The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
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PEASANTS AND COMMUNISTS 311
for the flight to Hong Kong, Swatow and Canton of more than
5
0,000
inhabitants from two hsien (and not all of them wealthy people, far from
it) and also for the participation of many peasants in revolts in truth
provoked mainly by parochial considerations,
101
the fact remains that a
large number of peasants did support the regime that cancelled their debts
and abolished their land rents (although the gradations in the intensity
of their support ranged from enthusiasm to passive fellow-travelling).
Even if they had not consciously sought the revolution upon which they
found themselves embarked and were no more partisans of collectivization
than of a return to the old order, most of them had profited sufficiently
from the change to fear any restoration of landlord domination.
4.
Polarisation
by
terror.
There was also a more pressing reason to fear
any restoration: the reprisals that many could have had no hope of
evading, since they had been involved in looting, arson and murder, in
short, in exercising the 'red terror'.
102
The soviet authorities had resorted
systematically to terror
—
as usual with a view to mobilizing the peasants.
The latter had both to be encouraged to shake off their psychological
bonds of submissiveness (by becoming convinced that the old order had
been destroyed never to return) and also to be made to participate in acts
of destruction and massacre so that it would be impossible for them to
pull back or defect. The plan, in short, was to banish all neutrality and
all abstention from Hai-Lvj-feng: 'Whoever is not with us is against us.'
Hence the public, even theatrical nature of the executions of counter-
revolutionaries, in the midst of a vast crowd invited to applaud and give
advice: 'Should these prisoners be killed?'; and even to take an active
part in the massacre. Hence too, the custom of organizing ' meetings of
heads'
which prefigured (usually it is the other way around) the ' banquet
of heads' described by the poet Prevert.
103
But in Hai-feng there was no
banquet; the recently severed heads were simply strung on a line above
the rostrum, providing an appropriate decor for the impassioned words
of the orator.
Actually though, there
were
banquets in Hai-Lu-feng. Sometimes (at
Chieh-sheng, for example) it even happened that those who refused to
consume the heart and liver of the victims were denounced as 'false
brothers'. But it was the peasants themselves, not the soviet authorities,
who initiated this convivial cannibalism. The deliberate terrorism of P'eng
P'ai (there can be no question of one giving way to pity and pardoning,
101
Like that of the White Flags in Lu-feng in early January, 1928 (Galbiati, 779).
101
On the terror in Hai-Lu-feng, see Galbiati, 704-84 passim and 825-49.
103
Jacques Prevert, Paroles, 7-18.
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312 PEASANT MOVEMENTS
for that would imply indifference and cruelty towards the revolutionaries)
is reminiscent of the icy reasoning of a Saint-Just,
104
but it has nothing
to do with the sadistic festivity, exuberance and refinements of peasant
terrorism. Public executions? They were better than a spectacle; they were
a festival not to be missed which many peasants attended, making
themselves hoarse with shouts of 'kill, kill, kill'. As for the (more
numerous) executions that were not an occasion for a public spectacle,
by the time a fortnight had passed the soviet government had no need
to pay their executioners: Red Guards (most of them young peasants) were
only too happy to be honoured with the enviable task. For a counter-
revolutionary, it became a privilege to be killed without being tortured.
Those who got off with having a limb cut off, cooked and eaten before
their very eyes before being killed were lucky. Some were quartered,
others (for instance a local magistrate of the Chieh-sheng district) were
shut in a crate and sawn into pieces with skilful slowness, the executioners
from time to time taking a tea-break so as to prolong the agony. The
peasants who tortured their victims felt they were taking their revenge.
The Chieh-sheng magistrate had had over a hundred peasants executed
and had forced the father and the brother of
the
chairman of the Chieh-sheng
Peasant Association to be present at his execution. Not to do things by
halves, brother was sometimes forced to execute brother, and brother and
son were occasionally made to eat a piece of the father's flesh with the
victim, not yet dead, looking on.
5.
Parochial
motivations.
The avengers thus gave as good as they got to
the officials and landlords, paying them back in their own coin. The action
provoked by P'eng P'ai and his Communist comrades undeniably
succeeded in inflaming class hatred. But, as practised in Hai-Lu-feng
during the winter of 1927-8, the vengeance exacted smacks less of the
revenge of an oppressed class than of the clan or village vendettas of a
still recent past. It perpetuated the tradition of rivalry and reprisals that
had inspired the conflicts between the Red and the Black Flags. In a similar
fashion, the refinements of torture and cannibalism simply repeat the
practices to which the chronicle of those conflicts so often testifies.
105
It
is a chronicle that is in no way interrupted by the 'modern' peasant
movement; quite the contrary. Lineage and community heads reacted to
the arrival of the Communists by reactivating their traditional organiza-
tions.
They even took the opportunity to settle old scores with rival or
'<*
P'eng P'ai: 'class justice is not concerned with the individual being judged; it is a necessary
measure in the civil war'. Saint-Just addressing the members of the Convention: 'You are not
here to pass a sentence upon an individual (Louis XVI), simply a measure of national emergency.'
105
On Flags, clans and localism, see Galbiati,
518-21,
777-83, 827-8, 848 and
passim.
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PEASANTS AND COMMUNISTS 313
hated neighbours. But these conscious reactions and deliberate calculations
are of less significance than the spontaneous appraisal of the Communist
struggle as just a new episode in the only conflict that was familiar (or
the one that was the most familiar) to them: the local wars between the
Flags.
When, in January 1928, the revolutionary army marching from
Hai-feng with its red flags flying passed through some villages of Lu-feng
hsien, it was welcomed with open arms by all and sundry, landlords
included. These villages, which belonged to the Red Flags, feted the ally
who,
they were convinced, had come to help them against the rival villages
dependent upon the Black Flags.
What becomes of social warfare in such circumstances? Sometimes, to
be sure, local conflicts and secular rivalries between neighbouring
communities did in effect mask a social antagonism. Consider the battle
which, in January 1926 in P'u-ning in eastern Kwangtung, set in
opposition on the one hand the powerful Fang lineage and, on the other,
the peasants of the neighbouring villages. The motivation of parochialism
was powerful in both camps but the Fang, who alone accounted for half
of the twenty thousand inhabitants of the chief town of the hsien,
controlled most of the economic activities of the hsien as a whole.
106
When
parochialism brings the town into opposition to the countryside (as also
in the case of Chieh-sheng, mentioned above) it naturally takes on a social
colouring. The same is not true when entire villages, rich and poor alike,
are opposed to other
villages.
The persistence of local parochialism, which
virtually banished the Communist-peasant movement from certain
villages in Lu-feng hsien that were traditionally controlled by the Black
Flags,
could not but be reinforced by the parochialism of peasant
associations and local activists, who claimed to be acting in the name of
the soviet regime even when they were in truth satisfying local hatreds.
Two powerful clans (the Ho in Chieh-sheng and the Lin in Mei-lung)
were particularly detested by the peasants whom they exploited and
mistreated. There was nothing selective about the revenge taken upon
them: however lowly his or her social status, whoever went by the name
of Ho in the one locality or Lin in the other was doomed to butchery.
Chinese Christians concentrated in certain localities and martyred at
Christmas in 1927 were also the victims of parochialism, or-to put it
another way - of a rejection of 'otherness', as were the lepers shot like
rabbits as they fled, or burned alive in their lazarets when they made no
attempt to escape.
106 P'u-ning hsien, neighbouring but independent from the two hsiens of Hai-feng and Lu-feng, also
attracted P'eng P'ai's attention because of his overall responsibilities in the (Kuomintang) peasant
movement for
the
province
as a
whole. P'eng P'ai had founded the Peasant Association of P'u-ning
upon which the rebel peasants centred to defend their cause against the Fang faction of the chief
local town.
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314 PEASANT MOVEMENTS
On the whole, the cruelty of the peasants favoured, rather than upset,
the plans of the revolutionary intellectuals. On the other hand there were
excellent reasons for the latter to fear the demobilizing effects of local
solidarities or rivalries. It was not for nothing that P'eng P'ai had chosen
a red and black flag as the emblem of the first peasant association of
Hai-feng: it symbolized the idea that the social struggle upon which the
association was engaged transcended the 'vertical conflicts' between the
Red and the Black Flags. Later on, at the time of the soviet government,
whoever protected a counter-revolutionary became liable to the death
penalty. This measure was principally aimed against peasant families which
were concealing the possessions of richer members of their clans, whom
they might well have attacked a few weeks earlier from within the body
of the peasant association.
6.
Peasant
worship.
In the eyes of the Communists, local parochialism and
clan power were survivals from feudalism, as were the religious beliefs
and superstitious customs of the peasants. If, during the heroic days of
his initial overtures towards the peasants, P'eng P'ai had been careful to
accommodate the village gods, such precautions were no longer in order
by the time the soviet dictatorship was installed. But it is difficult to assess
how far P'eng P'ai was personally responsible for the attacks against the
'feudal' ideology and practices which stemmed, naturally enough, from
the first measures adopted in the euphoria of victory. The names of towns
were changed (most of them becoming '
red':
cb'ih
or
bung)
as were street
names (Hai-feng now had streets named after Marx, Lenin, Rosa
Luxemburg or Karl Liebknecht); the Temple of Confucius was renamed
the Red Palace (and Hai-feng also boasted a Red Square, a Red Bridge
and a Red Flag). From there it was but a short step to attacking the idols.
It was a step soon taken by the Red Guards, the Pioneers and detachments
of the Communist Youth Corps, who carried through a mini-cultural
revolution forty years before the major one, destroying temple statues,
burning down religious buildings and attacking all those
—
diviners,
sorcerers or geomancers
—who
lived off the credulity of the peasants.
107
The Red Guards were themselves young peasants, but their elders
desperately resisted the destruction of their idols which they had taken
care to daub with red paint to indicate that they were well-disposed
towards the soviet. They painted the landlords' Buddhas white to show
that these did deserve to be punished and destroyed, but they strove to
preserve the centres of popular religion that most of the Taoist and
107
On the traditional mentality of the peasants and the facts mentioned in this and the following
paragraphs, see Galbiati 319, 521, 675, 732, 737-8, 767, 781-3, 789 and Appendix, 204 (no. 32).
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PEASANTS AND COMMUNISTS
3 I 5
Buddhist temples represented. They were even worshipping a new god,
almost as much revered and obeyed as Buddha
himself,
to wit P'eng P'ai,
whom heaven had chosen to found a new order and make it possible for
peace to reign once he became emperor. For them, taking part in the
revolution consisted primarily in blindly following a leader (as they used
to follow Ch'en Chiung-ming, who held a mandate before P'eng); which
did not, of course, prevent them from calling upon the gods (the other
gods) to protect the cause of their divine leader. At one critical moment
when the Kuomintang army, the militia and the police were on the point
of crushing the second of the revolts that preceded the establishment of
the Hai-feng soviet (on 25 September, 1927), a procession of peasants
bearing offerings went off to the temple to pray for the speedy arrival of
reinforcements which might, indeed, have represented a last hope, namely
the army of Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung which had reached Swatow after
a mini-Long March (another prefiguration of another saga) of the Red
Army remnants from Nanchang.
7.
Dependence
on
military
power.
When a party of these fugitives at last
reached the mountains of Hai-Lu-feng, a full three weeks after the second
insurrection had been crushed, they had to change their tune: in the
launching of a new offensive, it would certainly be impossible to count
upon these fugitives exhausted and discouraged by their series of defeats
and also by the lack of cooperation forthcoming from a peasantry their
leaders had described as being ready to rise up in arms.
108
And yet, less
than two weeks later, Hai-feng was once more in the hands of the
Communists (1 November, 1927); it remained so for four months. This
easy occupation, less ephemeral than earlier ones, owed much to the
rivalry between two generals (Li Chi-shen and Chang Fa-k'uei), who could
quite easily have prevented or crushed the revolt. It would not even have
been necessary for the two rivals to unite forces to put the red troops
to flight: it would have been quite enough for either one or the other
to grant the same strategic importance to districts as distant from Canton
as Hai-feng and Lu-feng as they did to the central areas of the province.
In short, they both deferred settling the score of the soviet until such
time as they would no longer be engaged in more serious matters. When
that moment came, the soviet collapsed like a house of
cards
(29 February
1928).
109
108
C. Martin Wilbur, "The ashes of defeat', CQ 18 (April-June 1964) 20.
105
Galbiati, 697, 701, 703-4, 744—5, 902, 905-6. The ephemeral nature of the Canton commune,
which lasted fewer days (n—15 December 1927) than the months that Hai-Lu-feng survived,
provides an a
contrario
confirmation. In Canton, the authorities could not afford to tolerate the
challenge.
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3 l6 PEASANT MOVEMENTS
The birth, survival and fall of the soviet thus illustrate the decisive
importance of the relationships among those who controlled power (or
the military forces) in the local and provincial context. In general, the
Communist-peasant movement only succeeded in implanting itself and
surviving thanks to either the rivalries (and in 1927-8 in Kwangtung there
were many others apart from the struggle between Li and Chang) or the
complex manoeuvring between the powerful (such as that which
prompted Ch'en Chiung-ming to tolerate the activities of the Peasant
Association of Hai-feng for so long, before 1924). In a complementary
fashion, as soon as those who held the greater power on a local and
provincial level decided that the threat had become too serious to be
tolerated any longer, or that it was playing into the hands of their rivals,
110
the fact that the forces were so unevenly matched sealed the fate of the
revolutionaries in advance.
The activities of P'eng P'ai in the rest of Kwangtung province during
the period between the official dissolution of the Hai-feng Peasant
Association, in March 1924, and the founding of the soviet in November
1927 do more than simply confirm the precarious nature of the first
'peasant' enterprises of the CCP (and the KMT), and the crucial
importance of the regional or local political situation. They also illustrate
what has been called the 'politics of dependency', the lack of autonomy
inherent in many of the enterprises which were time and time again saved
from failure by the providential intervention of the provincial authorities.
In this instance, as in Kwangning (in the north-west of the province) in
1924,
it was the secular authorities who came forward as allies, or even
protectors. And the interceder here was none other than P'eng P'ai,
secretary of the peasant section of the Kuomintang currently in power
in Canton. It was he who persuaded the governor of the province to
dismiss the hsien magistrate of Kwangning who was hostile to the peasant
movement, even before a later governor, Liao Chung-k'ai, who was even
more cooperative, sent a brigade of shock troops to help the peasant
adventure of the revolutionary apprentices of Kwangning.'''
This dependence upon external support naturally rendered the peasant
movement extremely vulnerable; the Kwangning movement did not
survive for long after the departure of the revolutionary armies of
Kwangtung on the Northern Expedition.
110
In March 1924, Ch'en Chiung-ming eventually authorized the dissolution of the Peasant
Association of Hai-Lu-feng, apparently after allowing the local notables to convince him that
it was hand-in-glove with his adversaries (both Communist and Kuomintang) in Canton (Galbiati,
339—40; Hofheinz,
Broken
wave,
177).
111
Hofheinz,
Broken
wave,
ch. 8 (in particular pp. 189 and 197).
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PEASANTS AND COMMUNISTS 3*7
8.
Non-peasant
leadership.
The promoters of the peasant movement of
Kwangning were natives of Kwangning who had received their secondary
education in Canton;
112
in short, modest replicas of the 'returned student'
P'eng P'ai, who belonged to one of the richest families of Hai-feng.
Whatever their standing in the intellectual and social hierarchy, those who
launched and organized the Kuomintang peasant movement (an official
label that in most cases masked a Communist takeover) from the east to
the west of the province shared in common their membership in the elite,
an elite by definition separate from the peasantry. While this may have
rendered the first contacts with the peasants more delicate, it greatly
facilitated their penetration of the local political game.
The landlords of Hai-feng, who without doubt would promptly have
repressed a purely peasant movement, waited for a long time before
riposting to the increasingly audacious initiatives of the peasant association
under P'eng P'ai's direction, no doubt because they were aware that they
could not count upon firm support from the regional power embodied
by Ch'en Chiung-ming, but also quite simply because P'eng P'ai and his
associates came from the best families in the locality and were educated.
One could not treat P'eng P'ai, the former director (at the age of 26!)
of the Education Office of Hai-feng hsien, as one would a vulgar peasant
leader. The relations between the leader of the Hai-feng Peasant
Association and Ch'en Chiung-ming, whom P'eng visited in his head-
quarters to plead the cause of the association, would have been altogether
inconceivable if P'eng had not been one of the elite. To be sure, Ch'en,
himself a former revolutionary (from the First Revolution of 1911) who
retained a number of reformatory inclinations, was no ordinary warlord.
But even where the local holders of power came from a more traditional
mould and the revolutionaries came from a lower intellectual level than
P'eng did, the latter still benefited from a network of relations
(kuan-hsi)
among the families of influence (and from friendships or complicities
among the educated scions of those families) which opened to them doors
that were closed to the peasants and assured them, initially at least, of
a relative impunity.
Sometimes it was the school holidays or the return of students to their
homes which sparked the peasant movements that urbanized intellectuals
operating from outside had been preparing.
113
However sincere and deep
the commitment of the latter towards the peasant masses, it almost always
followed and derived from a more global revolt. The review launched
112
Hofheinz, Broken
wane,
181-5. Galbiati, 414.
"
J
For Kwangtung, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's failure in China, 1)24-1927, 48.
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3 l8 PEASANT MOVEMENTS
by P'eng P'ai and the young radical intelligentsia of Hai-feng in the
autumn of
1921
did not differ significantly in its title
{Hsin Hai-feng)
(New
Haifeng), or its content, from what was being written or the claims being
made by their peers elsewhere. Their writing was perhaps more impas-
sioned, their tone more inflamed and their sense of urgency and their
rejection of half-measures more absolute. But the links of filiation with
Hsin
ch'ing-nien
and of kinship with the radical posterity of 4 May are
undeniable."
4
The revolutionary vocation of P'eng P'ai and his friends
was fuelled from the same sources (national and ideological rather than
social or specifically peasant) as those of the rest of the revolutionaries
of their generation who, like them, almost all came from the most
favoured social classes. In a very classic fashion, the Chinese revolution
began by setting in opposition among themselves the members (or in some
cases generations) of an elite in a state of crisis. The secession of family
heirs who were traitors to their class preceded their adoption of the
strategy of mobilizing the peasant masses.
9.
Organisation.
That mobilization was in effect no more than a means
to an end. This fact was squarely recognized by Lo Ch'i-yuan, who,
together with P'eng P'ai, was one of the pioneers of the Communist-peasant
movement and one of P'eng's principal Cantonese associates. Lo
speaks quite forthrightly of' using them [the peasants] as the basic force'
and so of offering them something in exchange to persuade them to
rally.
115
During the 1920s an alliance was forged in Hai-feng and the rest
of Kwangtung that was to prove most fruitful for the Communist
movement, but it was an ambiguous and unequal alliance to which the
peasants rallied with a view to obtaining satisfaction for specific claims
of an economic nature without, however, any clear idea of how far their
guides were to lead them.
These guides who came from outside the peasantry brought it the
efficient organization without which peasant agitation was doomed
to failure. But, by virtue of that very organization, they assured
themselves of the direction of the movement. It is a point that should be
emphasized: the organization provided by the Communists conferred
upon the peasant movement an effectiveness which it had hitherto lacked
but which undermined its independence. The peasant movement thus
became subordinated to the interests and overall strategies of the
revolutionary movement (Kuomintang before 1927, Communist
thereafter).
114
Galbiati, 205-12.
115
Gerald W. Berkley, 'Peasant mobilisation in China, 1924-1926' (unpublished paper, Washington
and Southeast Regional Seminar on China, March 1979) 17.
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PEASANTS AND COMMUNISTS 319
In Hai-Lu-feng, P'eng P'ai concentrated in his hands the powers of a
dictator. But he exercised them officially in his capacity as secretary of
an organ which coordinated the activities of all the other institutions:
namely, the special committee of the CCP for the East River Region (the
part of Kwangtung that included Hai-feng and Lu-feng). The peasants
were incapable of distinguishing between their government (the ' People's
government of the Hai-feng soviet', officially created only in February
1928,
the last month of the Soviet's existence) and the real power which
had penetrated their own little world with the abridged title of the ' East
Special' Committee. During the few months of soviet dictatorship, the
peasants of Hai-feng (and to a lesser degree those of Lu-feng) flocked to
join the CCP
en
masse.
They are said eventually to have made up 85 per
cent of
the
local party membership. But that
8 5
per cent had fewer powers
of decision than the 2.5 per cent of intellectuals - who, for their part, were
strictly controlled by the directives of the 'East Special'.
116
10.
Local
predispositions?
