Encyclopedia of Russian History

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bank) and Russian (left bank) spheres of influence

on either side of the Dnieper River. The treaty al-

lowed Muscovy to maintain temporary hold over

the two key cities of Smolensk (thirteen and a half

years) and Kiev (two years); but Muscovy defied

those provisions and retained these cities perma-

nently, paying only a token indemnity to the

Poles. The agreement at Andrusovo, though origi-

nally intended to be provisional, was confirmed by

the so-called “Eternal Peace” of 1686. Thus, the

treaty marked Muscovy’s ascendance over Poland-

Lithuania in the region.

The Peace of Andrusovo is significant in that it

defined relations between Muscovy and Poland-

Lithuania for much of the remainder of the cen-

tury. Subsequent treaties extended, clarified, or

confirmed the 1667 Peace of Andrusovo. Largely

because of this treaty, Muscovy and Poland-Lithua-

nia developed a mutual defensive stance against the

Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire in the

south. It also affected how the two nations defined

other aspects of their relationship, such as the sta-

tus of Kiev, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and of Or-

thodox populations in Polish-held territories.

The creation of Polish and Russian spheres of

influence had a far-reaching impact on their sub-

ject populations. The Poles pursued a policy of Pol-

onization of Belarus, forbidding the use of the

Belarussian language, and restricting the political

involvement of the Orthodox believers. The Rus-

sians limited the power of the hetmans and re-

turned the practice of serfdom to the Left Bank

region. The divided Ukrainians sought to gain ad-

vantage by playing Muscovy, Poland, and the Ot-

tomans against one another, with the result that

continuous warfare reduced their population and

destroyed their lands. Still, the division remained in

effect and contributed to Muscovy’s predominance.

See also: MUSCOVY; POLAND; THIRTEEN YEAR’S WAR

W. M. R

EGER

ANNA IVANOVNA

(1693–1740), empress of Russia (1730–1740).

Anna Ivanovna was a daughter of Peter the

Great’s half-brother and co-ruler Ivan V. When Pe-

ter’s young grandson, Peter II, died unexpectedly

the Romanov male line came to an end. The Supreme

Privy Council faced the problem of deciding to

which of the five female pretenders the Russian

crown was to be passed.

Two powerful aristocratic families, the Golit-

syns and Dolgorukys, dominated the Council. They

hoped to limit the powers of the autocratic monarch,

a plan that required a docile and passive figure on

the throne. Anna seemed to fit their needs perfectly.

She was a widow in near impoverishment, wish-

ing to escape her difficult circumstances in Cour-

land (Latvia). The Council believed that given her

essentially weak character and probable gratitude

toward the Council for the offer of the crown, she

would prove malleable enough to accept restric-

tions on her power. In a signed document Anna

agreed not to make any decisions on war or peace,

taxes, promotions, deprivation of titles and prop-

erty, remarrying, appointment of an heir, or

spending of state revenues without approval of the

Supreme Privy Council. The Council had in effect

executed a coup d’etat. Real power had moved from

the autocrat to the oligarchy in the Council.

As word began to spread about these condi-

tions, lesser nobles began to form opposition against

the Golitsyn and Dolgoruky conditions. These

lesser nobles, dependent on the monarch for their

positions, privileges, and material well-being, pre-

ferred the absolute power of a monarch, believed

to be above petty personal interests, to what they

considered to be the despotism of a small clique of

aristocratic families.

Anna entered Moscow on February 15, 1730.

Taking advantage of the opposition among the no-

bles and Imperial Guards to the limiting of her

power, at an audience she tore up the document

she had signed after accepting petitions asking her

to reclaim her autocratic power. Some historians

regard this as a lost opportunity for Russia to break

from its autocratic past. They believe that the

granting of legal rights to the nobility as a whole

would have led to dramatic changes in the so-

ciopolitical structure, thereby removing many ob-

stacles created by the autocratic system to Russia’s

further economic and political development.

In return for their support against the Coun-

cil, these nobles pressed Anna for concessions and

privileges that she eventually granted. She repealed

the 1714 Law on Primogeniture, shortened mili-

tary service, allowed entrance for nobles into the

military at officer rank and gave them more con-

trol over their serfs. These moves represented the

beginning of an upgrading of the Russian nobility’s

status.

ANNA IVANOVNA

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Anna had little inclination for ruling, prefer-

ring gossip, trivia, and matchmaking. Her lover

from Courland, Count Ernst-Johann Biron, exer-

cised a decisive influence on her. The great resent-

ment Russians felt towards him and the other

foreigners Anna placed in key posts and to whom

she granted much patronage became a leitmotiv of

her reign. This resentment, which continued after

her reign, had other roots as well. As Russian iden-

tity among the upper classes began to solidify, the

influx of foreigners, whose expertise was regarded

as important for modernization, came to be seen

as an affront to Russian dignity. The damaged be-

lief in Russian superiority, combined with the fre-

quently bad behaviour of foreigners, added to the

complexity of this problem.

Anna took several steps to consolidate her rule.

