Encyclopedia of Russian History

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Petrone, Karen. (2000). Life Has Become More Joyous Com-

rades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press.

Unger, Aryeh L. (1981). Constitutional Developments in

the U.S.S.R.: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions. Lon-

don: Methuen.

Wimberg, Ellen. (1992). “Socialism, Democratism, and

Criticism: The Soviet Press and the National Discus-

sion of the 1936 Draft Constitution.” Soviet Studies

44(2):313- 332.

AREN

ETRONE

CONSTITUTION OF 1977

The 1977 USSR Constitution was a curious mix-

ture of fact and fiction. It gave a correct descrip-

tion of the formal government structure of the

USSR and correctly noted in Article Six: “The guid-

ing and directing force of Soviet society, the nu-

cleus of its political system, state, and societal

organizations is the Communist Party of the So-

viet Union.” At the same time, it contained a purely

illusory set of promises of basic human rights and

the fundamentally false statement that the Com-

munist Party “exists for the people and serves

the people.” This “Brezhnev” Constitution, adopted

when Leonid Brezhnev was General Secretary of the

Communist Party, replaced the 1936 “Stalin” Con-

stitution. It did not bring any significant immedi-

ate changes in the Soviet system. However, under

Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, radical changes

began to occur in the USSR, and the 1977 Consti-

tution was amended to advance these changes. As

the USSR disintegrated in 1990 and 1991, the con-

stitution lost its practical importance. On Decem-

ber 25, 1991, the USSR was formally dissolved,

thus ending the story of the 1977 Constitution.

The opening chapter of the constitution was de-

voted to the political system. It accurately affirmed

the superiority of the Communist Party. But it in-

correctly stated that “all bodies of state power are

elective from the lowest to the highest.” In fact, all

important positions were filled by orders from the

Communist Party. And it misled when it said that

the Soviet state protects “the rights and freedoms of

citizens.” The next chapter gave a generally accurate

description of the economic system based on state

ownership and state planning. The following chap-

ter on social development and culture correctly noted

the state’s role in providing public health and edu-

cation services. However, it failed to note that the

economic system provided for extraordinary privi-

leges for members of the Communist Party elite. The

chapter misinformed when it said, “the development

of professional art and of the artistic creativeness of

the people is encouraged in every way,” since in fact

only creative works that met the narrow tastes of

the party leadership were encouraged.

The chapter on basic rights pointed out eco-

nomic rights that were to a large extent imple-

mented and civil rights that existed only on paper.

The economic rights included rights to full em-

ployment, education, medical care, housing, and

pensions. The political rights included a right to vote

that was in fact meaningless because the Commu-

nist Party allowed only one candidate for each po-

sition, and a right to free speech that was mocked

in practice by the sending of dissidents to labor

camps and psychiatric institutions. The remaining

chapters provided a relatively accurate description

of the formal governmental structures of the USSR,

though, of course, these structures were all subject

to the leading role of the Communist Party as stated

in Article Six of the Constitution. Even these chap-

ters contained gross omissions and outright un-

truths. The provisions on elections did not mention

that the party only allowed one candidate to run

for each position. The provisions on the Supreme

Soviet did not mention that it was controlled so as

always to rubber–stamp unanimously anything

that had party approval. The provisions on the

courts did not mention that judges were expected

to obey telephoned instructions from party officials.

Mikhail Gorbachev engineered major amend-

ments in 1988, 1989, and 1990, which reflected

and hastened the decline of Communist Party dic-

tatorship. The 1988 amendments provided for rel-

atively free elections to a newly created Congress

of People’s Deputies, though the election con-

stituencies were structured to favor the Commu-

nist Party. Further amendments in 1989 and 1990

abolished the special Constitutional position of the

Communist Party, legalized competing political

parties, restructured the electoral system to be fully

democratic, and created the post of president.

Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen president by the So-

viet parliament. A constitutional amendment pro-

vided that future presidents should be chosen by

popular election, but the Soviet Union dissolved be-

fore such an election could be held. Also during the

period 1988-1990, under Gorbachev’s leadership,

restrictions on private businesses were swiftly abol-

ished. The constitution was amended to legalize

CONSTITUTION OF 1977

323

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

private business. In the area of civil rights and hu-

man rights, Gorbachev greatly liberalized the Soviet

system. An amendment to the constitution created

a Committee on Constitutional Review empowered

to examine legislation for conformity to the con-

stitution. During its brief existence, the committee

found unconstitutional a number of the worst fea-

tures of the Soviet system, such as secret legislation

and restrictions on freedom of movement.

See also: ARTICLE 6 OF 1977 CONSTITUTION; BREZHNEV,

LEONID ILICH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldieh, Robert B. (1997). Russia’s Constitutional Revolu-

tion: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democ-

racy, 1995-1996. University Park: Pennsylvania

State University Press.

Butler, William E. (1988). Soviet Law, 2nd ed. London:

Butterworths.

Feldbrugge, F.J.M., ed. (1979). The Constitutions of the

USSR and the Union Republics. Alphen aan den Rijn,

Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.

Scurlock, John. (1980). “Constitutionalism Soviet Style.”

University of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review

48:167-215.

Unger, Arryeh L. (1981). Constititutional Development in

the U.S.S.R. London: Methuen.

Yakovlev, Alexandre, and Gibson, Dale. (1992). The Bear

That Wouldn’t Dance: Failed Attempts to Reform the

Constitution of the Former Soviet Union. Winnepeg: Le-

gal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba.

ETER

B. M

AGGS

CONSTITUTION OF 1993

The Constitution of the Russian Federation was en-

acted on December 12, 1993 by a public plebiscite.

With the breakup of the USSR in late 1991, Rus-

sia needed a new constitution to enshrine the de-

mocratic values of post-communist Russian society

and to establish the legal foundations for its gov-

erning institutions.

The Constitution was the product of a three-

year struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and

his parliament. Throughout the period 1991 through

1993, various draft constitutions circulated. Some

allocated the majority of power to a new parlia-

ment, while others favored a strong presidential

system. Sharp differences also erupted between

proponents of a strong central government, versus

those who favored the devolution of power to the

constituent republics and regions. Finally, the

process by which a new constitution would be ap-

proved was not clear; some favored the convening

of a constitutional congress, while others favored

a referendum. The inability to resolve these issues

resulted in a stalemate that led to Yeltsin’s disso-

lution of the parliament and attack on the White

House (Russia’s parliament building) in October

1993.

Once ratified in December 1993, the Constitu-

tion established a strong presidential republic; some

describe it as a superpresidential system. The Con-

gress of People’s Deputies was replaced with a

bicameral (two-chamber) Federal Assembly. The

upper chamber, the Federation Council, has 178

members—two from each of the eighty-nine re-

publics and regions that comprise the Russian

Federation. The Federation Council confirms ap-

pointments to the Supreme Court and the Consti-

tutional Court, authorizes the use of armed forces

outside Russia, and considers legislation coming

from the lower chamber on the budget, taxes and

currency matters, international treaties, and do-

mestic policies.

The lower chamber, the State Duma, is com-

prised of 450 deputies, one half elected by a plu-

rality in each constituency and the other half from

party lists on a proportional basis. The Duma con-

firms nominations for Prime Minister; can pass a

bill of “lack of confidence” in the government and,

if such a bill is passed twice in a three-month pe-

riod, can force the president to announce the res-

ignation of the government or dissolve the Duma

itself. It also confirms and dismisses the chairman

of the Central Bank, Accounting Chamber, and

Commissioner on Human Rights; declares amnesties;

and adopts federal legislation.

The President, elected to a maximum of two

four-year terms, appoints the Prime Minister, sub-

ject to consent of the Duma. The President also

names other members of the government, as well

as the chair of the Central Bank, judges of the

Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, and the

Procurator-General. The President has primary re-

sponsibility for foreign and defense policy and

chairs the Security Council.

The President may dismiss the government

without consultation or consent of the Duma. The

President can call for a national referendum and can

issue decrees that are binding, so long as they are

not in conflict with federal law or the constitution.

The President can veto legislation, which requires

CONSTITUTION OF 1993

324

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

a two-third vote of both houses to be overridden.

Under certain circumstances, the President also has

the power to dissolve the parliament and force new

elections.

The 1993 Constitution establishes federal su-

premacy over “the subjects” of the Russian Feder-

ation. The President has the power to suspend acts

of executive officials in the regions and republics.

Although Article 72 mentions broad policy areas

that are considered “joint federal-regional jurisdic-

tion,” it is the President who mediates disputes

between federal and regional governments. No

powers or policy matters are designated as exclu-

sively the domain of the subjects of the federation.

