Dignas B., Winter E. Rome and Persia in late Antiquity. Neighbours and Rivals
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20 The peace treaty of 562 143
double indemnity. If the dispute were still not settled at this point, the violated
party should send an embassy to the ruler of the offender. If the violated party had
not been compensated by the ruler within a fixed one-year period and had not
received the double indemnity, the peace treaty would be broken with regard to
this agreement.
(12) This concerned petitions for divine support and prayers: that the god be
gracious and an ally forever to the one who loved the peace, opponent and enemy
to the insincere and the one intending to violate the oaths.
(13) The agreements should be valid for fifty years and the peace should last for
fifty years, the year being reckoned according to old fashion that is ending after
365 days.
126
As mentioned already, it was also determined that declarations were
issued by both rulers expressing approval regarding everything the ambassadors
had negotiated.
When these terms had been agreed upon, the so-called sacrae litterae were
exchanged. . .
After all this had been formally agreed, the two separate declarations were handed
to the magistrates in charge, who compared their wording and meaning and imme-
diately made copies of both. The actual treaty was also folded and stamped with a
seal and other customary Persian symbols and with the signet-rings of the ambas-
sadors as well as those of the twelve interpreters, six on the Roman side and as many
Persian ones. They exchanged the documents. The Zich handed the Persian one to
Peter and Peter handed the Greek one to the Zich. In addition the Zich received a
Persian copy identical to the Greek one, without any seal, which was supposed to
remind him, and Peter respectively. After that they parted, both leaving the border
area, and the Zich travelled back to his homeland.
Negotiations
As had been the case when the foedus of 298 was concluded, on both
sides high ranking officials and experienced diplomats, the magister militum
praesentalis and the chamberlain of the Sasanian king, were in charge of the
negotiations. They were authorised to act with full power. The ambassadors
met in a neutral place by the border, close to D
¯
ar
¯
a, so that neither of the
parties was forced into a disadvantageous position even before negotiations
began.
127
At the beginning of the talks both sides made an effort to praise
the greatness and power of their own empire; then they worked towards an
understanding regarding the basic conditions for a peace.
These concerned above all the length
128
and scale of a settlement, and
in addition a solution to the Lazic question. After long discussions it was
agreed that the peace between the two empires should last for fifty years
126
The Roman and Persian calendars had to be synchronised; see Doblhofer 1955: 215–16.
127
On the significance of the choice of venue in the context of Sasanian–Roman peace negotiations
see Winter 1994: 589–607.
128
On the payments agreed upon in 562 see G
¨
uterbock 1906: 61–5 and Blockley 1985b: 285 n. 61.
144 4 The diplomatic solutions
and that it should apply to all territories, including Armenia and Lazika. In
the past, continuing military confrontations in these regions had prevented
a secure peace over and over again. By dropping all claims in this area, the
Sasanians did their part to solve the Lazic question; in turn, Byzantium
had to agree to substantial monetary payments the amount and conditions
of which were a point of contention until, finally, a compromise agreeable
to both sides was reached. As soon as these basic conditions for the peace
had received mutual consent, the respective documents were produced and
sent to both royal courts for ratification. Thereby the foundations for the
conclusion of a peace treaty were laid.
After that, further meetings and negotiations between the ambassadors of
both empires took place so that all details regarding a permanent settlement
could be discussed. The official peace document was composed in Greek
and Persian. It is remarkable how much care was used to make this process
as accurate as possible. Altogether twelve interpreters were to make sure that
each translation had the same meaning and would not allow for different
interpretations. The respective documents were compared word for word
and sentence for sentence.
129
Menander the Guardsman claims to have
quoted verbatim the document written by Xusr
¯
oI(531–79) in the Persian
language and addressed to his ‘brother’ Justinian (527–65).
Territorial terms
Altogether the Byzantine historian lists fourteen articles of agreement. Sev-
eral points concern the territorial scope of the peace, which was intended
to apply not only to the territories of the Sasanian and Byzantine Empires
but in the interest of stability to include further areas. The regulation in
article nine according to which the client kingdoms on both sides should
not be attacked refers primarily to the Caucasian regions of Ib
¯
eria and
Albania, which had often been the cause of renewed or continued mili-
tary confrontations and were the subject of existing agreements (17). The
Arabian tribes fighting on both sides, namely the Lahmids, who were allies
of the Sasanians, and the Ghassanids, who acted on behalf of Byzantium,
were addressed in the second article of the treaty.