She founded the powerful Izmailovsky Guards,

whose head was a former lover. The intelligence

service was reestablished, providing an effective

mechanism for surveillance and control over soci-

ety. Finally, in order to bypass the Supreme Privy

Council, in 1731 Anna established a Cabinet of

Ministers, which in reality governed the Empire.

This was not a limitation on the autocratic power,

since Anna willingly granted these powers to the

Cabinet of Ministers and was able to take them back

at will.

Anna’s foreign policy reinforced the general line

set by Peter and thereby set the tone for Russian

foreign policy for the rest of the century. With Aus-

tria she fought the War of Polish Succession

(1733–1735) to prevent the resurgence of French

influence in Poland and to promote the election of

a pro-Russian king, thereby adding to the security

of the Empire’s western borders. Continuing Rus-

sia’s push southward to the Black Sea, Anna with

Austrian support declared war on the Ottoman Em-

pire. The war ended in 1739 with the defeat of the

Crimean khanate, Russia’s regaining of Azov, and

the understanding that St. Petersburg would deal

decisively with rivals on Russia’s Black Sea coast.

Anna failed, however, to gain the right to main-

tain a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, a recurring is-

sue in Imperial Russian history. The policy of

working with Austria in regard to Poland and the

Ottoman Empire was adopted by Catherine II.

Anna died on October 7, 1740.

See also: AUTOCRACY; CABINET OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL;

NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; PETER I; RUSSO-

TURKISH WARS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dukes, Paul. (1982). The Making of Russian Absolutism

1613–1801. London: Longman.

Kamenskii, Aleksandr. (1997). The Russian Empire in the

Eighteenth Century, tr. David Griffiths. London:

Sharpe.

Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1981). The Romanovs: Autocrats of all

the Russias. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Longworth, Phillip. (1972). The Three Empresses: Catherine

I, Anna, and Elizabeth of Russia. London: Constable.

Raleigh, Donald, ed. (1996). The Emperors and Empresses

of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs. London: Sharpe.

HAND

P. S

HAKIBI

ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY,

METROPOLITAN

(1863–1936), metropolitan of Kiev, theologian,

church reformer, and leader of the Russian Ortho-

dox Church in exile after the Russian revolution.

Through early study of Dostoyevsky and

Slavophilism, Anthony became convinced that faith

and philosophy were closely intertwined. His Psy-

chological Data in Favor of Free Will and Moral Re-

sponsibility (1887) extended this earlier insight,

established his reputation as a theologian, and in-

spired many young men to become monastic mis-

sionaries so as to combat the rebellious ideas

current in society and to relieve human suffering.

To build the Kingdom of God in society, Anthony

believed, the church must be free from dependence

on the state (although he always remained a

staunch monarchist in politics). In August 1917 he

advanced his ideas on church reform at a council

(sobor) of the Russian church. He argued that the

church should be governed at the top by a patri-

arch and a council of bishops, a structure favored

by many bishops in attendance. For a time it looked

as if the council would elect Anthony as patriarch.

In the first round of balloting, he was the most

popular of the three finalists for the patriarchal of-

fice. However, the final selection by drawing lots

resulted in the selection of Tikhon (Bellavin).

In the confused political and religious turmoil

in Ukraine during the last months of German oc-

cupation (World War I), Anthony became metro-

politan of Kiev. During the civil war, he supported

the losing side and was forced to leave Russia for

a life of exile, first in Constantinople, then at Srem-

ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY, METROPOLITAN

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ski Karlovci in Yugoslavia. In 1920, as senior

among the bishops who had left Russia, he took

the lead in creating a Higher Church Administra-

tion and a Synod of the Russian Church in Con-

stantinople. The next year, he convened a council

in Yugoslavia that declared the new Synod as the

central church authority in emigration, expressed

its desire to see a restoration of monarchy in Rus-

sia, and proclaimed Anthony as “Vice Regent of the

All-Russian Patriarch.” The new organization de-

clared unconditional loyalty to Patriarch Tikhon,

but came to fear that the patriarch was acting on

behalf of the Communist government in Russia. In

the two years following Patriarch Tikhon’s death

in 1925, Anthony broke off relations with the

Moscow patriarchate and declared the Synodal

church in Yugoslavia to be the sole heir of the his-

toric Orthodox church in Russia. His followers ex-

pected him to be elected patriarch of this fully

autonomous church that claimed jurisdiction over

the entire Russian diaspora. Such a claim caused a

rupture in relations with Metropolitan Evlogy,

whom Patriarch Tikhon had placed in charge of the

Russian parishes in western Europe. Eventually, in

1931, the ecumenical patriarch Vasilios III inter-

vened and permitted Evlogy to place the exarchate

of the Russian church in western Europe under

Constantinople’s jurisdiction. Anthony’s influence

in the Orthodox emigration diminished thereafter.

See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRI-

ARCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antic’, Oxana (1988). “The Russian Orthodox Church

Abroad.” In Eastern Christianity and Politics in the

Twentieth Century, ed. Pedro Ramet. Durham, NC:

Duke University Press.

OBERT

L. N

ICHOLS

ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN

(1846–1912), metropolitan of St. Petersburg, mod-

erate church reformer.

Anthony began his career at the Kazan Theo-

logical Academy as a scholar and editor of the acad-

emy’s widely read journal Orthodox Interlocutor

(Pravoslavny sobesednik). His scholarly life ended

abruptly with the sudden illness and death of his

wife and two children. He became a monk, thereby

contributing to the notable revival in the 1880s of

the “learned monasticism” that had characterized

the church hierarchy in Russia before the Great Re-

forms of the 1860s.

Anthony soon became rector of the St. Peters-

burg Theological Academy and bishop of Vyborg,

vicar to the metropolitan of St. Petersburg. Some

of Anthony’s favorite students at the academy sub-

sequently became prominent churchmen: Sergei

Stragorodsky, the future leader of the Russian

church during the communist era, and Anthony

Khrapovitsky, Sergei’s rival and leader of the Russ-

ian church in exile after 1920. While promoting

monasticism, Anthony also sought to reform the

monasteries, particularly those whose economic

activities harmed the material welfare of the parish

clergy. The parish clergy, he felt, must be accorded

a more secure livelihood if they were to rescue the

church’s failing parishes. Anthony used his influ-

ence as bishop to advance these reforms. In 1892

Anthony became the archbishop of a newly created

Finnish diocese aimed at encouraging Russian pa-

triotic feeling and devotion to the Russian Orthodox

Church among the Finnish Orthodox population.

When the revolutionary disturbances in 1905

generated a new law on religious toleration, An-

thony, as ranking member of the Holy Synod, en-

tered the broader struggle for church reform. He

argued that the new law put the church at a dis-

advantage because other religious faiths were freed

from state interference in their internal affairs in a

way not permitted to Orthodoxy. These senti-

ments, transmitted to Nicholas II by Sergei Witte,

chairman of the Council of Ministers, decisively ad-

vanced the popular reform movement that culmi-

nated in an all-Russian council (sobor) of the church

and reestablishment of the patriarchate after the

fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. At the same

time, fearing that the church might be swept into

a political maelstrom, he warned against clerical

participation in the newly forming political parties

of post-1905 Russia. During these years, Anthony

courageously, if ultimately unsuccessfully, resisted

the harmful influence of Rasputin in church affairs,

and there is some evidence to suggest that he tried

to intervene personally with Nicholas II in order to

quell Rasputin’s potential influence on the Tsare-

vich Alexis. Following Anthony’s death in 1912,

Rasputin’s influence in the Holy Synod grew

rapidly.

See also: HOLY SYNOD; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH;

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cunningham, James W. (1981). A Vanquished Hope:

The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia,

1905–1906. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary

Press.

Curtiss, John S. (1965 [1940]). Church and State in Rus-

sia: The Last Years of Empire, 1900–1917. New York:

Octagon Books.

Meyendorff, Fr. John. (1978). “Russian Bishops and

Church Reform in 1905.” In Russian Orthodoxy un-

der the Old Regime, eds. Robert L. Nichols and Theo-

fanis G. Stavrou. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press.

OBERT

L. N

ICHOLS

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (usually referred

to as “the ABM Treaty”) was signed by U.S. pres-

ident Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid

Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972. It entered

into force on October 3, 1972. Under its terms, the

United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit

sharply both development and deployment of bal-

listic missile defenses in order to constrain the arms

race in strategic nuclear weapons and to enhance

the stability of the strategic balance. The ABM

Treaty was the principal achievement of the Strate-

gic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which also pro-

duced an Interim Agreement limiting strategic

offensive missiles, pending negotiation of a more

comprehensive treaty limiting such weapons. The

ABM Treaty was of indefinite duration, although

it could be amended by mutual agreement and ei-

ther party could withdraw at any time on six

months’ notice.

The ABM Treaty was the centerpiece of the

Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit of 1972, and the

SALT negotiation was seen as the icebreaker for a

broader political détente, as well as a stabilizing el-

ement in strategic arms control. Strategic arms

control and the ABM Treaty enjoyed wide support

for most of the next two decades. This was true

despite the prolonged and ultimately inconclusive

efforts to reach agreement on a SALT II treaty on

offensive arms.

By the time Ronald Reagan became president in

1981, American concerns over the strategic balance

had risen. In 1983 President Reagan announced

a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop strate-

gic antiballistic missile defense systems. Deploy-

ment, and even testing and development, of such a

system would have required radical revision or ab-

rogation of the ABM Treaty. In 1985 the Reagan

administration announced a unilateral revised in-

terpretation of the ABM Treaty loosening restric-

tions on testing new ABM technologies. This revised

“broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty was

highly controversial and was never applied to ac-

tual testing; in 1994 it was officially repudiated by

the Clinton administration. The SDI program

greatly increased expenditures on U.S. ballistic mis-

sile defense research and development, but it did not

lead to a deployable system.

In the 1990s and afterward, following the end

of the Cold War and agreed reductions in U.S. and

Soviet strategic offensive arms, the United States

renewed its pursuit of ballistic missile defense. On

December 15, 2001, President George W. Bush of-

ficially gave notice that the United States was with-

drawing from the ABM Treaty in six months.