Despite its flaws, the Constitution of the Russian

Federation gained widespread acceptance and pro-

vided much needed stability as the country endured

wrenching political, economic, and social changes

in the decade 1994–2003.

See also: FEDERAL ASSEMBLY; REFERENDUM OF DECEMBER

1993

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahdieh, Robert. (1997). Russia’s Constitutional Revolution.

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Sharlet, Robert. (1999). “Constitutional Implementation

and State-Building: Progress and Problems of Law

Reform in Russia.” In State-Building in Russia: The

Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, ed. Gor-

don B. Smith. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Smith, Gordon B. (1996). Reforming the Russian Legal Sys-

tem. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

ORDON

B. S

MITH

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Influenced by cubism and futurism, constructivism

had its roots in the abstract geometric construc-

tions of Vladimir Tatlin. In 1920 the sculptors An-

toine Pevsner and Naum Gabo joined Tatlin in the

publication of the Realist Manifesto, from which

the name constructivism was derived. Like the Fu-

turists, they admired the machine and technology,

functionalism, and modern industrial materials.

Within architecture the constructivists stressed that

form should be determined in the process of con-

struction by the utilitarian aim of the building and

the natural characteristics of the building materi-

als. They grouped around the “Union of Contem-

porary Architects” (OSA) led by the Vesnin brothers

(Alexander, Viktor, and Leonid) and Moisei Ginzburg

and its journal Sovremennaya arkhitektura (Contem-

porary Architecture). They argued that the con-

struction of a new environment was not simply a

matter of art or technology but entailed rebuilding

culture from the bottom up. History had entered

into a new creative cycle, and in that period of

youth, utilitarian and constructive aspects of style

were of paramount importance, and aesthetic sim-

plicity and organizational logic must determine the

new style.

This in no way signaled the demise of aesthetic

emotion, rather its transformation under the in-

fluence of modern economics, technology, and the

machine. Ginzburg developed what became known

as the Functional Method, whereby the functional

requirements of a structure, such as the “diagram

of movement,” within the building and the siting

of individual living units within a structure, were

given priority in spatial composition. To achieve

the desired goal, adherents used the pavilion

method, which divided a complex into blocks ac-

cording to their intended use and linked these units

by walkways or bridges to satisfy the entire en-

semble’s ultimate social function as a work of art.

Ginzburg put his theory to best use in a housing

complex designed and built between 1928 and 1930

for Narkomfin (the People’s Commissariat of Fi-

nance) on Novinsky Boulevard, now House 25,

Tchaikovsky Street.

See also: CULTURAL REVOLUTION; FUTURISM.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hudson, Hugh D., Jr. (1994). Blueprints and Blood: The

Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lodder, Christina. (1983). Russian Constructivism. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

UGH

D. H

UDSON

CONTROL FIGURES

Kontrol’nyi tsyfri, or control figures, were originally

the preliminary plan targets prepared by the State

Planning Commission (Gosplan, established 1921)

in 1925–1926. Soon thereafter these targets were

coordinated with the mandatory annual plans of

the Supreme Council of the National Economy

CONTROL FIGURES

325

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

(VSNKh) and with the associated material balances,

which theoretically provided the necessary inputs

to produce the obligatory outputs. From early on

and throughout the Soviet period, the control fig-

ures were approved by the Politburo of the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union, usually in the

summer prior to the plan year. (From 1957 to 1964

regional economic councils also had some role in

plan formulation.) Prospective plans were usually

expressed in percentage increases from the previ-

ously achieved level and published in the main

newspapers as ranges for the current five-year

and yearly plans. Often these priority targets for

around a dozen important commodities were ex-

pressed in physical units, such as tons or number

of vehicles, but where that was not reasonable, the

target was in value terms. Supposedly, the annual

control figures were coordinated with the five-year

plan then in effect and other directives of the Party

and Council of Ministers.

During the five-year plan era the control fig-

ures were elaborated by ministries and chief ad-

ministrations (glavki) for approximately two

hundred to three hundred product groups and dis-

aggregated into still more groups and passed down

to the ministries (commissariats) and from there to

the enterprises. Simultaneously the superior agen-

cies would estimate the correct data to achieve these

targets, often by applying established input-output

norms to the targets.The subordinate enterprises

would then request necessary supplies of labor,

capital, and intermediate inputs such as energy,

ores, and parts. Their requests, routinely exagger-

ated, would be pared down at the glavk, ministry,

or Gosplan levels according to the authorities’ best

estimates of necessary minima. Some bargaining

would occur at this stage, too. Finally, early in the

fall, Gosplan would endeavor to form a feasible na-

tional plan close to the original control figures. The

eventual directive plan could have as many as sixty

thousand separate headings. Usually, the sheer

complexity of the task, unavoidable delays, and in-

sufficient information meant that the legally bind-

ing enterprise plan (techpromfinplan) was neither

consistent nor optimal from the planners’ point of

view, not to mention the needs of the population

at large.

See also: FIVE-YEAR PLANS; GOSPLAN; TECHPROMFINPLAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergson, Abram. (1964). The Economics of Soviet Planning.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (1998). Russian

and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 6th ed.

Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

ARTIN

C. S

PECHLER

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN

EUROPE TREATY

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, after

less than two years of negotiation, by the mem-

bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization

(WTO). Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gor-

bachev’s announcement to the United Nations in

December 1988 of unilateral Soviet force reductions

had presented a challenge to NATO. Negotiations

on conventional forces thus began in Vienna in

March, 1989.

The Soviet leadership sought to reduce the

threat of new western weapons and operational

concepts, to create a “breathing space” for internal

economic and social restructuring, and to divert

manpower and resources to the country’s econ-

omy. Both superpowers wanted to eliminate capa-

bilities for initiating surprise attacks and large-scale

offensive actions. The treaty mandated the reduc-

tion to equal levels of NATO and WTO forces from

the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains across five

categories of weapons: armored combat vehicles

(ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft, combat heli-

copters and tanks. The WTO nations were expected

to make the largest cuts, given their numerical su-

periority. The treaty also provided for an advanced

verification regime, including intrusive on-site ver-

ification and data exchanges.

The collapse of the USSR and Warsaw Pact in

the period 1990–1991 presented problems, how-

ever. East European members of the WTO were uni-

laterally demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces

from their soil. Western critics argued that by fo-

cusing on bloc-to-bloc negotiations at a time like

this, NATO was constraining itself unnecessarily.

The USSR seemed hesitant to complete the CFE

agreement, since the WTO hardly constituted a

credible bloc. Meanwhile, the Soviet successor states

were loath to see their future military forces con-

strained by a treaty signed by the former regime.

Nevertheless, by January 1992, all agreed to rat-

ify the CFE treaty, and three years later, the par-

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY

326

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

ties had eliminated some fifty thousand weapons

and withdrawn fifteen thousand more.

The CFE treaty was later modified in Novem-

ber 1999, upon Russia’s request. As late as 2003,

NATO was continuing to press Moscow to reduce

the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles

(ACVs), and artillery it deployed in its northern and

southern “flank” regions, namely Moldova and

Georgia, which border Europe and the Black Sea.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) was monitoring Russia’s compliance

with the CFE treaty.

See also: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; WAR-

SAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Graham, Thomas. (2002). Disarmament Sketches: Three

Decades of Arms Control and International Law. Seat-

tle: University of Washington Press.

Jenner, Peter. (2000). Defense and Security for the 21st Cen-

tury. London: NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Peters, John E. (1999). The Changing Quality of Stability

in Europe: The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty To-

ward 2001. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Sharp, Jane M. O. (2003). History, Analysis, and Evalu-

ation of the CFE Negotiation Oxford: Oxford Univer-

sity Press.

OHANNA

RANVILLE

COOPERATIVES, LAW ON

The Law on Cooperatives (hereafter the Law) was

adopted in May 1988 to offer greater clarity about

the direction of private economic activity during

the early period of perestroika. This was necessi-

tated by the fact that the earlier Law on Individual

Labor Activity, which went into effect in May 1987

as the first step toward creating a legal private sec-

tor, was ambiguous as well as limited in its pro-

visions for privatization. Private economic activity,

embodied in organizations called “cooperatives,”

quickly evolved beyond the provisions of the 1987

Law, and the new Law was intended to reflect the

reality of the growing cooperative movement.

