Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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BythenIhadcometotheconclusionthatSadat’sdecisionmightnotbe

nearlysoprecipitateasIhadthoughtatfirst.InotedthatSadatexplicitlyrejected

anyrestrictionsontheuseofarmssupplie dbytheSoviets.Ispeculatedthatthis

statement“maywellrefertothepossiblefactthatthepresenceofSovietadvisers

withEgyptianunitscouldserveasaSovietbrakeonEgyptianoffensive

movements.”Myoverallassessmentsummedupfourpossiblemotivesonthe

partofSadat,oneofwhichwastoimprovehismilitaryoptionsforthefollowing

year(thatistosay,1973):



(a)thenecessitytorespondpoliticallytointernalfrustrations;(b)thenecessitytokeep,

andshowhimselfkeeping,theMiddleEastfrombecomingcompletelyfrozeninthisyearof

indecision;(c)thedesirabilityofseekinggreaterSovietsupportforoffensiveactionnextyear;

(d)theopportunityintakingthesestepstoofferanenticementtotheUSbyshowingthathe

couldcutbackontheSovietrelationship.



SadatmadetwomorespeechesonJuly24and27.Thoughheallegedthat

hehadbeenliedtoin1971bytheUnitedStates,hereservedhisheaviestfirefor

theSovietUnion.SadatpointedoutthathehadwarnedMoscowbeforetheUS‐

SovietsummitthatCairocouldnotacceptacontinuing stateof“nowar‐no

peace”;thesummitdemonstratedthatSovietsupportforEgyptfellfarshortof

AmericansupportforIsrael.Sadat’ssecondspeechwasanindirectappealtothe

SovietstolearnfromtheshockandtoenableCairotodevelopanadequate

militaryoptionforuseinthefuture. Egypt,proclaimedSadat,didnotwantSoviet

soldiersfightingitsbattles.Egypthadnointerestincausingaconfrontation

betweenthesuperpowers.ButMoscowhadtounderstandthatforEgypt,the

MiddleEastproblemwasitstoppriority,whereveritmightrankontheSoviet

agenda:



Ourfriendmustknowandappreciatethis.Tohim,theproblemmightbenumberfour

orfive…Hence,thepausewiththefriendsothathewillreallyappreciatethebattle.Perhaps

whenSoviet/Egyptiancooperationrunsinthisfieldthewayitdoesinthetechnologicalfield,

everythingwillbewonderful.



MuchhasbeenwrittenandsaidaboutthefailureoftheSovietUniontolive

uptotheprinciplesofrestrainttowhichitpledgeditselfattheMoscowsummit.

Mostofthecriticismisvalid. Buttherecordwouldbeneithercompletenorfair

withoutpointingoutthattheSovietUnionpaidheavilyinEgyptandthroughout

theMiddleEastforitsessentiallyputtingtheMideastoniceatthesummit.

Certainlyitdidnotexercisethisrestraintoutofaltruism.DoubtlessIsrael’s

strengthwastheprincipaldeterrent.TheKremlinalsoassessedthatawarrisked

adirectconfrontationwiththeUnitedStates.AndtheSovietleaders,needing

AmericangrainandoursupportforratificationoftheGermantreaties,couldnot

affordgeneratingacrisisinsosensitiveanarea.Butitispreciselyinthiswaythat

astrategyofdetente,posingbothrisksandincentivestoencourageSoviet

restraint,issupposedtowork.In1972,ayearwhentheUnitedStateswasheavily

engagedinVietnam,theSovietUnionheldbackfromendorsingitsclients’

positionsintheMiddleEastandthisdecisioncost Moscowdearly.Our

demonstrationsoffirmnessonIndia‐PakistanandonVietnam (nottomentionthe

conflictsintheautumnof1970)musthaveconvincedtheKremlinthatonemore

crisiswouldoverloadthecircuit.Coupledwiththisfirmness,ourconciliatory

postureinMoscowandtheprospectoffurthermovesontradehelpedproduce

Sovietrestraint.



