Dignas B., Winter E. Rome and Persia in late Antiquity. Neighbours and Rivals

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chapter 2

Warfare

3: Sasanian armament and tactics

Heliodorus, Aethiopica

.15.1–6

(1) The character of their armament is the following. A selected man chosen for

his bodily strength wears a helmet

that is compact and made of one piece, and it

is skillfully crafted to look exactly like a man’s face. He is covered by this from the

top of his head to the neck except for the eyes in order to see through it; he equips

his right hand with a pike longer than a spear, the left is free for the reins. He has

a sabre hung by his side under his arm, and he is armed with a corselet not only

across his breast but also across the rest of his body. (2) The construction of the

corselet is as follows: they forge plates of bronze and iron into a square shape that

is a span long on all sides, and they ﬁt one to the other at the edges on each side so

that the one above always overlaps with the one below and the one alongside with

the one next to run on continuously, and they furnish the conjunction with hooks

under the ﬂaps; thereby they create a kind of chiton clad in horny scales, which

clings to the body without causing pain and covers it on all sides, tracing each limb

and not hindering movement as it contracts and extends. (3) For there are sleeves,

and it reaches from the neck to the knee, separated only at the thighs, as much as is

necessary to mount a horse’s back. Such a corselet it is, a protection against missiles

and a defence against all wounds. The greave reaches from the top of the foot to

the knee, fastened to the corselet. (4) They fence their horses all around with a

similar equipment, tying greaves around the feet, and they bind the whole head

tightly with frontlets, and from the back to the belly they suspend on either side a

covering plaited in iron, so that it serves as armour but at the same time because of

its slackness does not impede the fast pace. (5) Having equipped or rather encased

the horse in this way the rider gets on, not leaping up but with others lifting him up

because of the weight. When the moment of battle comes, he drives his horse with

the rein, applies his spurs and goes with all his force against the enemies, looking

like an iron man or like a moving image wrought with the hammer. (6) With its

point the pike protrudes a lot, being held up against the horse’s neck by a rope. The

butt-end is fastened alongside the horse’s thighs with a knot, so that it does not

Grancsay 1963: 253–62; Overlaet 1982: 189–206.

64 2 Warfare

give way in clashes but supports the hand of the rider, which only gives direction

to the blow; the rider, however, exerts himself and presses for the wound to be even

harsher; through his force he destroys everyone whom he encounters, and with

one blow he may often transﬁx two.

Maurice, Strategikon

The Persian nation is wretched, dissembling and servile, but also patriotic and

obedient. It obeys its rulers out of fear. Because of this the Persians are capable

of enduring their work and engage in wars on behalf of their fatherland. Eager

to deal with most serious matters rather by way of counsel and strategy, they pay

attention to order and not to courage and rashness. Raised in a hot climate, they

easily bear the annoyance of heat, thirst and the lack of food. They are awesome

when they lay siege, and even more awesome when they are besieged; they are

extremely apt in hiding their pain, in holding out nobly in adverse circumstances

and turning these to their advantage. And in negotiations they are irreconcilable so

that they do not offer themselves what they want to choose for their own beneﬁt

but as recipients are offered this by their enemies. They are armed with cuirass or

thorax, bows and swords,

and experienced in quick – but not forceful – archery,

more than all other warlike nations. Going to war, they encamp within fortiﬁed

boundaries. When battle arises, they create a ditch and a sharp palisade around

themselves; they do not leave the baggage train in this but create the ditch to have

a refuge from a critical situation in battle. It is not their practice to let their horses

graze but to let them gather their feed from the hand. They are set up for battle

in three equal parts, the centre, the right and the left, with the centre having up

to 400 or 500 selected men in addition. They do not create an even depth within

the formation but try to line up the cavalry in each unit in the ﬁrst and second

line or phalanx and to keep the front of the formation even and dense. They place

the supernumerary horses and the train a short way behind the main line. When

they are in battle against pike men it is their practice to place their main line in the

