Dignas B., Winter E. Rome and Persia in late Antiquity. Neighbours and Rivals

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2.1 The third century 23

also made an advance into Cappadocia.

Exceptionally important was the

destruction of the caravan city Dura-Europos in the central Mesopotamian

steppe.

After the fall of Hatra, the Romans had now lost a further impor-

tant trading base in the region. In the second half of 253, however, the

Persians suffered a ﬁrst setback when one of their columns was stopped at

Emesa and defeated, possibly by the Palmyrene Odaenathus (died in 267).

In the following years this man ﬁgured prominently in Persian–Roman

confrontations. When

ur I rejected his offer of an alliance, Odaenathus

asked Rome instead and soon after his support became crucial for the

Roman position in the East (23).

At ﬁrst

ur I used the internal difﬁculties Rome faced during this

period for further offensives.

In 260 the Persians defeated the emperor

and his personal army. At Edessa they captured high Roman ofﬁcials and

Valerian himself.

Within all of Sasanian history this was one of the greatest

triumphs over their Western opponent. Over and over again

ur I boasted

of this triumph (5). According to his own words, the king exploited Vale-

rian’s defeat at Edessa by taking thirty-seven cities in the Roman provinces

of Syria, Cilicia and Cappadocia.

Apparently he also occupied the Syrian

metropolis Antioch on the Orontes. Among the numerous Roman pris-

oners were many engineers, scholars and artists, who were deported and

resettled in the modern provinces of F

ars and H

uzist

an. Many of them

found a new home in cities founded by

ur I. These men contributed to

a spread of Western ‘know-how’ to areas beyond the rivers Euphrates and

Tigris and thus enhanced the infrastructure of the Sasanian Empire (36).

Numerous Christians, and among these priests and Church ofﬁcials, also

entered Persia and established organised congregations.

These were not

bothered by

ur I because the king hoped that by tolerating Christians,

whose fellow believers in the Roman Empire were persecuted at the time

of the deportations, he would gain an advantage in his conﬂict with Rome.

However, the quick spread of Christianity in the Sasanian Empire endan-

gered the position of the Zoroastrian priesthood, whose claims to power

The individual dates are uncertain. An advance between 253 and 255 is as likely as one in 255/6.

MacDonald 1986: 45–68; Millar 1996: 445–71 and 1998b; Pollard 2004: 119–44.

Strobel 1993: 243–4.

On the Roman–Sasanian confrontations of the year 260 and on the capture of Valerian see

Kettenhofen 1982: 97–126.

SKZ §§ 10–17 (pp. 295–306 ed. Back); regarding the number of cities conquered by

ur I see

Maricq and Honigmann 1953: 144.

For the religious life in the Sasanian Empire see the respective entries in CHI iii.2 1983: 819–

1024; for the position of Christianity see Atiya 1991; Wieseh

ofer 2001: 199–216; see also chapter 7

below.

24 2 A chronological survey

became more and more visible towards the end of

ur I’s reign, and

in particular after his death. Although the Christian population displayed

loyalty towards the king in many instances, as a guardian and protector

of Zoroastrianism he was ultimately not allowed to tolerate Christian-

ity (30). Here we see clear parallels to the developments in the Roman

Empire where reasons of state were also responsible for persecutions of the

Christians.

ur I’s long-standing policy of religious tolerance favoured especially

the rise of Mani, the founder of Manichaeanism,

a religion that was for

a short time a religious alternative to Zoroastrianism, but at the end of his

life the king turned to Zoroastrianism.

In his Great Inscription

proclaimed that he owed his political successes entirely to the goodwill of

Ahura Mazda (30). At the beginning of the fourth century Constantine the

Great displayed a similar attitude with regard to the Christian God after

his victories over Maxentius and Licinius.