In general, the Law liberalized the way in which

cooperatives operated. The legal basis for private

enterprise was changed, and cooperatives were ac-

corded the status of “basic units” in the economy

and were thus placed on an equal footing with state

enterprises. No longer was the size of a coopera-

tive or the amount of its assets limited. Coopera-

tives could now engage in any economic activity,

except for those prohibited by law. Financial

arrangements also moved in a new direction. Shares

in a business could be issued. There was no limit

on income, the size of which could be based either

on one’s financial contribution to the cooperative

or on the amount of work one performed there.

Cooperatives still had to be registered by local au-

thorities, but these administrative organs no longer

had the right of approval or disapproval of its ac-

tivities. Cooperatives were made formally indepen-

dent of the state sector, and the latter was forbidden

to give compulsory state orders to cooperatives.

Cooperatives were given the right to form joint

ventures with foreign companies. In essence, the

Law made cooperatives indistinguishable from cap-

italist enterprises.

See also: CAPITALISM; ECONOMY, POST-SOVIET; LIBERAL-

ISM; PERESTROIKA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hansen, Philip. (1988). “The Draft Law on Cooperatives:

An Assessment.” Radio Liberty 111/88, March 15.

Jones, Anthony, and Moskoff, William. (1991). Ko-ops:

The Rebirth of Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

ILLIAM

OSKOFF

AROL

AYLE

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

Cooperative societies, as distinguished from the

peasant commune and arteli (cooperative associa-

tions) of peasant migrant laborers, were seen by

the liberal and socialist intelligentsia of the mid-

nineteenth century as devices to protect the labor-

ing classes from exploitation and empower them

(cf. Chernyshevsky’s What Is to Be Done?). The

famine of 1891–1892 and the subsequent intensi-

fication of industrial development led the educated

classes and some government agencies to foster the

growth of cooperatives, although bureaucratic re-

strictions persisted. The movement burgeoned be-

tween the Revolution of 1905 and World War I,

with a tenfold increase in the number of cooper-

ative societies, which handled roughly 7 percent

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

327

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

of consumer goods sales by 1914. The main types

were urban consumer cooperatives, concerned

principally with retail and wholesale trade, and

agricultural credit cooperatives, whose primary

purpose was to make short-term loans to mem-

bers. There were also some producer associations,

most notably butter cooperatives of Northern

Russia and Western Siberia, and artisanal cooper-

atives. During World War I, cooperatives increased

by another 60 percent, helping to produce goods

for the war effort and cushion consumers against

inflation.

After 1917, Bolshevik policy alternated be-

tween tolerating cooperatives as voluntary organi-

zations and making them into quasi-state organs.

During war communism, cooperatives became ad-

juncts of the Commissariat of Supply, to which

producers and consumers were required to belong.

Agricultural producer cooperatives were few and

weak, but valued by the Soviet regime as precur-

sors of collective farming. During the New Eco-

nomic Policy (NEP), the Communist Party allowed

cooperatives to resume their function as voluntary

organizations, and Lenin singled them out as the

means to lead peasants to socialism. By 1926 and

1927, with the state supporting them as an alter-

native to private entrepreneurs, cooperatives ac-

counted for as much as half of consumer trade, and

a fifth of handicraft and small-scale industrial pro-

duction. All this ended in 1929 and 1930, when

voluntary cooperatives were eliminated during in-

dustrialization and collectivization. Although co-

operatives nominally persisted, with the kolkhoz

defined as an artel in the 1934 Model Charter, in

fact they had lost their independent status and once

again became channels for state-imposed economic

activity.

With the rise of perestroika under Mikhail Gor-

bachev, cooperatives took on renewed importance,

emerging in the late–1980s as a principal structure

for private economic activity. On April 1, 1990, on

the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there

were more than 185,000 operating cooperatives

employing almost 4.4 million people.

See also: COLLECTIVE FARMS; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY;

PEASANT ECONOMY; PERESTROIKA; WAR COMMUNISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kayden, Eugene M., and Antsiferov, Alexis N. (1929). The

Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War. New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lewin, Moshe. (1968). Russian Peasants and Soviet Power.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

AROL

AYLE

ILLIAM

OSKOFF

COPPER RIOTS

The Copper Riots (Medny bunt) were a series of ri-

ots in Moscow in the summer of 1662 in protest

against an economic crisis caused by the use of an

inflationary copper currency.