roughest landscape and to use their bows in order that the attacks of the pike men

against them are dispersed and easily dissolved by the difﬁcult terrain. Not only

before the day of the battle do they like to delay the ﬁghting, in particular when

they know that the enemies are well prepared and ready for ﬁghting, encamping

on the most inaccessible ground, but also during the battle itself, in particular

in the summer, they like to make their attacks around the hottest hour, in order

that through the boiling heat of the sun and the delay in time the courage and

spirit of those lined up against them slackens, and they make their charges step

by step in an even and dense formation, because they walk gently and attentively.

They are, however, distressed by the following: the cold and the rain and the south

wind, which ruin the force of their bows; a formation of infantry that is carefully

composed; a place with an even surface or a bare one because of the charges of

pike men; dense ﬁghting because showers of arrows become useless from close

by and because they themselves do not use pikes and shields; pressing forward in

Rostovtzeff 1943: 174–87; Paterson 1969: 29–32; Overlaet 1989: 741–55 and Masia 2000: 185–9.

3 Sasanian armaments and tactics 65

battles because they rush to immediate ﬂight and do not know how to suddenly

turn against their attackers, as do the Scythian nations; attacks and encirclements

as the result of an outﬂanking on the sides and rear of their formation because

they do not place good ﬂank guards in their line to sustain a major attack; often

also unexpected nightly attacks against their camp because they place their tents

without distinction and at random within the encirclement of the camp. It is thus

necessary to line up in battles as the treatise about formations says, namely to

choose ground that is even, open and level, so far as possible, which does not have

swamps or ditches or shrubs so as not to dissolve the formation. When the army or

formation is well prepared do not delay the attack, if it has been ﬁrmly decided to

ﬁght on that day. In battle, launch the charges and attacks when close to the reach

of the bows, even and in dense order, and swiftly, lest through a delay in getting

to hand-to-hand combat the enemies, sending a continuous shower of arrows, get

to afﬂict our soldiers and horses with even more missiles.

The two passages are excerpts from two very different sources, each of

which provides us with an impressive as well as vivid account of Sasanian

armament and tactics.

Heliodorus, who tells us that he was a ‘Phoenician

from the city of Emesa, from the family of the descendants of Helios’, is

the author of a Greek novel entitled Aethiopica (‘Aethiopian stories’). The

date of this work is uncertain but it was probably composed in the third

century, or possibly the second half of the fourth century.

As a genre, the

Greek novel was extremely popular. The Aethiopica tells the love story of

a certain Theagenes and an Aethiopian princess Chariclea, whose adven-

tures take them all the way to Delphi.

Because of its wide geographical

scope this novel is particularly interesting. In our passage the contemporary

observer Heliodorus describes the mailed Sasanian cavalry,

which under-

lines the signiﬁcance of this source with regard to questions of cultural

history.

The second source relates to the late phase of Byzantine–Sasanian rela-

tions. A work entitled Strategikon

is attributed to the Byzantine emperor

Maurice (582–602), who secured the throne for the Persian king Xusr

oII

arv

ez (34). This is a manual on military affairs composed in Greek, which

contains much information concerning military tactics, the organisation

and line-up of the army, military training and the use of armament as well as

siege craft and instructions for generals. It is not clear whether the emperor

For a general background see Tafazzoli 2000.

Cf. van der Walk 1941: 97–100 and Szepessy 1975: 279–87; Bowie 1999: 40–1.

See Winkler 1982: 93–158 (also in Swain 1999: 286–350); Szepessy 1984: 432–50; Hunter 1998.

On the Sasanian mailed cavalry see Bivar 1972: 271–91; Michalak 1987: 73–86; Mielczarek 1993: 51–67;

Campbell 1999: 339.

For the Greek text see Dennis 1981; for an English translation see Dennis 1985; also Kollautz 1985:

87–136.