WhateverthereasonsfortheSoviets’embarrassment,wewereintenton

makinguseoftheopportunity.MyfirstneedwastocalmdownDobrynin.OnJuly

20,Itoldhimtruthfully,ifabitcoyly,thatwedidnotknowwhatwasgoingonin

Egypt;wehadhadnoadvancewarning.Wewerepreparedtocontinueour

explorationofthe“principles”discussedinMoscow;Dobryninmusthave

recognizedthisasessentiallyaplacebo.Thatafternoonhebroughtmealetterto

NixonfromBrezhnev.Withamazingchutzpah,Brezhnev’sletterarguedthatthe

SovietdeparturefromEgyptwasinpartanimplementationofthetroop

withdrawalproposalpresentedbyGromykotoNixoninSeptember1971;adown

payment,asitwere,ontheoffertowithdrawSovietforces!Thus,itwasargued,

theUnitedStateswasnowunderanobligationtofulfillitspartofthebargain,

namelytoinfluenceIsraeltowarda settlement“whosecenterpieceshouldbethe

liberationofallArabterritoriesoccupiedbyitin1967.”Isawnopointindebating

thismind‐bogglingdemand;IrepeatedmyoffertoexploretheMoscow

principles.Itwasthebest waytogaintimetofindoutwhatCairowasthinking.



Wedidnothavelongtowait. ThesamedayIreceivedareportthatthe

chiefofEgyptianIntelligencehadthedaybeforeapproachedusinthesecret

channel.HestressedthatweshouldtakeseriouslyCairo’sinvitationtocomeup

withnewideasasapreludetoasecrethigh‐levelmeeting.TheEgyptians,we

weretold,wereespeciallyinterestedinaninterimagreementalongtheSuez

Canal.



Istilldidnotwanttogetinvolvedinoffering“new”ideasthatmightonly

disappointSadatandabortthecontactatthebeginning.Ipreferredageneral

explorationtoenableustodeterminewhatwasfeasiblebeforecommitting

ourselvestoacourseofaction.OnJuly29,therefore,IreturnedareplytoCairo

reaffirmingourwillingnesstoconductconfidentialtalks,whichIdescribedas

“potentiallyextremelyimportant”:



WithrespecttotheEgyptianstatementthatthesetalkscanproceedonlyonthebasisof

newU.S.proposals,theU.S.viewisasfollows:Inalltheprevioussuccessfulnegotiations

conductedattheWhiteHouselevel,thepartieshavefirstsoughtandachievedinpreliminary

discussionanunderstandingontheprinciplesandgeneraldirectionofanagreementbefore

engaginginconcretenegotiation.Newproposalsthatledonlytoanewstalematewouldserve

neitherside’spurpose.Therefore,theU.S.sideproposesthatinitialcontactsconcentrateona

detaileddiscussionofwhatisrealisticallyachievable.Thisistheessenceofthematter,andthe

onlyjustificationforthedirectinvolvementofthePresident.Ifdetailedagreementcanbe

reachedonthis,thendetailedproposalscanbedevised.



NothingsignificantwasheardfromSadatduringAugust.Twonew

prospectiveintermediariesmadetheirappearance:anEgyptianwhoclaimedto

beafriendofSadat,andaEuropeanbusinessmanassertinghigh‐levelEgyptian

contacts.WhileintheearlyphasesofapproachinganothergovernmentIwas

generallypreparedtoexploremanydifferentavenues,Ineverunderminedthe

integrityofavalidchannelonceitwasestablished.Thetwoself‐appointed

intermediarieswerethereforegentlyturnedaside.ThatEgypthadnotyetsettled

itscoursebecameapparentonAugust22whenweweretoldinthesecret

channelthatSadatwasstillconsideringhisresponse,butitwouldcomesoon;

thenweweretoldthatafewmoredayswouldbeneeded.OnSeptember4we

wereadvisedthatSadatacceptedthetalksinprinciplebutwouldaskforsome

“clarifications”inafewdays.



Finally,onSeptember7,wereceivedalongandextremelysubtlemessage

fromCairo.ItinformedusthattheexpulsionofSovietadviserswasapurely

nationaldecision,nottaken“topleaseordispleaseanyone”;inotherwords,

Egyptaskedfornospecialconsiderationbecauseofit.Themessagecomplained

ofthedisproportionateinfluencethatIsraelappearedtohaveonAmerican

policy;itrecitedEgypt’sdisappointmentwiththediplomaticexchangesofthe

previousyears,andEgypt’swillingnesstoreopentheSuezCanal.Noneofthis,it

wassaid,wasputforwardasapreconditionfortalks.



Itwasall,asIwouldcometorealize,vintageSadat.Hisnegotiatingtactic

wasnevertohaggleoverdetailbuttocreateanatmospherethatmade

disagreementps ychologically difficult.He(likeChouEn‐lai)laidstressona

philosophicalunderstanding,recognizingthattheimplementationofagreements

betweensovereignstatescannotbeenforced;itrequiresa willingnessonboth

sides.Agreementonconceptsissometimesmoreimportantthanondetails.I

cannotsaythatIfullyunderstoodSadat’sinsightthen.Greatmenaresorarethat

theytakesomegettingusedto.



ThenextdayIreplied,acceptingtheprincipleofasecretmeetingwithHafiz

IsmailandpromisingafullerreplyonmyreturnfromanothervisittoMoscow.My

lengthierreplyofSeptember18onceagainavoidedthespecificissuesraisedby

Egypt,becauseIwantedtoreservetheseforaface‐to‐facemeeting.Iputforward

somehousekeepingdetails,suchasapossiblevenueforsecrettalks,and

concludedwithageneralstatementofourintent:



TheUSwishestoreassuretheGovernmentofEgyptofitsfirmdeterminationtoseek

theterminationofthecycleofviolenceintheMiddleEastandtostressthatitplacesthe

greatestimportanceontheforthcomingdiscussionsbetweenrepresentativesofthetwo

governmentstoachievethispurpose.



Bythen,themessagesweretakingonamorethanproceduralcontent.For

example,Egyptusedtheprivatechanneltovoiceitsunhappinessaboutthetone

ofourpubliccondemnationoftheterroristattackonIsraeliathletesatthe

OlympicGames;itexpressedfearthatIsraeliretaliationagainstLebanonmight

causesomeotherArabcountriestoinviteSovietmilitaryhelp—aninteresting

indicationthatSadatwasinfactopposedtoSovietmilitaryactionintheMiddle

East.OnSeptember30,wereceivedanotherEgyptianmessagecomplainingthat

ourcallforrealismwastooreminiscentofIsrael’sposition.AllEgyptwanted,we

weretold,wassomeassurancethatwewouldmeet with“openhearts.”Iknew

toolittleaboutEgyptianpsychologythentorespondwithcomparablehumanity;

somewhatlesspoetically,Istatedthatwewerepreparedtoenterthetalks“with

anopenmindtodeterminewhatusefulrole[we]canplayinpromotingajust

settlement.”



Thesesecrettalksaredesignedtodevelopacourseofactionthatcanleadtothe

implementationofSecurityCouncilResolution242.Thebigissueistodefinepracticalmeasures

toaccomplishthis.Itservesnobody’sinteresttomakeemptypromises.Thisisthemeaningof

thetermrealistic.



Thetwosides,meetinginaspiritofgoodwill,shouldexploreallpossibilitieswithaview

tobeginningacontinuedexchangeofseriousandopenviews.



