McBride W.M. Technological change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945

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Doctrine, Hoover was quite willing to accede to Japanese inﬂuence in Asia.

He pointed out that “No critic has yet asserted that with the navies provided

in this agreement, together with our army, our aerial defense, and our na-

tional resources, we cannot defend ourselves, and we certainly want no mil-

itary establishment for the domination of other nations.” The economy of-

fered by the treaty was set at $500 million in construction alone and the

savings would increase when the operating costs for the larger, pretreaty

ﬂeet were included.

On 21 July 1930, the Senate ratiﬁed the treaty, ﬁfty-

eight votes to nine.

As the Depression deepened, Hoover sought to reduce government ex-

penditures, especially in naval armament. In 1931, he cut the naval con-

struction budget and suspended naval construction for the 1933 ﬁscal year,

reinforcing the General Board’s fears that the navy would be budgeted out

of existence.

In 1932, Hoover pushed for further naval reductions at the

Geneva Arms Conference. When the conference broke down over the

complex issues of military disarmament in Europe, Hoover sought to revi-

talize it by ﬂoating an offer of even deeper naval armament cuts: a reduc-

tion in aircraft carrier tonnage by one-fourth and capital ship and subma-

rine tonnage by one-third. Hoover’s plan was accepted by the majority of

the attending nations but blocked by Britain. The talks continued, but the

prospect of further naval reductions died with Hoover’s loss to Roosevelt in

the fall election.

Roosevelt and the Navy

In contrast to his three Republican predecessors, Franklin Roosevelt was

a navalist. He was inﬂuenced by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and,

while recovering from polio in 1922, had agreed to edit, but never made any

progress on, a new edition of Mahan’s works. Roosevelt had been a mem-

ber of the U.S. Naval Institute since 1927 and, prior to joining, had acquired

a set of the Institute’s Proceedings from 1887 through 1917. Roosevelt’s naval

worldview was grounded in his tour as assistant secretary of the navy (1913–

20), where he grew to know the navy, and its ofﬁcers, during the height of

the battleship era. As a battleship aﬁcionado, Roosevelt subscribed to the

navy’s battleship-based strategic and technological paradigms and during

the 1930s appointed members of the “Gun Club”—battleship ofﬁcers who

Technological Change and the United States Navy

164

had served as chiefs of the Bureau of Ordnance—to serve in the navy’s

highest post, chief of naval operations (CNO).

Franklin Roosevelt’s occupancy of the White House meant more than

just renewed executive branch support for a larger navy. Roosevelt always

found time to manage the Navy Department, and according to Robert Al-

bion, selected the old and ailing Senator Claude Swanson to serve as sec-

retary of the navy precisely so that the president could have a free hand.

Unlike his predecessors, Roosevelt regularly reviewed designs for new

ships; he even ordered the relocation of airplane catapults and speciﬁed

the number of “smoke-stacks” to suit his taste.

With regard to the navy,

Roosevelt was like a small boy given the run of a candy store. Although not

hostile to naval aviation, he saw its strategic and tactical roles as subordi-

nate to the battleship in much the same way as did the navy’s senior admi-

rals.

While an active “tweaker” of surface ship technologies, Roosevelt de-

ferred to the battleship hierarchy on broader issues within the navy’s strate-

gic paradigm. In 1937, for example, he canceled the navy’s lighter-than-air

program on the advice of the chief of naval operations, Admiral William

Leahy.

But Roosevelt’s was a strong voice on technological issues within

the battleship technological paradigm, and he forced the navy to issue con-

tracts for six battlecruisers in 1940 despite the professional consensus that

this type of ship was no longer viable. Roosevelt’s “meddling” resulted in a

cold relationship with Admiral William H. Standley, who as CNO (1933–

37) resented the president’s “inﬂated opinion” of his own knowledge of

naval matters. All in all, Franklin Roosevelt had more to do with the navy

than any chief executive since Theodore Roosevelt.

The naval ofﬁcer corps welcomed Roosevelt’s interest after the antinaval

policies of the New Era. Roosevelt’s campaign courted the naval vote dur-

ing the 1932 presidential race, spreading rumors that President Hoover in-

tended to reduce the navy further and abolish the Marine Corps if he was

reelected. Hoover had canceled the salaried annual reserve training in 1932

in the interest of ﬁscal responsibility, and naval reserve ofﬁcers in the 7th

Naval Reserve Area (Great Lakes region) were warned that the Navy De-

partment was planning on removing all training ships from the Great

Lakes. After meeting with Roosevelt, a naval reserve ofﬁcer, Commander

M. R. Whortley, informed his colleagues that “Governor Roosevelt assured

me with considerable force that if he is elected, and we can carry on until

Disarmament, Depression, and Politics

165

March 4th [inauguration], that we need no longer worry about the secu-

rity of the Naval Reserve and its training vessels on the Lakes.”

The election of 1932 hardly turned upon the votes of the relatively small

number of active and reserve naval ofﬁcers, but the naval ofﬁcer corps

strongly identiﬁed with Roosevelt and saw him as a chief executive who

would support naval expansion and the construction of the maximum

number of ships allowed under the naval treaties. The U.S. Naval Institute’s

prize essay for 1933, written after the November 1932 election, reﬂected

the expectations engendered by Roosevelt’s membership in the navalist

thought collective, predicting that “the naval policy of the United States

under the new Democratic administration is necessarily the realization of

President Wilson’s vision of a world dominant American navy establishing

world peace.” The editor of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings charac-

terized the forthcoming years as yielding a “new Pax Romana based on the

American Navy.”

Naval ofﬁcers’ exuberance over Roosevelt was typiﬁed by Harold Stark

(later CNO when Pearl Harbor was attacked in 1941), a battleship captain

and compatriot from Roosevelt’s days as assistant secretary of the navy.

Stark asked permission to visit the White House to see Roosevelt “in those

surroundings where we have so long wanted and needed you.” In a second

note, Stark told Roosevelt: “Take good care of Uncle Sam’s Navy! We have

long been in need of a friend; . . . it is good to have a one hundred per cent

American in the White House.”

If patriotism was measured by support

for naval expansion, then Roosevelt would soon become Uncle Sam in-

carnate. During the seven and one-half years between his inauguration and

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt rebuilt the Amer-

ican navy. But the navy he rebuilt was based on authorizations for seven-

teen new battleships and reﬂected Roosevelt’s commitment to the battle-

ship technological paradigm and the strategy it embodied.

Naval Rearmament as Public Works

In November 1932 Roosevelt met with the Democratic chairman of the

House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson of Georgia, at Warm Springs

to develop a consensus regarding the naval program for the next four years.

Vinson had fought unsuccessfully against the congressional leaders of his

Technological Change and the United States Navy

166

own party and Hoover to authorize naval construction up to the treaty lim-

its. After meeting with Roosevelt, Vinson shocked naval ofﬁcers when he

announced a “Democratic naval program” that was more conservative

(cutting the naval budget $100 million—28 percent below ﬁscal year 1932)

and provided less money for naval construction for the next ﬁve years ($30

million per year) than Hoover’s.

The naval retrenchment proposed by

Roosevelt was most likely a passing fancy attributable to early interregnum,

conservative ﬁscal advisers who saw balanced federal budgets as the way to

economic recovery. With the major private-sector and navy shipyards lo-

cated in Democratic strongholds such as Philadelphia, New York City,

Boston, Camden, and Charleston, such cutbacks were unlikely.

Once back among his congressional colleagues, Vinson repudiated this

initial naval plan and led the ﬁght for public works funding for naval ship

construction. In December 1932 he requested a navy study on the eco-

nomic effects of naval ship construction programs. The previous year, the

navy had tried to promote itself by touting its relation to the “industrial, sci-

entiﬁc, economic, and political development of the Nation.” Outgoing

navy secretary Charles Adams, frustrated and perhaps embittered by

Hoover’s antinavalism, informed Vinson that an annual appropriation of

$400 million would “keep at least 1,290,000 of people of this country out of

unemployed status . . . [and] In discharging its constitutional function of

‘providing for the common defense’ the federal government would thus

manifestly be ‘promoting the general welfare.’ “ Rear Admiral Emory S.

Land, chief of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, began lobbying Sen-

ator Robert Wagner, Democrat from New York, for public works appropri-

ations for ship construction as part of what became the NIRA.

By March 1933, the ﬁscally conservative Roosevelt naval program of the

previous November was dead. Within three weeks of his March inaugura-

tion, Roosevelt was encouraging naval rearmament as a part of public works

since approximately 85 percent of shipbuilding costs went to labor. Secre-

tary of the Navy Swanson boasted that “every State will beneﬁt” since ship

construction drew on materials produced throughout the United States

and ship production required the skills of more than 125 trades.

On 21

March 1933, Swanson announced, not surprisingly, that the navy would

support the inclusion of naval construction as a part of the public works in-

cluded in any legislation enacted for unemployment relief. The following

day, Swanson told the chief of naval operations and the chiefs of the navy’s

Disarmament, Depression, and Politics

167

bureaus that “the Navy could rely heavily upon the friendly attitude of the

President” in their efforts to include naval construction in unemployment

relief.