66 2 Warfare

Maurice was indeed the author of the work but it is fairly certain that the

text originates from some time between the end of the sixth and the begin-

ning of the seventh century. The confrontations with the Islamic Arabs that

began in the 630s are not mentioned.

Although the so called Strategikon of

Maurice is one of many comparable military treatises that were composed

in the early Byzantine period,

it stands out as one of the most important

works and adheres to the reality of its time in an exceptional way. Moreover,

it is of special value because of its detailed descriptions of foreign peoples

and possible opponents, such as the Avars, Slavs and Persians, which provide

us with important historical and ethnographical information.

Both texts give insight into the character of Persian armament and battle

techniques as well as tactical counter-measures adopted by the Byzantine

army.

The extremely detailed descriptions of Sasanian armament, tech-

niques and strategies are vivid and accurate, which surprises and impresses

the reader. Many of the observations correspond not only with the late

antique accounts of particular battles between Byzantium and the Persian

Empire

but also with the numerous visual testimonies. Many Sasanian

silver bowls, ﬁnest examples of Persian art and culture, represent the king

in full armour and engaged in hunting.

The depicted equestrian statue is

most likely that of the Sasanian ruler Xusr

oII(590–628)

because it was

found in the grotto of Taq-i Bustan (map 5),

immediately below the rock

relief representing the investiture of this king. It is not only one of the most

important monuments of Sasanian art

but also the latest one among the

known Sasanian rock reliefs (ﬁg. 3).

The equestrian statue shows the king in full armour.

He is armed like a

clibanarius of the heavy Sasanian cavalry. The equipment of both rider and

horse are visible in all details. In 1821 Sir Robert Ker-Porter made a drawing

of the relief to illustrate his book Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia and

Ancient Babylonia; in its own way it conveys a good impression of both

For a discussion of the date and authorship see Whitby 1988: 242.

Hunger 1978: 329–30.

Cf. e.g. Speidel 1984: 151–6 and Negin 1995: 65–75.

Greatrex and Lieu 2002: 179 and 297 n. 92; Greatrex 1998: 169–85 and 195–207; Wiita 1977:

53–111.

For the most important examples see Ghirshman 1962: ﬁgs. 207–11; 247–54; see also Peck 1969:

101–46; Tanabe 1981: 105–18; Wilcox and McBride 1986: 36–48; Harper 1983: 1113–29.

Several scholars have attributed this rock relief to king P

oz (459–84); cf. Ghirshman 1962: 193;on

the interpretation of this relief see also Shepherd 1983: 1086–89.

Ghirshman 1962: ﬁg. 235; on the signiﬁcance of Taq-i Bustan as a place for royal self-representation

see the references pp. 92–3 nn. 87–90.

Fukai and Horiuchi 1962–72; Fukai 1972.

See also Wilcox and McBride 1986: 41.

3 Sasanian armaments and tactics 67

Fig. 3 Equestrian statue of Xusr

o II at Taq-i Bustan

(Ghirshman, R. (1962) Iran. Parthians and Sassanians: ﬁg. 235)

(Photo: Ph. Claude Deffarge-Rapho)

the monumentality of the work and the many details eagerly added by the

artist (ﬁg. 4).

Testimonies such as the two passages that opened this chapter attest not

only to the Western insight into Persian customs and tactics but also to

an awareness in the West that the powerful Persian military was well wor-

thy of and in need of investigation.

The respect accorded to the Persians

Cf. also Lee 1993a: 103–4.