Whiletheseexchangesweretakingplace,SovietForeignMinisterGromyko

paidhisannualvisittotheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.Inmeetingswith

boththePresidentandmeherepeatedthestandardSovietlineasifabsolutely

nothinghadchanged.Hewasloathtoabandonsacramentalpositions,even

thoughhehadnoideahowtoimplementthem. Hedeprecatedaninterim

settlement,claimingthatEgyptwouldrejectit.(Weknewbetter.)Andhe

ritualisticallypressedforanoverallarrangementinwhichIsraelwouldgetonlya

declarationofnonbelligerencyinreturnforthe1967frontie rs.Iwastoo

immersedinVietnamandNixoninthecampaigntodoanyseriousnegotiating.

NixontoldGromykosimplythathewouldgiveper sonalattentiontotheMiddle

EastafterVietnamwassettled.IwentbacktomyproposaloftakingMoscow’s

“generalworkingprinciples”—which Gromykowastryingtobury—andapplying

themtoeachofIsrael’sneighbors(Egypt,Jordan,Syria).I knewthatthe

procedurewouldcertainlynotworkquickly;itwouldgiveusfurthertimeto

exploretheEgyptianchannel.TheUS‐SovietdialogueontheMiddleEast

remainedinabeyance,whichwaswherewewantedit.



AllthatremainedwastosetadateformysecrettalkwithSadat’s

representative.SadatshowedgreatunderstandingwhenIwastooheavily

engagedinthechaoticfinalphaseoftheVietnamnegotiationtoacceptthe

Egyptians’proposeddatesofOctober16or23.MymeetingwithHafizIsmail,

Sadat’snationalsecurityadviser,didnottakeplaceuntilFebruary1973.The

seminalopportunitytobringaboutareversalofalliancesintheArabworldwould

havetowaituntilwehadfinallyputthewarinVietnambe hindus.



<<Contents>>



****

XXXI



FromStalematetoBreakthrough



Hanoi’sDiscomfiture



ythetimewereturnedhomefromMoscow,Hanoi’soffensivehadrunoutof

steam.Severalfactorshadcontributed.TheNorthVietnamesedidnotfollow

upthecaptureofQuangTriwithanassaultontheoldimperialcapitalofHué,

whosefallmighthavebeendecisive.Asin1968,Hanoioptedforpsychological

ratherthanmilitaryimpactbylaunchingacountrywideoffensive,which,asthen,

ledtoitsmilitarydefeat.Threefrontsprovedtoodifficulttosynchronizeandeven

morecomplicatedtosupply;henceSaigonwasabletoswitchitssmallstrategic

reservetomeeteachthreatasitdeveloped.Thedispersalofeffortalsomeant

thattheNorthVietnameseneedednearlythreeweekstobring upreinforcements

fortheattackonHué.BythenpartoftheSouth’sstrategicreservehadmovedin.

Saigon’sairbornedivisionfoughtbothatAnLocandnearHué.Themarineswere

usedinboththeCentralHighlandsandinMilitaryRegion1.AndtheSouth

Vietnamesedivisionsfoughtbetterthaninanypreviousbattle.Ourmassive

reinforcementofB‐52s,raisingthetotaltoover200bytheendofMay,exposed

theattackingforcestoaformidableconcentrationof firepower,makingmass

attacksincreasinglydifficult.Hanoi’sproblemsmultipliedfurtherbecauseits

commanderswerenotexperiencedinhandlinglargeunits.Attacksbytanks,

artillery,andarmorfrequentlyboggeddownasthevariouselementslostcontact

withoneanother.SobythemiddleofJune,withourbombingandminingmaking

themselvesfelt,theNorthVietnamesearmywasstalled.