The financial demands of the Thirteen Years’

War against Poland-Lithuania forced the Russian

government to abandon its silver currency in the

first year of the war. In addition to debasing the

silver ruble, the government introduced a new cop-

per ruble at an artificial 1:1 exchange rate vis-à-

vis the old currency. The government assessed its

levies in silver while using the copper currency to

dispense its own obligations. Only silver currency

could be used in foreign trade. Four mints produced

small copper coins after 1655, and the total out-

put of copper money clearly exceeded the initial

emission of 4 million rubles severalfold.

The unpopular currency reform was followed

by other calamities: a devastating cholera epidemic

in 1654 and 1655 and disastrous harvests from

1656 to 1658. A two-year campaign against Swe-

den from 1656 to 1658 failed in its central objec-

tive of gaining access to the Baltic. The initially

successful campaigns against the Commonwealth

turned into a Russian retreat in the years 1659 to

1661. In order to finance the growing military de-

mands, the government imposed extraordinary

levies that further increased the pressures facing the

population. In addition to several regional levies, a

10 percent tax on townsmen in 1654 was followed

by a 20 percent levy in 1662.

By the early 1660s, inflation got out of con-

trol, leading to a breakdown of market-driven dis-

tribution. A system of parallel silver and copper

prices came into existence, and severe shortages of

many foodstuffs became commonplace. Counter-

feiting was widespread, and rumors circulated

about government involvement. Ultimately, there

was a flight from money, and the government was

forced increasingly to collect taxes in kind.

The growing discontent, which had generated

a flood of petitions to the tsar, burst into the open

COPPER RIOTS

328

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

on July 25, 1662. Following a meeting by discon-

tented townsmen in response to the new 20 per-

cent levy, some four to five thousand people

assembled in Red Square to hear merchants and sol-

diers voice their grievances against speculators.

Some degree of organization had preceded the

event, although no key group of instigators was

identified. During the days leading up to the event,

various “proclamations” (vorovskie listy) from var-

ious parts of the country circulated in the capital.

The proclamations singled out various members of

the political and economic elite as “traitors,” with

especially damning criticism directed at the

Miloslavskys, Fyodor Rtishchev, Bogdan Khitrovo,

Dementy Bashmakov, Vasily Shorin, and Semeon

Zadorin. The “traitors” were accused of counter-

feiting and pro-Polish sentiments.

Military detachments in the Kremlin failed to

respond to the gathering, and some soldiers from

their ranks even joined the demonstrators. After a

three-hour gathering, the crowd marched on the

tsar’s residence in Kolomenskoye with a petition

that the speculators and counterfeiters be handed

over and punished. In addition, the crowds called

for lower taxes. After leading boyars failed to ap-

pease the crowd, the tsar agreed to address them.

Having received a petition, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich

gave a conciliatory speech, in which he promised

to reduce the tax burden and investigate the demon-

strators’ grievances.

In the meantime, a riot broke out in Moscow,

and many demonstrators attacked the warehouses

of prosperous merchants, especially those belong-

ing to the family of the gost (privileged merchant)

Vasily Shorin. Shorin’s son was captured by the

rioters and forced to “confess” his father’s guilt.

Another crowd of five thousand departed for

Kolomenskoye, meeting with the members of the

earlier crowd along the way. The gates of the tsar’s

residence were locked, and six to seven thousand

troops massed around the royal residence. The

demonstrators demanded that “guilty” boyars be

handed over and, failing that, threatened to storm

the palace. In response, the tsar ordered the troops

to attack, an operation that led to some 900 deaths.

At the same time, 225 alleged organizers of the

events were arrested in Moscow. Eighteen of those

arrested were hanged the following day, a measure

that succeeded in restoring calm after a day of ri-

oting. An official investigation was ordered into the

events. In the course of a month, large numbers of

people were arrested, with several tortured and ex-

ecuted or exiled.

The riots, in spite of their limited duration, ap-

pear to have strengthened the government in its re-

solve to reform the bankrupt monetary system. In

order to make possible a return to a silver stan-

dard, in 1662 the government collected extra-

ordinary taxes and monopolized for a year the

exportation of six key export commodities: potash,

hemp, yuft leather, tallow, sable furs, and white

ash. A total of 1.4 million copper rubles was spent

on requisitioning these goods, and while most of

these sold quickly, some remained on the market

until 1676. Russia returned to a silver standard in

May 1663.