Discussions had been held with the Russians on

possible amendments to the treaty, but the United

States decided that it wished an open slate for de-

velopment and deployment decisions and opted to

withdraw.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty thus had a

thirty-year life. The ABM Treaty alone had been

unable to restrain a buildup in strategic offensive

arms in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was less needed

in the post–Cold War world, although many in the

United States (and the Western allies, Russia, and

China) had urged its retention. In any event, the

ABM Treaty did contribute to greater certainty of

mutual nuclear deterrence for nearly two decades

of the Cold War, and even the fact of its success-

ful negotiation had borne witness to the ability of

the nuclear superpowers, even as adversaries, to

agree on such a measure to reduce the dangers of

the nuclear confrontation.

See also: ARMS CONTROL; COLD WAR; STRATEGIC ARMS

LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIA-

TIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). Détente and Confrontation:

American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan,

rev. edition. Washington, DC: The Brookings Insti-

tution.

Newhouse, John. (1973). Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.

New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Smith, Gerard. (1980). Double Talk: The Story of SALT I.

Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

AYMOND

L. G

ARTHOFF

ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany

and Japan on November 25, 1936, and joined by

Italy on November 6, 1937. Disguised as an effort

to combat the influence of the Communist Inter-

national (Comintern), the treaty was intended to

serve as a military alliance aimed at the Soviet

Union. In reality, the treaty did not result in any

coordinated German-Japanese military action, but

instead became the foundation for growing distrust

and betrayal between the two fascist allies them-

selves.

The text of the treaty was brief and to the point.

It asserted that the Communist International was

a threat to world peace and that the signatories

planned to “keep each other informed concerning

the activities” of the Comintern and cooperate in

their mutual defense, and invited other nations to

join their efforts. A Supplementary Protocol em-

powered Germany and Japan to “take stringent

measures against those who at home or abroad

work” for the Comintern, authorizing repressive

measures against members of the Communist

Party in Germany, Japan, or countries under their

influence. Finally, both promised not to sign a sep-

arate agreement with the Soviet Union without the

other being informed. Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji,

the Japanese ambassador to Germany, and Joachim

von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to London,

signed the treaty. It went into force immediately

and was valid for five years.

The Anti-Comintern Pact threatened the USSR

and seemed to be one more aspect of Germany’s

aggressive policy. Nevertheless, the German and

Japanese military staffs did not coordinate their ac-

tions, and each country pursued its own interests

irrespective of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In 1939, while the Soviet army was defeating

the Japanese military in Manchuria along the Mon-

golian border, Ribbentrop traveled to Moscow and

negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact,

leaving the Japanese out of these deliberations.

Japan could not trust Hitler. In 1941, again with-

out notice, Germany invaded the USSR. Japan de-

cided not to assist its ally in the Anti-Comintern

Pact and eventually attacked the United States in-

stead of the USSR.

See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; GERMANY, RELA-

TIONS WITH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD

WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Department of State. (1943). Foreign Relations of the

United States: Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. II.Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office.

Haslam, Jonathan. (1992). The Soviet Union and the Threat

from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Pre-

lude to the Pacific War. Pittsburgh, PA: University of

Pittsburgh Press.

AROLD

J. G

OLDBERG

ANTI-PARTY GROUP

The Anti-Party Group, so called by Nikita Khrush-

chev, whom it tried to oust from power in June

1957, was neither opposed to the Communist Party

nor really a group. Rather, it consisted of three of

Khrushchev’s main rivals in the party leadership,

Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar

Kaganovich, themselves hardly united except in

their wish to oust Khrushchev, plus a diverse set

of allies who supported them at the last minute:

titular head of state Klimenty Voroshilov; chair-

man of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin;

central economic administrators Mikhail Pervukhin

and Maxim Saburov; and Dmitry Shepilov,

Khrushchev’s protégé whom had he had recently

promoted to foreign minister.

When Josef Stalin died in March 1953, Malenkov

seemed the heir apparent, but Molotov also ap-

peared to be a contender for supreme power.

Khrushchev joined with both of them to bring

down secret police chief Lavrenty Beria, who was

arrested in June 1953 and executed in December.

Khrushchev turned next against Malenkov, who

was demoted from prime minister to minister of

electrification in February 1955, and then against

Molotov, who was soon dropped as foreign min-

ister. However, both Malenkov and Molotov were

allowed to remain full members of the Party Pre-

sidium, leaving them in position to seek revenge

against Khrushchev.

ANTI-PARTY GROUP

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

The logic of power in the Kremlin, in which

there was no formalized procedure for determining

leadership succession, largely accounted for this

struggle. So did certain policy differences: Molotov,

Kaganovich, and Voroshilov were particularly dis-

mayed by Khrushchev’s “secret speech” attacking

Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February

1956, as well as by the de-Stalinization process he

began in domestic and foreign policy. Malenkov

had seemed more open to reform during his stint

as prime minister, but although his and Khrush-

chev’s skills could have complemented each other,

personal animosity drove them apart. Despite

choosing Bulganin to replace Malenkov as prime

minister, Khrushchev disdained Bulganin. Per-

vukhin and Saburov felt threatened by Khrushchev’s

proposed reorganization of economic administra-

tion, which jeopardized their jobs. Shepilov proba-

bly betrayed his patron because he thought

Khrushchev was bound to lose.

Including seven full members of the Presidium,

the plotters constituted a majority. When they

moved against Khrushchev on June 18, 1957, they

counted on the Presidium’s practice of appointing

its own leader, leaving the Party Central Commit-

tee to rubber-stamp the result. Instead, however,

Khrushchev insisted that Central Committee itself,

in which his supporters dominated, decide the is-

sue. While Khrushchev and his enemies quarreled,

the KGB (Committee on State Security) and the mil-

itary ferried Central Committee members to

Moscow for a plenum that took place from June

22 to 28.

Khrushchev’s opponents had no chance once

the plenum began. Molotov, Malenkov, and

Kaganovich were subjected to a barrage of charges

about their complicity in Stalin’s terror, including

details about Stalinist crimes that were not fully

publicized until the late 1980s. Following the

plenum, Molotov was exiled to Outer Mongolia as

Soviet ambassador, Malenkov to northern Kazakh-

stan to direct a hydroelectric station, Kaganovich to

a potash works in Perm Province, and Shepilov to

head the Kyrgyz Institute of Economics. So as not

to reveal how many had opposed him, Khrushchev

delayed his punishment of the rest of the Anti-

Party Group: Bulganin remained prime minister

until 1958; Voroshilov was not deposed as head of

state until 1960. After the Twenty-second Party

Congress in October 1961, in which Khrushchev

intensified his all-out attack on Stalin and Stalin-

ism, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were ex-

pelled from the Communist Party.

See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; MALENKOV,

GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; MOLOTOV VYACHESLAV

MIKHAILOVICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Linden, Carl A. (1966). Khrushchev and the Soviet Leader-

ship. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Micunovic, Veljko. (1980). Moscow Diary, tr. David

Floyd. New York: Doubleday.

Resis, Albert, ed. (1993). Molotov Remembers: Inside Krem-

lin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev. Chicago:

I. R. Dee.

Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His

Era. New York: Norton.

ILLIAM

AUBMAN

ANTONOV UPRISING

The Antonov Uprising (1920–1921) was a large,

well-organized peasant revolt in the Tambov

province of Central Russia. Part of the Green Move-

ment, the uprising threatened Communist power

in 1921 and was a major reason for the abandon-

ment of War Communism.

Alexander Antonov (1889–1922) was a So-

cialist Revolutionary (SR) whom the February Rev-

olution rescued from a long prison sentence for

robbing railroad station ticket offices. He returned

to Tambov province in 1917 to become a district

police official under the Provisional Government.

He left this post in April 1918 and went under-

ground, organizing an armed guerrilla group to re-

sist the new Communist government.

Increasingly severe food-procurement and con-

scription policies, along with a drought, pushed

Tambov peasants into a spontaneous rebellion

against the Communist government in August

1920. Seizing the opportunity, Antonov put him-

self at the head of the rebellion. He organized a ter-

ritorially-based army divided into regiments, which

he recruited from the many local World War I and

civil war veterans. Local socialists created a strong

network of local committees (STK—soiuz trudovogo

krestian’stva, Union of the Working Peasantry) that

created an alternative, noncommunist government

in the province. While they fought the Communist

government, they did have wider plans. Their pro-

gram (which survives in various versions) called

for an end to civil war, the convening of a freely

ANTONOV UPRISING

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

elected Constituent Assembly, land to the peasants,

and workers’ control of industry.

Initial attempts to suppress this rebellion were

failures. The few troops in the province were un-

reliable, and often went over to the insurgents. By

spring 1921 the insurgents controlled much of

the countryside, had halted grain procurement,

and threatened rail communications through the

province. The central government responded with

reforms and repression. Forced grain procurement

and conscription were curtailed, removing the

greatest irritants to the peasantry. The end of the

Polish-Russian war enabled the Communist gov-

ernment to move fifty thousand troops to the

province, including crack cavalry brigades, auto-

mobile detachments, airplanes, and artillery. By the

end of July 1921 the insurgency was crushed. Its

regiments were run to ground and annihilated by

the larger, better-armed Red Army forces. The

Cheka rooted out the STKs and shot or exiled thou-

sands of insurgents. Antonov himself remained at

large for another year, but died in a Cheka ambush

on June 24, 1922.

See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; GREEN MOVEMENT;

SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; WAR COMMUNISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DuGarm, A. Delano. (1997). “Peasant Wars in Tambov

Province.” In The Bolsheviks in Russian Society, ed.

Vladimir Brovkin. New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press.

Radkey, Oliver. (1976). The Unknown Civil War in Soviet

Russia. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

A. D

ELANO

ARM

APPANAGE ERA

Most historians since the nineteenth century—

Russian, Soviet, and Western—have used the

phrase “appanage era” to designate the period be-

tween the collapse of Kievan Russia and the emer-

gence of a centralized Russian state. It is dated from

the Mongol conquest of Kievan Russia between

1237 and 1240 to either the accession of Ivan III

(1462) or Basil III (1505), or to the beginning of

the reign of Ivan IV (1533). It was characterized

by the emergence of a multiplicity of independent

principalities (udeli or appanages). Princes treated

appanage holdings as private property, conveying

them to their heirs by wills that divided the lands

between all their sons. This practice meant that

holdings were increasingly fragmented in each gen-

eration. As the principalities were weakened, inter-

nal conflict escalated and external attacks came not

only from the Mongols, but also from Lithuani-

ans, Germans, Poles, and Swedes. This tumultuous

situation ended only as Moscow fashioned an au-

tocracy capable of “gathering the Russian lands.”

In the later twentieth century, a new interpre-

tation of the age emerged. New, broadly based

archeological evidence refuted the traditional view

that Kiev itself was in economic decline from the

mid-twelfth century, and suggested instead a gen-

eral economic expansion. The new interpretation

proposes that the eleven or twelve appanages that

developed between 1150 and 1240 represented a ra-

tional division of labor and delegation of authority

within the Rurikid dynasty, and that they were

designed to respond to economic and political ex-

pansion. It maintains that the principalities should

be understood as components of a dynastic realm,

not as private property. As proof, it offers detailed

evidence to argue that the frequent wars of the late

twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were fought

to defend the principle of lateral succession devel-

oped in the Kievan period. It argues at length that

this principle continued to underlie succession de-

cisions and legitimacy issues to one degree or an-

other during much of the Mongol period, and

remained important as late as the civil wars of the

second quarter of the fifteenth century. The inter-

pretation also set a new initial date for the era—

the mid 1100s—which has become increasingly

accepted by scholars in the field, and a number of

new publications since the late 1980s minimize the

use of the term “appanage era,” but most still re-

tain much of the traditional interpretation associ-

ated with it.

See also: KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT;

RURIKID DYNASTY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cam-

bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, David B. (1986). “The Kievan Principality on the

Eve of the Mongol Invasion: An Inquiry into Cur-

rent Historical Research and Interpretation.” Harvard

Ukrainian Studies 10:215–240.

Pipes, Richard. (1974). Russia Under the Old Regime. New

York: Scribners.

LVIRA

M. W

ILBUR

APPANAGE ERA

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

APPARAT

An informal term used to describe a part or the

whole of a bureaucratic structure, such as the

Communist Party.

The literal translation of apparat is apparatus.

The Bolsheviks began as an underground move-

ment, and, to survive, the party machine demanded

solidarity and discipline. Members were known as

apparatchiki, that is, men of the apparat, or as

komitechiki, members of the underground commit-

tees. As time passed, the term came to refer to any

part, or the whole, of the Soviet bureaucratic sys-

tem. It was frequently used in later years as a term

of denigration and contempt, as was the term ap-

paratchik.

See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fainsod, Merle.(1961). How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.

AMES

R. M

ILLAR

APRIL THESES

Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s “April Theses” was one of the

most influential and important documents of the

Russian Revolution and Bolshevik history. The

main ideas of Lenin’s April Theses were first deliv-

ered in speeches immediately after his arrival in Pet-

rograd on April 16, 1917, and then formalized in

a newspaper article (“The Tasks of the Proletariat

in the Present Revolution”) in the Bolshevik news-

paper Pravda on April 20. The Theses refused any

support for the Provisional Government, attacked

the Petrograd soviet (council) leadership’s policy of

cooperation with the Provisional Government, and

declared that the soviets should be the basis for a

new, revolutionary government. This latter posi-

tion soon aligned the Bolsheviks with popular sen-

timent, which by summer was demanding “all

power to the soviets,” that is, a government based

on the soviets. The Theses also called for immedi-

ate radical social and economic reforms and for

transforming the international war into civil war.

Although Lenin’s theses were too radical for the

optimistic and cooperative mood of April, they po-

sitioned the Bolsheviks to benefit from the discon-

tentment and disillusionment that summer and fall

as the Provisional Government failed to solve the

war, economic, and other issues. Lenin’s April The-

ses also called for a Bolshevik party congress to re-

vise the party program and to change the party

name to communist. Lenin’s ideas initially shocked

most Bolsheviks as much as other political leaders,

but Lenin soon brought the Bolshevik Party to ac-

cept them. The Theses, especially those calling for

immediate passage into the next stage of revolu-

tion and a soviet-based government, significantly

redefined Bolshevism.

See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH;

OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT;

SOVIET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Harding, Neil. (1981). Lenin’s Political Thought: Theory

and Practice in the Democratic Revolution. 2 vols. New

York: St. Martin’s Press.

Harding, Neil. (1996). Leninism. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-

versity Press.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. (1964). “The Tasks of the Prole-

tariat in the Present Revolution.” In Collected Works,

vol. 24. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Service, Robert. (1985–1994). Lenin: A Political Life. 3

vols. London: Macmillan.