B



OnJune9,inanappraisalforthePresidentofwhattheblockadebegunon

May8hadachieved,IsaidtheprospectsforSouthVietnamlooked“substantially

brighter.”Theblockadehadforcedallsuppliestocomebyrail, andtherailroad

lineswerebeingcutbyourairattacks.Morethan1,000railroadcarswerebacked

upontheChinesesideoftheborder.Asaresult,supplieshadtobetransferredto

trucks,whichrequiredtime‐consumingloadingandunloadingandencountered

extremedifficultiesduringtherainyseason.Enemycommunicationsspokeof

ammunitionshortages;ourpilotsreportedanoticeablereductioninsurface‐to‐air

missilefirings,indicatingthatHanoimightberationingitsstocks.RadioHanoi

lamented“anumberofdifficulties”inprovidinglaborforagriculture,industry, 

andtransport.CorruptionandblackmarketeeringwereprovokingangryNorth

Vietnameseexhortationstotheirpeople.



Moreover,mymemorandumcontinued,HanoicouldseeMoscow’sand

Peking’sreactionstoourMay8measuresonlyasexasperatinglycircumspectand

limited.Sovietrefusaltocancelthesummitdeeplydisturbedandangeredthe

NorthVietnamese.Ontheeveofourtrip,Hanoihadpubliclywarned(unnamed)

fellowCommunistsnotto“setnationalinterestsagainsttheinterestsofworld

revolution”(thatis,againstHa noi’sinterests).Severaldayslater,onMay21—

whilewewereonthewaytoMoscow—aSovietspokesmanhadmadeclearthat

Moscowknewwhowasmeant;hewarnedbluntlythatHanoiwasadoptingan

“extremelyarbitraryinterpretation”oftheSovietUnion’s“duty”toNorth

Vietnamandpointedoutthattherestof theCommunistworld,evenincluding

China,favored“peacefulcoexistence.”SincetheMoscowsummit,Hanoihad

constantlyifindirectlyattackedthesummitandtheagreementsreachedthere.



Ourtwinsummitshadundoubtedlyengenderedasenseofisolationinthe

North.WewereseeingtheireffectsonthemoraleoftheNorthVietnamese

leadership,population,andarmedforces.Andtheyhadgreatlystrengthened

Nixon’sdomesticposition,thusremovingHanoi’skeyweaponofleverag eonus.

InJunewereceivedthefirstinconclusivehintsthatHanoimightbeengagedin

cease‐fireplanning.Duringthesummertheevidencebecameclearer.Bythe

middleofSeptember,asIshallshow,itwasunmistakable.



MoraleinSouthVietnamhadreacheditsnadirafter thefallofQuangTri.

WildrumorsthattheUnitedStateshadagreedtoturnovertheNorthernpartof

thecountrytoHanoi—almostcertainlydisseminatedbyCommunistcadres—had

beenendedbyNixon’sdecisiontomineNorthVietnameseharbors.Witha

revivedhopeandpurpose,Thieuralliedhispopulation.Wewere,inmyview,ina

strongpositiontoresumesecrettalks.



Manyconsidernegotiationsasasignofweakness.Ialwayslookedatthem

asaweaponforseizingthemoralandpsychologicalhighground. Sometreat

willingnesstotalkwhenthereisnopressureasanunnecessaryconcession;tome

itisadeviceto improveone’sstrategicposition,becauseone’sinterlocutoris

awarethatonefacesnonecessitytomakeconcessions.Itwas,however,notfor

theoreticalbutpracticalreasonsthatNixonapprovedanapproachtoHanoion

June12.WeproposedaprivatemeetingwithLeDucThoforJune28,whenIhad

aweekendfreebetweenatriptoChinaandasojourninSanClemente.Our

messageinvitedarepetitionofthegamesofthepreviousspringbysuggesting

thatthesecrettalkshouldprecedeaplenarysession.IfHanoifolloweditsscriptof

demandingaplenarybeforeaprivatemeeting,wewerereadytoacceptJuly13

foraplenaryandJuly18fortheprivatetalk.Nixonpreferredthistimingbecause

oftheDemocraticConvention’sopeningonJuly10.Wewouldbeableto

announcethatameetingwasabouttotakeplace,whereasmyownpreferenceof

June29hazardedannouncingafailureof thetalksjustbeforetheDemocratsmet.



