The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
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REGIONAL REGIMES 341
ward system was adopted by Yen Hsi-shan as a bridge between county
and village; the three to six wards per county functioned primarily as
police and taxation authorities. Second, Yen drew upon a tradition of
gentry activism that sought village revitalization through education and
the transformation of public morals.
The origins of the Shansi system have been traced to a gentry-led model
town in Hopei, the Chai-ch'eng experiment which later became famous
as the basis of the Ting-hsien project in the late 1920s and 1930s (see below,
pp.
3 5
3-5). The Mi family of Chai-ch'eng had been so successful with local
education and self-government activism that the county magistrate, Sun
Ch'un-chai, had the town declared a model and subsequently the county
itself.
Sun had become magistrate of Ting-hsien in 1914. Two years later
he was chosen by Yen Hsi-shan to be chief administrator of the Shansi
provincial government
(sheng-chang).
Whether or not
his
elevation stemmed
from his unique experience with village-level administration, he seized
the opportunity to urge upon his patron his approach to revitalizing local
government. Sun lost his post in less than a year, but the new
administrative system remained as Yen Hsi-shan's basic strategy for local
control.
21
As it developed, Yen's new system was quite compatible with the local
self-government regulations issued by Yuan Shih-kai's administration in
1914.
These had been aimed at taming the vigorous county and provincial
politics of the republic's early years, in which local elites competed with
the bureaucracy for control of local resources. Yuan's abolition of
provincial and county assemblies aimed at a more bureaucratic tone in
local government: the basic unit, the ward
(ch'u),
was an administrative
territory too large to conform to any natural sub-county unit (too large,
for instance, to conform to a standard marketing community). The
implication was clear: sub-county self-government, when it finally
emerged after a series of prescribed stages, was to be more responsive
to the supervision of officials than to the political organizations of local
communities.
22
What the new 'village' system added was the ts'un unit:
this was similar to the old' administrative village'
(pien ts'un)
of the Ch'ing,
in that small communities were generally linked under a headman. As the
system developed in Shansi, it became a sub-bureaucratic framework for
transmitting government directives. The village heads, generally illiterate
and dependent on county authorities for appointment, could take little
21
Yin Chung-ts'ai, ed. Cbai-dfatg ts'un ebib (Gazetteer of Chai-ch'eng ts'un, 1925; Taipei reprint,
1968) 211. Guy
S.
Alitto, The last Confucian: Uang Sbu-ming and the Chinese dilemma
of
modernity,
146.
22
On
Yuan's regulations see Ch'en Po-hsin, Cbung-km
ti
ti-fang cbib-tu cbi cb'i kai-ko (China's local
system and
its
reform),
5
8ff.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
34
2
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
independent initiative.
A
1922 inspector's report found them ineffective
even
for
channelling official orders. The ward heads were men
of
larger
capacities. Though all were from Shansi, they were
not
appointed within
their
own
counties, which amounted
to
extending
the old
Ch'ing
'
rule
of avoidance'
to
the sub-county level. As petty administrators, they were
not likely instigators
of
vigorous local politics
of
the ' self-government'
variety. However, their direct appointment by the provincial government
gave them
a
higher status
in the
bureaucratic order.
The bureaucratic flavour
of
the
Shansi system
was
enhanced
by
a
campaign
to fix the
boundaries
of the
administrative villages. This
was
substituting known administrative jurisdictions
for
customary inter-
personal
ties.
More important was its usefulness for
the
land-tax administra-
tion.
The
administrative village
{ts'uri)
functioned
as the
descendant
of
the old
li-chia
tax-collection areas
of
the Ch'ing, now furnished with more
accurately drawn boundaries based
on
cadastral surveys undertaken
during Yen's early administration.
23
In terms
of
administrative history,
Yen
Hsi-shan's highly touted
' village system' amounted
to
little more than
a
voluntarist self-government
facade
for
what was essentially an old imperial tax-administration system,
onto which was attached a version
of
the old
pao-chia
surveillance system
of decimal population units.
In this respect, Yen's system
is an
example
of the
twentieth-century
practice
of
fixing tax responsibilities upon villages as
a
whole and thereby
strengthening the village as
a
political-administrative unit. The particular
taxes
in
question were known
as
'special assessments' (t'an-k'uari),
extraordinary levies upon local communities
to
meet the expanding needs
of government.