The last item is more of a question than
affirmation; but it cannot be avoided for it raises an important problem:
did the Hai-Lu-feng area (or the East River region or even Kwangtung
province as a whole) possess some particular quality that predisposed these
regions to the pioneer role that they played in the history of the
Communist-peasant movement? Or did the adventure that has earned
Hai-feng the names of 'Little Moscow' stem from fortuitous historical
circumstances? Could it have taken place
anywhere
in China?
The coastal hsien of Hai-feng can hardly be called representative of
interior China; and yet in many respects it is a faithful reflection of it;
a
traditional China
in
miniature.
Hai-feng and
its
port of Swabue (Shan-wei)
were more open to external influences than the average hsien of a province
of the interior. The proximity of Hong Kong (where many emigres from
Hai-feng the name of 'Little Moscow' stem from fortuitous historical
missionary settlements in the hsien multiplied the opportunities for
contacts with foreigners. The same goes for the province of Kwangtung
as a whole, which was more outward-directed than the rest of China.
Throughout the century that preceded the first Provincial Congress of
Peasant Associations (1925), history had underlined and reinforced the
originality of this province that had never been quite the same as the rest.
The combination of
the
outlying location of Kwangtung and its particular
historical traditions may have been favourable to the development of a
revolutionary peasant movement in this region where the T'ung-meng
hui had also found a preferred terrain for its subversive activities.
116
Galbiati, 738, 787 and Appendix 217, n. 87.
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3
2
° PEASANT MOVEMENTS
Kwangtung's 'predisposition'
to its
destiny
of
pioneering
the
Communist-peasant movement
was
thus strongly dependent upon
its
connections (and therefore heritage);
it
owed much
to
the revolutionary
successors
of
one
of
its native sons,
Sun
Yat-sen, born
in a
southern
district where the appeal and influence
of
the outside world were more
keenly felt than elsewhere. The first peasant unions of Hai-feng themselves
owed nothing
to
the implantation
of
the Kuomintang
in
Canton but,
in
the absence
of
any revolutionary legacy,
it is
always possible
to
point
to
the martial traditions of
the
natives which had been kept alive by incessant
feuds and private wars. The inhabitants
of
Hai-feng had
the
reputation
of enjoying battles; they set more store by courage
in
combat than most
other Chinese
and
they
had for
many years
had at
their disposal
an
instrument of conflict: the para-military organizations
of
the Red and the
Black Flags that chequered the entire region. The violent parochialism
that
had
often prompted them
to
attack their neighbours could,
on
occasion, cause them
to
rise
up
against
the
authorities
and
their agents
who arrived from elsewhere;
in
Hai-feng the Cultural Revolution was
to
take
on
the aspect
of
a struggle between local inhabitants and strangers
and
it
was
to
prove particularly bloody.
117
In short,
it
is easy enough to record the local antecedents and aptitudes
of the inhabitants that would favour P'eng P'ai's enterprise; easy enough,
too,
to
point out that
a
mountain barrier isolated Hai-feng,
in
the west,
from the rest of the province and lent the hsien a strategic advantage (not
simply
an
added encouragement
to
parochialism).
It is
also easy enough
to underline
the
particular customs
and
character
of the
Hakkas
and
Hoklos (originally natives of Fukien), and so on. But all this is convincing
only
up to a
point. From the strategic point
of
view,
it is
equally easy
to object that the mountains
of
Hai-feng did not provide
a
refuge
in
any
way comparable
to
either
the
Ching-kang-shan
or the
more northern
ranges that provided sanctuary
for the
Communist forces during
the
Sino-Japanese War. Parochialism
and
outward-looking attitudes
are to
a certain extent contradictions
in
terms:
if
external influences had deeply
affected and transformed Hai-feng, they would certainly have blunted the
local parochialism. Above all, none
of
the points we have made affected
the economic and social conditions
of
the masses whom P'eng P'ai was
going
to
attempt
to
rouse.
There was much in those conditions to provoke indignation and revolt.
But they did not differ radically from the conditions that prevailed
in
the
117
Galbiati, 1004 and
1000-14
passim.
F°
r
the rest of the paragraph and the next one (Hai-feng four
or five decades before the Cultural Revolution), see Galbiati, vi, xi,
1,
8-9, 35—6, 39, 50, 56-66,
96-104,
144, 275, 789 and
passim.
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