WhilewewerewaitingforHanoi’sreply,twoeventsunderscoredNorth

Vietnam’sisolation.



OnJune8IhadaskedDobryninwhathadhappenedtoPodgorny’smission

toHanoi,ofwhichwehadbeentoldinMoscow.HesaidtheSovietswerestill

waitingforanofficialinvitation—anexplanationthat,givenmyknowledgeofthe

Kremlin’spricklyandobstreperousclients,wasclearlyplausible.Finally,onJune 

11,whileIwaspayingabriefvisittoJapan,Do brynintoldHaigthatPodgorny

wouldleaveforHanoionJune13andrequestedthatwestopthebombingof

NorthVietnamwhilehewasthere.Wereplied,asNixonhadindicatedto

Brezhnev,thatduringPodgorny’sstaywewouldnotbombwithintenmilesof

HanoiandwithinfivemilesofHaiphong;nootherrestrictionswouldbeobserved.

OnJune22BrezhnevreportedtoNixonthatHanoi’sleadershiphadlistenedwith

“anattentiveattitude”toPodgorny’sexpositionoftheAmericannegotiating

position;theywerepreparedtoresumenegotiationsonabusinesslikebasis;they

didnotinsistondiscussingonlyNorthVietnameseproposals.Ifaccurate,thiswas

atonewehadneverheardfromNorthVietnam.Previously,Hanoihaddismissed

anydeviationfromitsvarious“points”asnot“reasonableandlogical.”Brezhnev’s

letterconcludedwiththesuggestionthattheUnitedStatesshouldproposeadate

fortheresumptionofnegotiations.



ThiswaspuzzlingsincewehadmadepreciselysuchaproposaltoHanoion

June12.WasHanoikeepingMoscowinthedark?OrwasBrezhnevurgingusto

replypromptlytoamessagefromHanoithatreachedusonJune20?Thatreply

hadturnedouttobemuchmilderthanusual.Contrarytotheassumptionsofour

critics,bombingand mininghadgreatlyimprovedHanoi’smanners.After

perfunctorilycataloguinggrievances—thebombingandminingandthe

suspensionofplenarysessions—itgottotheheartoftheprobleminnear‐biblical

language:“TheDRVside,clothedbyitsgoodwill,agreestoprivatemeetings.”Its

goodwilldidnot,however,extendtoabandoningitsinsistenceonapriorplenary

session.Hanoi’smessageclaimedthatLeDucThoandXuanThuy,being“engaged

inworkpreviouslyscheduledinHanoi,”couldnota ttendaplenarybeforeJuly13.

Thiswasanotherinterestingsign;Hanoiwasnotinthehabitofgivingsuch

explanations.July15wasproposedfortheprivatemeeting;thusHanoineatly

solvedNixon’spoliticalproblemforhimbyproposingadateaftertheDemocratic

Convention.



