Mounds, Memory, and Contested Mississippian History 161
Without a doubt, the archaeology of the last 30 years points to fundamental
problems inherent with ahistorical (structuralist or functionalist) explanations. In part
owing to the growing discordance within these older paradigms, various “historical-
processual” perspectives (i.e., practice-theoretical, agent-centered, feminist, phenome-
nological, and even neo-Darwinian schools of thought) are promulgating a sense of
“traditions” as dynamic phenomena (Pauketat 2001a, following Wolf 1982:387–91;
see also Van Dyke and Alcock, this volume). Traditions for such theorists are not
normative, static, and epiphenomenal. They are “practiced,” put into action, and
made and remade continuously by people through time.They can even be “invented”
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In effect, traditions are the media of change, co-opted
and promoted in ways that selectively draw from the past (Trouillot 1995). Whole
community, ethnic, and national identities are “imagined” through such selective recol-
lections of traditions (Anderson 1983).
Given this selective, dynamic quality, it follows that traditional knowledge is not a
fixed quantity accessible to all or to be recollected in the same way from the past by
all.“Memory is historically conditioned, changing . . . according to the emergencies of
the moment; . . . it is progressively altered from generation to generation . . . [and] is
inherently revisionist and never more chameleon than when it appears to stay the same”
(Samuel 1994:10). It does not stay the same; it cannot be transmitted as a structure or
as information without incurring change.Trouillot (1995:14–16) is critical of viewing
traditions as fixed collective memories that can be retrieved uniformly by living people.
Consider an individual’s memory: it “is not always a process of summoning represen-
tations of what happened” in one’s lifetime (Trouillot 1995:14). For instance, know-
ledge of one’s own childhood may derive from what one was told later, such that these
later informants actually contribute to the creation of an individual’s history based on
their own imperfect (and etic) recollection. Few people can remember details of various
earlier life experiences, leaving certain recollections weighted in ways more propor-
tionate to the context of recollection than to the importance of the experience at the
time (see also Connerton 1989; Meskell, this volume).
Given that the individual’s history tends to be constructed in these ways, surely the prob-
lems of determining what belongs to the past multiply tenfold when that past is said to
be collective....We may want to assume for purposes of description that the life history
of an individual starts with birth. But when does the life of a collectivity start? At what
point do we set the beginning of the past to be retrieved? How do we decide – and
how does the collectivity decide – which events to include and which to exclude?
(Trouillot 1995:16)
Memories may be fixed to a degree if incorporated in mnemonic devices – litur-
gical recitations, ritual processions, music, song, prayer, etc. – and through the inscrip-
tion of them in material culture, the human body, and space (Van Dyke and Alcock,
this volume; see also Abercrombie 1998; Connerton 1989; Hagedorn 2001:77; Joyce
2000, this volume; Joyce and Hendon 2000; Kus 1997; Meskell, this volume; Rouget
1985:121; Rowlands 1993).Written history clearly constitutes such a case of inscrip-
tion (see Papalexandrou, this volume). However, mounds are also a kind of inscrip-
tion of social memory in space. Each instance of mound construction is an inscriptive