68 2 Warfare

Rock reliefs

C a s p i a n

S e a

Other remains

(Yazd) Modern towns

Salmas

(Tabrız)

Chalus

Shahristanak

Tepe Hisar

Nıshapur

(Mashhad)

KHURASAN

A F G H A N I S T A N

Qal



a-yi Dukhtar Bazı Hur

GURGAN

0 300 km

20 miles

Varamın

Kai Ka'us

Takht-i Rustam

Karku

SISTAN

(Kırman)

(Yazd)

(Isfahan)

Natanz



I R A Q - I



A J A M

Niyasar

Atashkuh

(Dizful)

Susa

Stakhr

Naqsh-i Rustam

Naqsh-i Bahram

Bıshapur

Kazarum

Sar Mashhad

Jirra

Fıruzabad

Tang-i Karam

Atashkada

Barm-i Dilak

(Shıraz)

Naqsh-i Rajab

Guyum

Farrashband

Abu Nasr

Qasr-i

Shushtar

KHUZISTAN

Khung-i

Nauruzı

Aivan-i Karkha

Yazdikhwast

Khairabad

Stakhr

(Shıraz)

Fıruzabad

Bıshapur

0 50 miles

100 km

Darabgird

Tang-i Chakchak

Fıshvar

G u l f

P e r s i a n

FARS

Gardana Bizan

BALUCHISTAN

LARISTAN

(Qazvın)

Ray

Kalar Dasht

(Tehran)

MAZANDARAN

Takht-i Sulaiman

(Hamadan)

Harsın

Taq-i Bustan

(Kirmanshah)

L U R I S T A N

AZARBAIJAN

Qasr-i Shırın

Halush

Quri

Taq-i Girra

R. Tigris

KURDISTAN

L.Urmıya

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Map 5: Sasanian Sites

and their army was certainly crucial. Although in general the Strategikon

displays a hostile attitude towards the Eastern opponent, its author is full

of admiration when addressing speciﬁc aspects of the Sasanian military.

The texts therefore reveal how tough and tenacious the military strug-

gle between the great powers was and how much the relationship cen-

tred on strategic advantages and the numerous campaigns fought between

the third and the seventh century – campaigns that lasted over decades

and moreover demanded long logistic and strategic preparations.

Lee 1989: 257–65 and Whitby 1995: 61–124.

3 Sasanian armaments and tactics 69

Fig. 4 Sketch of the relief from Taq-i Bustan

(Sir Robert Ker-Porter, Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Ancient Babylonia During the

Years 1817, 1818, 1819 and 1820. Vol. ii, London 1822, pl. 62)

the Roman

as well as the Persian side

matters concerning the organisa-

tion of the army and its resources were paramount throughout late antiquity.

See Eadie 1967b: 161–73; MacMullen 1980: 451–60; Kaegi 1981a: 209–13; 1982; Turtledove 1983: 216–

22; Kennedy 1989: 235–46; Coulston 1990: 139–60; Dixon and Southern 1992; Isaac 1995: 125–55;

Kennedy 1996c.

See Inostrancev 1926: 7–52;Frye1977: 7–15; Coulston 1986: 59–95; Shahbazi 1986: 496–9; Hamblin

1986: 99–106; Nicolle 1996; Tafazzoli 2000.

chapter 3

Military confrontations

Diplomatic contacts and an intensive exchange of information regarding

a variety of issues – economy and trade, the security of the borders, reli-

gious and cultural matters etc. – formed an important part of Roman–

Persian relations. However, it was above all the military confrontations that

characterised Rome’s relations with her Eastern neighbours. These were as

numerous as they were of long duration. Both powers’ claim to univer-

sal rule pointed out in the previous chapter did not leave any room for a

stable coexistence on the basis of international law. Almost inevitably, or

rather instinctively, any perceived or real weakness provoked the military

initiative of the opponent so that from the third into the seventh century

a state of war between the two has to be seen as ‘endemic’.

The analy-

sis of these military confrontations is therefore predominant in this study,

not because of an imbalanced modern view of Roman–Sasanian relations

that adopts a ‘confrontational perspective’ but because of the actual his-

torical events, which were experienced and analysed by the contemporary

observers in a similar way. These also emphasise the opposition between

West and East and focus on sometimes very elaborate descriptions of a

permanent struggle for a powerful position and strategic advantages in the

Near and Middle East. This is – and rightly so – reﬂected in modern schol-

arship, which has always paid particular attention to questions of peace and

war as well as triumph and defeat. Our diachronic survey thus includes a

detailed account of the rivalry between the two powers as it is expressed in

the numerous military confrontations. The theatres of war included both

the Eastern Roman provinces and the Western regions of the Sasanian

Empire.

