Dignas B., Winter E. Rome and Persia in late Antiquity. Neighbours and Rivals

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1 To the beginning of the third century 13

Caesar’s plans for a Parthian War

and the intense preparations prior

to Antony’s Parthian campaign

conﬁrm Rome’s respect for the military

force of the Parthian kingdom. However, the Romans were still not willing

to acknowledge their opponent in the East as an equal power. In the late

republican period Roman foreign policy strove to create a Rome that was,

as Cicero puts it, ‘lord over kings, victor and ruler over all nations’ (domi-

nus regum, victor atque imperator omnium gentium).

The claim for world

domination prevented the imperium Romanum and other states from coex-

isting as equal partners bound by principles of international law. However,

Augustus’ policy in the East paved the way for a new attitude. In order to

come to an ofﬁcial agreement concerning the political relations between the

two powers, the Parthians had to return the Roman standards they had cap-

tured at Carrhae; they agreed to do so in 20 bc when Rome demonstrated

its military strength in the East.

It is not surprising that in Roman eyes

the foedus concluded between Augustus and Phraates IV (38–3/2bc) was a

great success.

Given that public opinion in Rome was all in favour of war,

it was even more important that the princeps decided to restore the Roman–

Parthian amicitia and to conclude a foedus in 20 bc according to which the

Romans respected the Euphrates as the frontier between the two powers.

The treaty acknowledged the fact that Rome was, in the long term, not

in a position to control vast territories beyond the Euphrates. Augustus

pursued a policy ‘within the existing borders of the empire’ (intra terminos

imperii)

although ofﬁcial propaganda continued to emphasise an ‘empire

without borders’ (imperium sine ﬁne).

However, by refraining from fur-

ther expansion in the East Rome acknowledged the military strength of

the Parthian kingdom. Authors of the early imperial period talk about

the Parthian kingdom and the Roman empire as maxima imperia

and as

‘the two greatest rules under the sun’,

and the Augustan historian Pom-

peius Trogus saw the world as divided between Romans and Parthians;

there is no doubt that such statements reﬂect emerging rules of an inter-

national community of which the Parthian kingdom was a part. On an

Malitz 1984: 21–59.

Craven 1920; Bengtson 1974; Schieber 1979: 105–24; Hersh 1980: 41–5.

Cic. Dom. 90.

Timpe 1975: 155–69.

On the signiﬁcance of returning the standards see Zanker 1987: 188–96; in this context see also

Schneider 1998: 95–147.

Strabo xvi.1.28; on Strabo’s representation of the Parthians see Bosi 1994: 109–222; Drijvers 1998:

279–93.

Tac. Ann. i.11.

Verg. Aen. i.279.

Tac. Ann. ii.56.

Ios. AJ xviii.46; on the representation of the Parthians in Josephus see Rajak 1998: 309–24.

Iust. xli.1.1; on this passage see also Van Wickevoort Crommelin 1998: 261; on the Parthians in

Pompeius Trogus see Alonso-Nunez 1988–9: 125–55.

14 1 To the beginning of the third century

ideological level, however, Rome’s claim for world domination remained

intact.

Many comments made by poets of the Augustan period, who rep-

resented the opinion of the nobility in the city of Rome, reﬂect the view

that no state or people could be equal to the imperium Romanum.

Augustus initiated a policy that refrained from conquests beyond the

Euphrates and acknowledged the Parthians as a second world power equal

to Rome. Although Nero (54–68) fought a Parthian War over Armenia,

the Arsacid ruler Tiridates was eventually crowned by Nero as king of

Armenia in a great Roman spectacle,

and we may say that Augustus’

policy of cooperation laid the foundation for a more or less uninterrupted

peace between the two powers throughout the ﬁrst century ad. The fact

that in ad 66 the so-called ‘Armenian question’ found a solution must

have strengthened relations even further (26).

Local conﬂicts, Rome’s

fortiﬁcation of the frontier along the Euphrates and in the Caucasus and a

tightened Roman rule in the Eastern provinces did their part to see relations

deteriorate but did not immediately lead to new armed confrontations on

the Eastern frontier of the Roman Empire.

Rome, however, improved its

military position signiﬁcantly during this period.

At the beginning of the second century the emperor Trajan (98–117)

intended to conquer the Parthian kingdom and thereby turned the dream

of Roman world domination into political reality.

Our ancient sources do

not reveal the precise reasons for the emperor’s Parthian campaign. It looks

as if ideas of world domination and military glory

were equally important

as strategic considerations regarding a stronger Roman frontier beyond the

Euphrates. Trajan rejected Parthian efforts to come to a peaceful settlement.

