Publisher : MIT press.
Perspectives on Science.
Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 2008.
E-ISSN: 1530-9274 Print ISSN: 1063-6145.
26 pages.
Subject Headings:
Debates and debating.
Science - Philosophy.
Colliders (Nuclear physics) - Philosophy.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Summary:
For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question conces the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. Our central claim is that normative philosophy of science must move beyond abstract theories of justification, confirmation, or evidence conceived impersonally and incorporate a theoretical perspective that includes dialogical elements, either as adjuncts to impersonal theories of evidence or as intrinsic to the cogency of scientific argumentation.
Perspectives on Science.
Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 2008.
E-ISSN: 1530-9274 Print ISSN: 1063-6145.
26 pages.
Subject Headings:
Debates and debating.
Science - Philosophy.
Colliders (Nuclear physics) - Philosophy.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Summary:
For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question conces the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. Our central claim is that normative philosophy of science must move beyond abstract theories of justification, confirmation, or evidence conceived impersonally and incorporate a theoretical perspective that includes dialogical elements, either as adjuncts to impersonal theories of evidence or as intrinsic to the cogency of scientific argumentation.