Senator Wagner’s original public works relief package was expanded

and incorporated into the compromise National Industrial Recovery Act

hammered out by Wagner and Commerce Department undersecretary

John Dickinson in meetings with budget director Lewis Douglas and labor

lawyer Daniel Richberg. The $3.3 billion public works funding authorized

by NIRA appealed to those who advocated government “pump priming,”

as well as to navalists who had fought, without success, to include naval

construction as federal public works during the Hoover presidency.

While apparently aiding the ailing domestic economy, the naval aspects

of NIRA generated keen attention abroad—especially in Japan. On 16 May

1933, one month prior to signing NIRA, Roosevelt sent his “Appeal to the

Nations” message to world leaders in which he called for the elimination

of “all offensive weapons.” In reporting his message to Congress, Roosevelt

wrote: “permanent defenses are a non-recurring charge against govern-

mental budgets while large armies, continually rearmed with improved of-

fensive weapons, constitute a recurring charge. This . . . is responsible for

governmental deﬁcits and threatened bankruptcy.” Roosevelt’s focus was

on military, not naval, expenditures, and the inference is that he consid-

ered expenditures on the U.S. Navy as defensive—a view not shared by the

Japanese. He had sent his message, he told Congress, “because it has

become increasingly evident that the assurance of world political and eco-

nomic peace and stability is threatened by selﬁsh and short-sighted poli-

cies.”

Was NIRA naval rearmament to stimulate the economy a selﬁsh policy?

To many, the plan for new naval construction seemed so. The president of

the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Hanna Cloth-

ier Hull, castigated Roosevelt for tolerating any plans to build the navy

up to the treaty limits. Hull was joined by a cross-section of academics,

such as the president of Brown University and the dean of the School of

Journalism at the University of Oregon, who characterized the Navy De-

partment’s policy as “insanely and dangerously reckless.” Mary Woolley,

president of Mt. Holyoke College, worried about the effect of naval con-

struction on the Good Neighbor Policy.

But according to Raymond Mo-

ley—Roosevelt’s conﬁdant, de facto chair of Roosevelt’s professorial “brain

trust,” and assistant secretary of state—Roosevelt did not believe that the

Technological Change and the United States Navy

168

Depression could be ended by “international measures” such as reducing

war debts or opening international trade. The core of the recovery program

had to be domestic.

Roosevelt’s responses to his critics were sugary, and his support for the

naval construction program, as a part of economic recovery, did not waiver.

He did direct Henry L. Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, to

muzzle the admirals who were calling too much attention to the NIRA

naval construction program by their public attacks on the “professional

paciﬁsts.”

With battleship construction prohibited by treaty, the question for the

admirals was how to use NIRA funds. Their answer was to shore up the

battleship technological paradigm by replacing or adding supportive ships

such as destroyers constructed during World War I and now reaching ob-

solescence en masse. To prevent block obsolescence from recurring, Chief

of Naval Operations Admiral William V. Pratt proposed the construction

of 132 ships spaced over the next 8 years. The ships included 76 destroyers,

9 destroyer leaders, 23 submarines, two 20,000-ton aircraft carriers, one

15,200-ton aircraft carrier, 8 cruisers, and 13 gunboats, for a total cost of over

$944 million. First priority was assigned to destroyers, followed by aircraft

carriers, light cruisers, submarines, and one heavy cruiser. To ensure broad

political support, Pratt speciﬁed which private-sector and navy shipyards

could receive particular contracts.

In passing the NIRA, Congress relinquished its traditional role of deﬁn-

ing the technological nature of American naval power as it had done with

the “sea-going coastline” battleships of the 1890s. But the National Indus-

trial Recovery Act, in accordance with Roosevelt’s wishes, did not specify

the level of funding or the numbers and types of ships to be built with pub-

lic works money. In a complete break with precedent, naval construction

now would be at the discretion of the president and begin by executive or-

der. NIRA gave the president carte blanche to construct ships and procure

aircraft as allowed under the terms of the naval treaties. The geographic di-

versity of NIRA public works blunted congressional opposition to placing

so much power in the hands of the president.

On 15 June 1933, the day Roosevelt signed NIRA into law, Secretary

Swanson submitted a draft executive order for naval construction. In his

annual report for ﬁscal year 1933, Swanson called for the creation, mainte-

nance, and operation of a navy “second to none.”

Toward this end Swan-

son’s draft requested $253 million—$238 million for ship construction and

Disarmament, Depression, and Politics

169

$15 million for new aircraft. Roosevelt approved the $238 million for new

ships on the same day he signed the NIRA and personally approved the

contracts for twenty-one NIRA ships to be built by private shipyards.

