Benson М. The Philosophy of Leibniz

150

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

while

that between words

and

their denotations

is

indirect, mediated

by the

relevant concepts. Words

are

symbols

for

thoughts

and

only indirectly refer

to

whatever objects,

if

any, these thoughts

may be

about.

This

holds

for

proper

names

as

well

as for all

other

types

of

expression.

It is not the

case,

Leibniz would say, that

we

succeed

in

directly associating

a

proper

name with

a

definite individual

and

then,

as we

discover properties

of

that individual,

gradually

build

up a

concept

or

intension

to go

with

the

name. Rather,

to the

extent that

we

understand what

we are

saying when

we use the

name,

we

already have some sort

of

concept attached

to the

name,

and

then

we

gradually narrow down

the

range

of

possible individuals

who

could

fall

under

the

concept.

We

form

the

concept

X by

learning

the use of the

expression

X

as a

part

of the

language,

and not by

abstracting qualities

from

what

we may

take

to be the

designatum

of

X.

From this point

of

view,

it is not as

though

we

know

from

the

start exactly which individual

we are

talking about,

and as

though over time

we

find

out

more

and

more attributes

of

that individual

and

can

intelligibly speculate

as to

what would have happened

if

that very same

individual

had had

properties other than

the

ones

he

does have.

Now,

it

might

be

supposed that,

at

least

in

very favorable though artificial

circumstances,

we can

(and

do)

indeed manage

to

attach

a

proper name

to a

definite

individual

and

then,

as we

discover

the

properties

of

that individual,

use the

name

in

making true assertions, including counterfactual conjectures,

about

it. So I

might point

to

somebody

or

something

and

say,

"By

'Nixon'

I

mean this

man;

now, what

if

Nixon

had not

resigned

the

presidency?"

Of

course, with almost

all the

proper names

we use

(including, needless

to

say,

the

cherished example "Nixon")

we

have never carried

out any

such

deictic

or

dubbing performance.

But

even when

we

have,

it is by no

means

clear that

by

using

a

name introduced

in

this

way we can

formulate

an

intel-

ligible

question about what would have happened

if

some individual

had had

attributes

other than

the

ones

he

does have.

For

Leibniz

will

ask, "Exactly

which

individual

are you

talking about?"

It

will

be of no

avail

to

resume

the

pointing

while reiterating,

with

whatever emphasis,

THIS

MAN,

for

Leib-

niz's question amounts

to

"Who

is

this

man

?"

We can

hardly claim that

by

pointing

we

have singled

out and

identified

a

particular individual,

if at the

same time

we

have

to

admit that there

may be

many individuals such that,

for

all

we

know,

any one of

them might have been

the one in

front

of us at the

time

when

we did the

pointing.

In

introducing

a

name

or

making

an

identification,

the

demonstrative pronoun "this"

is

effective

only

to the

extent that

the

speaker

and the

audience

can

distinguish

the

intended object

from

the

rest

of

the

objects

in the

world.

As

mentioned earlier, Leibniz

is

willing

to go the

whole

way in

this direction

and

argue that even

in the

case

of our own

indi-

vidual

concepts,

to say

nothing

of

those

of

others,

we

have only confused

experience,

so

that

in a

real sense

we do not

even know precisely

who we

ourselves

are.

36

Cf.GII46(M50).

Cross-

World

Identity

151

At any

rate, whatever

the

right

view

about these matters

may be, we

should

take note that Leibniz agrees with

his

opponents

on one

important

point, namely, that

proper

names, unlike such descriptions

as

"The

first

man,"

are

what

are

today called "rigid

designators";

37

they designate

the

same

thing

in

every possible world

in

which they designate anything.

But for

Leib-

niz

this

is

because

no

proper name designates anything

in

more than

one

pos-

sible

world.

37

Kripke

(1972),

269-70.

IX

"Two

Great Principles"

and

Two

Lesser Ones

In

sections

31

and 32 of the

Monadology,

Leibniz

says:

Our

reasonings

are

based upon

two

great principles:

the

first,

the

Principle

of

Con-

tradiction,

by

virtue

of

which

we

judge that

false

which involves

a

contradiction,

and

that

true which

is

opposed

or

contradictory

to

the

false;

and the

second,

the

Principle

of

Sufficient

Reason,

by

virtue

of

which

we

observe that there

can be

found

no

fact

that

is

true

or

existent,

or any

true proposition, without there being

a

sufficient

reason

for

its

being

so and not

otherwise, although

we

cannot know these reasons

in

most

cases.

1

Similarly,

in the

Theodicy:

I

have remarked

...

that there

are two

great principles,

namely,

that

of

Identity

or

of

Contradiction, which says that

of two

opposed propositions

one is

true

and the

other

is

false,

and

that

of

Sufficient

Reason,

according

to

which there

is no

true

proposition

for

which anyone with

the

requisite knowledge

to

fully

understand

it

could

not see the

reason.

2

and

There

are

two

great principles

of our

reasoning;

one is the

Principle

of

Contradic-

tion,

which asserts that

of two

contradictory propositions

one is

true

and one is

false;

the

other

is the

Principle

of

Determining

Reason,

that nothing ever happens

without

there being

a

eause

or at

least

a

determining reason

for

it...

.

3

In

interpreting

these

two

principles,

Couturat

and

others

4

have

suggested

that

the

first

amounts

to the

claim

that

every

analytic

proposition

is

true,

1

G

VI

612

(L

646);

G

VII

309.

2

G

VI

413-14

(H

418-9).

1

G VI

127.

There

are

literally

dozens

of

other references

in the

Leibnizian

corpus

to

these

"two

great principles."

4

CL213-17;R

v.

Rescher(1979)

23ff.,

in

a

variation

on

this,

has

the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

as

"Every true

proposition

is

analytic,"

the

principle

of

Identity

as

"Every

finitely

analytic

152

"Two Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser

Ones

153

while

the

second asserts that every true proposition

is

analytic,

so

that

both

together

are

equivalent

to the

statement that

in

every true proposition

the

concept

of the

predicate

is

contained

in the

concept

of the

subject. With this

suggestion

in

mind,

let us now

take

a

closer look.

1 The

Principle

of

Identity

or of

Contradiction

The

first

thing that meets

the eye

when

we

survey

the

passages

in

which

Leibniz states this principle

is

that

he

pays

no

attention whatever

to a

number

of

distinctions that today would

be

thought important

or

even essential.

Clearly,

he

regards

all the

following

statements

as

alternative formulations

of

a

single law:

1 A

proposition

cannot

be

true

and

false

at the

same

time.

5

2 A

proposition

is

either true

or

false.

6

3 A is A and

cannot

be

non-A

.

7

4

Of a

pair

of

contradictories,

one is

true

and one is

false.

8

5 The

same

thing

cannot

be and not

be.

1J

Indeed,

in one

text

he

seems

to

include under

the

same heading almost

the

entire theory

of

truth

and

falsity:

First

of

all,

I

assume that

every

judgment (that

is,

affirmation

or

negation)

is

either

true

or

false

and

that

if the

affirmation

is

true

the

negation

is

false,

and if the

negation

is

true

the

affirmation

is

false; that what

is

denied

to be

true—truly,

of

course—is

false,

and

what

is

denied

to be

false

is

true;

that

what

is

denied

to be

affirmed,

or

affirmed

to

be

denied,

is to be

denied;

and

what

is

affirmed

to be

affirmed

and

denied

to be

denied

is

to be

affirmed. Similarly,

that

it is

false that what

is

false should

be

true

or

that

what

is

true

should

be

false;

that

it is

true

that

what

is

true

is

true,

and

what

is

false false.

All

these

are

usually

included

in one

designation,

the

principle

of

contradiction

}°

Perhaps

it is not too

surprising that

in

view

of the

obviousness

and

seem-

ing

triviality

of

Tarski equivalences like

'"Snow

is

white'

is

true

if and

only

if

snow

is

white," most

of

these

multifarious

formulations would appear

to

Leibniz (and

to

many others)

to

amount

to the

same thing.

But it is

more

puzzling

that such formulations

as "A is A

"

or

"Every identical proposition

is

true

and its

contradictory

is

false"

1

'

should

be

considered equivalent

to the

rest

of

them.

There

is no

doubt, however, that this

was

Leibniz's view.

In

many

places

he

uses phrases like "the principle

of

Contradiction

or,

what

amounts

to the

same thing, that

of

Identity,"

and he

indicates

in

other ways

that

for him the two

principles

coalesce.

12

proposition

is

necessarily

true,"

and the

principle

of the

Best

as

"Every

infinitely

analytic pro-

position

is

contingently

true."

5

G

VII

355

(L

677).

"

A.6.6.361-62.

9

Grua

20.

7

G

VII

355

(L

677).

10

G VII 299 (L

225).

8

G

VI

127.

"

G

VII

309.

12

GIV359(L385);G

V 14; G VII

309,

355 (L

677);

G

VI

413;

C 1.

154

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

Actually,

it is not

difficult

to see why

Leibniz

might look

at

things

in

this

way.

We

have only

to

keep

in

mind that,

for him the

proposition

'A

is

B'

(essential)

is

equivalent

to the

generalized conditional

'If

something

is

A,

then

it is

B\

Thus, taking "Nothing both

is A and is not A

"

as the

principle

of

Contradiction,

and "A is A

"

as the

principle

of

Identity,

we see

that while

the

former

is

equivalent

to "If

something

is

A,

then

it is not

nol-A,"

the

latter

is

equivalent

to "If

something

is

A,

then

it is

A,"

and

that these last

are

plainly

equivalent

to one

another.

I do not

vouch

for the

soundness

of

this line

of

argument,

but I do

believe that

it

accurately reflects Leibniz's

way of

thinking

about

the

matter.

13

We

have seen

(in

chapter

7)

that

the

principle

of

Identity plays

a

central

role

in one of

Leibniz's ways

of

defining

necessary

and

contingent truth.

He

says

that

'A

is

B'

is a

necessary truth

if, and

only

if, by

means

of a

finite

series

of

definitional

replacements

in A and B it can be

reduced

to the

form

'A

^A

2

...

A

n

is

B

1

B

2

...

B

m

',

where each

B

t

is one of the

A

f

's.

(Or,

equivalently,

it is

necessary

if and

only

if its

contradictory,

'A

is not

B',

can by

such replace-

ments

be

brought

to a

form

in

which some component

of the

predicate

is the

complement

of

some component

of the

subject.)

It is

therefore clear that

Leibniz wishes

his

principle

of

Identity

to

cover

not

only propositions

of the

form

"A is

A,"

but

also

those

of

such

forms

as

"AB

is

A,"

"ABC

is

AC," and,

generally,

"A

^A

2

...

A

n

is

B

1

B

2

...

B

m

,"

where every

E

L

is one of the

^4/s.

Hence,

if we are to

judge

by the use to

which Leibniz puts this principle,

its

content

is, as

Couturat

has

asserted, that every

explicitly

analytic subject-

predicate proposition

is

true.

The

word "explicitly" must

be

added here

because

we are not

told, either

by

Leibniz

or by any of his

modern expositors,

whether

the

propositions obtained

at the

successive steps

of

this sort

of

reduction

are or are not to be

considered identical

with

the

original

proposition—for

example, whether

the

proposition "Bachelors

are un-

married"

is or is not the

same proposition

as

"Unmarried

men are un-

married."

2.

The

Principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

The

second "great principle"

so

often

cited

by

Leibniz

is

that

of

Sufficient

Reason: Nothing comes

to

pass without

a

reason

(nihilfit

sine

ratione).

As

with

the

principle

of

Contradiction,

so

this principle, too,

is put

forward

in

many

different

versions that

are by no

means obviously equivalent.

In

addi-

tion

to the

five

formulations already quoted, here

are a few

more:

There

must

be a

sufficient

reason

for

anything

to

exist,

for any

event

to

occur,

for

any

truth

to

obtain.

14

13

Cf.PLR61.

14

G

VII

419

(L

717).

"Two

Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

\

5

Nothing occurs

for

which

it

would

be

impossible

for

someone

who had

enough

knowledge

of

things

to

give

a

reason adequate

to

determine

why the

thing

is as it is and

not

otherwise.

15

There

is no

proposition (other than identicals)

in

which

the

connection between

subject

and

predicate

cannot

be

distinctly

explained.

16

The

principle

that

a

reason

must

be

given

is

this:

that

every

true

proposition

not

known

per se has an a

priori proof,

or

that

a

reason

can be

given

for

every truth,

or, as is

commonly

said, everything

has a

cause.

17

Nothing exists without

a

reason.

For

nothing exists without

the

aggregate

of all its

requisites.

(A

requisite

is

that without which

the

thing cannot exist;

the

aggregate

of all

requisites

is the

full

cause

of the

thing.)

18

Nothing exists without

a

reason,

or

there

is no

effect

without

a

cause.

19

Whether

this principle plays

as

great

a

role

in

"all

our

reasoning"

as

Leibniz

seems

to

think

it

does

20

is

open

to

question.

But

there

is no

question

that

he

uses

it

frequently

in his own

philosophizing.

21

Some

of the

arguments

in

which

it

appears are,

in

very condensed form,

as

follows:

1.

On

absolute

space.

If

space were absolute, there would

be no

reason

why

the

physical universe should

be

oriented

as it is

rather than

in

some

other way,

for

example, with east

and

west reversed. Therefore,

space

is not

absolute.

22

2.

On

absolute time. Similarly,

if

time were absolute,

God

would

have

had no

reason

to

begin

the

world

at one

time rather than another.

Therefore, time

is not

absolute

and the

world

is

eternal.

23

3.

On

atoms.

If God had

created

two

things that

differed

solo

numero,

he

would have

had no

reason

to put one of

them

in one

place

and the

other

in

another, rather than vice versa. Therefore, there

do not

exist

two

things that

differ

solo numero,

and

such atomic theories

as

postu-

late

the

contrary

are

false.

24

4.

On the

existence

of

God.

God

exists,

for

otherwise there would

be no

sufficient

reason

why

this possible world rather than some other

exists.

25

15

G

VI

602

(L

639).

16

C513.

17

G

VII

309:...

etprincipium

reddendae

rationis,

quod scilicet

omnis

propositio vera,

quae

per se

nota

non

est,

probationem

recipit

a

priori, sive quod omnis veritatis reddi ratio potest,

vel

ut

vulgo

ajunt,

quod

nihilfit

sine causa.

Cf. VII

301.

18

Grua267.

19

C

519.

Other

statements

are

at

C

11,

25. For a

really early statement

of the

principle,

see

Plato,

Timaeus,

28a4-6.

20

See

G

VII

301.

21

The

principle appears

in

Leibniz's works from

the

very beginning;

cf.

A.6.1.490

(from

1668),

A.2.1.23

(from

1669).

See O.

Saame's

edition

of

Confessio

Philosophi,

145 n. 28.

22

G VII 364 (L

682);

cf.

GII

515,

III

595.

23

Grua270;G11515.

24

C

519

(L

268).

25

G VI 603 (L

639);

cf. G VII 356 (L

677-78).

GII

424:

If no

series were best,

God

would

have created nothing,

for he

cannot

act

without

a

sufficient

reason.

156

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

5.

On

Archimedes'

De

Aequilibrio.

Archimedes,

in his

book

De

Aequilibrlo,

was

obliged

to

make

use of a

particular case

of the

great

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason.

He

takes

it for

granted that

if

there

be a

balance

in

which everything

is

alike

on

both sides,

and

if

equal weights

are

hung

on the two

ends

of

that balance,

the

whole

will

be at

rest.

This

is

because

no

reason

can be

given

why one

side should

go

down rather

than

the

other.

26

In

chapter

8 we

have seen that Leibniz also employs

the

principle

in a

series

of

arguments

of the

form: there

is no

reason

for

P;

therefore,

not-/

J

.

Presumably such arguments

are

enthymemes

for

arguments

of the

form:

either

P or

not-/

J

;

if P,

then there

is a

sufficient

reason

for P; but

there

is no

sufficient

reason

for P;

therefore,

not-/

J

.

We

have earlier noticed

two

examples

of

this sort

of

reasoning:

...

It

follows,

also,

that

if he had had

other

circumstances

this

would

not

have been

our

Adam,

but

another,

because

nothing

prevents

us

from

saying

that

this

would

be

another.

He is,

therefore,

another.

27

...

If, in the

life

of any

person,

and

even

in the

whole

universe,

anything

went

differ-

ently

from

what

it

has,

nothing

would

prevent

us

from

saying

that

it was

another

person

or

another possible

universe

which

God had

chosen.

It

would

then indeed

be

another

individual.

28

In all of his

uses

of the

principle

it is

evident that Leibniz tacitly places

limits

on the

kinds

of

reasons that

are to be

considered.

In the

argument con-

cerning

the

balance,

for

example,

it is

assumed that

the

only relevant reasons

would

refer

to

physical features

of the

balance,

the

weights,

and the

surrounding environment. Indeed,

it is

clear that

not

even

all

such features

are

regarded

as

relevant. After all, everything can't

be

"alike

on

both

sides"

of

the

balance,

or

else,

on

Leibnizian principles, there wouldn't

be two

sides.

So,

some features must

be

excluded. Thus,

the

tacit conditions

of the

Archime-

dean

argument would presumably

be

violated

if, the

equal weights being

made

of

iron,

a

magnet that

is

close

to one

side

of the

balance causes that side

to go

down.

We are

also

left

to

wonder,

in

this case

and in

similar cases,

why

Leibniz's principle

does

not

call

for a

sufficient

reason

for

balance

as

well

as

for

imbalance.

He

seems

to

assume gratuitously that

if the

equal weights (and

by

what criterion

are

they equal?)

do not

balance, that calls

for an

explana-

tion, whereas

if

they

do

balance, nothing more need

be

said about

it.

Similarly,

in the

arguments about space

and

time, only "internal" proper-

26

G VII 356 (L

677),

301 (L

227);

C 519 (L

268), 402.

At C 514

Leibniz argues that

Euclid's axiom that

the

results

of

adding

equals

to

equals

are

equal also follows

from

the

princi-

ple

because

no

reason could

be

given

for

their being diverse!

27

GII

42

(M

46).

Cf.

C374(P64n.

1).

28

GII

53 (M

59-60).

At

GII

43 (M

46),

in a

similar argument,

he

draws

a

weaker conclu-

sion:

"...

there must

of

necessity

be a

reason

for the

true

statement...

that

1 who was in

Paris

am

now in

Germany.

For if

there

is no

reason,

one

would

be as

justified

in

saying that

it is

another

person."

"Two

Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

157

ties

of the

universe—properties

that would

be the

same

no

matter when

or

where

it was

located—were

to be

considered

by

God.

No

doubt speculation

in

these matters

is

best

left

to the

theologians,

but one

might suppose that

God, like

any

ordinary workman, would

act to

produce

an

artifact when

and

only when

he

felt

that

he was

quite ready.

And

when

a

workman feels that

he

is

quite ready

is

surely

not

determined exclusively

by the

design

and

materials

of

the

contemplated product.

In

any

case, when

the

possible reasons

are

restricted

in

this way,

the

principle that there must

be a

sufficient

reason

for

whatever happens seems

to

lose whatever vague

plausibility

it has

when

it is

stated

simpliciter.

We

should take note, however, that

in

most

of the

aforementioned appli-

cations

the

relevant individuals

are not

simple substances. Perhaps

the

prin-

ciple

applies

to

aggregates only

by

weak analogy with

the way it

applies

to

monads.

And in the

latter connection,

at

least,

it

seems intended merely

as a

corollary

of the

definition

of

truth,

or of the

Predicate-in-Subject axiom,

as

has

been

argued

by

Couturat, Rescher,

and

Parkinson.

In

support

of

this

interpretation,

Parkinson

29

quotes Leibniz's remark that

the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

"is

contained

in the

definition

of

truth

and

falsity,"

and he

points

to

such passages

as the

following:

It is

evident, therefore, that

all

truths—even

the

most

contingent—have

an a

priori

proof,

or

some reason

why

they

are

truths

rather than not.

And

this

is

just

what

is

meant when

it

commonly said that nothing happens

without

a

cause,

or,

that there

is

nothing

without

a

reason.

30

Thus,

the

sufficient

reason

for the

truth

of

"Caesar crossed

the

Rubicon,"

for

example, would

be

found

in the

complete individual concept

of

Caesar,

involving

perhaps

that

he was

angry with Pompey, that

he

considered

a

good

offense

to be the

best

defense,

and so

on.

31

In

other words, anyone

who

really

knew

who

Caesar was, that

is, who

knew

in

full

what kind

of

individual

he

was,

would know

why he

chose

to

cross

the

Rubicon; and,

in

general,

to

dis-

cover

the

reason

for the

truth

of the

essential proposition

'A

is

B'

is to

analyze

the

concept

A far

enough

to

reveal

the

concept

B as

contained

in

it.

32

In

contingent truths, where

the

analysis would

go on to

infinity,

we

mortals

can

only achieve

a

probable opinion, presumably

by

analyzing

the

subject

term

to a

point where

we can

discern some sort

of

tendency.

The

root

of all

this

is,

once again, Leibniz's idea that every question

can be

resolved into

a

question

of

which

individuals exist

or of

what would

be the

case

if

this

one or

that

one did

exist.

We

might

ask

ourselves: what's wrong

with

this idea, anyway? Well,

for

one

thing,

it

seems

to

make

it

impossible

for

anyone

to be

mistaken about

the

29

PLR66.

3(1

G VII

301,

as

translated

by

Parkinson.

Cf. G IV

436-37

(L

310-11),

C

405,

519.

31

C 26: If

Peter

acts

differently

from Paul,

the

reason

for

this

can

only

be

found

in

Peter-ness

and

Paul-ness.

32

G II 46 (M

50):

To say

that

the

predicate

is in the

subject

is to say

that

there

is

always

something

to be

conceived

in the

subject which serves

to

explain

why

this predicate

pertains

to it.

158

The

Philosophy

of

Leibniz

accidents

of any

individual. Whoever appears

to

believe something false

of

individual

x has not

fully

grasped

the

complete individual concept

of

x,

and

hence

the

belief

is not

really about

x.

This result obviously

does

violence

to

our

intuitions.

We may

note, however, that while,

on

Leibniz's doctrine,

I

cannot believe

of

Caesar that

he

died

in

bed,

I can

mistakenly believe that

the

proposition "Caesar died

in

bed"

is

true.

For I can

fail

to

understand

or

grasp

that proposition (that

is, the

sense

of the

sentence "Caesar died

in

bed")

to the

extent requisite

for

investigating

its

truth.

Hence

the

clash with intuition

may

not

be

quite

so

serious

as it

appears

at

first.

Nevertheless,

it

cannot

be

denied

that

Leibniz comes uncomfortably close

to

holding

the

curious doctrine that

"every

assertion

is

true

in the

sense intended."

Leibniz's

use of the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

in

proving

the

exist-

ence

of God

calls attention

to

another deficiency

of

that principle.

He

argues

as

follows.

We can ask not

only

why a

particular state

of the

world should

exist,

but

also

why

there should

be a

world

at all and why it

should

be

struc-

tured

according

to one set of

laws rather than another.

In the

first

of

these

cases,

we can

give

a

reason

for the

particular state

by

referring

to

preceding

ones

and

citing natural laws that link them

to the one in

question,

but in the

other

two

cases

there

must

be

some other sort

of

reason.

Then

he

continues:

The

reasons

for the

world therefore

lie in

something extramundane,

different

from

the

chain

of

states

or

series

of

things whose aggregate constitutes

the

world

...

and

since

there

is no

reason

for an

existing thing except

in

another existing thing, there

must

necessarily exist some

one

being

of

metaphysical necessity,

or a

being

to

whose

essence belongs

existence.

33

Thus Leibniz moves

us

from

the

relatively innocuous admission that

it

makes

sense

to ask

certain

Why

questions,

to the

much stronger conclusion

that

there

is a

necessary being,

and the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

has

been

shifted

from

the

claim that nothing happens without

a

reason

to the

very

different

claim that everything

has a

cause. Indeed,

from

several

of

Leibniz's

formulations

quoted earlier

in

this section

it can be

seen that

he

notices

no

difference

here. With very

few

exceptions

he

appears

to use the

terms

"reason"

and

"cause"

interchangeably.

34

This tendency

on

Leibniz's part

to

confuse reasons

and

causes

can be

explained,

if not

justified.

It is not

peculiar

to

him,

and in

fact

it

goes back

through

the

history

of

philosophy

to

Plato

and

Aristotle

and

their

use of the

Greek word

aitia,

which

was

later translated into Latin

as

causa

and

even-

tually

into English

as

"cause."

Every beginner

in

philosophy

has

been puzzled

33

G VII 303

(487).

G

II

264:

the

reason

for the

existence

and

harmony

of the

monads

is in

that

res we

call

"God."

Cf.

A.6.6.98.

GII

271

(L

538):

to ask why

there

is

perception

and

appeti-

tion

in

monads

is to

inquire about something ultramundane

and to

demand reasons

of

God.

34

At C 533 he

asserts straight

out

that"Causa

is

nothing else than

realis

ratio [real

reason]."

Gil

233:

the

causes

of

eternal monads

will

have

to be

mtiones

extmneas.

A.6.2.483:

Ratio

suffi-

cient

est qua

posita

res

est.

A.6.6.118:

"Hunger

has

particular reasons that

do not

always

exist."

Cf.

the

proof

of the

principle

of

Sufficient

Reason

at

A.6.6.483,

in

which

the

sufficient

reason

for

a

thing's existence

or

occurring

is

identified

with

all the

"requisites"

for its

occurring

or

existing;

a

ratio

sufficiens

is

defined

as qua

posita

res

est,

and a

requisition

is quo

non

posito

res

non

est.