Both rulers propagated their

close relationship with a supreme god in a way that illustrates structural

similarities between their ideas of kingship. On the Eastern side, one is

reminded of the Sasanian reliefs that capture the ‘King of kings’ receiving

the ring, symbol of his divine rule, that is Ahura Mazda handing over

his power to the secular ruler; on the Western side, what comes to mind

are the many images that underline the close link between emperor and

God and show the emperor as the executor of divine plans in the world.

Further parallels to the religious situation in Persia can be observed with

regard to the motives, goals and consequences of Constantine’s religious

policy. As the Sasanian kings supported Zoroastrianism a long time before

the conversion of Constantine, religious developments in Persia must have

been signiﬁcant for the events in the West.

It is striking how much

ur I’s aggressive policy against Rome rein-

forced the claims made by the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, Arda

ır

I, namely to rule the territories that had once made up the Achaemenid

Empire (2). During his reign, Sasanian interests in the West reached a high

point for the ﬁrst time and Rome had to apply all its energies in order to

On M

ı and the religion named after him see MacKenzie 1979: 500–31; Hutter 1988; Lieu 1992 and

1994.

On Zoroastrianism in the Sasanian Period see Zaehner 1975 and 1961; Duchesne-Guillemin 1983:

866–908 and Boyce 1984a: 101–43 and 1984b.

See Brandt 1998: 32–7 and 128–46 for references.

One famous example is the silver medallion from Ticinum, which probably dates to the year 315;

see Brandt 1998: 135–7.

Paul 1983: 108–12.

2.1 The third century 25

deal with the threat. Although

ur I suffered setbacks towards the end

of his rule, West and East always remembered that he had defeated the

Romans several times, that Gordian III had met his death in the battle of

ık and that Valerian had been captured.

The activities of Odaenathus of Palmyra rather than Roman offensives

deserve credit for the fact that the territories and cities conquered by

ur I

remained in Persian hands only for a short period of time. On behalf of the

Romans Odaenathus promoted Western interests against Sasanian claims.

ur I’s earlier rejection of Odaenathus’ offer to ally himself with Persia

backﬁred. The Roman emperor Gallienus (260–8) invested the Palmyrene

king with almost unlimited power, and from the second half of the year

260 onwards the Sasanians suffered several defeats at his hands. From 264

onwards the Eastern frontier of the Roman Empire was quiet.

When Odaenathus was assassinated in the spring of 267

ur I was

ﬁnally liberated from a dangerous opponent. With Odaenathus’ help

Palmyra – which was favoured by its geographical location in the ﬁrst

place – had developed into a powerful buffer state between Rome and

Persia. Odaenathus’ successor Zenobia (267–72) took advantage of the so-

called crisis of the Roman Empire

and fostered an unparalleled rise of

Palmyrene power. Eventually, the creation of a Palmyrene kingdom that

was independent from Rome was not tolerable. In the year 272 the Roman

emperor Aurelian (270–5) attacked Palmyra and captured Zenobia, who

was paraded through Rome in the emperor’s triumph (23).

The Sasanians did not intervene in the confrontations between Rome

and Palmyra, possibly because the short reigns of Hormizd I (272–3) and

Bahr

am I did not allow for any bold initiatives in foreign affairs. Removing

Palmyrene power from the political map certainly strengthened the Roman

position. Aurelian adopted the titles Parthicus and Persicus maximus

and

thereby emphasised his military achievements in the East. The Roman

emperor Probus (276–82) travelled to the East twice; these visits included

diplomatic contacts with the Persian opponent but no armed conﬂict. A

Roman offensive was planned for the year 283 but was abandoned when

the emperor was assassinated.

De Blois 1975: 7–23.

On this ‘crisis’ see Potter 1990; Bleckmann 1992; Strobel 1993; with further references Witschel 1999;

Strobel 2001: 239–78.

CIL iii 7586 (= ILS 8925); vi 1112; viii 9040; xii 5549 and 5561; xiii 8973 (= ILS 581); see also

Kettenhofen 1986: 138–46.

SHA Prob. 17.4; 20.1; for the year 279 the title Persikos megistos is attested; cf. P. O x y . xiv 1713; for

Probus’ activities in the East see Crees 1965: 110–11 and 124–5; Kreucher 2003: 82–3 and 179–86.

26 2 A chronological survey

His successor Carus (282–3) was proclaimed emperor with the explicit

goal of destroying the Persian Empire.

This may be literary ﬁction but

Carus translated into action a long-planned military offensive against the

Sasanians. The Roman army invaded Mesopotamia and did not meet any

Persian resistance.

Internal unrest during the reign of Bahr

am II (276–93)

may have favoured the successful advance and capture of Kt

esiph

on.

This

was the only time ever that the Romans captured the Persian capital, which

to some extent made up for the humiliation Rome had suffered in 260.Not

surprisingly, Carus also adopted the titles Persicus maximus and Parthicus

in order to display his success over the Eastern rival.

Carus’ sudden death prevented Rome from further advances. In the

Historia Augusta we read that he was struck by lightning while in his

camp at the Tigris. No Roman emperor was destined to advance beyond

esiph

on.

According to the words of this so-called ‘Kt

esiph

on oracle’

Carus died because he did not abide by an oracular prophecy that anybody

who tried to conquer the Persian capital would be punished. Rome’s cau-

tious dealings with Persia were thus expressed not only in political terms

but also as a motif in the realm of myth and ﬁction. Carus’ successor,

Numerianus (283–4), withdrew his army immediately and without even

negotiating for a peace.

The campaign thus had no consequences for the

Sasanians. Rome was not able to use the prestigious victory over Bahr

am II

and did not gain any territory in the long term. The latent state of war and

the unsettled situation along the frontiers that had existed already before

Carus’ Persian campaign continued.

Too many unresolved issues prevented a formal peace or agreement

regarding the frontiers, and this did not change until the Roman emperor

Diocletian (284–305) consolidated his rule and returned to the East in 286.

Immediately, he started to reorganise Roman rule and the defence system

along the frontier, a development which caused Sasanian concern. In the

year 287 Bahr

am II sent ambassadors to Diocletian in order to negotiate for

a peace treaty.

Apparently the negotiations were successful and a peace

was concluded without any territory changing hands. Diocletian was sat-

isﬁed that the Sasanian king respected the existing Eastern frontier and in

Anonymus post Dionem, frg. 12 (FHG iv 198).

SHA Car. 8.1; Aur. Vict. Caes. 38.2–3; Eutr. ix.18.1; Fest. 24.

SHA Car. 8.1; Pan. Lat. xi (iii) 17.2 (p. 268, rec. Mynors).

CIL viii 12522 (= ILS 600); IGRR i 1144.

SHA Car. 9.1; in this context see Kerler 1970: 263–4.

Aur. Vict. Caes. 38.6.

For the Persian campaign of the emperor Carus see Winter 1988: 130–7.

Pan. Lat. x (ii) 7.5; 9.2.

2.1 The third century 27

288 returned to the Western parts of his empire in order to intervene in the

conﬂict with the Alamanni.

Bahr

am II’s readiness to come to a friendly understanding with Rome

indicates that the Sasanian king was preoccupied with domestic affairs.

His brother Hormizd was rebelling against the legitimate ruler with the help

of Eastern peoples such as the Saka and the K

an,

and the Zoroastrian

priest Kart

er was exerting more and more inﬂuence in the empire. The

latter, who had been a political factor already during the reign of

ur I,

was now at the zenith of his power and had great inﬂuence over Bahr

am II.

The king backed Kart

er in pursuing a repressive policy that aimed at the

elimination of all non-Zoroastrian religions in Persia (29).

Measures by

which Bahr

am increased the powers of the Zoroastrian priesthood reﬂect

the king’s efforts to unify his kingdom as well as to strengthen his own

position.