The

majority of the thirty-two ships contracted by Roosevelt under NIRA were

a boost to traditional Democrat areas. The Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine,

received contracts for two destroyers that returned 1,500 skilled ship-

builders to work. This contract fulﬁlled the promise made in Bath by

Jimmy Roosevelt during the presidential campaign. As a result of the con-

tracts, the president of Bath Iron Works, W. S. Newall, abandoned the Re-

publican Party and became a “Roosevelt Democrat.”

Roosevelt’s battleship orientation, coupled with the economic insignif-

icance of the aircraft industry in comparison to shipbuilding, led him to

reject the argument for new naval aircraft, and he cut the aviation pro-

curement authorization by over one-third. The chief of the Bureau of Aero-

nautics, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, argued that the battleship admirals

had forced the bureau to pay wrongfully for the observation and scouting

aircraft carried on new ships out of the 1,000-plane-navy appropriations stem-

ming from the 1926 Morrow Board.

According to King, aircraft for new

ships should have come from separate, annual “increase of the navy” ap-

propriations, and not cut into the 1926 appropriations designed to beef up

navy and army air power. “Increase of the navy” funds were extremely lim-

ited during the Hoover administration, and their expenditure was con-

trolled by the battleship hierarchy, who considered aviation, although im-

portant for scouting, as just one of many areas competing for limited funds.

Roosevelt referred the bureau complaint to Secretary of the Interior Harold

Ickes, chairman of the president’s Special Board for Public Works.

Ickes

had no sympathy for King’s request, but after several months of wrangling,

naval aviation was able to wrest $7.5 million from Ickes for 130 new aircraft,

half of $15 million allocated for army and navy aviation.

House Naval Affairs Committee chairman Carl Vinson sought to build

upon the momentum of the NIRA naval program by working for the en-

actment of a multiyear naval construction plan in 1934. In addition to the

thirty-two ships authorized under NIRA, the United States was still allowed

ninety-two ships (displacing 177,000 tons) under the terms of the naval

treaties. In December 1933 Roosevelt expressed interest in a $100 million

authorization bill to increase NIRA ship construction in 1935 from three

ships to twenty-ﬁve. Opposition from budget director Lewis Douglas as well

as a letter warning against expanded naval construction from Norman

Technological Change and the United States Navy

170

Davis, the U.S. delegate at the Geneva arms negotiations, dampened Roo-

sevelt’s enthusiasm and he tabled his proposal, but Vinson and the navy

pushed ahead. Encouraged by NIRA funding, the navy proposed its own

ambitious 1935 program introduced by Vinson as H.R.6604. Vinson pried

a grudging endorsement from the Bureau of the Budget and began hear-

ings on his bill in January 1934. The naval construction proposed by Vin-

son became the target of paciﬁst and antinavy sentiment already inﬂamed

by the naval construction included under NIRA. In February 1934, Secre-

tary of State Cordell Hull informed the president that the government had

been receiving over two hundred letters and telegrams per day, 99 percent

of which opposed the Vinson Bill.

The political inﬁghting over the enactment of the Vinson–Trammell

Act of 1934 is incidental to this study, but one point is worth noting. The

Act conﬁrmed the abdication of congressional authority over the techno-

logical composition of the navy, placing its determination in the hands of

the president. After signing the bill into law on 27 March 1934, Roosevelt

issued a statement attempting to pass the Vinson–Trammell Act off as a

mere policy statement concerning the naval construction philosophy of

Congress. But during the signing ceremony, Roosevelt had promised Vin-

son and Acting Secretary of the Navy Henry L. Roosevelt that the funds for

the twenty ships of the ﬁrst year’s construction program would be taken di-

rectly from Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds, obviating the

navy’s potentially controversial $38 million supplemental budget request

pending before the Bureau of the Budget.

Roosevelt and the navy were

spared the publicity, and delay, of congressional hearings.

While some domestic attention was deﬂected, international interest was

keen. The hierarchy of the Japanese navy, according to Arthur Marder, at-

tached tremendous importance to the Vinson–Trammell Act, believing it

provided the U.S. Navy the means to engage in offensive operations in

Asia.

The End of Treaty Restrictions

Japanese naval ofﬁcers responded to New Deal naval programs with

pressure on their government to increase overall naval construction and to

withdraw from the London Naval Treaty to concentrate on the construc-

tion of superbattleships to ensure qualitative, technological superiority

Disarmament, Depression, and Politics

171

over the United States. The majority of Japanese naval ofﬁcers had been

offended by the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance after World

War I and the “humiliating” Five-Power and London naval treaties. They

equated “disarmament” and “naval limitation” with U.S. “oppression” of

Japan.