Hanoi’sisolationwasdramatizedalsobythefactthatthismessagereached

meinPeking,wherefromJune19to23IbriefedtheChineseleadersonthe

Moscowsummit,generallytomaintainmomentuminournewrelationshipandto

discomfitHanoi.MyvisitbroughtnonewdevelopmentsonVietnam.Asalways,

ChouEn‐laishowedmoreinterestinacease‐firethaninapoliticalsettlement.He

understoodwellenoughthatacease‐firewastheeasiertoarrange,andhewas

eagertoremovetheirritantofVietnamfromUS‐Chineserelations.Unlike

Moscow,Pekinghadnointerestinademonst ration thattheUnitedStateswas

preparedtodumpitsfriends;in itslong‐rangeperspectiveofseekinga

counterweighttotheSovietUnion,Pekinginfacthadastakeinourreputationfor

reliability.AndtherewasalwaysanundercurrentofChineseuneasinessabout

Hanoi’shegemonicaspirationsinIndochina.Chouaskedpointed questionsabout

Nixon’sMay8proposal(whichwasineffectacease‐fireoffer),repeatedthe

standardlineofChina’shistoricaldebttoHanoi,avoidedanyimplicationofany

Chinesenationalinterestinthewar,and impliedthatmostofChina’ssuppliesto

Vietnamwerefoodstuffs.ThisparalleledwhatKosyginhadtoldusaboutSoviet

deliveriesfourweeksearlier.GivenChina’smorerudimentaryarmaments

industry,Chouwasthemorelikelytobetellingthetruth.Hanoiwasnotina

brilliantpositionwhenitstwopatronswereineffecttellingitsadversa rythatthey

werenolongersupplyingmilitaryequipment.



Onthedayofmyreturn(June23)werepliedtotheNorthVietnamese.We

acceptedJuly13fortheresumptionofplenarysessionsandsuggestedJuly19for

theprivatemeeting,largelybecauseitfittedinbetterwithNixon’stravel

schedule.WedismissedHanoi’scomplaintscurtly:“Inordertohelpcreatethe

properatmosphereforthesediscussionstheUSwillnotre spondtothe

allegationsintheDRVnoteofJune20.”OnJune26DobrynincametotheWhite

HouseinhiscompulsivequesttofindoutwhatIhadbeendoinginPeking.Inthe

processheinquiredaboutVietnam.Ourfour‐daypostponementoftheprivate

meetingwould,hesaid,arouseprofoundsuspicionsinHanoi.(Thisimpliedanew

urgencyinouradversary,whoearlierintheyearhadprocrastinatedforfour

monthsbeforesettingadate.)DobryningavemehisguessthatHanoimightbe

waitinguntilAmericanelectoralprospectswereclearerbeforemakingafinal

decisiononwhethertoconcludethewar.



Itwasaprescientremark.Hanoiwasindeedwatchingourelection

campaign,thoughIwasnotthensurewhetheritwouldholdoutonnegotiation

untilaftertheelectioninNovemberoropttonegotiateseriouslyjustbefore.It

wouldnotdecide,ItoldNixoninamemorandumonJune26,“untilitbelievesit

hasaclearerpictureofwhetherornotyouwillbere‐elected.”Isenthima

summaryofaJune10articleintheHanoipartynewspaperthatspokefavorably

ofMcGovernbutrefrainedfromflatlypredictinghisvictory.NorthVietnam’s

angeratitsownallieswasthinlyconcealedinthedenunciation ofNixonfor

havingremainedahawkevenwhenhe“borroweddove’swingsfordistanttrips.”



The“hawk”wasmeanwhilefacedwithanothertroopwithdrawaldecision.

Ournumberswerenowsolowthatwhenthedeadlinecameupattheendof

Junetherewasnoroomforanydramaticreductions.ButNixo ndecidedto

announcethewithdrawalof10,000troopsovertwomonths—andtoldZieglerto

addthatnomoredrafteeswouldbese ntunlesstheyvolunteered.Thedraft,

whichhadbeenattheheartofsomuchcampusunrest,nolongerthreatened

studentswithVietnamservice;whenschoolsreopenedinthefallthestudent

protestwasover.Nixonenjoyedannouncingtheresumptionofplenariesata

pressconferenceonJune29,onedayafterthetroopwithdrawalnews,aweek

andahalfbeforetheDemocratic Convention.Predic tably,theNewYorkTimes

complainedthatthiscoincidedwiththepoliticalcalendar.Ipointedouttoa

journalistthatHanoihadpickedthedate.Henceonlytwoconclusionswere

possible:EitherHanoiwantedtopromotethereelectionofNixon,anunlikely

prospect;orelseHanoiwantedtopreservetheoptionofasettlementbeforethe

election.Andthatwasexactlythecase.