130
Considering the polit-
ical as well as military significance of these vassal states for the Sasanian–
Byzantine confrontations in particular during the sixth century (25), this
article makes a lot of sense. The Roman and Persian rulers were to enforce
peace among the vassals. This term, however, could have been expected to
129
On the oral and written components in the formation of a treaty see T
¨
aubler 1964: 318–72.
130
Shah
ˆ
ıd 1988: vii.
20 The peace treaty of 562 145
cause problems because the Arab leaders were not directly involved in the
negotiations.
Borders
Further clauses concerned the protection of shared border areas. As conflicts
had arisen in particular with regard to this point, the very first article of
the foedus of 562 addressed the main issue, namely the protection of the
Caucasian passes from invasions of the Huns, Alans and other barbarians
(27). From this point onwards the Sasanians alone were responsible for
the defence. In turn, the Romans agreed to refrain from any future troop
movements in the Caucasus. Moreover, articles eight and ten addressed the
situation of the border city D
¯
ar
¯
a, a matter that was extremely important
from a Roman perspective (12).
131
In breach of earlier treaties Justinian had
fortified D
¯
ar
¯
a to the extent that Procopius decribed the city as a bulwark for
the entire Byzantine East.
132
The Sasanians now accepted D
¯
ar
¯
a’s paramount
status as a fortress, insisting, however, that the number of troops stationed at
D
¯
ar
¯
a would be reduced and that the magister militum per Orientem moved
his seat from there. In addition, both sides agreed that in the future already
existing border cities should not be fortified and offer reasons for wars.
Trade and customs duties
‘Economic’ clauses can be found also in this treaty.
133
Three articles address
economic and trade-related issues but the decisions do not diverge from
the principles spelled out earlier (17 and 28). According to article three
of the treaty, just like before, Sasanian and Byzantine merchants, who
had to respect that there was a ban on the import and export of certain
goods, were allowed to import goods at a few official customs posts only.
As reference was made to previous agreements, Nisibis, Kallinikos and
Dv
¯
ın (instead of Artaxata)
134
must have kept their preferred status as trade
centres. Apparently, the fortress of D
¯
ar
¯
a, which has already been mentioned,
131
On the negotiations concerning D
¯
ar
¯
a see Blockley 1985a: 71–2.
132
In general on the importance of D
¯
ar
¯
a see Proc. BP i.10.13–16; i.16.6–8; see Crow 1981: 12–20; also
Croke and Crow 1983: 143–59 (= Croke 1992: xi) and Whitby 1986a: 717–35 and 1986b: 737–83;on
the fortification of border cities and fortresses see Wagner 1985: 68–9.
133
Synelli 1986: 96–8 and Winter 1987: 67–72.
134
During the first half of the fifth century the Armenian metropolis (of trade) Artaxata lost more
and more of its significance. Its neighbour Dv
¯
ın, which was primarily inhabited by trades- and
craftsmen, became the new political and economic centre. According to Proc. BP ii.25.3 there were
numerous merchants who came from India, Ib
¯
eria and all of Persia as well as from territories that
were under Roman control in order to engage in trade at Dv
¯
ın; on the importance of the city as a
place of trade see Pigulevskaja 1969: 153 and Manandian 1965: 81–2 and 87–8; with a comprehensive
bibliography Kettenhofen 1996a: 616–19.
146 4 The diplomatic solutions
acquired the same rights. Byzantium gained considerable fiscal advantages
from the fact that now a further place within the Roman realm would be
dedicated to the exchange of goods. When the Sasanians conquered D
¯
ar
¯
a
in 573, the Roman emperor intended to buy D
¯
ar
¯
a back or to win the city
back in some other way.
135
The Sasanian ruler, however, did not want to
return the city under any circumstances and announced that he would never
withdraw from D
¯
ar
¯
a, or from Nisibis.
136
The Persians were not willing to
give up the financial advantages that came with controlling the city.
