Benson М. The Philosophy of Leibniz

160

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz.

announced doctrine that

nous,

or

intelligence,

is

ultimately responsible

for

everything,

our

English translations have Socrates ridiculing

the

suggestion

that

the

cause

of his

sitting there

in a

bent position

is

that

his

sinews,

by

relax-

ing

and

contracting, have brought

his

skeletal frame into that configuration.

"The true cause,"

he

says,

"is

that

the

Athenians decided

to

condemn

me and

that

I, for my

part, have thought

it

best

to sit

here."

But

what Socrates

is

really

concerned with

is the

aitla,

and not the

cause;

and the

aitia

must

be

some-

thing

prominently mentioned

in an

appropriate answer

to the

question "Why

are you

sitting

here?"—so

that obviously

it

would

be his own

decision

and

that

of the

Athenians.

Thus,

in

philosophical discourse

the

Latin word causa (and consequently

some

of its

derivatives

in

modern languages) acquired

from

aitia

a

sense that

does

not

jibe with that

of

"cause"

in

ordinary English.

It

covers

not

only what

we

call

"causes"

but

also many other

things

as

well,

including

in

certain cases

the

propositions that

we

would call "reasons."

Now

reasons,

it

seems

to me,

belong

to the

category

of

propositions

(thoughts,

the

senses

of

declarative sentences); they

are

good

or

bad, true

or

false,

and

they stand

in

logical

relations

to one

another

and to

that

for

which

they

are the

reasons. Causes,

on the

other hand, would seem

to be

things

or

events

or

circumstances—with

all of

which, unlike reasons,

it

makes sense

to

associate spatiotemporal

coordinates.

38

The

propositions

that

2 + 3 = 5 can

serve

as a

reason,

for

example,

in

relation

to the

proposition that

2 + 3 is a

prime number, but, considered

as an

abstract entity,

it can

hardly

be a

cause.

My

belief

in the

truth

of the

proposition, which, unlike

the

proposition

itself,

is

something that occurs

within

a

certain time span,

can

indeed

be a

cause,

perhaps,

of my

saying that

at

least

one

prime number

is the sum of two

others.

But

the

proposition itself

is

supposed

to be

timeless.

We do

indeed speak

of

reasons

for

actions,

and

actions occur

in a

space-

time frame.

But it

seems

to me

that when

we

speak

of the

reasons

for

some-

one's action,

we are

referring

to

certain propositions concerning

the

agent's

wants,

beliefs,

or

other

attitudes that motivate

his

action. "What

was his

A.6.2.475

n.

93),

and he

translated

most

of the

Theaetetus

into Latin. Portions

of the

following

paragraphs

are

from

the

cited paper.

38

At

A.6.6.475

Leibniz says:

"A

reason

is a

known truth whose connection with some less

well

known truth leads

us to

give

our

assent

to the

latter.

But it is

called

a

'reason',

especially

and

par

excellence,

if it is the

cause

not

only

of our

judgment

but

also

of the

truth

itself—which

makes

it

what

is

known

as an

'a

priori

reason'.

A

cause

in the

realm

of

things corresponds

to a

reason

in

the

realm

of

truths,

which

is why

causes

themselves—and

especially

final

ones—are

often

called

'reasons'."

LH IV vii B

57-58

(Fasz.

1,

#40,

137):

"The cause

is

the

thing

the

existence

or

mode

of

existence

of

which

is the

reason

for the

existence

of

another

thing,

called

the

effect."

This might

be

interpreted

to

mean something

like:

x is the

cause

of y if and

only

if

'A

exists'

is a

reason

for

'/J

exists',

where

x

falls

under

the

individual

concept

A and y

falls

under

the

individual

concept

B.

G IV 422 (L

291):

"A

concept

is

obscure which does

not

suffice

for

recognizing

the

thing

represented,

as

when

...

1

consider some term which

the

Scholastics

had

defined poorly, such

as

Aristotle's

entelechy,

or

cause

[causa]

as a

common term

for

material,

formal,

efficient,

and

final

cause,

or

other such terms

of

which

we

have

no

sure

definition."

Cf.

Grua

269,

PLR

65n.

and 66.

"Two

Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

161

reason

for

driving

so

fast?" "Because

he

wanted

to

avoid

the

five

o'clock

traffic."

The

reasons

themselves, which

are

propositions,

do not

cause

the

actions;

rather,

it is the

agent's attitude that

has the

causal

efficacy.

Likewise,

as

regards

the

motivating attitudes, their causes

are one

thing,

and the

reasons

that

would

be

given

to

justify

them

are

another.

Of

course,

in

giving reasons

we may

mention

causes.

Indeed,

it can

happen that

the

very sentence expressing (having

as its

sense)

the

reason

can

also

refer

to

(have

as

denotation)

a

state

of

affairs

that

is the

cause.

If I

support

my

claim

that there

will

be an

eclipse tomorrow,

I

shall probably give

reasons

in

which reference

is

made

to

certain circumstances that

will

cause this

occurrence.

But the

causes

of the

eclipse

are

still

not to be

confused with

the

reasons that

may be

adduced

for the

claim that

an

eclipse

will

take place.

The

connection

of all

this with

Why

questions

is

evident.

39

When

we ask a

question

of the

form

"Why

is

such

and

such

the

case?"

we are

asking

in the

first

instance

for a

reason,

not a

cause.

Strictly

speaking,

the

answer would

express

a

proposition

and

should

not be a

name

or a

description. (When

we

do

accept

a

phrase like "because

of his

health"

as an

answer

to

"Why

is he

taking

after-dinner walks?" such

a

phrase

may be

viewed

as

elliptical

for a

clause

containing

a

sentence, "Because

he

wishes

to be

healthy.")

The

reason

given

may or may not

refer

to a

cause,

but it

will

not

itself

be a

cause.

If a

ques-

tion

of the

form

"Why

is

such

and

such

the

case?" makes sense, then there

must

be a

reason

why

such

and

such

is the

case,

but it

does

not at all

follow

that

there must

be a

cause.

Yet

that

is

just what Leibniz seems

to be

assuming.

Having

been

presumptuous enough

to

accuse Leibniz

of

confusing

reasons

and

causes,

I

shall

go the

rest

of the way and

conjecture

a

train

of

thought that could have

led him to

this confusion.

Note

first

that, whether intentionally

or by

inadvertence, Leibniz does

not

respect

the

distinction, which many

of us

nowadays

find

so

fundamental,

between propositions

and the

objects they

are

"about." This

is

evident

from

various

features

of his

analysis.

For one

thing,

he

applies

the

terms "true"

and

"false"

indifferently

to

propositions

(as

expressed

by

sentences)

and to

indi-

viduals

or

classes

(as

denoted

by

names

and

descriptions).

For

another,

he

intends

the

substituends

for the

variables

in

formulas

like

"A

is

B"

to

include

not

only names

of

individuals

and

classes

but

also

infinitive

phrases

("for

man

to be an

animal") that express propositions; thus,

as we

have

seen,

he

analyzes

'If

A is

B,

then

C is

/)'

as

'For

A to be B is for C to be

D\

managing

in

this

way

to

bring

it

under

the

general

"A is B"

form.

40

It is

further

clear that when

he

appends

the

phrase

"is

true"

to

individual

and

class names,

he

uses

it to

mean

practically

the

same

as

"exists"; this suggests that

he

also considers

the

3

'

J

Leibniz

himself

points

out the

centrality

of Why

questions

in

connection

with

the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason,

which

is in

effect

the

statement that

every

Why

question about

the

actual

world

has an

answer.

See

the

Confessio

Philosophi

7r

(Saame,

40).

In his

letter

of

March

1706

to

Princess Sophie

(Correspondance

de

Leibniz,

ed.

O.

Klopp,

Hanover, 1874,

vols.

3,

172),

Leibniz says:

"Un des

grandes principes dont

je me

sens,

est

celui

qui

porte

que

rien n'est

sans

raison,

ou

bien

qu'il

y a

toujours

un

pourquoi"

[Leibniz's

emphasis].

40

C 389 (P

78);

cf. C 363 (P

54).

162

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

truth

of

propositions

to

consist

in the

existence

of

something, presumably

a

corresponding state

of

affairs.

The

next step,

I

think,

is to

confuse

a

state

of

affairs

with

a

complex object

having

the

components

of

that state

of

affairs

as

parts. Thus

one

might

suppose that

to

assert that

the

book

is on the

table

is to

assert

the

existence

of

the

fact

that

the

book

is on the

table,

or

that there

is

such

a

state

of

affairs;

and

one

might then

go on to

identify

this

fact

or

state

of

affairs

with

a

complex

object

consisting

of the

book

and the

table arranged

in the

requisite positions

relative

to

each other

and to the

earth.

From

this point

of

view, therefore,

the

sentence would

be the

name

of an

object having

as

parts

the

objects named

by the

parts

of the

sentence. Such

a

complex object could,

of

course,

be a

cause. Thus,

a

sentence that expresses

(that

is, has as its

sense)

a

reason that there

will

be an

eclipse

of the sun

tomorrow—for

instance

the

sentence "Tomorrow

the

moon

will

come

between

the

earth

and the

sun"—could

be

considered

as

denoting

an

object

or a

fact

that

will

cause

the

eclipse.

If

these

are the

lines along which Leibniz

was

thinking, then

the

error

here,

as in so

many other philosophical tangles,

is

simply

the

failure

to

distin-

guish

the

sense

of

linguistic

expressions—particularly,

of

sentences—from

their denotation

or

reference. Even

if we

were

to

agree that

a

sentence

expressing

the

reason

why

there

will

be an

eclipse refers

to or

denotes

a

state

of

affairs

that

can

plausibly

be

considered

to

cause

the

eclipse,

we

should

not

conclude that

in

this

or any

similar case

a

reason

is the

same

as a

cause.

For

although

the

cause

may be the

denotation

of the

sentence

in

question,

the

reason

is its

sense,

the

proposition that

it

expresses.

In

sum, then,

we can say

that

the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason,

inter-

preted

as a

claim about reasons,

is, as

Couturat

has

maintained, just

a

rather

trivial

corollary

of the

Predicate-in-Subject principle.

But

when

it is

inter-

preted

as

concerning causes,

it

amounts

to the

so-called

law of

universal

causation.

By

confusing

reasons

and

causes, Leibniz gets

the odd

result that

if

it

makes sense

to ask

'Why

is A

B'7

there

must

be

some cause

for

A's

being

B

—for

example, there must

be a

cause

to

explain

why the

laws

of

physics hold

or why the sum of the

angles

of a

triangle

is 180

degrees

or why

something,

rather than nothing, exists.

3.

The

Principle

of

Continuity

We

have

briefly

considered this principle

in

chapter

8 in

connection with

the

conditions

for

cross-world identity.

There

we

were only interested

in

Leibniz's application

of it to

yield

the

conclusion that "there

is no

vacuum

of

forms."

But he

applies

it in

many other

ways

and in

many other areas.

One of the

best statements

of the

principle

and of its

significance

for

Leibniz

is

found

in a

letter

he

wrote

to

Bayle's Nouvelles

as

part

of a

con-

troversy

with

Nicolas

de

Malebranche

and the

Abbe

Catelan. Leibniz

"Two

Great Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

163

observes

that certain

of

Malebranche's proposed physical laws violate

a

"Principle

of

General Order":

This

principle

has its

origin

in the

infinite

and is

absolutely necessary

in

geometry,

but it is

effective

in

physics

as

well, because

the

sovereign wisdom,

the

source

of all

things,

acts

as a

perfect geometrician, observing

a

harmony

to

which nothing

can be

added. This

is why the

principle serves

me as a

test

or

criterion

by

which

to

reveal

the

error

of an

ill-conceived opinion

at

once

and

from

the

outside, even before

a

penetrat-

ing

internal examination

has

begun.

It can be

formulated

as

follows. "When

the

differ-

ence between

two

instances

in a

given series

or

that which

is

presupposed

can be

diminished until

it

becomes

smaller than

any

given quantity whatever,

the

correspond-

ing

difference

in

what

is

sought

or in

their results must

of

necessity

also

be

diminished

or

become less than

any

given quantity whatever."

Or, to put it

more

commonly,

"When

two

instances

or

data approach each other continuously,

so

that

one at

last

passes over into

the

other,

it is

necessary

for

their consequences

or

results

(or the

unknown)

to do so

also."

This

depends

on a

more general principle, that

"As the

data

are

ordered,

so the

unknowns

are

ordered also"

(Datis

ordinatis

etiam

quaesita

sunt

ordinata).

41

Elsewhere

he

compresses

the

principle into

the

maxim that "Nature

never

makes

jumps,"

42

or "No

transition happens

by a

leap."

43

"This holds,"

he

says,

"not only

of

transitions

from

place

to

place,

but

also

of

those

from

form

to

form

or

from

state

to

state."

44

He

adds that experience confutes

all

sudden

changes; what pass

for

such

are

always

found,

on

closer examination,

to be

merely changes that

are

greater

or

more rapid than

the

ordinary.