A. W

ADE

ARCHITECTURE

The architecture of medieval Rus, initially influ-

enced by Byzantine architecture, developed a dis-

tinct set of styles between the eleventh and

fourteenth centuries. As Moscow established its

dominance and as contacts with western European

culture increased in the late fifteenth century, Russ-

ian motifs began to blend with Western ones. By

the eighteenth century the design of Russia’s pub-

lic buildings followed Western styles. Rapid social

change at the turn of the twentieth century and

the establishment of Soviet power after 1917 gen-

erated new bursts of architectural experimentation.

MEDIEVAL AND MUSCOVITE

ARCHITECTURE (C. 1000–1700)

Little is known of pre-Christian architecture among

the eastern Slavs, but with the acceptance of Chris-

tianity by Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev in 988,

the construction of masonry churches spread

throughout Rus. The largest and most complex of

APPARAT

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

these early churches was Kiev’s Cathedral of Divine

Wisdom (1037–1050s), commissioned by Prince

Yaroslav the Wise and built with the direction of

Greek masters. The interior contained extensive

mosaics as well as frescoes. Other major churches

of this period include the Sophia Cathedral in Nov-

gorod (1045–1052), the Cathedral of the Transfig-

uration of the Savior in Chernigov (1031–1050s),

and the Cathedral of the Dormition at the Kiev Cave

Monastery (1073–1078; destroyed in 1941).

Regardless of size, the churches adhered to a plan

known as the “inscribed cross”: a cuboid structure

with a dome marking the intersection of the main

aisles. The dome was elevated on a cylinder sup-

ported by the four main piers. The facades usually

culminated in curved gables known as zakomary.

In addition to Kiev, Novgorod, and neighbor-

ing cities, the third center of architecture in pre-

Mongol Rus was the Vladimir-Suzdal principality,

whose limestone churches were distinguished by

carved decoration and precision of design. Grand

Prince Yury Dolgoruky commissioned the first of

these churches, such as the Transfiguration in

Pereslavl-Zalessky (1152–1157). His son Andrei

Bogolyubsky began the great era of limestone

building in this area with the Cathedral of the Dor-

mition in Vladimir (1158–1160); his palace church

at Bogolyubovo (1158–1165) of which only frag-

ments remain; and the Church of the Intercession

on the Nerl (1165). His successor, Vsevolod III, en-

larged the Dormition Cathedral (1185–1189) and

built the Cathedral of St. Dmitry in Vladimir

(1194–1197), whose upper tier is covered with

elaborate carving representing Biblical and secular

motifs.

After the Mongol invasion of 1237–1241,

church construction sharply declined; but by the

middle of the fourteenth century, masonry con-

struction revived, particularly in Novgorod, with

the support of wealthy merchants and neighbor-

hood craft guilds. The Church of St. Theodore

Stratilates on the Brook (1360–1361) and the

Church of Transfiguration on Elijah Street (1374;

frescoes by Theophanes the Greek) exemplified a

distinct local style with steeply pitched roofs.

Moscow also enjoyed an architectural revival in the

construction of limestone churches, but not until

the last quarter of the fifteenth century did the ma-

jor churches of the Kremlin take shape under the

direction of Italian masters imported by Ivan III.

During the sixteenth century, Moscow’s brick

churches displayed boldly inventive designs, also

with Italian influence. The culmination of this

period occurs in the most famous of Russian

churches, the Intercession on the Moat, popularly

known as Basil the Blessed (1555–1561). Built on

what later became known as Red Square, in cele-

bration of Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan and As-

trakhan, the structure consists of a central tent

tower surrounded by eight tower churches. The

latter part of the sixteenth century also witnessed

the building of major brick fortresses, most notably

the citadel at Smolensk (1595–1602) by Fyodor

Kon. With the restoration of order after the Time

of Troubles (1605–1612), the building of brick

churches occurred on an unprecedented scale, es-

pecially during the reign of Alexei (1645–1676).

THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (C. 1700–1917)

The assimilation of Western architectural styles,

which had begun in the late seventeenth century,

increased radically during the reign of Peter I

(1682–1725). In 1703 Peter founded St. Petersburg,

which became the Russian capital in 1711. West-

ern European architects Jean Baptiste Le Blond

(1679–1719) and Domenico Trezzini (1670–1734)

submitted plans for its development. At this stage

Petersburg’s architecture owed much to the north-

ern European baroque, particularly in Sweden and

Holland. The stuccoed brick walls of the city’s

baroque buildings were painted, with white trim

for window surrounds and other details. Bar-

tolomeo Francesco Rastrelli (1700–1771) defined

the high baroque style during the reigns of Anna

(1730–1740) and Elizabeth (1741–1762). Among

his major projects are the Stroganov Palace

(1752–1754), the final version of the Winter Palace

(1754–1764), and the Smolny Convent with its

Resurrection Cathedral (1748–1764). In addition

Rastrelli greatly enlarged the existing imperial

palaces at Peterhof (1746–1752) and Tsarskoye Selo

(1748–1756).