Contemporary observers criticised the emperor’s actions prior to the

military confrontations

and accused him of turning his back on a Roman

policy in the East that had prevailed since Augustus, namely a policy that

acknowledged the sovereignty of the Parthian kingdom as a political factor

within a community of states that abided by the same international laws.

On the image of the Parthians in the West see Sonnabend 1986.

For references see Wissemann 1982.

Anderson 1934: 743–80; Ziegler 1964: 67–78; Wagner 1985: 31–42.

Wolski 1983a: 269–77; for the period after 34/5 see also Schottky 1991: 81–7; for the position of

Armenia between the two great powers in general see Garso

ıan 1997a: 63–94 and 1985: 95–116.

For developments within the Parthian kingdom during the ﬁrst century see Dabrowa 1981: 187–204;

Schottky 1991: 61–135; Ash 1999: 114–35.

For the fortiﬁcation of the Roman–Parthian frontier along the Euphrates from Augustus to the

Flavian emperors see Dabrowa 1980: 382–8; Wagner 1985: 19–57; Bosworth 1976: 63–78; Mitchell

1993: 118–42.

On Trajan’s political goals see Eadie 1985: 407–23.

Cf. esp. Cass. Dio lxviii.17.1.

E.g. Front. 15.

Cf. Ziegler 1964: 102.

1 To the beginning of the third century 15

In spite of Trajan’s great military successes, his Parthian War (114–17)

ended with a ﬁasco.

Late in Trajan’s reign revolts took place in the con-

quered territories, and the new provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia and

Assyria were eventually lost. Trajan’s successor Hadrian (117–38) returned to

the Augustan policy of ‘sustaining the empire within its borders’ (coercendi

intra terminos)

and restored the amicitia with the Parthian kingdom on

the basis of the status quo that had existed before the war.

In its outline,

this policy was not even changed by the successful Parthian Wars of L. Verus

(161–9) and Septimius Severus (193–211), who – after Trajan’s offensive –

advanced a second and third time as far as the Parthian capital Seleucia-

esiph

on.

Rome withdrew after these successes. Its declared goals were

different from those of the beginning of the second century and no longer

extended to the subjugation of the Parthian kingdom. But whereas the East-

ern power had retained its political sovereignty, Rome’s military successes

improved its strategic position along the Eastern frontier considerably, in

particular by moving the frontiers forward to the Chaboras-Singara line,

which created a boundary within Mesopotamia, and ﬁnally establishing the

province of Mesopotamia during the reign of Septimius Severus.

Roman

control over upper Mesopotamia represented a permanent and immedi-

ate threat to the Mesopotamian heartland of the Parthian kingdom. This

was the end of a policy that ﬁrmly recognised the Euphrates as the border

between Romans and Parthians.

At the beginning of the third century ad Caracalla (211–17) launched yet

another attack against the Parthians.

In contrast to his predecessors, he

seems to have pursued the conquest of the Parthian kingdom. Apparently,

his plans amounted to world domination and were guided by the idea that

he would become a successor of Alexander the Great – he was certainly

not prepared to acknowledge Parthian sovereignty. Caracalla’s attempts to

create a casus belli for a ‘justiﬁed war’ illustrate this position no less than

his actions during the Parthian campaign when he desecrated the graves

of local rulers in the Adiab

In contrast, ancient authors mention

Caracalla’s plans to marry the daughter of the Parthian king Artabanos IV.

Lepper 1948; Eadie 1985: 407–23; Lightfoot 1990: 115–26; Wylie 1990: 37–43.

See note 21 above.

Birley 1956: 25–33 and Birley 1998: 66–76.

Birley 1987: 140–7; 1988: 201–4; Rubin 1975: 419–41; Speidel 1985: 321–6; Potter 1991: 277–90; Millar

1996: 80–99 and 111–26.

On the fortiﬁcation of the Roman Eastern frontier along the Tigris and Chaboras under the Severan

emperors see Kennedy 1987: 57–66; Wagner 1985: 63–7; 1983: 103–30; Millar 1996: 127–41.

Heichelheim 1944: 113–15.

Cass. Dio lxxix.1.1–2.

16 1 To the beginning of the third century

The king’s refusal led to war.

Caracalla’s request was certainly unrealistic

and the Roman emperor may have anticipated the refusal in his political cal-

culations. Nevertheless, Herodian’s account of the situation is revealing.