This period saw the origins of the union between the Sasanian

monarchy and the Zoroastrian religion that would become so signiﬁcant

for the history of the Sasanian Empire (28). The priest Kart

er expanded

his power enormously and became the leading exponent of a movement

that gained more and more independence from the monarchy. Reﬂecting

the king’s weak position, this development is probably the reason why

Bahr

am yielded to Diocletian and was eager to come to an agreement with

the emperor. From now onwards religious affairs became a signiﬁcant and

growing factor in the relations between the two great powers.

Both sides respected the agreement of 288 while their energies were

applied elsewhere. Already in 290 Diocletian once more headed East. In

the following period he took numerous measures in order to strengthen

the Roman position along the Eastern frontier.

Above all, he inter-

vened in Armenian matters by restoring Tiridates III to the throne in

290, thereby increasing Roman inﬂuence in this strategically important

region.

Although Tiridates’ realm of inﬂuence was limited to Western

(Lesser) Armenia, Diocletian used the opportunity to win an important

ally for the imminent conﬂict with Persia (26). The difﬁcult situation

On the Roman–Sasanian peace treaty of 288 see Winter 1988: 137–51.

On the king’s struggle to legitimise his rule see Winter 1988: 138–41.

Pan. Lat. x (ii) 7.5; 9.2; on the Saka see Bosi 1994: 109–22; Narain 1987: 27–31 and 1990: 151–76;on

the K

an see the glossary, and below p. 93 with n. 107.

For Kart

er and his rise to power see Sprengling 1940a: 197–228; Chaumont 1960: 339–80; Hinz 1971:

485–99.

Brock 1978: 167–81.

Decret 1979: 130–1.

Metzler 1982: 144.

The title Persicus maximus of the year 290 (CIL iii 5810) emphasises Diocletian’s successes in the

East; cf. Enßlin 1942.

Chaumont 1969: 93–111; Kettenhofen 1995c: esp. 48–55 and 144–68; see also p. 128 with n. 47 below.

28 2 A chronological survey

mentioned above forced Bahr

am II to watch the activities of the Roman

emperor without taking any action.

Since the capture of Valerian in the year 260 the balance of power

between West and East had changed. The Sasanian Empire, which from

its foundation in 224 had pursued an aggressive policy against its West-

ern neighbour and had inﬂicted major defeats on Rome, suffered setbacks

that were the result not only of its own internal situation but also of a

recovering Roman Empire from the beginning of the 270s. In particular

Diocletian’s sensible and far sighted reforms

helped to get over the so-

called crisis of the Roman Empire, and this had to affect the relations with

the Eastern neighbour. Only when Persia’s internal struggle for power

ended in favour of king Nars

e(293–302) was the Eastern power in the

position to revert to the policy of expansion pursued by the early Sasanian

kings.

In 296 Nars

e used the ﬁrst opportunity for a military offensive against

Rome and invaded the Roman part of Armenia. He beneﬁted from the fact

that the Romans had to deal with a revolt against their rule in Egypt. In

297 Diocletian was determined to end the political unrest and issued an

edict against the Manichaeans, whose religion was one of those persecuted

by the Zoroastrian priest Kart

er in the Sasanian Empire but who from a

Western perspective were perceived as followers of a Persian religion.

It is

not clear, however, if the so-called ‘Edict against the Manichaeans’ of 297

(31), which formed part of a general policy of religious restoration pursued

by Diocletian and his fellow emperors,

should be seen in the context of

the new Persian war. However, it is remarkable that persecutions of the

Manichaeans ceased in Persia after 297 in order that their support could be

used in the battle against Rome.

In the year 297 the armies of Nars

e and Galerius ([293] 305–11), who

had been made Caesar by Diocletian because of his military successes,

clashed between Kallinikos and Carrhae; the Romans were utterly defeated.

Ammianus Marcellinus tells us that Diocletian hurried to the scene and that

Galerius, clad in purple, marched for nearly a mile before the carriage of

the enraged emperor. Possibly, Diocletian humiliated Galerius in this way

Brandt 1998: 19–26.

On the quarrels over the succession to the throne after the death of Bahr

am II in 293 see Tanabe

1991: 7–39.

