
Pawnbroking, as we saw above, was a quintessentially urban means of bridg-
ing the gap between income and expenditure with pawn shops, yielding a gross
profit of – per cent on turnover, concentrated in city-centre areas of densely
packed working-class housing. Although the absence of pawnbrokers on new
housing estates did not stop the habit of pawning, after the number of
brokers and the amount of business declined despite the problems of unemploy-
ment and short-time working. They suffered from the new competition of banks
and building societies offering immediate liquidity, from the rapid growth of
hire-purchase schemes overcoming the need to pawn in order to purchase new
articles, and from the growth of public pensions and unemployment relief.
129
At the same time that the mutual aid friendly societies were declining after
, the industrial life assurance companies expanded among the working class,
as endowment policies designed to give an annuity at a certain age grew dramat-
ically in popularity, replacing ‘whole life’ policies that yielded a lump sum at
death. This change in the type of industrial assurance purchased reflected the
decline in infant mortality and increased adult longevity. Thus, there was a
change in the pattern, similar across urban areas, of widespread burial club mem-
bership and more restricted friendly society membership, to one of endowment
policies from industrial life assurance companies after providing contrac-
tual saving for private old-age provision.
130
The income of industrial assurance
companies increased from £. million in to £. million in and
‘practically every family, even the very poorest’, from York to Bristol had taken
out industrial life policies.
131
Unlike unemployment insurance administered by civil servants, an alternate
channel for the provision of social welfare existed for health insurance with com-
mercial insurance and friendly societies receiving a subsidy from public funds for
providing their members with access to basic medical care from general practi-
tioners and with sickness benefit. This partnership of the approved societies with
the state attracted criticism from historians and contemporaries throughout the
interwar years. As mentioned above, the approved societies, particularly the
large, commercial insurance companies, accumulated substantial reserves during
the First World War which they maintained afterwards and were reluctant, for
reasons of business competition, to pool with smaller societies or raise benefits.
Yet, as Noelle Whiteside argues, these reserves were not sufficient to extend
health insurance to dependants even though societies agreed about the desirabil-
ity of extending the scope of the scheme, and the societies saved the govern-
ment money by absorbing the administrative overheads.
132
The Beveridge
Report echoed the criticisms that benefits varied among societies and were not
Marguerite Dupree
129
Johnson, Saving and Spending, pp. –; Tebbutt, Making Ends Meet, esp. ch. .
130
Johnson, Saving and Spending, pp. , , , .
131
Finlayson, ‘Moving frontier’, .
132
N. Whiteside, ‘Private agencies for public purposes: some new perspectives on policy making in
health insurance between the wars’, Journal of Social Policy, (), –; Finlayson, Citizen,
State and Social Welfare, p. .
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