The so-called Thaw begun under Nikita Khrush-
chev (1953–1964) benefited Armenia. Anastas
Mikoyan came to Armenia to rehabilitate a number
of Armenian authors and to signal the end of the
Stalin era. After 1956, therefore, Armenians built
new cadre of national leaders and were empowered
to run their local ministries. For the next thirty-five
years, Armenia was ruled by only four heads of
state. Armenian industrial output surpassed that of
Georgia and Azerbaijan. Seventy percent of Armeni-
ans lived in urban centers, and more than 80 per-
cent had a secondary education or higher, making
them one of the best educated groups in the USSR,
along with the Jews and ethnic Russians.
Armenians vastly outnumbered all other eth-
nic groups living in their republic, comprising 98
percent of the population. Ironically, however, Ar-
menians also had the largest numbers living out-
side their republic. More than 1.5 million lived in
the other Soviet republics, and more than 2.5 mil-
lion had participated in the diaspora. After the Jews,
Armenians were the most dispersed people in the
USSR. A million lived in Georgia and Azerbaijan
alone.
The two decades of the Leonid Brezhnev era were
years of benign neglect that enabled the Armenian
elite to become more independent and nationalistic
in character. Removed from the governing elite, Ar-
menian dissident factions emerged to demand ma-
jor changes. They even managed to remove the
Armenian Communist chief, Anton Kochinian, on
charges of corruption, and replaced him with a new
leader, Karen Demirjian. Ironically, much of the dis-
sent was not directed against the Russians, but
against the Turks and the Azeris. Russia was viewed
as a traditional friend, the one power that could re-
dress the wrongs of the past and reinstate Arme-
nia’s lost lands. Since Armenian nationalism did not
threaten the USSR, the Armenians were permitted,
within reason, to flourish. The fiftieth anniversary
of the Armenian genocide (1965) was commemo-
rated in Armenia and a monument to the victims
was erected. The status of Karabakh was openly dis-
cussed. Armenian protests shelved the idea, proposed
during the 1978 revision of the Constitution of the
USSR, of making Russian the official language of all
republics.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika
had a major impact on Armenia. Russia anticipated
problems in the Ukraine and the Baltic states, but
no one predicted the great eruption of Armenian
nationalism, primarily over Karabakh. On Febru-
ary 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet passed a reso-
lution for the transference of Karabakh to Arme-
nia. Gigantic peaceful demonstrations followed in
Yerevan. The Azeris reacted by carrying out
pogroms against the Armenians in Azerbaijan. Gor-
bachev’s inaction soured Russo-Armenian rela-
tions, and dissident leaders, known as the Karabakh
Committee, gained credibility with the public.
In May 1988, Demirjian was replaced by Suren
Harutiunian, who promised to take the Karabakh
issue to the Supreme Soviet. Moscow rejected the
transfer, and a crackdown began in Karabakh and
Yerevan. The terrible earthquake of December 7,
1988, Moscow’s inept handling of the crisis, and
Azeri attacks upon Karabakh resulted in something
extraordinary. Armenians, the most pro-Russian of
all ethnic groups, demanded independence. Haru-
tiunian resigned, and after declaring its intent to
separate from the USSR, the Armenian National
Movement, under the leadership of Levon Ter-
Petrossian, a member of the Karabakh Committee,
assumed power in Armenia. On September 21,
1991, the Armenian parliament unanimously de-
clared a sovereign state outside the Soviet Union
and two days later, on September 23, Armenia de-
clared its independence.
INDEPENDENT, POST-SOVIET ARMENIA
On October 16, 1991, barely a month after inde-
pendence, Armenians went to the polls. Levon Ter-
Petrossian, representing the Armenian National
Movement (ANM), won 83 percent of the vote. Nei-
ther the Dashnaks nor the Communists could ac-
cept their defeat and, ironically, they found common
cause against Levon Ter-Petrossian’s government.
Receiving a clear mandate did not mean that
the government of Levon Ter-Petrossian would be
free from internal or external pressures. The ma-
jor internal problem was the virtual blockade of Ar-
menia by Azerbaijan, exacerbated by the plight of
the hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees
from Azerbaijan and the earthquake zone. Other
domestic issues involved the implementation of
free-market reforms, the establishment of democ-
ratic governmental structures, and the privatiza-
tion of land. The external concerns involved future
relations with Russia, Turkey, Georgia, and Iran.
The immediate concern, however, was the conflict
with Azerbaijan over mountainous Karabakh and
the political uncertainties in Georgia, which con-
tained 400,000 Armenians.
Ter-Petrossian attempted to assure Turkey that
Armenia had no territorial claims against it and
ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS
81
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY