
BOMBENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR CULTURE
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many chapters through which to pass, Eisenhower stimulated dis-
course on the topic of nuclear weapons from the outset.
Eisenhower’s ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ speech, given at the United
Nations in 1953, clearly instructed the world on the technological
stand-off that confronted it. The ‘‘two atomic colossi,’’ he forecasted,
could continue to ‘‘eye each other indefinitely across a trembling
world.’’ But eventually their failure to find peace would result in war
and ‘‘the probability of civilization destroyed,’’ forcing ‘‘mankind to
begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery
toward decency and right, and justice.’’ To Eisenhower, ‘‘no sane
member of the human race’’ could want this. In his estimation, the
only way out was discourse and understanding. With exactly these
battle lines, a war—referred to as cold, because it never escalates
(heats) to direct conflict—unfolded over the coming decades. With
ideology—communism versus capitalism—as its point of difference,
the conflict was fought through economics, diplomacy, and the
stockpiling of a military arsenal. With each side possessing a weapon
that could annihilate not just the opponent but the entire world, the
bomb defined a new philosophy of warfare.
The Cold War, lasting from 1949-1990, then may best be viewed
as an ongoing chess game, involving diplomats and physicists, while
the entire world prayed that neither player made the incorrect move.
Redefining ideas of attack and confrontation, the Cold War’s nuclear
arsenal required that each side live on the brink of war—referred to as
brinksmanship by American policy makers. Each ‘‘super power,’’ or
nuclear weapons nation, sought to remain militarily on the brink
while diplomatically dueling over economic and political influence
throughout the globe. Each nation sought to increase its ‘‘sphere of
influence’’ (or nations signed-on as like minded) and to limit the
others. Diplomats began to view the entire globe in such terms,
leading to wars in Korea and Vietnam over the ‘‘domino’’ assumption
that there were certain key nations that, if allowed to ally with a
superpower, could take an entire region with them. These two
conflicts defined the term ‘‘limited’’ warfare, which meant that
nuclear weapons were not used. However, in each conflict the use of
such weapons was hotly debated.
Finally, as the potential impact of the use of the bomb became
more clearly understood, the technological side of the Cold War
escalated into an ‘‘arms race’’ meant to stockpile resources more
quickly and in greater numbers than the other superpower. Historians
will remember this effort as possibly the most ridiculous outlet of
Cold War anxiety, because by 1990 the Soviets and Americans each
possessed the capability to destroy the earth hundreds of times. The
arms race grew out of one of the most disturbing aspects of the Cold
War, which was described by policy-makers as ‘‘MAD: mutually
assured destruction.’’ By 1960, each nation had adopted the philoso-
phy that any launch of a nuclear warhead would initiate massive
retaliation of its entire arsenal. Even a mistaken launch, of course,
could result in retaliatory action to destroy all life.
On an individual basis, humans had lived before in a tenuous
balance with survival as they struggled for food supplies with little
technology; however, never before had such a tenuous balance
derived only from man’s own technological innovation. Everyday
human life changed significantly with the realization that extinction
could arrive at any moment. Some Americans applied the lesson by
striving to live within limits of technology and resource use. Anti-
nuclear activists composed some of the earliest portions of the 1960s
counter culture and the modern environmental movement, including
Sea Shepherds and Greenpeace which grew out of protesting nuclear
testing. Other Americans were moved to live with fewer constraints
than every before: for instance, some historians have traced the
culture of excessive consumption to the realization that an attack was
imminent. Regardless of the exact reaction, American everyday life
had been significantly altered.
If Americans had managed to remain naive to the atomic
possibilities, the crisis of 1962 made the reality perfectly obvious.
U.S. intelligence sources located Soviet missiles in Cuba, 90 miles
from the American coast. Many options were entertained, including
bombing the missile sights; President John F. Kennedy, though,
elected to push ‘‘brinksmanship’’ further than it had ever before gone.
He stated that the missiles pressed the nuclear balance to the Soviet’s
advantage and that they must be removed. Kennedy squared off
against Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev in a direct confrontation with
the use of nuclear weapons as the only subsequent possibility for
escalation. Thirteen Days later, the Soviet Premier backed down and
removed the missiles. The world breathed a sigh of relief, realizing it
had come closer to destruction than ever before. For many observers,
there was also an unstated vow that the Cuban Missile Crisis must be
the last such threat.
The period of crisis created a new level of anxiety, however, that
revealed itself in a number of arenas. The well-known ‘‘atomic
clock,’’ calculated by a group of physicists, alerted the public to how
great the danger of nuclear war had become. The anxiety caused by
such potentialities, however, played out in a fascinating array of
popular films. An entire genre of science fiction films focused around
the unknown effects of radiation on subjects ranging from a beautiful
woman, to grasshoppers, to plants. Most impressively, the Godzilla
films dealt with Japanese feelings toward the effects of nuclear
technology. All of these films found a terrific following in the United
States. Over-sized lizards aside, another genre of film dealt with the
possibilities of nuclear war. On the Beach blazed the trail for many
films, including the well-known The Day After television mini-series.
Finally, the cult-classic of this genre, Dr. Strangelove starred Peter
Sellers in multiple performances as it posed the possibility of a
deranged individual initiating a worldwide nuclear holocaust. The
appeal of such films reveals the construction of what historian Paul
Boyer dubs an American ‘‘nuclear consciousness.’’
Such faith in nationalism, technological supremacy, and authori-
ty helped make Americans comfortable to watch above-ground
testing in the American West through the late 1950s. Since the danger
of radiation was not discussed, Americans often sat in cars or on lawn
chairs to witness the mushroom clouds from a ‘‘safe’’ distance.
Documentary films such as Atomic Cafe chronicle the effort to delude
or at least not fully inform the American public about dangers. Since
the testing, ‘‘down-winders’’ in Utah and elsewhere have reported
significant rises in leukemia rates as well as that of other types of
cancer. Maps of air patterns show that actually much of the nation
experienced some fall-out from these tests. The Cold War forced the
U.S. military to operate as if it were a period of war and certain types
of risks were necessary on the ‘‘home front.’’ At the time, a
population of Americans who were familiar with World War II
proved to be willing to make whatever sacrifices were necessary; later
generations would be less accepting.
Ironically, the first emphasis of this shift in public opinion would
not be nuclear arms, but its relative, nuclear power. While groups
argued for a freeze in the construction of nuclear arms and forced the
government to discontinue atomic weapons tests, Americans grew
increasingly comfortable with nuclear reactors in their neighbor-
hoods. The ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ program of the 1950s aided in the
development of domestic energy production based on the nuclear