It mentions a Roman embassy dispatched to propose the marriage to the

Parthian king. The ambassadors claimed that if the empires of the Romans

and the Parthians, which in their words were the greatest of the world, were

no longer separated by a river and frontier but formed a single empire, no

opposition would arise because the other barbarian nations would be an

easy prey to these. Although we have to be cautious when using Herodian

as a historical source, his ideas reﬂect contemporary views and throw light

on the relations between the two single great powers at the beginning of

the third century.

Caracalla’s war of aggression is therefore surprising. In order to explain

his political goals, in particular the dream of succeeding Alexander the

Great,

we have to take into account the character and personality of this

Roman emperor. After Caracalla’s assassination, his successor Macrinus

(217–18) immediately announced that his predecessor had done wrong by

the Parthians and restored peace. In 218, after a battle fought at Nisibis

during which both sides suffered heavy losses, a treaty was signed. According

to Herodian, the Roman emperor Macrinus was delighted about having

won the Iranian opponent as a reliable friend.

Be that as it may, until its downfall the Parthian kingdom was and

remained an openly acknowledged serious opponent, who required con-

stant Roman vigilance.

Internal developments in Iran made it impossible

to intensify Roman–Parthian relations and to strengthen emerging signs of

an international law. In 224 the rise of the Sasanians, fostered, to be sure,

by the confrontations and tensions between Parthians and Romans during

the ﬁrst two decades of the third century, led to the fall of Arsacid rule.

Modern scholars long underestimated the Arsacid dynasty and regarded

Parthian–Roman relations solely from the Roman perspective. Inevitably,

scholars did not acknowledge an ‘active’ Western policy on the part of

the Arsacids. Above all the many works of G. Wolski

have opened the

discussion to new views, and the era of the Parthian kings within the

The historicity of Caracalla’s plans is controversial; see Ziegler 1964: 132–4.

Herodian iv.10.2–4.

Ziegler 1964: 133–40.

On Caracalla’s imitatio Alexandri see Cass. Dio lxxviii.7.1–4; Herodian iv.8.1–3.

Herodian v.1.4.

There has been a lively scholarly discussion regarding the goals and character of Rome’s military and

strategic policy along the Eastern frontier of the empire. Cf. Luttwak 1976; MacMullen 1976; Isaac

1989: 231–4; 1992 and Zyromski 1998.

Wolski 1966: 65–89; 1976: 195–214; 1985: 163–73; 1983b: 137–49.

1 To the beginning of the third century 17

history of Iran as a whole has gained signiﬁcance – in particular with

regard to the study of the Achaemenids and the Sasanians. Relations with

Rome were in fact a major structural element in the history of the Parthian

kingdom. Wolski is right in emphasising that the ‘Iranicism’ of the Arsacids

played an important role in their conﬂict with Rome. The recollection of

the signiﬁcant Achaemenid past

encouraged the Arsacids to stand up to

the Roman Empire, an aspect that widens the scope of Arsacid policies

tremendously.

A prime example is the following: according to the Roman

historian Tacitus, the Parthian king Artabanos II (10/11–38) threatened

the Roman emperor Tiberius (14–37) by referring to the old Persian and

Macedonian conquests and by boasting that he would gain possession of

what Cyrus and later Alexander had ruled.

By comparing the ﬁrst Arsacid

ruler with the ﬁrst Achaemenid ruler Cyrus (559–530 bc) the third-century

author Justin also underlines this claim.

The Parthians thus continued

Achaemenid traditions and can be counted among the ‘ﬁrst pioneers of

Iranicism’.

K. H. Ziegler hesitates to label Arsacid foreign policy ‘programmatic’

because there was no Arsacid ideology equivalent to the Roman idea of

world domination. He argues that Parthian goals never amounted to the

destruction of the Roman Empire and that even the claims made by Arta-

banos II in Tacitus’ account aimed at territorial gains that were modest in

comparison with later Sasanian claims.

It is crucial for an assessment of

Roman–Sasanian relations to examine whether the Sasanians took up goals

of the Arsacid rulers and continued their Western policy or developed plans

that went beyond any foreign policy pursued by the Parthians. Given that

the late phase of Parthian–Roman relations was characterised by mutual

respect and appreciation – certainly beyond a modus vivendi

and with

options for a formalised relationship on the basis of an international law,

one also has to ask if and to what extent the rising Sasanian Empire was

prepared to use the opportunity and to further develop existing relations.

Metzler 1982: 130–7.

On the goals of Arsacid foreign policy and on Arsacid military strength see Kennedy 1996a: 67–90.

Tac. Ann. vi.37. Cf. Wieseh

ofer 1986b: 177–85; Ehrhardt 1998: 299 with further references.

Iust. xli.5.5.

Wolski 1983b: 147.

Dabrowa 1984: 153.

Ziegler 1964: 86; cf. also Zyromski 1998: 11.

Wirth 1980/1: 324.

Ziegler 1964: 140.

chapter 2

Rome and the Sasanian Empire:

A chronological survey

2.1 the third century: the origins of

sasanian interests in the west

The rise of the Sasanian dynasty, the revolt of Arda

ırI(224–40) against the

Arsacids, the fall of Parthian rule and the foundation of the Neo-Persian

Sasanian Empire (map 2)

– together, these were not only a turning point

within the history of Iran

but also a benchmark regarding Iran’s relations

with Rome. Although Arda

ır’s hostile attitude against Rome was at ﬁrst a

mere continuation of Parthian sentiments, within a few years of his reign

the king established, consolidated and centralised his rule

to the extent

that his ambitions threatened wide areas of the eastern half of the Roman

Empire. The West knew that Arda

ır’s claims would go beyond the borders

of the Parthian kingdom and that he would ask for more than declarations

of loyalty from the many client kings within his empire; it was clear that he

would claim all the territories that had once belonged to his Achaemenid

ancestors. Rome therefore considered the Sasanian dynasty as a serious

opponent right from the beginning of their relations (1).

As soon as Arda

ır had established his rule he turned towards the West.

According to the contemporary historian Herodian, Arda

ır I responded

to a letter from the Roman emperor Severus Alexander (222–35), in which

the emperor warned him to respect peace and reminded him of the great

victories of Augustus, Trajan and Septimius Severus,

by asking Rome to

For a chronology of the early Sasanian rulers and the beginnings of Sasanian history see Altheim-Stiehl

1982: 152–9; Sundermann 1990: 295–9; Richter-Bernburg 1993: 71–80.

For the history of the Sasanian Empire see Morony 1997: 70–83; Christensen 1944; Widengren

1971: 711–82;Frye1983a: 116–80; 1984: 287–339; Schippmann 1990: 10–79; Wieseh

ofer 2001: 151–

221; see Shahbazi 1990: 588–99 for a survey of the multi-faceted relations between Iran and the

West.

With regard to the activities of the ﬁrst Sasanian king see Wieseh

ofer 1986a: 371–6.

On ‘Achaemenid echoes’ see Frye 1983c: 247–52 and Roaf 1998: 1–7.

Herodian vi.2.4–5.

2.1 The third century 19

withdraw altogether from Syria and Asia Minor.

Between 230 and 232

Arda

ır invaded Roman territory but was stopped in 233 by a counter-attack

of Severus Alexander, who had successfully reorganised Rome’s desolate

Eastern frontier units. The Sasanians withdrew from the areas they had

conquered and the status quo ante bellum was restored. Although this ﬁrst

military confrontation was not a victory for either Persians or Romans,

the fact that a Persian advance had been prevented was viewed as a major

triumph in the West (4).

Soon the Sasanians invaded again. When in 235 the assassination of

Severus Alexander caused political unrest in the Roman Empire, Arda

ır I

once more turned to the West. In 235 and 236 he apparently gained control

of a number of fortresses in Roman Mesopotamia, among these the impor-

tant cities of Nisibis and Carrhae.

Arda

ır not only attempted to conquer

Roman frontier areas, but he also advanced into southern Mesopotamia, the

western coastal regions of the Persian Gulf and eastern Arabia.

Above all he

must have been interested in trade with India and therefore tried to control

seafaring in the Persian Gulf. It looks as if Arda

ır actually gained control

over the northern part of the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. His

activities along the Persian Gulf, which primarily illustrate economic and

strategic motives, affected Roman economic interests. Immediately after

the fall of the Arsacid dynasty Arda

ır had occupied Spasinu Charax on

the

Satt al-Arab and thereby threatened the trading metropolis and Roman

colony of Palmyra, which was located in the Syrian Desert, and engaged

in trade with Indian luxury goods along the Persian Gulf; in consequence

also Roman interests in trade in the region were threatened. This situation

could not but affect relations between the two powers (23).

Moreover, both powers contended for the well-fortiﬁed caravan city of

Hatra, which had turned into one of the most important Arabian centres

during the course of the second century; because of its location in northern

Mesopotamia, the city functioned as a junction for caravan routes and a

stop on the route from Nisibis to Kt

esiph

on (22). Herodian describes Hatra

as an impregnable fortress.

The ‘city of the sun-god’ with its many shrines

was also an important destination for pilgrims and derived further wealth

from this.

Ibid. vi.2.5–6; vi.4.4–5; Potter 1990: 372–5 suggests that Arda

ır’s goals were more modest, namely to

establish or secure control over the former client kingdoms such as Hatra and Armenia, which had

fallen under Roman rule.

Wieseh

ofer 1982: 437–47; Kettenhofen 1982: 21–2 and 1995a: 159–77.

Widengren 1971: 754–5; Whitehouse and Williamson 1973: 29–49;Frye1983b: 167–70; Winter 1988:

72–9; Potts 1990: 228–41 and 1997: 89–107.

Herodian iii.9.4.

20 2 A chronological survey

Map 2: Sasanian Iran

When Arda

ır I had taken over Parthian territories he had also made

an unsuccessful attempt at capturing Hatra. Losing a fortress of immense

strategic importance for securing middle Mesopotamia to Rome threatened

the Persian Western frontier considerably. Only towards the end of Arda

ır’s

reign the Sasanians managed to capture Hatra after a two-year siege and

probably by treason.

Scholars date the fall of Hatra to some time between

Tabar

ı, tr. N

oldeke 33–40; Bosworth 31–7 (827–30).

2.1 The third century 21

Map 2:(cont.)

April 12 and September 30 of the year 240.

It was a blow to Rome because

controlling Hatra put the Persians in a much better strategic position in

northern Mesopotamia. The already strained diplomatic relations between

Rome and Persia took a turn for the worse when Arda

ır I died. From a

Western perspective the conquest of Hatra was the cause of the new war

The conquest of Hatra is closely linked to the beginning of the reign of

ur I; see 22 with further

references.

22 2 A chronological survey

that broke out during the reign of Arda

ır’s son and successor

ur I

(240–72).

In the spring of 243 the Roman emperor Gordian III (238–44) set off

with his army from the Syrian metropolis Antioch on the Orontes, crossed

the Euphrates and won back the cities of Carrhae and Nisibis, which had

been occupied by the Sasanians.

Under the command of the Prefect of

the Guard Timesitheus the Romans defeated the Persians at Rhesaina and

then advanced into the Sasanian province of

urest

an.

They probably

intended to get as far as the Sasanian capital Kt

esiph

but at the begin-

ning of the year 244

ur I scored a decisive victory against the Roman

army at Mi

ık. Gordian III died in battle (5). His successor Philip the Arab

(244–9)

concluded a peace with

ur and withdrew. Although Rome

had to pay large sums of money and lost inﬂuence in Armenia the Roman

emperor boasted about the peace (16).

The peace of 244 lasted for only a few years.

ur claimed that Rome

was to be blamed for new confrontations because it had done wrong by

Armenia.

When the Arsacid king of Armenia had become the victim of

Persian intrigues his son Tiridates, who was not yet of age, went over to

Rome (26).

ur saw the regulations of the foedus of 244 violated and

used the opportunity to take over Armenia.

In 252 he eliminated the

Arsacid royal house and turned Armenia into a Sasanian province under

the command of his son Hormizd.

This development brought signiﬁcant

strategic advantages for the Sasanians, and this not only with regard to the

looming conﬂicts with Rome but also with regard to their military and

economic interests in the Caucasus region.

From 252 on

ur was once more at war with Rome.

He boasted

of a spectacular victory at Barbalissos over a Roman army of 60,000

men.

Afterwards the Persians invaded the Roman province of Syria. They

captured Hierapolis, Antioch on the Orontes and further Syrian cities and

Schippmann 1990: 19.

On Gordian’s Persian expedition see Kettenhofen 1983: 151–71.

Amm. xxiii.5.17.

SHA Gord. 27.6.

On this emperor and his rule see de Blois 1978–9: 11–43 and K

orner 2002.

SKZ § 9 (p. 294 ed. Back).

For the possible causes of the Sasanian expedition against Armenia and the course of events see

Chaumont 1976: 169–76 and below (26) with further references.

For an examination of

ur’s intervention in Armenia see Schottky 1994: 223–35, esp. 231–2; see

again 26 below.

It is difﬁcult to establish a chronology of the various Sasanian expeditions between 253 and 256; see

Kettenhofen 1982: 50–96; Schippmann 1990: 21–3; Potter 1990: 189–96 and 290–7; Strobel 1993:

220–56.

SKZ § 9 (p. 295 ed. Back).