During the reign of Catherine the Great

(1762–1796), imperial architecture moved from

the baroque to neoclassicism. With the support of

Catherine, a constellation of architects endowed the

city during the second half of the eighteenth cen-

tury with a grandeur inspired by classical Rome.

Charles Cameron (ca.1740–1812), the leading pro-

ponent of neoclassicism, designed the palace at the

imperial estate of Pavlovsk (1780–1796), a gift

from Catherine to her son Grand Duke Paul. An-

drei Voronikhin (1759–1814) created a still more

obvious example of the Roman influence in his

Cathedral of the Kazan Mother of God (1801–1811),

ARCHITECTURE

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

with its sweeping colonnade reminiscent of the

Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome.

The reign of Alexander I (1801–1825) wit-

nessed a new campaign to create an interconnect-

ing system of architectural ensembles and public

space throughout the center of Petersburg. The re-

building of the Admiralty (1806–1823) by An-

dreyan Zakharov (1761–1811) reaffirmed that

structure and its spire as dominant elements in the

city plan. The culmination of the imperial design

fell to Carlo Rossi (1776–1849), who created four

major ensembles, including the General Staff Build-

ing and Arch (1819–1829), facing Palace Square.

Neoclassicism in Moscow appeared primarily in

houses and other institutions built by the nobility

and wealthy merchants. Of particular note are

mansions and churches designed by Matvei Kaza-

kov (1738–1812).

During the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855),

classical unity in Petersburg yielded to eclectic

styles and innovations in construction engineering,

both of which are evident in the final version

of St. Isaac’s Cathedral (1818–1858) by Auguste

Montferrand (1786–1858). Of special significance

was the Russo-Byzantine style, supported by

Nicholas I and implemented by Constantine Thon

(1794–1881), builder of the Great Kremlin Palace

(1838–1849). The major work in this style was

Ton’s Church of Christ the Redeemer (1837–1883;

destroyed in 1931 and rebuilt in the 1990s), cre-

ated as a memorial to Russian valor in the 1812

war.

By the 1870s there arose a new national style

based on decorative elements from sixteenth- and

seventeenth-century Muscovy as well as on motifs

from folk art and traditional wooden architecture.

Major examples of the Russian style in Moscow in-

clude the Historical Museum (1874–1883), built on

the north side of Red Square to a design by Vladimir

Shervud (1833–1897); the Moscow City Duma

(1890–1892) by Dmitry Chichagov (1835–1894);

and the Upper Trading Rows (1889–1893) by

Alexander Pomerantsev (1848–1918), assisted by

the construction engineer Vladimir Shukhov

(1853–1939). In Petersburg the Russian style was

used by Alfred Parland (1845–1892) for the Church

of the Resurrection of the Savior “on the Blood”

(1883–1907).

The “new style,” or style moderne, that arose in

Russian architecture at the turn of the century em-

phasized the innovative use of materials such as

glass, iron, and glazed brick in functional yet

highly aesthetic designs. The style flourished in

Moscow primarily, where its leading practitioner

was Fyodor Shekhtel (1859–1926), architect for

patrons among Moscow’s entrepreneurial elite,

such as the Ryabushinskys. In Petersburg the style

moderne appeared primarily in the design of apart-

ment buildings. In contrast to their American con-

temporaries, Russian architects did not design large

buildings with steel frames, but became experts at

the use of reinforced concrete construction.

SOVIET ARCHITECTURE (1917–1991)

The economic chaos engendered in Russia by World

War I proved catastrophic for building activity, and

the ensuing revolution and civil war brought ar-

chitecture to a standstill. With the recovery of the

economy in the 1920s, bold new designs—often

utopian in concept—brought Russia to the atten-

tion of modern architects throughout the world.

Constructivism, the most productive modernist

movement, included architects such as Moysei

Ginzburg (1892–1946), Ilya Golosov (1883–1945),

Grigory Barkhin (1880–1969), and the Vesnin

brothers: Leonid (1880–1933), Viktor (1882–1950),

and Alexander (1883–1959). Their designs, pri-

marily in Moscow, set a standard for functional

design in administrative and apartment buildings,

as well as social institutions such as workers’ clubs.

Another modernist active during the same period,

but not a part of Constructivism, was Konstantin

Stepanovich Melnikov (1890–1974), known for his

bold designs for exposition pavilions and workers’

clubs.

During the 1930s more conservative trends as-

serted themselves, as designs inspired by classical,

Renaissance, and historical models received the

party’s approval. After World War II architectural

design became still more firmly locked in tradi-

tional, often highly ornate eclectic styles, epito-

mized by the postwar skyscrapers in Moscow and

other Soviet cities. After 1953 pressing social needs,

particularly in housing, led to a return to func-

tionalism, heavily dependent on standardized de-

signs and prefabricated components. With the

demise of the communist system in Russia, the re-

vival of private practice in architecture seems likely

to change the face of the profession, even as new

problems arise in zoning and resource allocation.

WOODEN ARCHITECTURE

Throughout Russian history wood has been used

for almost every type of construction, from churches

and fortress walls to peasant dwellings and grand

ARCHITECTURE

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY