building craftsmen, joiners etc. and new craftsmen like boilermakers, iron puddlers and railway engine drivers—
conventionally labelled the ‘labour aristocracy’—were prominent among the fortunate group. Factory cotton spinners, the
majority of farm workers in the Scottish Lowlands, most domestic servants and perhaps building workers also experienced
rising real wages. Workers hit by technological advance and who were unadaptable like handloom weavers, framework
knitters and the nail-makers of the Black Country; a great many of the London workers mentioned by Henry Mayhew and the
agricultural labourers of southern England, declined. Regional variations were imposed on these differences. If anything
economic change markedly increased regional wage variations: by 1850 there were at least twelve distinct wage areas in Britain.
In the early nineteenth century, for example, compositors earned 12s.–19s. in Scotland. 18s.–22s. in northern England, 18s.–
24s. in the south-east and as much as 25s. in London. Emphasizing handloom weavers or agricultural labourers as opposed to
factory workers, or one region rather than another, or 1790–1830 rather than 1800–50, would lead to different conclusions.
Conclusions?
Given all these qualifications can historians say anything about real wages with any degree of confidence? In the first half of
the eighteenth century production of staple foodstuffs kept pace with population growth. Wheat prices were low and, after
1730, were falling, reaching their lowest point in 1755. By the 1760s the southern counties were largely on a wheat diet,
though the northern counties, poorer than the south, continued longer on barley and rye and took to potatoes sooner. Lower
prices increased the purchasing value of wages, allowing a greater proportion to be spent on manufactured goods and imports
than previously. This increase in demand played an important role in stimulating economic growth and rising wages in the
vicinity of industrial areas. However, the position of the labourer and cottager in southern England, where the opportunities for
additional or alternative employment were limited, showed signs of deterioration. It was their low wages which were partly
responsible for lower wheat prices down to 1755. Between the 1760s and 1790s corn prices began to rise faster than other
prices and faster than wages. Average wages are estimated to have risen by 25 per cent between 1760 and 1795 and the cost
of living by 30 per cent, though this obscures a definite rise in the industrial north and a distinct fall in London and the
agricultural counties. From about 1790 until the end of the French Wars, M.W.Flinn estimated
7
, real wages of most workers
kept pace with rising prices. Between 1813 and the early 1820s prices fell sharply and to a greater extent than wages so that
those who were in work (an important qualification) appear to have enjoyed an increase in living standards of up to a quarter.
These gains seem to have been retained, though not increased, between 1820 and 1850 and with less unemployment a greater
proportion of the labour force may have benefited from the earlier gains. There is nothing here to suggest that there was a
general and sustained fall in real wages between 1790 and 1850. Lindert and Williamson, however, disagree with Flinn’s
analysis, arguing for a decline in real wages between 1815 and 1819 locating the real improvement between 1820 and 1850.
8
Qualitative considerations
It is not enough to argue that because real wages rose for the bulk of the labouring population that there was an overall
improvement in standards of living. Standards of living cover qualitative as well as quantitative conditions. When ‘the quality
of life’ is considered the pessimists have a less assailable position. Exploitation, human misery, squalor are highly ambiguous
and emotive concepts for historians to use. What validity is there in arguing, for example, that the change in the nature of
work from the ‘freedom’ of the domestic system to the soul-destroying factory system marked a reduction in the quality of
life? In what ways did the relationship between rich and poor change? How was the family affected? J.L.Hammond argued
that there was a price to be paid for economic change, one that could not be measured in statistical terms, including ‘the want
of beauty, the same want of pageants or festivals…the ugliness of the new life, with its growing slums, its lack of beautiful
buildings, its destruction of nature.’
9
But were conditions qualitatively worse for the labouring population in 1850 than in
1700? Again historians have problems with the ‘general’ and the ‘specific’.
Much early industrialization took place in rural areas and manufacturers often provided housing and other social amenities
for their workers. Jedidiah Strutt, the eighteenth-century mill-owner, for example provided houses, shops, schools, a library, a
swimming pool with instructor and a room for dancing for his workers. The result was that conditions in industrial villages
were often quite good though increasingly urban squalor and the proliferation of mills and mines were seen as synonymous.
Overcrowding, jerry-building, impure water, street pollution and poor sanitation were the consequences. Many more people were
exposed to the hazards of adulterated food. In 1819 alone, for example, there were nearly one hundred convictions of brewers
and brewers’ druggists for using a variety of substitutes for beer and hops. But Engels overstated the case when he wrote that
‘Everything in this district that arouses our disgust and just indignation is of relatively recent origin and belongs to the
industrial age….’
Open sewers and adulterated foods were not the invention of the industrial age and neither was poor housing, though all were
accentuated by the growth of manufacturing industries. Engels inherited a romanticized notion of pre-industrial rural cottages
in which lived contented spinners and weavers. Urban death rates in 1700 or Hogarth’s prints leave no doubt that squalor
184 SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN MODERN BRITAIN 1700–1850