal")
imaginadon,
conrent
lf he
avoids
conradictions
whin
he
develops
his
initial
idea or
"intuition." But when
the
confrontation
with
a different
opinion
or
myth
engenders
the
desire
for
t
proof
,
which
cannor
as
yet
be satisfied
by-z danonstration
through
dis-
cussion,
one
feels
the need
to found
one's
opinion
or the
mph
that
one
is
proposing
(both
being
supposed
tobe
unverifiable-empiri-
c-afll-i.e.,
by
an
appeal
to
tommon
sense
experience)
on rotn"-
,Tng
To.t:
than simple
personal
conaiction br
,,subiective
cer-
.d1ry"
(Gea:issheit)-which
is
visibty
of the
same
rype
and
w{g\
as the
adversary's.
A
foundation
of
superior
or'.idivine"
value
is
19ught
and
found:
the
myth is
presenied as having
been
"reveeled"
!)r
a
god, who
is
supposed
to be the
guarantee
for
its
truth-that
is,
for
its
universal
and eternal
validiw.
Just
like
dialectical
truth,
rhis
"revealed"
myrhical
rrurh could
not have
been
found
by
an
isolated
man
confronted with
Nature.
Here
too
"trees teach
man
nothing,"
But
,,the
men
in the
city"
do
not
teach him
anything
either.
It
ii a
God who
reveals
the
truth
to
him-in-
a
"myrh."
But
in
contrast
to
dialectical
truth, this
mythical
truth
is
not
the result
of
r discussion
or
a dialogue:
God
alone
spoke,
while
man
was
content
to listen, to undlrstand,
and
to
transcribe
(and
to
do this
far
from
the ciry, on the
top of
a
mountain,
and so
on).
Even
after
having
been
a Platonic
philosopher,
man
can
still
sometimes
renrrn
ro
the
"mythological't
period. Such
was
the
case
oJ
Saint
Augustine.
But
this
"retirn"
is
in
realiry a
"synrhesis":
the
myth-revealing
God
becomes
a quasi-Socraiic intlrlocutor;
man
engages
in
dialogue
with his
God, even
if
he does
nor go
so
far
rs to have
a
discussion
with him
(Abraham,
however,
disiusses
with
Jehovah!).
But
this
divine-human
"dialogue"
is but
a
hybrid
r8z
TLe
Dialzctb
ol
tlw Reat
anil
tfu
Phenomercbghal
MetW
ln
Hegel
and ffensitory
form
of the
dialectical
method.
Accordingly,
it
assumed
"n
iofinite
variety
of forms
among
the
diverse
"Mystics,"
ranging
from
true dialogue
in which "God"
is but a
title
for
the
huriariinterlocutor
witfi
whom
one discusse',
to
diverse "revela-
tions"
on the tops
of
mountains
in which
the
human partner
is
only a
mute
auditor,
"convinced"
beforehand.
In any
case,
the divine
interlocutor
is,
in
fact,
fictitious.
It
all
happenjin
the
soul
itself of the
"scientist."
And
that
is why-
S1y
Augustine
had
"dialogues"
with
his
"soul."
And
a
distant--disciple
of ihat
Platonic
(or
Plotinian) Christian,
Descartes,
deliberately
dropped
God
and wes
content to
have
dialogue
and
discusion
yith
hiil;f. Thus
Dialectic
became
"Meditation."
It
was
in the
form
of
Cartesian
meditadon that the dialectical
method
was
used
by the
authors
of the
great philosophical "systems"
of the
seventeenth
and
eighteenth
centuries,
from Descartes
to Kant-Fichte-Schelling.
At
first sight,
this is a step
backwards
in relation
to Socrates-Plato-
Aristotle. The great
modern
"Systems"
are like
so
many
"Myths"
which are
iuxtiposed
without being
discussed,
which are
created
out of nothing by their
authors
without coming
from
an
earlier
dialogue.