While the Republican New Era administrations had limited warship

construction, the Japanese had built their navy up to their treaty limits and

were close to achieving 80 percent of tonnage parity with the United States

in all categories except battleships. The Japanese expected to maintain this

ratio, and its favorable strategic implications, through 1936, but were con-

cerned by renewed U.S. naval construction with NIRA funding. The navy

minister,

Osumi Mineo, lobbied for a larger naval budget in response to

what appeared to be an open-ended American naval construction program.

The army minister, sensitive to any increase in the naval budget, and the

foreign and ﬁnance ministers argued for restraint. In the fall of 1933, Prime

Minister Saito¯ Makoto ignored the advice of the ﬁnance minister and in-

creased the military budget from 36 percent to 45 percent of total expen-

ditures to fund the 1933 Emergency Program. The Second Replenishment

Program (1934–37) authorized 90 ships totaling 221,096 tons in response to

the 1934 Vinson–Trammell Act.

Emboldened, the naval ofﬁcer corps set their sights on ending Japanese

naval inferiority rooted in the naval treaties’ ratio system. Admiral Kato¯

Kanji warned that if the government failed to end participation in the ra-

tio system, it would be difﬁcult to control the naval ofﬁcer corps. With the

navy’s position “absolute,” Prime Minister Okada Keisuke opted on 7 Oc-

tober 1934 to save his government and gave the two-year notice to abrogate

the naval treaties.

Prior to their pursuit of superbattleship technology, the Japanese relied

on yo¯geki sakusen, the “strategy of interceptive operations” put into place

in 1933. This doctrine mandated repeated submarine and torpedo bomber

attacks to reduce the U.S. battle ﬂeet by 30 percent as it advanced toward

Japan for a battleship duel.

Even before the advent of “interceptive” op-

erations, Admiral Kato¯ relied on Japanese “will power,” based in the Yamato

spirit and the warrior code of bushido¯, to overcome the U.S. Navy’s mater-

ial superiority.

This was much like the Edwardian ofﬁcer corps’ planned

reliance on “manly courage” and “virility” to prevail against the machine

gun and modern artillery at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Ad-

miral Yamamoto Isoroku woefully compared the Yamato spirit with the

Technological Change and the United States Navy

172

Yankee spirit, and found the former “often verged on blind daredevilry”

while the latter was “soundly grounded on science and technology—a case

in point being Lindbergh’s transatlantic solo ﬂight.”

In justifying Japan’s withdrawal from the treaty system, the navy general

staff told Emperor Hirohito that “unrestrained naval construction would

actually be more economical, for Japan would be free to concentrate on ship

categories ‘best suited to its national requirements’ ”—the superbattleships

of the Yamato class, which would provide Japan with unassailable, quali-

tative, technological superiority over the Americans.

The argument res-

onates with one later advanced to support the development of the hydro-

gen bomb. The Japanese believed that even if the United States produced

a superbattleship comparable to Yamato and her 18.1-inch guns, Japan

would already be on its way to developing even larger superbattleships

mounting 20-inch guns. Japanese planners estimated that if their battle

plan was just 50 percent successful, the United States would require two

years to rebuild and mount another attack which would fare little better

without superbattleships. Presumably, rather than repeat the same mistake,

or spend ﬁve to eight years to design, build, and deploy superbattleships

of their own, the United States would recognize Japan’s primacy in East

Asia.

Responding to domestic concerns over the Japanese naval appropria-

tions of 1933–34, Roosevelt justiﬁed American naval construction in an Oc-

tober 1935 Navy Day letter by citing the “unsettled conditions existing

throughout the world.” He praised the Vinson–Trammell Act and its au-

thorization to build up the navy to a “degree commensurate with Amer-

ica’s needs, interests, and abilities.” The chief of naval operations, Admiral

Standley, echoed the president’s support for naval construction in a speech

before the New York State Chamber of Commerce. Standley argued that

American national security could only be maintained through the “insur-

ance of national military vigor” through continued appropriations to fund

the ships authorized by the Vinson–Trammell Act.

The 1935 London Naval Conference was the only hope of averting a new

naval race. Roosevelt’s appointment of the paciﬁst-baiting Admiral Stand-

ley (whom Roosevelt had previously had to muzzle) as a disarmament del-

egate drew widespread criticism. For example, Wyoming state senator

Charles Bream, a Roosevelt supporter in 1932, wrote Roosevelt that he

would work for his defeat in 1936 because Standley’s appointment de-

stroyed “all the conﬁdence sincere Americans had in you.” Calling Stand-

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173