See also: ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH; ECONOMY, TSARIST;

TAXES; THIRTEEN YEARS’ WAR

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fuhrmann, Joseph T. (1981). Tsar Alexis, His Reign and

His Russia. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International

Press.

ARMO

T. K

OTILAINE

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

Corporal punishment, a form of criminal punish-

ment usually involving public torture of convicts,

began in ancient times and existed in Russia until

1904. It was known in Kievan Rus, but limited to

certain groups. From the late thirteenth century

onward, corporal punishment was applied more

widely and used against individuals of any social

group without exclusion. It is believed that this

broader application arose under the influence of the

Tartar and Mongolian conquerors, who freely

practiced corporal punishment. In the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, as a consequence of the to-

tal enslavement of the population to the state, cor-

poral punishment came into extensive use and

peaked in the first quarter of the eighteenth cen-

tury. All known methods of corporal punishment

were employed and applied in full view of the pub-

lic. For speaking disrespectfully of the tsar or speak-

ing in an obscene manner in a church, the convicted

offender’s tongue was cut out; for attempting to

kill one’s master, a hand was cut off; for forgery

and thievery, fingers were cut off; for brigandage,

rebellion, and perjury, the nose or ears were cut

off. Criminals were branded so that they could be

easily identified. During the reign of Peter I, the

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

329

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

more dangerous criminals had their nostrils slit;

less dangerous criminals had their foreheads

branded with the letter “V,” for vor (criminal). In

addition to sentences involving the mutilation of

limbs, other painful punishments were meted out:

flogging with the knout for the most serious

crimes; beating with sticks or the lash for less se-

rious crimes; or, in the case of soldiers, forcing the

offender to run the gauntlet. Minors and adults

found guilty of less serious offenses were beaten

with birch rods. The number of blows began at 500

or more and sometimes extended to infinity—

which for all practical purposes meant beating a

person to death.

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century,

corporal punishment was applied to all classes

within the population equally. But in the eight-

eenth century, the privileged estates successfully

sought the repeal of corporal punishment against

them. Motivating their opposition was the grow-

ing opinion that corporal punishment was a dis-

grace for those on whom it was imposed. For

instance, a soldier who had undergone corporal

punishment was unable to become an officer. As a

result of this opposition from privileged groups,

members of the nobility, distinguished citizens

(pochetnye grazhdane), and merchants of the first

and second guilds were exempted from corporal

punishment in the imperial charters of 1785. The

clergy was granted the same privilege in 1803, as

later were members of other social estates—pro-

vided they had an education. However, beating

with birch rods remained common until the 1860s

as a form of punishment for students in elemen-

tary and secondary schools, even though children

from the privileged social estates predominated in

the latter.

Over time, the severity of sentences was eased,

and some forms of punishment were even abol-

ished. For instance, the use of the knout ended in

the beginning of the nineteenth century. The knout

was the most deadly means of corporal punish-

ment; an experienced executioner could kill a

person with three blows. The 1845 Code of Pun-

ishments established the upper limit for sentences

using the lash and birch rods to 100 blows. Ex-

ceptions for the sick and the elderly were under

way, as were additional measures to protect the

health of individuals undergoing punishment as

much as possible. For instance, sentences would not

be carried out in extremely cold and windy condi-

tions. Beginning in 1851, a physician was present

at the scene of corporal punishment. From 1863

on, corporal punishment was greatly curtailed.

Women were entirely exempted. Men were subject

to it in only five cases stipulated by law: (1) Dis-

trict courts (volostnye sudy) were permitted to sen-

tence peasants to up to twenty blows of the lash,

a sentence that earlier had been considered appro-

priate only for children. (2) With the permission of

the governor of the province, prisoners were al-

lowed to be punished with up to 100 blows of the

birch rod for various violations of the established

order. (3) Those serving sentences of hard labor in

exile and those in exile as penal settlers could re-

ceive between 100 and 300 blows of the birch rod

for various violations. (4) Those serving sentences

of hard labor in exile who committed an additional

crime could receive up to 100 blows of the lash.

(5) Those serving on vessels at sea could be pun-

ished with up to five blows of the whip, and ap-

prentices could be given between five and ten blows

of the birch rod.

Not until 1903 were all forms of corporal pun-

ishment abolished for those serving sentences of ex-

ile at hard labor or sentences of exile as penal

settlers. The following year, corporal punishment

was officially abolished for all peasants, soldiers,

sailors, and other categories of the population.