The
special assessments were initially
a
way
of
meeting
the immense Boxer indemnity payments,
but
later became
a
common
method
for
financing
the
modern needs, particularly
the
military needs,
of provincial
and
local governments.
Yen
Hsi-shan's success
in
building
armies owed much
to
his effective taxation
of
local communities through
the village-run special assessments. This was obviously a calculated result
of his
'
village system', however prettily that system was dressed
up
with
reformist programmes.
Reformist programmes, nevertheless, did achieve
a
nationwide reputa-
tion
for
Shansi. The old
pao-chia
and
li-chia
formats were used
to
promote
anti-footbinding, anti-opium, public security and literacy campaigns, with
impressive results. Liang Shu-ming,
who was
highly critical
of
Yen's
23
The evolution
of
li-cbia
units and their connection with administrative villages may
be
found
in Lu-cb'eng
bsien-cbib,
2.7D-10D. Also see Hsiang-ningbsien-cbib,
5, 7b;
T'ai-kuhsien-cbib, ch.
3.
Also
see Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Rural China: imperial control in the nineteenth century.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
REGIONAL REGIMES 343
programme for its bureaucratic tone, found much to commend
it
for in
social reform. Overall, the Shansi programme can
be
evaluated
as a
determined effort
by an
activist provincial government
to
project
its
bureaucratic power downward
to the
village level.
Its
debt
to the
Chai-ch'eng experiment of the Mi family was mostly rhetorical, yet there
was
a
shared conviction that close attention to sub-county government
was high on the twentieth-century agenda.
24
Shansi was not the only province
to
undertake local government
reforms. Another notable effort was that
of
the 'Kwangsi clique'
to
tighten local government through
a
province-wide militia system. By
training village and township leaders and enrolling them as cadres of the
local militia, it was hoped to infuse them with a spirit of military discipline,
so that orders from provincial authorities would be effectively passed on
to lower levels. These headmen would also serve as teachers in a system
of' basic schools'
(chi-ch'u hsueh-hsiao)
to foster literacy, public spirit, and
economic self-sufficiency. From a strictly military standpoint, the militia
served as the basis of
a
province-wide conscription system. The ideal was
the old ' union of soldiers and people'
{ping-min
ho-i)
which was designed
not only to build an immense military pool, but also to infuse the whole
populace with
a
heightened sense
of
discipline. The system was begun
in 1933, but was unable to repel the Japanese invasion six years later. Like
the Shansi system,
the
Kwangsi format aimed
at
local control and
development by strengthening the power of the provincial bureaucracy
to penetrate village society.
25
It
was also believed that provincial
organization of the Kwangsi militia would shoulder aside the indigenous
local militia corps that were under the control of powerful
'
local bully'
elites.
Provincial initiatives like these tended
to
reflect the interests and
temperaments of their warlord patrons. The Shansi system emphasized
conservative social goals and moral uplift; Kwangsi emphasized a militant
nationalism along with its community-building rhetoric. Both touted local
self-government, but their essence was bureaucratic control. Noteworthy
in both cases was the determination to make such control effective on the
lowest level of organization, in effect to extend bureaucracy below its late
24
The
Chai-ch'eng local boosters were
of
course eager
to
show
how
influential their initiative
had
been around
the
country.
See
Chai-ch'eng t/un-chih, 165—251.
A
general treatment
of the
Shansi
system
is
Chou Ch'eng, Shan-hsi ti-fang t^u-cbib kang-yao
(An
outline
of
Shansi local
self-
government),
in
Ti-fang t^u-chib cbiang-i (Lectures
on
local self-government).
On
fan-k'uan
and
its effects,
see
Prasenjit Duara,' Power
in
rural society: North China villages, 1900-1940' (Harvard
University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1983), 326-36.
25
Ch'iu Ch'ang-wei, Kuang-bsi bsien-cbeng (County government
in
Kwangsi), 222—41. Kuang-bsi
min-fuan kai-jao
(A
general view
of
the Kwangsi militia). Diana Lary, Region
and
nation:
the
Kwangsi
clique
in
Chinese
politics, 1921-19)7, 170-93.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
344 DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
imperial level, the county. The Shansi system was particularly important
in this regard because it influenced the local system of the Nanking
government after 1928.