But in fact, this
is
not
at all the
case. On
the
one
hand
the author
himself discusses
his
"theses"
and
demonstates
theit
veracity by
refuting
possible
oblections
or
"antitheses":
thus
he
applies a dialectical method. On the
other hand,
in fact,
the Platonic
Dialogues preceded
these Systems,
which come
from them "dia-
lectically" through the
intermediary of the
aporetic discussions
of
Aristotle and the scholastic
Aristotelians. And
just
as
in a Platonic
Dialogue,
the
auditor
(who
in this case
is
a
historian-philosopher
of
philosophy)
discovers
the absolute truth
as the
result
of the
implicit
or tacit
"discussion"
between
the great
Systems
of
history,
hence. as the result of their "dialecdc."
Hegel was the first of these auditor-historian-philosophers.
In
any
case, he was the first to be so consciously. And that
is why
he was
the
first
who could knowingly abandon Dialectic
conceived as a
philosophical
method. He is content to observe
and describe
the
dialectic which
was effected throughout history,
and he no longer
needs
to
make
t dialectic himself. This
dialectic,
or the
"dialogue"
of
the Philosophies,
took
place
before
him.
He
only
has to have
the "experience"
of it and to
describe
its synthetical
final
result
in
a coherent
discourse: the expression of rhe absolute
truth
is
r83
INTAODUCTION
TO
THE
READINC
OF IIEGEL
nothing
but
rhe adequate
verbal
description
of
rhe
dialecdc which
engendered
it.
Thus,
Hegel's
Science
is
,,dialectical,'
only
to
the
extent
that
the Philosophy
which
prepared
it throughout
History
has
been
(implicitly
or explicitly)-diilecdcal
-
At
6rst sight,
this
attitude
of
Hegel
is
a
simple
return
to
plato.
If Plato
lets
Parmenides,
Protagoras,
Socrates, and
sdll
others
have
dialogues,
while being
conrent
to
record
the
result
of
their
dis-
cussions,
Hegel records
the
result
of
the
discussion
which
he
orqnizes
between
Plato and
Descartes,
Spinoza and Kant,
Fichte
and
Schelling,
and
so on.
Hence, here
again we
would seem to
be
dealing
with
a dialectical
ntetbod
in the
search for
truth
or in
its
exposition,
which
in no
way
affects the
Real
which that truth
reveals.
And
Hegel
does
actually
say somewhere
that he is only
rediscovering
the
ancient
or, rarher,
Platonic,
dialectic. But
a
closer
examination
shows
that
this is not
at
all
the
case,
and
thar
when
Hegel
speaks
of
Dialectic,
he is
talking about something
quite
different
from
what
is found
in
his
predecessors..
One can
say, if
one
pleases,
that the
erernal light
of
absolute
Hegelian truth,
too, comes
from
the collision of
all
the philosophic
opinions
which
preceded
it. However,
this ideal
dialectic, the dia-
logue of
the
Philosophies,
took
place,
according
to Hegel, only
because
it is
a refection
of the real
dialectic of
Being. And only
because
it
reflects
rhis
real
dialectic
does it finally achieve,
in the
person of
Hegel, the
truth
or the
complete and adequate
revelation
of
the Real. Each
philosophy
correctly reveals
or
describes e turn-
ing
point
or
a stopping
place-thetical,
andthetical,
or synthetical-
of
the real
dialectic, of the
Beasegu.ng
of
existing Being.
And
that
only
re
is
why each
philosophy
ir
"rrue"
in
a
certain sense.
But it is true
only
relatively
or
temporerily: it
remains
"true"
as long
as a
new
or
temporerily: it
remains
"true"
as long
as a
new
philosophy, also
"true," does not come
along
to
demonstrate
its
"error."
However,
a
philosophy does not
by
itself
transform
itself
into
anorher
philosophy or
engender
that orher
philosophy
in
and
by an
autonomous
dialectical
movement.
The
Real
corresponding
to
a
given
philosophy
itself
becomes
really
other
(thetical,
anti-
thetical,
or
synthetical),
and this other
Real
is
what engenders
a
Hegel is nonetheless
right
in saying
that
he
rediscovers
Plato;
for Platonic
dielectic,
the dialectical
method,
acrually
is an aspect of
the
dielecdc
of. the rcal
rvhich
Hegel
discovered.
r84