See Hauser’s review on Winter and Dignas 2001 (BMCR 2002.05.06).

4 Earliest Roman–Sasanian confrontations 71

3.1 the third century: origins of sasanian

interests in the west

4: Earliest Roman–Sasanian confrontations (230–3)

In the year 230 Arda

ır made his ﬁrst advance into Roman territory.

The

Persians besieged Nisibis and undertook raids that led them as far as Syria

and Cappadocia.

Arda

ır seemed determined to put his political ideas

into practice. The Roman emperor reacted with dismay to the Sasanian

invasions.

On several occasions he sent ambassadors to the king in order to

negotiate for a peaceful solution but Arda

ır repeated his aim to re-conquer

former Achaemenid territories.

A military confrontation was therefore

inevitable.

There are but few Western sources that help us with a reconstruction of

the events, and the ones that do exist contradict one another. The Eastern

tradition does not yield any precise references. Tabar

ı’s remark that Arda

ır

was always victorious and that his army had never been defeated is typical.

Herodian’s elaborate but problematic account

is closest to the events in

time and allows for a closer analysis.

Herodian

.6.4–6

(4) When Alexander arrived in Antioch he recovered quickly because after the dry

heat in Mesopotamia the much cooler air in the city and its good water supply

felt pleasant. He wanted to win back the soldiers’ loyalty and tried to appease their

anger by promising them a lot of money. He thought that this was the only remedy

when it came to regaining the good will of soldiers.

He also gathered and prepared

a force for a new attack against the Persians, should they cause problems and not

give peace. (5) He was informed, however, that the Persian king had demobilised

his force and had sent all units back to their homelands. Although the barbarians

seemed to have been victorious through the help of some superior force,

they

were still worn out by the many clashes in Media and the battle in Parthia, where

For sourcebooks on Roman–Persian relations in the third century see Felix 1985 and Dodgeon

and Lieu 1991.

On the history, origin, course and outcome of this war see Winter 1988: 45–68.

Herodian vi.2.1; Cass. Dio lxxx.3.4; Zon. xii.15.

On the relationship between the two rulers see Potter 1987: 147–57.

Herodian vi.2.4 and vi.4.5 (for an Engl. tr. of these passages see Dodgeon and Lieu 1991: 17 and

19–20.

Tabar

ı, tr. N

oldeke 21; Bosworth 1999: 17 (820).

Zon. xii.15 is based on Herodian’s account. On Herodian see p. 55 n. 10.

These words once more reveal Herodian’s critical view of Severus Alexander, whose skills in warfare

he tends to judge very negatively.

The expression ek tou kreittonos has been interpreted in various ways; cf. M

uller 1996: 332; another

possible translation would be ‘by superiority of military force’.

72 3 Military confrontations

B l a c k S e a

40 °E

LAZICA

Petra

Caesarea

Mazaca

Trapezus

Cılıcıan Gates

Zeugma

Tarsus

C A P P A D O C I A

Antıoch

Barbalıssus

Palmyra

Massıce

(Anbar)

Hira

Dhu Qar

300 km0

0 200 miles

Dura Europos

Cırcesıum

Callınıcum

Carrhae

Hatra

Sıngara

Nıneveh

Arbela

Lesser Zab

Nısıbıs

Resaina

Zab

Dara

Constantına

Amıda

Maıferqat

Edessa

Nımrud

Dagh

Dvin

L.Van

Mt Ararat

Theodosıopolıs

(Erzurum)

G E O R G I A

A R M E N I A

40°N

35°N

30°N

40 °E

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Map 6: The Roman Near East and the Western Regions of the Sasanian Empire