EARLY POLICIES OF NANKING ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
As a movement pledged to social transformation as well as national
unification, the Nationalists of the 1920s came to power committed to
carrying out Sun Yat-sen's vision of a democratic China. This vision,
embodied in the Fundamentals of national
reconstruction
(Chien-kuo ta-kang,
Sun's blueprint for what
we
would now call' nation-building'), represented
his mature views on constitutional questions. Issued in 1924, at a time
when the Kuomintang's alliance with the Soviet Union was in full swing,
it is remarkable how little it reflects the views of the Kuomintang left.
Actually it was a restatement and culmination of views long held by Sun
about how popular sovereignty should be instituted.
Sun believed that a nation unaccustomed to the forms and ideas of
constitutional government and political participation had to build from
the ground up: from county, to province, to centre. Under the supervision
of the Kuomintang, citizens were to be tutored in the form and practice
of 'self-government' on a county format. In this 'tutelage' stage of
political development, party guidance was to aim at making all the
counties in a province ' self-governing', and then the province
itself.
When
a majority of provinces became self-governing in this manner, the
National People's Congress was to promulgate a constitution based on
the five-part division of powers.
This bottom-up model of political development Sun had derived from
none other than the ' self-government' theories made popular in the first
decade of the century by K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and their
followers. Sun was clearly committed to the local self-government ideas
as early as 1912. It was, he thought, the natural foundation of a strong,
unified state. His rationale was hardly different, in either tone or substance,
from that of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao which we have already discussed. By 1916,
Sun had linked local self-government to his vague but deeply felt
populism; to avoid the old round-robin of one despotic regime replacing
another (which had characterized most of Chinese history and was now
being replayed under the republic), it was necessary to make the people
the basis of government. To do this, the institutions of government must
be rebuilt from the ground up. The culminating national structure would
be as a roof-beam to the foundations of a house.
The essence of Sun's vision of national political development cannot,
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EARLY POLICIES OF NANKING 345
however, be understood on the basis of populist self-government alone.
Although he was impressed by contemporary American progressive
measures such as initiative, referendum and recall, he was also convinced
that elite leadership was needed to train the Chinese people to use such
powers. 'Those who have foresight', the most enlightened elements of
the modernized elite, were to lead the people to democracy. The Chinese
people were by nature tractable and trainable, and therefore were
particularly apt objects of this kind of elite tutelage.
26
This amalgam of
genuine hope for a democratic China, and a conviction that firm guidance
was needed on the way to it, infused Sun's political thinking from the
beginning. It was to prove a conundrum to Kuomintang administrators
in later years, who found the two elements quite incompatible in the
process of consolidating their power after 1928. At the time the new
Nationalist government adopted Sun's
Fundamentals
of national reconstruction
as its guiding text, it had virtually no experience in local administration.
It is not surprising that the confused historical roots of the theory, added
to the vagueness of
its
presentation, did not readily produce a viable form
of constitutional democracy in China's local communities.
Bureaucrati^ation of
local government
The evolution of the Nationalist government's policy toward local
administration embodied a general trend away from Sun's conception of
local self-government and toward a more rigorous system of bureaucratic
control. In the process, the vestiges of local elite participation in the
management of community affairs were the targets of repeated attacks.
Much of this work took place in the context of a resurgence of
conservative thinking within the Kuomintang, as well as the frantic quest
for internal security which characterized
its
approach to civil administration
during the 1930s.
In September 1928, the Nanking government issued the first version
of its County Organization Law (Hsien tsu-chih-fa), which attempted to
define both the administrative structure and the representative democratic
functions of local government. The county administration itself was
divided between those functional offices directly under the magistrate
(Jk'o,
or sections), and those specialized bureaus
(chii)
which were controlled
by the analogous departments (fing) of the provincial government. For
instance, the financial section
(ts'ai-cheng-k'o)
of the county government
was paralleled by the financial bureau
{ts'ai-cheng-chu),
which was
controlled by the provincial Financial Department. This curious division
26
Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals ofnational
reconstruction,
126-49.