45

Besides,

it is

agreed

on all

hands that motion, transition

from

place

to

place,

is

continuous;

the

same

a

priori reasons, whatever they are,

will

apply

to

transitions

from

state

to

state.

46

Leibniz's

favorite

examples

to

illustrate

the

application

of his

principle

are

from

geometry

and

mechanics.

The

most

frequently

occurring geo-

metrical

example concerns

the

fact

that

the

various conic sections

can be

con-

tinuously

transformed into

one

another

by

gradually tilting

the

intersecting

plane.

Thus,

if a

right circular cone

is cut by a

plane parallel

to its

base,

the

intersection

is, of

course,

a

circle.

If the

plane

is

then gradually tilted, using

a

diameter

of the

circle

as the

axis,

the

intersection becomes

an

ellipse.

As the

tilting

is

increased

and the

plane approaches

a

position parallel

to one of the

elements

of the

cone,

the

ellipse (with

its

foci

becoming farther

and

farther

apart) approaches

a

parabola. When

the

plane becomes parallel,

the

inter-

section

is a

parabola.

If

the

plane

is

tilted

still

farther

in the

same direction,

41

G III 52 (L

351);

cf. G VI 321 (H

333-34).

Leibniz's

manuscripts also contain

a

Latin

version

of

this letter, which

differs

considerably from

the

French.

In the

Latin version

the

principle

is

stated

as

follows: When

the

particular cases

or

data continuously approach each

other until

at

length

one

goes over into

the

other, then

the

same must happen

in the

correspond-

ing

consequences

or

results

(or

unknowns)

(GM VI

129).

He

refers

to

this again

at GM VI 250

(L

447)

and at GM IV 93 (L

544).

42

A.6.6.56;GVII567;GT403.

43

GII

168

(L

515).

44

GII

168

(LSI

6,

R

222-23).

45

Gill

634

(L

658).

4f

>

Gil

168 (L

516).

164 The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

the

parabola

becomes

a

hyperbola. Thus,

the

parabola

can be

regarded

as a

limiting

case

of the

ellipse

or of the

hyperbola.

In

view

of

this, Leibniz says, theorems about ellipses

and

hyperbolas

can

be

carried over

to

parabolas.

For

example,

an

important theorem about

the

ellipse

is

that

all the

rays

from

either

of its

foci

intersect, when reflected,

at the

other; thus,

as the

foci

become

more

and

more distant

from

one

another,

the

reflected

rays from either

of

them become closer

and

closer

to

parallel;

at the

limit,

the

reflected rays from

the

focus

of the

parabola

are

parallel.

We

there-

fore

see, Leibniz says, that this

fact

about parabolas

is

only

a

corollary

of the

cited theorem about

ellipses.

47

The

examples from mechanics

are

designed

not

only

to

illustrate

the

application

of the

principle

but

also,

as he

says

in the

passage quoted above,

to

show

how it can be

used

"to

reveal

the

error

of an

ill-conceived opinion

at

once

and

from

the

outside, even before

a

penetrating internal examination

is

begun." Descartes,

in the

second part

of his

Principles

of

Philosophy,

had set

forth

several "rules" describing collisions

of a

pair

of

perfectly elastic

(per-

fecte

dura)

bodies,

B and

C.

48

According

to the

first

rule,

if B and C are of

equal mass

and

collide while moving

in

opposite directions

at the

same

velocity,

both

will

be

repelled, with

the

velocities remaining

the

same

but

directions

reversed. Leibniz

has no

quarrel with this.

But the

second rule says

that

if the

conditions

are the

same except that

the

mass

of B is

greater than

that

of C,

then

after

the

collision

B

will

continue

in the

same direction with

the

same velocity

as

before, while

C

alone will

be

deflected, moving

now

with

its

former velocity

but in the

opposite direction,

so

that

B and C

together

will

move

in the

original direction

of

B.

Leibniz argues that

if

these

two

rules were both true, there would

be a

dis-

continuity

in

nature.

For as the

mass

of B is

continuously

decreased

toward

equality

with that

of C, the

result

of the

collision should continuously

approach that described

in the

first

rule.

But

Descartes's second rule

has B

retaining

the

same velocity

and

direction

after

its

collision with

C,

no

matter

how

little

B's

mass exceeds that

of C,

until suddenly, when

B and C are

equal

in

mass,

B's

motion

is

completely reversed

and it

bounces

off

with

un-

diminished

velocity

in the

opposite direction.

