ix
introduction
been Chancellor of Germany for two years by the time of the publication
Napoléon , and who had already closed down newspapers, imprisoned polit-
ical opponents, withdrawn from the League of Nations and set Europe on
the path to war.
Described by Robespierre’s biographer Colin Haydon as an ‘austere
republican’,
*
Lefebvre also took Napoleon to task for his lack of trust in
the French people, pointing out the paradox in the emperor’s attitude towards
the general will, and likening it to that of Frederick the Great. ‘The fewer
obstacles he met, the more jealous and irritable he became,’ wrote Lefebvre.
‘Like Frederick II, he continually emphasised the personal character of his
government. Judging by the constitutions he gave to the realms of Naples and
Westphalia, his intention was to eliminate fi nally the elective principle.
However, neither the electorate nor the assembly did anything to hinder him.’
Lefebvre highlighted the Treaty of Lunéville of February 1801 as the
moment when the true interests of France began to diverge from those of
her First Consul, a date far earlier than most of Napoleon’s other biogra-
phers. ‘Bonaparte had slashed the Gordian knot with a single blow,’ he states
when summing up the treaty. ‘The victory over Austria had done far more
than confi rm and consolidate the conquest of the natural frontiers . . . he
clearly indicated that he intended to keep Austria out of Italy altogether . . .
The pacifi cation of Europe, pursued along these lines, could only result in a
temporary truce.’ In such strictures against Napoleon’s hectoring and
bellicose foreign policy it is again hard not to discern contemporaneous
criticism of Adolf Hitler.
Yet even that needs to be seen in the context of Lefebvre’s equivocating
conclusions about Napoleon back in 1935, because when considering
whether ‘Napoleon’s work was doomed to fail’, the author wrote: ‘It would
perhaps be salutary for all would-be Caesars and for the good of the human
race if this judgement could be held beyond a doubt. But this cannot for one
moment be admitted.’ For, Lefebvre argues, Tsar Alexander I’s ‘will-power
might well have failed at Moscow, and the allied army might have been
destroyed at [the Battle of ] Lützen. The only solid certainty is that the risks
were tremendous, and that France, hazarding her all, lost all that the
Revolution had conquered in her name.’
Lefebvre sees Napoleon’s second tragedy as stemming from the break-
down of the Anglo-French Peace of Amiens in May 1803, and it is hard to
disagree with him. Fierce historiographical battles have been fought ever
since, not least by Napoleon himself in his memoirs dictated on St Helena,
* Colin Haydon and William Doyle (eds), Robespierre (Cambridge, 2006), p. 6.