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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
of authority was actually designed
to
separate purely local functions
(entrusted to the bureaus) from those of the province and nation (handled
by the sections of the county administration). The fact that the magistrate
did not control the appointment
of
the heads
of
bureaus meant that
a
substantial part
of
local administration (and the funds that financed
it)
remained outside his control. Local education,
for
example, would
be
managed
by the
education bureau, whose head would
be
appointed
directly by the provincial Department of Education.
27
The County Organizational Law also sought
to
define
the
units
of
government below
the
county level
and
their role
in
representative
government. Following the example of Shansi province (whose governor,
Yen Hsi-shan, was named minister
of
interior under the new Nanking
government),
a
multi-layered system
of
units was established. Directly
under
the
county
was the
ward {ch'u),
an
important administrative
subdivision since the early republic. Its extent was left vaguely specified,
from ten to fifty townships according to local conditions. Like its Shansi
exemplar, however, it was clearly a much larger unit than could be defined
by any natural community, suitable
for
bureaucratic administration
or
electoral districting, but not for local home rule.
28
Below the ward were
the natural communities: rural villages
of
100 families or more
(ts'un),
or
urban neighbourhoods of the same size (//). Beneath these were
a
kind
of mutual-surveillance and local-responsibility unit familiar
to
students
of Chinese history
aspao-chia,
but termed here
lii
and
lin
(25- and 5-family
groupings). Besides
the
wards, each
of
the natural communities
was
eventually to have an elected headman and a council. Until local elections
were held, however,
the
heads were
to be
appointed
by the
county
magistrate.
Whatever
the
prospects
for
actually putting them into effect,
the
provisions for local democracy in the original County Organization Law
were the least that could be expected, given the prescriptions
of
Sun's
Fundamentals of national
reconstruction,
to which the Nationalist government
was explicitly committed. The county was
to
be both an administrative
and
a
self-government unit: the magistrate,
at
the head
of
an executive
council
{hsien-cheng
hui-i) composed
of
section and bureau heads, was
to
be paralleled by an elected county assembly
{hsien ts'an-i-hui)
with broad
powers
to
review budgets and executive performance. Below the county
level, all units were seen as totally ' self-government' bodies, with elected
27
Hsieh Chen-min, Cbung-bua min-kuo li-fa sbib (History
of
legislation
in the
Republic
of
China),
826.
28
Chao Ju-heng, Ti-fang t^u-ibih cbib ti-lunyu ihih-chi (Theory and practice
of
local self-government),
77-
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EARLY POLICIES OF NANKING 347
ward chiefs and elected assemblies
at
lower levels. Of course, until such
time
as the
election procedures could
be
worked
out
and
the
people
educated to the practice of self-government, personnel at these levels were
still to be appointed by the magistrate.
29
The environment
in
which such
a
plan for local democratization was
to be carried out, however, was likely to bring about a desire for greater
control, rather than greater local self-government. Beset by recurrent civil
war and foreign aggression, as well as by the social effects of the worldwide
depression, the government saw internal security as the order of the day.
The result was to strengthen those elements within the Kuomintang who
were more impressed by bureaucratic and military effectiveness than by
popular participation. Beginning
in
late 1928, Nanking worked out re-
visions of the County Organization Law that had the effect of strengthening
bureaucratic administration and,
at
the same time, putting off the date
for implementing local self-government. A conference of representatives
from the civil administration departments
{min-chen-f'ing)
of the provinces
under Nanking's control suggested that the county organization law had
been too hasty in promoting county assemblies, for which the people were
unready. Such assemblies were now to be put off until the time when ward
heads were popularly elected. This was subsequently defined
as
taking
place no later than
1933.
30
(The hesitation to convene county assemblies
is reminiscent of Yuan Shih-k'ai's suspicion of such bodies
a
generation
earlier,
at
which time the local self-government movement was virtually
destroyed.)
In
the spirit
of
the conference, the Legislative Yuan passed
a law (11 May 1929) which affirmed the 'tutelage' role
of
the county
magistrate
in all
matters relating
to
local self-government.
It
also
strengthened the role of the provincial government in local administration
by placing the appointment
of
ward heads directly within the power of
the provincial Department
of
Civil Affairs. The magistrate was given
greater power to control the special-function bureaus within his county
by being made responsible for nominating their heads
to
the provincial
government for appointment.
31
At the same time, the original model of sub-county administration was
found
to be
unsuitable
for
general application.
The
'administrative
village' system
of
Shansi (as adapted by Nanking) had been close
to
the
old
pao-chia
principle
of
numerical aggregates:
an
administrative village
was to include approximately a hundred households, linking several small
natural villages under government appointed headmen. Nanking now
n
Hsieh Chen-min, LJ-fa-sbib, 825-9.
30
Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, Min-kuo cbeng-cbib sbib (History
of
the Republican political system), 553.
31
Hsieh Chen-min,
U-fa-sbih,
829-32.
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34-8 DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
found this too discordant with natural settlement units and decreed that
the more conventional 'township'
(hsiang)
and
'market town'
{chert)
designations of the early Republic be restored.
32
It was also a move away
from
a
single, national system of local administration and an admission
that Nanking's ability
to
control provincial governments outside east-
central China was limited.
The objectives
of
the County Organization Law,
in
respect
to
both
self-government
and
administrative reform, were found increasingly
impractical by provincial administrators. Two conferences of provincial
civil officials sponsored by the Ministry of Interior produced resolutions
aimed at diluting its original purposes. The
first
of
these'
civil administration
conferences'
{nei-cheng
hui-i),
in
1931, resolved
to
loosen
the
rigid
numerical limits on the sizes of local units: to limit townships and market
towns to administrative aggregates of no more than 1,000 households was
impractical
for
densely populated areas, since
it
would result
in a
finer
network of local control than could be financed or staffed. Further, it was
found impractical
to
limit
the
office
of
ward head
to
trained local
government personnel, since there were insufficient facilities
to
produce
the numbers needed.
And
finally,
the
requirement that
the
County
Organization Law be fully implemented by the end
of
1929 was found
impractical under the variety of provincial conditions.
The second conference, convened in December 1932, went further in
its attacks
in
the County Organization Law. No longer was
a
unified
national system thought feasible, given the variety of local traditions and
social conditions. Henceforth neither the sizes of local sub-county units,
nor their principles
of
organization, nor their nomenclature was
to be
dictated by the Ministry of Interior in Nanking. More significant was the
attack on self-government
as
a principle of local organization: sub-county
units,
from the ward downward, had been designated
by
the County
Organization Law as purely self-government bodies; now local home rule
formed only part of their function
—
they were to serve also as lower-level
administrative units under county officials. The county itself was now
primarily administrative and only secondarily
a
home-rule unit. On
all
levels,
the functions of self-government were more closely circumscribed:
police, for
example,
were to
be
solely the business of national administrative
organs,
not
agents
of
any self-government body. Procedures were
recommended which would
give
the county magistrate greater supervisory
power over
the
budgets
and
activities
of
self-government bodies,
including
a
virtual veto over any resolutions passed by self-government
assemblies. These recommendations
of
the civil administrators were
32
Ibid.
830-1;
Qiao Ju-heng, Ti-fang tyi-cbib,
35off.
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EARLY POLICIES OF NANKING 349
directed at a supervising and controlling self-government bodies, and even
turning them into auxiliary branches of county administration. At the same
time,
they were a recognition that the powers of the Nanking government
to enforce its writ in the form of a standardized and reorganized local
administrative system were very limited.
33
Another important change recommended by the second civil administra-
tion conference was the abolition of the specialized bureaus
{chit)
in county
administration and the subsuming of their functions under the analogous
sections of the county government. The significance of this idea went
beyond mere simplification. It had the effect of returning county
administration to a more conventional format by strengthening the
authority of the magistrate over all sectors of public life. However, this
enhancement of the magistrate's authority may have been based less in
traditional practice than in the effort by the 'CC clique' to extend its
influence by inserting modern-trained graduates of its Central Political
Institute into county magistracies in KMT-controlled provinces. If so,
then the erosion of the magistrate's power since the Ch'ing was indeed
a serious problem. Chiang Kai-shek complained in 1932, for example, that
the proliferation of specialized bureaus had taken much power from the
magistrate; in practice, he said, it was the analogous departments (ftng)
of the provincial government that had the power to appoint and supervise
bureau heads in the counties.
34
Losers under the new policy were the specialists at the provincial level,
as well as local elites who had participated in the work of the bureaus
since the early republic. Neither group would now have much control
over county resources. Just how deep was the involvement of local elites
in the county bureaus by the 1930s is a question awaiting research. It seems
likely that it had diminished somewhat from the days of the early republic,
when local literati had considerable control over bureaus such as education
and economic development. If
so,
then the abolition of bureaus and their
amalgamation into the sections of county government
{ts'ai-chii
kai-k'o),
which became a watchword of governmental reform during the mid 1930s,
was the final step in a process of bringing county government back to
a more conventional bureaucratic format. Reducing local participation of
this sort was analogous to the virtual scuttling of plans for local
self-government which occurred during the early years of Nationalist
rule.
3
*
These policies, which were largely adopted by 1937, were close to the
33
Nei-cbeng nien-cbicn (Ministry
of
Interior year book), 1936,
B.
659-42.
34
Ch'eng Fang, Cbmg-kuo bsien-cbeng kai-lun (An introduction to county government
in
China), 39.
35
Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, Min-kuo cbtng-cbib
Mi,
55 iff.
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35° DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
spirit of the ' bandit suppression' (anti-Communist) campaigns then being
commanded from Chiang Kai-shek's military headquarters
at
Nanchang.
Until we have access to operational documents from the archives, we shall
have
to
rely on inference to determine where the bureaucratization drive
originated. But the evidence suggests clearly that Chiang and his close
advisers promoted them.
For example,
the
programme
of
abolishing bureaus seems
to
have
originated in Hupei in
193
2-3
as
part of
a
campaign to reduce administrative
expenses, possibly under
the
sponsorship
of
Chiang's protege, Chang
Ch'iin. Taken
up by the
'bandit-suppression'
of
Communist bases
in
Hupei, Honan and Anhwei, the programme became official policy
at
the
county level.
In
March 1934, Chiang Kai-shek convened
a
conference of
provincial administrators
at
his Nanchang headquarters
to
devise new
measures
of
civil administration
to
complement his military suppression
campaigns
in
Kiangsi
and
other 'bandit-suppression provinces'.
The
' bureaus into sections' idea was announced as general policy in the report
by Chiang's administrative secretary, Yang Yung-t'ai. Formal regulations
were promulgated
in
December
1934 for all
bandit-suppression
provinces.
36
Whether or not this reform achieved its purpose of strength-
ening the authority
of
the county magistrate,
it
must be conceded that
the system
it
supplanted was wasteful and confusing. To have documents
passing between specialized county bureaus and their counterparts in the
provincial capitals, without ever crossing the desk of the magistrate, was
a recipe
for
weakening county government
and
injecting
yet
another
patronage system into local politics.
Another bureaucratic advance
of the
mid-thirties
was the re-
establishment
of
the ward
(cb'ii)
as a
sub-county public security unit.
It
will
be
recalled that the ward was originally borrowed from the Shansi
example, and eventually was to take on self-governing powers. It was then
temporarily abandoned in favour of the three-tier system of natural units
from the early republic. But the anti-Communist campaigns of the 1930s
brought
the
ward back into prominence. Originating with
the
Hupei-
Honan-Anhwei bandit-suppression headquarters (like the effort to elimi-
nate bureaus), this measure took shape
in
1932 as
a
way
of
introducing
a
public security office that could supervise the reinstituted/wo-^/a system.
This measure,
too, was
endorsed
by
Chiang Kai-shek
at the 1934
56
Ko-sheng kao-chi hsing-cheng jen-yuan feng-chao Nanchang chi-hui chi-lu (Record
of the
meeting
of
high provincial administrators held
at
Nanchang) issued by the Headquarters
of
the
Chairman of the National Government Military Commission, Nanchang, June 1934. On county
government see' Work critiques'
on
pp.
52-5.
Also see
Ch'eng Mao-hsing, Cbiao-fei ti-fangbsing-cbcng
cbib-tu (Governmental system
of
the bandit-suppression areas); Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, Min-kuo
cbeng-cbib
sbib,
j 56-7; Ch'en Chih-mai,
Cbung-kuo cbeng-Ju
(The Chinese government), 3.83-7.
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