According to article four of the foedus ambassadors and those travelling
for reasons of state did not have to pay any customs duty for the goods
they brought with them and were not subject to any trade restrictions.
137
A similar arrangement had existed in 408/9. However, the diplomats were
allowed to stay on foreign territory only as long as necessary.
138
They were
thereby prevented from gathering information about the opponent (35).
Article five stopped Saracen or other barbarian merchants from entering
the Persian or Roman Empire via unknown roads. They were required
to go straight to Nisibis or D
¯
ar
¯
a and to obtain an official permit if they
wanted to continue their journey from there. Any violation of these terms or
customs fraud entailed legal proceedings. This article concerned merchants
from Roman as well as Persian territories and also travellers from nations
who were not allies of the great powers, such as tradesmen from South
Arabia.
139
This stipulation was designed to stop the smuggling of goods
as well as to eliminate any foreign competition for merchants at home
and also to prevent Arab tradesmen from engaging in espionage. Above
all the geographic conditions to the west and south-west of the Euphrates,
where the Syrian Desert represented the actual frontier between the empires,
made any strict control of this border area impossible and increased mutual
suspicion. Due to these circumstances, foreign trade and national security
were politically linked in a way that was characteristic for the economic
relations between the Sasanian and the Byzantine Empire, a link that is
nicely illustrated by the relevant articles of the foedus of 562.
Fugitives of war, reparations, guarantee clauses
Further points dealt with the treatment of the fugitives of war, the payment
of reparations as well as the observance of the treaty.
140
Article six permits
135
Menander Protector, frg. 47 (FHG iv 250).
136
Ibid., frg. 55 (FHG iv 257).
137
Antoniadis-Bibicou 1963: 47–8.
138
Cod. Iust. iv.63.4 (3).
139
Contacts between the Sasanian Empire and South Arabia, which were primarily initiated by interests
in trade, are attested already for the early Sasanian period; cf. Metzler 1982: 190.
140
G
¨
uterbock 1906: 80–3.
20 The peace treaty of 562 147
defectors to return without punishment. The treaty explicitly mentions,
however, that this applied only to persons who had left their country during
the war and not to future defectors so that these would not jeopardise
home security by passing on information. The long period of war had
seen many cases of unrest and raids among the population of the border
regions concerned. The controversies between individuals and above all the
conflicts between the border cities were to be investigated. According to
articles seven and eleven the authorities in charge of the border areas were
instructed to mediate in these cases and those responsible forced to pay
damages. If an agreement could not be reached the matter was entrusted to
higher authorities, which had to come to a decision by a fixed deadline.
141
If the matter had not been settled at the final stage of appeal, which was
the appeal to the ruler, this amounted to a breach of the treaty.
Last but not least, the two parties included a ‘religious guarantee clause’ in
order to make sure that the agreed terms would be observed and effective. If
Menander the Guardsman uses the authentic words by which the peace was
entrusted to divine protection, the treaty displays extremely careful wording
also in this respect; the clause compelled both a Christian Byzantium and a
Zoroastrian Persia to respect the agreement. The author makes no reference,
however, to either hostages of high rank, who would customarily have been
part of an official treaty of this type,
142
or to an oath sworn by each ruler.
Conclusion
Who was the ‘victor’ of the foedus of 562 after all? On the one hand, Justinian
cannot have been happy with the stipulated large payments, which showed
the character of tributary payments and were bound to ruin his prestige.
On the other hand, he could claim as a success that the important fortress of
D
¯
ar
¯
a was retained, that the Romans were freed from the financial burdens
to do with the protection of the Caucasus passes and that the Sasanians were
withdrawing from the territory of Lazika. From a Sasanian perspective it was
a considerable loss to give up this strategically and economically important
Black Sea region.
Beyond throwing light on the question of how the balance of power
was shifted the foedus and the actual treaty as transmitted by the Byzan-
tine historian Menander the Guardsman serve as an excellent testimony
to the intense diplomatic contacts and the high level of international rela-
tions between Byzantium and the Persian Empire in the sixth century.
143
A survey of the individual points addressed in the treaty indicates that all
141
Ziegler 1972: 427–42.
142
Lee 1991: 366–74.
143
Verosta 1965: 153–6.