For a different interpretation see Wieseh

ofer 1993: 373 n. 54, who argues that Nars

e’s attack was a

preventive measure and not part of an expansionist Western policy.

On the revolt in Egypt and the role of the Manichaeans as ‘agents of the Persians’ see Seston 1939:

227–34.

Strobel 1993: 337–8 and Brandt 1998: 25–6.

Frye 1983a: 131.

2.1 The third century 29

in order to provoke his thirst for revenge.

And indeed, in 298 Galerius

defeated Nars

e at Satala in Armenia.

There are many attestations of this

particular Roman triumph against its Eastern rival (6).

The new success against Persia made Rome forget the setbacks of the

third century, in particular the capture of Valerian by

urIin260. The

reign of Diocletian instilled in the West a level of conﬁdence regarding

victory and peace that had been lost throughout the third century. Rome’s

successes reminded it of its former glory and accordingly were much empha-

sised in Western historiography. In the Historia Augusta Diocletian is called

the ‘father of a golden age’ (aurei parens saeculi).

Aurelius Victor refers

to him as a father who had acted on behalf of his people.

Even Eusebius

of Caesarea mentions the fortune and wealth of the reign of Diocletian in

his ecclesiastical history.

According to the emperor Julian (361–3) Dio-

cletian, the ‘ruler of the entire world’, instilled such fear into his enemy

that the Sasanian king had to accept his conditions for peace.

The pan-

egyric literature praises the victory over Persia by emphasising that this

empire was the only power in a position to diminish Rome’s glory.

its preamble, the Prices Edict of the year 301, which is preserved on stone,

mentions that the most fortunate stability and peace had been restored in

the Roman Empire, if only with great difﬁculty.

Coins that show the

legend pax aeterna and securitas orbis were part of an imperial propaganda

but also expressed how much the Romans hoped that they had returned to

their former glory.

Diocletian was the man whom the state needed (vir

rei publicae necessarius).

In the light of his crushing defeat at Satala Nars

e wanted to end the

conﬂict as quickly as possible, in particular as he could otherwise expect

Galerius to advance further into Sasanian territory. It was to his advan-

tage that Galerius and Diocletian could not agree on a strategy.

Whereas

Galerius intended to pursue Nars

e, who had taken ﬂight, and take posses-

sion of the Persian heartland, Diocletian saw the aims of the war fulﬁlled

with the victory at Satala. He did not want to embark on new and uncertain

So Klein 1997: 278.

Enßlin 1936: 102–10; 1942: 40–5; for the chronology of the events see Barnes 1982: 54–5 and 63.

SHA Heliogab. 35.4.

Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.8.

Eus. HE viii.13.9.

Iul. Or. 1. 18a–b.

Pan. Lat. viii (v) 10.4.

Edictum Diocletiani et collegarum de pretiis rerum venalium, praef.; for an English translation of the

preamble and an early list of the prices see Grazer in Frank 1940: 157–74 (= Lewis and Reinhold

1955 ii: 464–72); for new fragments of the text see Crawford and Reynolds 1977: 125–51 and 1979:

163–210; S. Corcoran is preparing a translation of all fragments; see also Brandt 1998: 78–86.

Cf. e.g. references in RIC vi 1967: 145.

SHA Car. 10.1.

Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.36; see also Kolb 1987a: 85.

30 2 A chronological survey

Syrian

Desert

Damascus

Palmyra

Apamea

Mediterranean

Sea

SYRIA

Gabbulon

Beroea

Antioch

Zeugma

Hierapolis

Batnae

Edessa

Carrhae

Constantia

River Euphrates

Amida

Satala

Melitene

Land over 1000 metres

100 miles0

0 200 km

Taurus M

ountains

CAPPADOCIA

Resaina/Theodosiopolis

OSRHOENE

EUPHRATESIA

Callinicum

Zenobia

Sura

Sergiopolis

Barbalissos

Map 3: Northern Mesopotamia and adjacent regions

military campaigns that could put at risk what had been accomplished so

far. In the end, Diocletian prevailed in the negotiations at Nisibis. A peace

treaty was concluded and put an end to the last of the Roman–Sasanian

Wars of the third century. Although the foedus of 298 put the Sasanians at

a major disadvantage (17), Rome intended to respect the sovereignty of the

defeated Sasanian ruler.

Chrysos 1976: 11–17.

2.1 The third century 31

ARMENIA

PERSARMENIA

Artaxata

Dvin

River Araxes

Theodosiopolis

Citharizon

Martyropolis

Cepha

Bezabde

Nineveh

River Tigris

Irbil

Lesser Zab

Greater Za

Kirkuk

(Karka de

Beth Selok)

Perozshapur

Ctesiphon

Dastagerd

River Diyala

Monocarton

Nisibis

Solachon

Thannuris

Singara

Circesium

River Euphrates

Khabour

Jebel

Sinjar

Dara

Tur Abdin

CORDUENE

ZABDICENE

Lake Urmiah

Lake

Van

ARZANENE

(

)

Map 3:(cont.)

There is no doubt that the peace treaty of 298 made the Roman Eastern

frontier more secure. During the ﬁrst Tetrarchy the so-called Strata Dio-

cletiana from Damascus via Palmyra to Sura

was built and fortiﬁed with

numerous forts (map 3), and a security zone with military roads, fortresses

and watch towers created between Hauran in Southern Syria and the Sinai.

See Eadie 1996: 72–82; Konrad 1999: 392–410.

32 2 A chronological survey

The latter was later called ‘Palestinian’ or ‘Arabian Limes’.

Given how

important Persia was for Roman foreign trade (28), Diocletian had worked

towards a settlement in which economic and strategic components comple-

mented each other. It was his goal to reconcile questions of security with the

control over the trade with the East, which was so important for Rome.

The treaty established the Mesopotamian city of Nisibis as central to the

trade between the two empires (17), and this role would continue in the

future. From now on economic and strategic factors were also important

in the diplomatic relations between both empires (27–28). Although there

were still unsolved problems to do with the spread of information through

diplomats, defectors and spies (35), for the time being the peace treaty of

Nisibis formed the beginning of a peaceful period between Rome and Persia

that would last for forty years – an exceptionally long period of peace in

the history of Roman–Sasanian relations.

2.2 the fourth century: the conflict escalates

under

ur ii (309–79)

Very little is known about the successors of the Sasanian king Nars

Hormizd II (302–9) and Adanars

e(309). They did not play a decisive

role in Roman–Sasanian relations. It looks as if Hormizd II embarked on

an unsuccessful Western campaign, possibly in order to take revenge for his

father Nars

e’s humiliating defeat, which he had witnessed.

A small note

found in the so-called Chronicle of Arbela, a Syriac–Nestorian source of the

sixth or seventh century whose authenticity and reliability are controver-

sial among scholars, should be mentioned in this context.

The chronicle

claims that Hormizd initiated his Western campaign in order to avenge

the Roman persecutions of Christians that took place during the reigns

of Diocletian and Galerius.

Hormizd II indeed showed tolerance to the

Christians, who were a persecuted minority in both the Roman Empire

and the Sasanian kingdom. His Western advance, however, did not bear an

impact on the peace of 298.

This peace between Romans and Persians ended during the reign of

ur II (309–79), who renewed the aggressive Western policy of the early

Sasanian kings.

ur II intended to recover not only those territories

On the development of this part of the Roman frontier see Graf 1978: 1–26; Kennedy 1982; Bowersock

1983: 76–157; Isaac 1992: 118–34.

Seston 1946: 176–7.

Wieseh

ofer 1989: 68–71.

See ibid. 68–9 n. 7.

Chr. Arb. ii p. 67, 9–11 (tr. Kawerau); cf. Assfalg 1966: 19–36; on the signiﬁcance of this source see

Kettenhofen 1995b: 287–319.