
156  CHAPTER 5.  THEORY REVISION AND PROBABILITY 
of K), the more drastic and coarse a  contraction will be;  the more fine-grained it 
is (in the other extreme K  itself), the more we approach the above completeness 
result.  This  is  made  precise  in  Proposition  5.23,  which,  basically,  shows  that 
splitting  an  axiom r  into  {~b V 05, ~b V 705} will decide 05,  i.e.  give completeness 
with respect  to  r 
Consider now theories T, T! ....  in some finite s  C_  s  It is natural to define r,(T) 
:= E  {#(g(t)):  dorn(t)  :  s  t 
b 
r}.  (t b  T  means, of course, t(05) =  true for all 
05  E T, see Remark 5.20.)  In other words, t,(T)  is the sum of the probabilities  of 
all s  t  that make all 05 E T  true.  The more specific a  theory is, the less 
likely it is, too:  T  C_ T/ ~  u(TI)  <_  t,(T),  and the empty theory has probability 
1.  On the other hand, we are interested in  "good choices", i.e.  we prefer 05  to -~05 
if u(05) >  u(-~05). So t, will be  a good measure only for theories of the same level 
of specificity.  In other words, K  -  A  (here, K  -  A means some contraction of K 
with respect  to A)  cannot sensibly be the u-maximal Kt C__ K  such that K/~/A, 
as this is  always the empty theory. 
A  better  choice might be a  r-maximal one (if it exists)  among KA  ::  {K/C  K 
maximal:  K/k/A, K/is F-closed}, this is again  "maxichoice contraction". 
But  there  is  a  problem  to  maxichoice contraction,  pointed  out  in  lAMB2]: For 
any  K1  E  Ka,  A  E  K,  Th(I(~ u 
{~A}) 
will be  a  complete theory.  (The proof 
is  very  simple:  Let  B  be  given.  As  A  E  K,  AVB  and  AV-~B  are  in  K. 
Suppose  A  V B  r  K/,  A V -~B  r  KI.  As  A V B  6  K/,  by maximality there  is 
Co E Kt such that Co A (A V B) b  A, and as A V -~B r  Kt, there is C1  E K/with 
U1A(AV-,B) t- A. Thus, for C  := CoAC~ E Kt, CA(AVB)  t- A, CA(AV-,B) F A, 
consequently C  A B  F  A, C A -~B b  A, and C  t-  A, contradicting C  E K! E KA. 
Thus, A V B  E Kt or AV-~B  E K6  and KIU {-~A} b  B, or Kt U {-~A} b  -~B.  ) 
We now show that  this problem essentially carries over to theory revision based 
on axiom sets too. 
So far, we have examined theories without any specified axiom system generating 
the theory.  In the following, we consider pairs <  K, X  >, where X  is an axiom set 
for K. Define KA, X  :=  {<  Kt, X1 >:  X/C  X  maximal, X/t7' A, K/=  Th(Xt)} 
and choose K-A  as a u-maximal <  Kt, XI >  from KA, X  (if possible).  Consider 
nOW  <~  I(, X 1  >,  <~  /(, X 2 ~>,  w}lere X l  :--- {05, 05  ---+ ~), ~}, 
and X2  := {05, 05  --* ~b}. 
In both cases, we can infer ~b,  and the resulting theories are the same.  Suppose 
we now retract 05  -+ ~b. In case [, it is very sensible to uphold ~b, whereas in case 2, 
it will not be a  good choice.  (This example can be found analogously in  [GM88] 
and [FUV83].)  So we are highly dependant on the syntactic form of the axioms, 
and this is certainly not very desirable.  As  another example, consider revising a 
theory which  is  given by the  axiom 
sets  {al,  a~].  or 
{a I 
/~, a2}. 
So revision  may 
give different results  ({al}  or  {a2} vs.  the empty theory),  which  is  a  doubtful 
outcome.  To avoid this influence of the syntactic form, we might split the axioms 
as far as possible to obtain optimal results.  This procedure, however, approaches 
completeness, as the following Proposition will show: