
Credit Swaps, and indeed all credit derivatives, are mainly inter-professional
(meaning non-retail) transactions. Averaging $25 to $50 million per transaction,
they range in size from a few million to billions of dollars. Reference Entities
may be drawn from a wide universe including sovereigns, semi-governments,
financial institutions, and all other investment or sub-investment grade corporates.
Maturities usually run from one to ten years and occasionally beyond that,
although counterparty credit quality concerns frequently limit liquidity for longer
tenors. For corporates or financial institutions credit risks, five-year tends to be
the benchmark maturity, where greatest liquidity can be found. While publicly
rated credits enjoy greater liquidity, ratings are not necessarily a requirement.
The only true limitation to the parameters of a Credit Swap is the willingness of
the counterparties to act on a credit view.
Illiquidity of credit positions can be caused by any number of factors, both
internal and external to the organization
in question. Internally, in the case of
bank loans and derivative transactions, relationship concerns often lock portfolio
managers into credit exposure arising from key client transactions. Corporate
borrowers prefer to deal with smaller lending groups and typically place
restrictions on transferability and on which entities can have access to that
group. Credit derivatives allow users to reduce credit exposure without
physically removing assets from their balance sheet. Loan sales or the
assignment or unwinding of derivative contracts typically require the notification
and/or consent of the customer. By contrast, a credit derivative is a confidential
transaction that the customer need neither be party to nor aware of, thereby
separating relationship management from risk management decisions.
Similarly, the tax or accounting position of an institution can create significant
disincentives to the sale of an otherwise relatively liquid position – as in the case
of an insurance company that owns a public corporate bond in its hold-to-maturity
account at a low tax base. Purchasing default protection via a Credit Swap can
hedge the credit exposure of such a position without triggering a sale for either tax
or accounting purposes. Recently, Credit Swaps have been employed in such
situations to avoid unintended adverse tax or accounting consequences of
otherwise sound risk management decisions.
More often, illiquidity results from factors external to the institution in question.
The secondary market for many loans and private placements is not deep, and
in the case of certain forms of trade receivable or insurance contract, may not
exist at all. Some forms of credit exposure, such as the business concentration
risk to key customers faced by many corporates (meaning not only the default
risk on accounts receivable, but also the risk of customer replacement cost), or
the exposure employees face to their employers in respect of non-qualified
deferred compensation, are simply not transferable at all. In all of these cases,
Credit Swaps can provide a hedge of exposure that would not otherwise be
achievable through the sale of an underlying asset.
In some cases,
credit swaps
have
substituted
other credit
instruments to
gather most of
the liquidity on
a specific
underlying
credit risk.
Credit Swaps
deepen the
secondary
market for
credit risk far
beyond that of
the secondary
market of the
underlying
credit
instrument.