148 4 The diplomatic solutions
areas of concern that had surfaced at some point since the beginnings of
Roman–Sasanian relations in the third century are mentioned. The foedus
of 562 therefore not only reflects some diplomatic effort to end the military
conflict between Byzantium and the Sasanian Empire during the reigns of
Xusr
¯
o I and Justinian but also gives us detailed insight into the intensity
of relations.
144
It was a serious attempt to find a comprehensive solution to
all controversial topics in order to stabilise the situation between the two
powers. Be that as it may, although the peace was concluded for fifty years
it did not last very long. By 572 West and East were at war again.
21: The peace treaty of 628 between Heraclius and Kav ¯adh II
ˇ
S¯er ¯o¯e
Immediately after he had succeeded to the throne, the Persian ruler Kav
¯
adh
II
ˇ
S
¯
er
¯
o
¯
e (February – September 628) initiated peace negotiations with
Heraclius (610–41). After his victory over Xusr
¯
oIIParv
¯
ez (590–628) and
his advance all the way to Kt
¯
esiph
¯
on at the beginning of the year 628 the
Byzantine emperor had decided to withdraw his troops.
145
From 11 March
to 8 April 628 he stayed at Gandzak in Azerbaijan.
146
During these weeks he
received a letter written by Kav
¯
adh II, in which the Persian ruler expressed
his desire for peace and which is remarkable in many ways. The text was
recorded in the so called Easter Chronicle, the Chronicon Paschale, which
was composed by an unknown cleric from Constantinople between 631 and
641. It represents one of the most important examples of Graeco-Christian
chronography; originally the work covered the time span from Adam to
the year 630 but the narrative is preserved only up to the year 628.In
particular with regard to the seventh century the Chronicon Paschale is a
valuable independent source because it includes numerous historical details
and draws on many official documents.
147
Chronicon Paschale a. 628
Copy of the memorandum (written) by Kav
¯
adh, the most clement Persian king,
who is also called
ˇ
S
¯
er
¯
o
¯
e, (addressed) to Heraclius, our most pious and god-protected
emperor.
From Kav
¯
adh Sadasadasach we are sending greatest joy to Heraclius, the most
clement emperor of the Romans, our brother.
To the most clement emperor of the Romans, our brother.
144
Higgins 1941: 279–315; Scott 1992: 159–66.
145
On the assassination of Xusr
¯
oIIParv
¯
ez, on the succession of Kav
¯
adh II and the events of the year
628, which led to the final Roman victory over the Sasanian Empire, see Stratos 1968: 223–34.
146
Schippmann 1990: 71.
147
For a good introduction and English translation of the Greek text see Whitby and Whitby 1989.
21 The peace treaty of 628 149
‘Through fortunate divine providence we have been adorned with the great
diadem and have gained possession of the throne of our fathers.
148
As we have
therefore been deemed worthy by God of gaining such throne and rule, we have
decided, if there is anything that benefits and serves mankind, to accomplish this
in so far as possible, and we have, as it was proper, given generous instruction for
this to be done. As God has designated us to hold such a great throne and such
great rule, we have decided to release every man whom we have imprisoned for
whatever reasons. And thereafter we ordered, if there is anything else that benefits
and serves mankind and this state and that we were capable of ordering, also this
and it has been done. And we made these decisions in order to live in peace and
love with you, the emperor of the Romans, our brother, and the Roman state and
with the other nations and other princes around us.’
By addressing the Byzantine emperor as his brother the Sasanian king tries
to emphasise the equal rank of both rulers.
149
In 590 Xusr
¯
o II Parv
¯
ez had
approached the emperor Maurice (582–602) by using a comparable captatio
benevolentiae in order to enforce his legitimate claims to the throne against
the rebel Bahr
¯
am
ˇ
C
¯
ob
¯
ın.
150
Kav
¯
adh’s remark that he owed his throne to God
is also very deliberate.
151
The Sasanian king refers to a God in the singular,
thereby paying respect to the Christian emperor and creating a favourable
atmosphere for the impending peace negotiations. Similarly, in the year
590 Xusr
¯
o II had hoped that using a ‘Christian vocabulary’
152
would help
him with securing Byzantine support in his struggle for the throne.