An

adequate account, Leibniz

insists,

must provide that

if

B is

gradually

diminished,

its

advance

also

will

diminish

continuously

until,

when

a

certain

ratio

is

reached between

B and C, B

will

at

length

come

to

rest

and

then,

by a

continuous

diminution,

be

turned

into

contrary

motion;

this

will

gradually

increase

until

finally,

when

all

inequality

between

B and C is

removed,

the

motions

end in the

rule

for

equality,

in

which

the

regressive

motion

of

each

body

after

collision

is

equal

to

its

progressive motion before

collision,

as the

first

rule

states.

49

47

GM VI

129-30;

cf. G III

51-52

(L

352),

GIV

375-76

(L

397-98).

18

Descartes,

Principia

Philosophiae,

Part

2,

sections

46-52

(Ueuvres,

ed.

Adam

and

Tan-

nery,

Paris,

1964,

vol.

viii-2,

68-69).

49

GIV

376-77

(L

398-99);

cf.

A.2.1.470.

For a

useful

discussion

of the

principle,

particu-

larly

in

relation

to

this

case,

see

Scager

(1981),

485ff.

"Two

Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

165

Another

application

of the

principle

in the

domain

of

physical theory

is

Leibniz's

use of it to

rule

out the

existence

of a

vacuum.

50

Apparently

he

thought

that

an

empty

space

would

be the

kind

of

"gap"

or

"leap"

the

prin-

ciple excludes.

We may

mention parenthetically that

he

also argues

for

this

conclusion

on the

basis

of the

Identity

of

Indiscernibles

(as one

empty space

would

be

completely indiscernible from

another)

5

'

and on

that

of the

prin-

ciple

of the

Best

(as

more

is

better,

in the

case

of

existence),

52

as

well

as on

that

of the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason ("because there

is no

reason

for

limiting

or

ending,

or for

stopping

at any

particular

place").

33

But

underlying

all

of

this

bad

reasoning, probably,

was his

feeling that

the

notion

of

action

at

a

distance

was a

mere scholastic superstition,

so

that

the

undeniable

fact

of

gravitational

attraction must involve

the

presence

of

bodies between

and

surrounding

the

bodies

attracted.

54

The

principle

of

Continuity

is

also cited against

the

existence

of

rigid

atoms. Leibniz says:

Matter, according

to my

hypothesis, would

be

divisible everywhere

and

more

or

less

easily with

a

variation which would

be

insensible

in

passing

from

one

place

to

another

neighboring place; whereas, according

to the

atoms,

we

make

a

leap

from

one

extreme

to the

other,

and

from

a

perfect

incohesion,

which

is in the

place

of

contact,

we

pass

to an

infinite

hardness

in all

other places.

And

these leaps

are

without example

in

nature.

55

In the

field

of

psychology Leibniz uses

the

principle

as

support

for his

thesis that there

are

unconscious perceptions.

"It

asserts,"

he

says, "that

we

pass always from

the

small

to the

large,

and

vice versa, through

the

inter-

mediate magnitudes

in

degree

and

quantity;

and

that motion never arises

immediately

from

rest

nor is

reduced

to it

except through

a

smaller motion.

And all

this leads

us to

conclude rightly that noticeable perceptions also

come

by

degrees

from

those which

are too

minute

to be

noticed."

3

''

As is

only

too

obvious,

none

of

these

various formulations

and

purported

applications

of the

principle

of

Continuity

is

quite clear. Instead

of our

having

a

good understanding

of the

principle

and its

alleged consequences,

and of

seeing

just

how the

consequences

follow

from

it, we

have

to

use,

as an aid to

interpretation,

the

fact

that Leibniz thought that such logical relationships

obtained.

So, in

view

of all

this, what

are we to

conclude about

the

meaning

of the

5(1

Jag

28

(L

157).

51

G

VII

372

(L

687).

52

G

VII

303-4

(L

487).

53

G

II

475

(L

608).

54

At G VI 599 (L

637) Leibniz argues that

plenitude,

i.e.,

the

nonexistence

of a

vacuum,

implies

that

everything

is

connected

and

each

body acts

on

every other, etc.,

and he

says that

from

this

it

follows

that "each monad

is a

living

mirror,

or a

mirror endowed with

an

internal

action,

and

that

it

represents

the

universe

according

to its

point

of

view

and is

regulated

as

com-

pletely

as is the

universe

itself."

55

GMII

156(R235).

56

A.6.6.56.

At G

III

635 (L

658) Leibniz uses

the

principle

to

argue against metem-

psychosis.

166

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

principle?

Clearly,

the

terminology employed

by

Leibniz supports Cou-

turat's opinion that

the

principle must have been suggested

to him by his

work

on the

infinitesimal calculus, where every

function

considered

was

assumed

to be

continuous

and

everywhere

differentiate.

57

And the

principle

obviously

reflects Leibniz's belief that whenever

one

physical quantity

or

state

is a

function

of

another, that function

is

continuous. (That

is—roughly—

for

every argument

x

g

in the

range

of

significance

of the

function,

the

limit

of

the

function values

as

their arguments approach

x

0

is the

function value

for

the

argument

x

0

.)

In the

cases

to

which this aspect

of the

principle applies,

Leibniz's reasoning

is

relatively clear.

Consider,

for

example,

the

quoted critique

of

Descartes's rules about

collisions.

The

principle implies that

if the

body

5's

velocity depends

on its

mass, then

by a

suitably small change

in

5's

mass

its

velocity

can be

made

to

increase

or

diminish

by

however small amount

may be

desired. Thus,

if B

will

have

a

given velocity

in the

cases

in

which

the

masses

are

equal, that velocity

can

be

increased

or

diminished however slightly

one

wishes

by

making

a

suit-

ably small change

in

/?'s

mass.

In the

geometrical example,

the

shape

of the

curve

can be

changed

as

slightly

as one may

wish (that

is, by a

finite

amount

within

any

preselected range)

by

making

a

suitably small change

in the

tilt

angle

of the

intersecting plane. Since that angle

can be

altered gradually, there

can

be no

"jumps"

in the

series

of

resulting curves.

But

how the

principle,

as

thus interpreted, yields

the

conclusions about

the

nonexistence

of

vacuums

and

indiscernible atoms,

or the

existence

of

petite

perceptions

or the

continuity

of

forms,

is

less clear.

As is all too

often

the

case with Leibniz,

we can

see—perhaps

"feel"

is the

more appropriate

word—that

he has an

important idea,

but

neither

he nor we can

formulate

it

with

anything like

satisfactory

precision.

58

4.

The

Principle

of the

Best

Leibniz accepts

the

Socratic principle that nobody desires what

he

really

considers

to be bad for

himself,

or,

more generally, that everyone desires only

57

CL235n.

1.

58

This

is not to say

that

it is

without

content.

Attempts

to

express

the

same

idea continue

to

this

day. Hermann

Weyl

(1956),

1833, writes:

"In

studying

a

function

one

should

let

the

independent variable

run

over

its

full

range.

A

conjecture about

the

mutual interdependence

of

quantities

in

nature, even before

it is

checked

by

experience,

may be

probed

in

thought

by

examining

whether

it

carries through over

the

whole

range

of

the

independent variables.

Some-

times certain simple limiting cases

at

once reveal that

the

conjecture

is

untenable.

Leibniz

taught

us

by his

principle

of

Continuity

to

consider rest

not as

contradictorily

opposed

to

motion,

but as

a

limiting case

of

motion. Arguing

by

continuity

he was

able

a

priori

to

refute

the

laws

of

impact

proposed

by

Descartes.

Ernst

Mach

gives this prescription:

'After

having

reached

an

opinion

for

a

special

case,

one

gradually modifies

the

circumstances

of

this case

as far as

possible,

and in so

doing tries

to

stick

to the

original opinion

as

closely

as one

can.

There

is no

procedure which

leads

more

safely

and

with greater mental economy

to the

simplest interpretation

of all

natural

events.'"

"Two

Great Principles

"

and Two

Lesser Ones

167

what

he

deems

to be

best.

59

Applying this

to

God,

of

whom

it can be

said that

(1) if he

deems something

to be the

best, then

it is the

best,

and (2) if he

desires that something happen, then

it

does happen,

we

infer that

the

actual

world,

which

God

created,

is the

best

of all

possible

worlds.

60

This general

principle,

and

sometimes

the

special case

of its

application

to

God's creation

of

the

actual world,

is

called

by

Leibniz

the

principle

of the

Best.

61

Its

impor-

tance,

for

him,

has to do

with

the

nature

of

explanation.

As we

have seen

in our

discussion

of the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason,

Leibniz

observed that

in

many cases questions about

the

actual world require

answers

referring

to

what

is

best,

or is

thought

to be

best,

rather than

to

mechanical

causes.

His

doctrine

on

this point might

be

summarized

as

follows.

There

are at

least

four

different

Benson М. The Philosophy of Leibniz

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