At

"Two

Great

Principles"

and Two

Lesser Ones

159

by

Aristotle's doctrine

of the

"four

causes," since only

his

so-called

efficient

causes seem

to

deserve

the

name

at

all.

Aristotle

was of

course philo-

sophizing

in

Greek,

and the

crucial word

was

aitia.

As

both

he and

Plato

usually

employ this word,

x is an

aitia

of

y's

being

in

such

and

such

a

condi-

tion

if x is

prominently mentioned

in an

appropriate answer

to a

question

as

to why y is in

that condition.

This becomes clearer

if we

consider

the

following

four

Aristotelian ques-

tions

and

answers.

35

1.

Why did the

Persians invade Attica? Because

the

Athenians

had

raided Sardis.

2. Why is

this statue

so

heavy?

Because

it is

made

of

bronze.

3. Why is he

taking after-dinner

walks?

Because

of his

health.

4. Why is the

angle

A

inscribed

in a

semicircle

a

right angle? Because

it is

equal

to an

angle

B

that

is

half

of a

straight angle.

In

each

case

the

aitia

is

what

is

mentioned most prominently

in the

answer.

Thus,

in the

first

example

the

Athenian raid

on

Sardis

is the

aitia; this

aitia

is a

so-called

efficient

cause.

In the

second example

the

aitia,

according

to

Aristotle,

is the

bronze,

the

material cause.

The

third example

is

supposed

to

illustrate

the

final

cause, which

in

this case

is

health.

And in the

last

example

the

aitia

is,

oddly enough,

the

angle

B,

which

is the

formal

cause.

36

We

see, therefore, that Aristotle

is in

effect

noticing four

different

kinds

of

answers

that

can be

given

to Why

questions; only

one of

these types

of

answer

mentions what

we

today would call

a

"cause."

Plato's

use of

aitia

is

similar,

and in the

same

way it

gives rise

to

texts that

in

translation seem rather odd.

In

Leibniz's favorite passage from

the

Phaedo

(97C-99B),

37

where Socrates complains that Anaxagoras

did not

stick

to his

Grua

267

Leibniz

states

that

the

aggregate

of all

requisites

is the

"full

cause"

(causaplena)

of the

thing.

A

passage

that

seems

clearly

to

make

causes

a

subclass

of

reasons

is the

following, from

LHI,

4,3,1-4

(Fasz.

2,

#69,

236):

Axioma

Magna

Nothing

is

without

its

reason.

Or,

what

is

the

same,

nothing

exists

without

its

being

possible

(at

least

for an

omniscient

being)

to

give

a

reason

why it

exists

rather

than

not,

and why it is in

this

condition rather

than

in

some

other.

Whence

it follows

that

nothing

is,

per

se and

absolutely

speaking,

undetermined

[indifferens],

and the

indifference

of

things

is

only

a

figment

of our

ignorance,

like

what

the

pagans

call

Fortune. But, somebody

will

say,

if

nothing

is

without

its

cause,

then there

will

be no

first

cause

and no

ultimate

termination.

The

response

is

that though indeed

nothing

is

without

its

reason,

it

does

not

follow

that

nothing

is

without

its

cause.

For a

cause

is a

reason

for the

thing

that

is

outside

the

thing,

or a

reason

for the

production

of

the

thing;

though

it is

indeed possible

for the

reason

for a

thing

to be

internal

to

the

thing

itself.

This

would

be the

case

with

all

things

that

are

necessary,

like

mathematical

truths

that

contain

their

own

reasons,

and

God, who, alone among

existing

things,

is

the

reason

for

his own

existence.

35

Here

I

follow

the

excellent

account

in

Vlastos

(1978).

The

relevant

references

to

Aristotle

are

given

in his n. 7.

36

One

might

have

thought

that

it

would

at

least

be the

proposition

that

angle

A is

equal

to

angle

B and

angle

B is

half

of a

straight

angle;

and in

other

instances

propositions

do

serve

as

aitiai;

e.g.,

the

premises

of a

valid

syllogism

are

said

to be

aitiai

of the

conclusion.

37

Cf. G

Iff

54-55

(L

353).

This

passage

(and

Leibniz's

translation

of it) are

discussed

at

some

length

in

Mates

(1973).

Leibniz

also

has

praise

for the

Parmenides

and

Timaeus

(cf.

Benson М. The Philosophy of Leibniz

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