Considering the weakness of the Sasanian Empire and the military defeat
it had just suffered in 628 Kav
¯
adh II had good reasons to evoke the familiar
themes of the ‘family of kings’ and the ‘legitimacy of rule’.
153
Moreover,
he appealed to the Byzantine emperor’s clemency and his desire for peace.
He emphasises that he himself would do everything to benefit mankind,
namely to release all prisoners, and that he wished to live in peace with all
other nations.
148
Kav
¯
adh had imprisoned his father Xusr
¯
oIIParv
¯
ez, who in spite of the military defeat had not been
willing to conclude a peace with Byzantium; he then had his brothers assassinated and took over
the throne in February 628 as Kav
¯
adh II
ˇ
S
¯
er
¯
o
¯
e.
149
On this address see Oikonomid
`
es 1971: 269–81; the reader is reminded of the exchange of letters
between
ˇ
S
¯
ap
¯
ur II and Constantius II quoted in Ammianus Marcellinus: Rex regum Sapor, particeps
siderum, frater Solis et Lunae, Constantio Caesari fratri meo salutem plurimam dico. The corresponding
beginning of the response letter reads: Victor terra marique Constantius semper Augustus fratri meo
Sapori regi salutem plurimam dico (xvii. 5.3). Constantine the Great called
ˇ
S
¯
ap
¯
ur II ‘my brother’
(Eus. v. Const. 4.11); it is remarkable that in a letter to the wife of Xusr
¯
oIAn
¯
o
ˇ
s
¯
arvan the Byzantine
empress Theodora also addressed her as ‘sister’ (Malal. 18.61 [p. 467]); for further references see
Helm 1932: 385 n. 3;D
¨
olger 1964: 60 points to the general reluctance of the Byzantine monarchy
to acknowledge an equal status of any other power and speaks of an enormous concession to the
Persian king.
150
On the relationship between Xusr
¯
oIIParv
¯
ez and Maurice see Winter 1989a: 79–92.
151
Whitby and Whitby 1989: 189 n. 491.
152
Theoph. Simoc. iv.11.
153
Winter 1989a: 72–92.
150 4 The diplomatic solutions
Kav
¯
adh II entrusted the memorandum to his Persian commander Phaiak
and sent him to Heraclius’ camp at Gandzak.
154
Unfortunately, Heraclius’
response has not survived.
155
We owe a short summary to Nikephoros I, who
was patriarch of Constantinople between 806 and 815 and whose earliest
work, an account of the period between 602 and 769, incorporates many
lost sources of the seventh and eighth centuries. According to Nikephoros
Heraclius called Kav
¯
adh II his son and assured him that he would never
deprive a king of his legitimate throne. The emperor proclaimed that Xusr
¯
o
II had received divine punishment, which he deserved, and that divine guid-
ance was fostering reconciliation between himself and Kav
¯
adh.
156
Heraclius
thus also expressed his desire for peace and offered terms that even from a
Sasanian perspective were moderate and acceptable.
157
The emperor entrusted the tabularius Eustanthios to work out the details
of a peace treaty. After the Sasanian ambassador Phaiak had spent just under
a week in the Roman camp Heraclius sent both to the court of Kav
¯
adh II.
158
Our sources do not reveal the exact terms of the foedus of 628. Only isolated
notes and later events allow us to reconstruct the content of the treaty.
159
One important hint comes from Theophanes Confessor, who between
810/11 and 814 continued the incomplete chronicle of his friend Georgios
Synkellos and covers the period between 284 and 813.
160
His narrative is
generally reliable and was a source for many later chroniclers.
Theophanes, Chronographia
i
, p. 327 (ed. C. de Boor)
After peace had been concluded between Persians and Romans in this year, the
emperor sent his own brother Theodore together with letters and men dispatched
by
ˇ
S
¯
er
¯
o
¯
e, the Persian king, in order that they send back peacefully to Persia those
Persians in Edessa and Palestine, Jerusalem and the remaining Roman cities and
that these could pass through Roman territory without harm. The emperor, who
had defeated Persia in six years, made peace in the seventh year and returned to
Constantinople with great joy.
We learn that Heraclius gave permission for all Persians who were still on
Roman territory to make their way into Sasanian territory. He entrusted his
brother Theodore with the supervision of this task. Apparently it had been
154
Chr. pasch.a.628.
155
Cf. the attempts for a restoration of the text in Oikonomid
`
es 1971: 269–81.
156
Nikephoros 22b–23b (p. 19–20 ed. de Boor); Mango 1990: 15.
157
Stratos 1968: 237 emphasises the moderate attitude of the Byzantine emperor, ‘Heraclios did not
make the same mistake as Justinian. He neither wished to humiliate nor to weaken Persia. He was
aiming at restoration of the 591 frontiers, as if to show that the Greeks had no thought of conquest.
This was why he immediately accepted the peace terms offered by Kavad, the new King of Persia.’
158
Chr. pasch.a.628.
159
Rawlinson 1875: 535–6 and 693–4.
160
Mango and Scott 1997.
21 The peace treaty of 628 151
agreed that all Persian prisoners would be released and that the emperor
would guarantee their safe return.
There is no doubt that the terms of 628 primarily aimed at a restoration
of the status quo ante bellum. The new borders would be those which
had existed between the Byzantine and the Sasanian Empires before the
beginning of the war in the year 602. The Persians had to withdraw from
all territories they had conquered in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor
and in Western Mesopotamia and had to return them to Byzantium.
161
According to Theophanes the Persian troops left these areas during the first
year of the reign of Kav
¯
adh II.
162
In addition, the Persians had to agree that
they would release the captives they had deported to the Sasanian Empire
from these areas.
163
One further aspect must have been particularly important for Hera-
clius, namely the return of the Holy Cross, which the Sasanians had car-
ried off when they conquered Jerusalem in 614.
164
Its festive restoration
in Jerusalem, probably in March 630, earned Heraclius great prestige and
made it manifest to the world that a Christian Byzantium had triumphed
over a Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire, and this triumph had been sealed by
the foedus of 628.
165
161
Rawlinson 1875: 536.
162
Theoph. Chron. am 6119 (p. 327 ed. de Boor); on the execution of the terms of the treaty see Stratos
1968: 245–56.
163
Theoph. Chron. am 6118 (p. 327 ed. de Boor).
164
On the Sasanian conquest of Jerusalem see the references on p. 45 n. 171.
165
See Stratos 1968: 245–56.
chapter 5
Arabia between the great powers
After the foundation of the Sasanian Empire in the year 224 the two powers
had to deal with and administer an Arab world that was divided into
three different groups. The first group was the Arab population in the
Sasanian Empire, who had already lived in the Parthian kingdom during the
Arsacid period and who now inevitably formed part of the Sasanian Empire.
They settled in the eastern coastal area of the Persian Gulf, in northern
Mesopotamia, where the desert fortress Hatra was the most important
centre (map 1) and in southern Mesopotamia, where H
¯
ıra, which was
located c. 100 miles to the west of the Sasanian capital Kt
¯
esiph
¯
on on the
edge of the Arabian desert, had become a new centre (map 2).
1
The second
group comprised the Arab population in the Roman Empire, and the third
group was formed by the Arabs who lived beyond the Sasanian and Roman
territories on the Arabian Peninsula.
The following events and developments illustrate an ‘Arabia policy’ of
the great powers that remained an important component of the foreign
relations between Rome and the Sasanian Empire into the seventh century
and that both powers designed in a similar way: the inhabitants of Hatra
joining the Rome side after 224, the ambitious political activities of the
trade metropolis in the Syrian desert, Palmyra, and finally the creation of
a system of Arab vassal states.
2
22: Hatra
During the course of the Roman imperial period one caravan route, which
took travellers through the steppes of central Mesopotamia to the north
1
During the Muslim period a distinction was made between al-Ir
¯
aq (The South of Mesopotamia)
and al-
˘
Gaz
¯
ıra (The North of Mesopotamia).
2
Funke 1996: 217–38 (esp. 225–35) discusses the role of individual Arab dynasts and dynasties in the
political considerations of the rivalling powers and the systematic creation of vassal states; see also
Parker 1986b; Shah
ˆ
ıd 1984a, 1984b and 1995a.
152