Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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withdrewfortykilometersortwentykilometersfromtheCanal,butthefactthat

anIsraeliwithdrawalwouldbeoftremendoussymbolicsignificance.Egypthadto

decidewhetheritwantedsubstanceortheory;therewasnopossibilityof

agreeingnowontheshapeofthefinalsettlement.Themoretheologywe

includedintheinterimsettlement,thelesslikelyitwouldbeachieved.Indeed,ifI

wantedtowastetime,Iwouldurgethattheinterimaccordbespecificaboutthe

finalsettlementbecauseitwouldneverbeagreedtobytheparties.Ifthe

PresidentandIweretogetinvolved,itwouldhavetobeonthebasisthat

progresswaspossible;thismeanttomethatthereshouldbesomevaguenessas

tothefinaldestination.



Gromykorejectedthisapproach.Heinsistedthataninterimagreementbe

linkedspecificallyandindetailtoafinalsettlement.Hearguedthattherecould

benofirststageuntilafinalsettlementhadbeenworkedoutandaprecise

timetablehadbeenestablished.ThefinalsettlementintheSovietviewshould

occurnolaterthanayearaftertheinterimagreement,thoughthelengthofthe

intervalwasnegotiable.(Gromykodidnotexplainwhatvalueaninterim

agreementhadinthesecircumstances.)Hemaintainedthatafinalsettlement

hadtoinvolvetotalIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheoccupiedterritoriesofallArab

states.Inotherwords,theSovietUnionwasstillbackingthemaximumArab

position,oblivioustothefactthatinsuchcircumstancesIsraelhadnomotivefor

aninterimagreementandwehadnoincentiveto proceedjointlywithMoscow.

TherewasnosignoftheSoviet Union’swillingnesstopressitsclientstoward

flexibility.However,GromykohadputforwardtoNixoninthehideawayofficea

proposalthatonthesurfacewasatantalizingmodificatio nofthestandardSoviet

position.Intheeventofacomprehensivesettlement,Gromykosaid,theSoviets

wouldbepreparedtowithdrawtheirforcesfromtheMiddleEast,joininanarms

embargointhearea,andparticipateinguaranteesofasettlement.Butasusual

therewaslesstotheseproposalsthanmettheeye.Wewerestillbeingaskedto

forceIsraeltoacceptbordersitconsideredincompatiblewithitssecurity.The

promisedwithdrawalofSovietforceswouldcomeattheendoftheentire

process;inotherwords,wewouldhavetoexecuteourentirecontributiontothis

arrangementbeforetheSovietshadtodoanything.AndeventhentheSoviets

madetheirwithdrawalfromEgyptconditionalonthewithdrawalofAmerican

advisersfromIran.AllthisatatimewhenSadatwasthreateningtosettlethe

issuebywarin1971or1972.(Thiswasoneofthereasonswhywehadreactedso

stronglytotheIndianassaultonPakistan;wewantedtomakesurethatthe

SovietUnionunderstoodthata Soviet‐sponsoredattackintheMiddleEastwould

resultinanevensharperresponse.)



ButGromykohadatleastaddedenoughnewingredientstofuel

“exploratory”discussionsbetweenDobryninandme.Thisinturnwouldgivethe

SovietsanincentivetokeeptheMiddleEastcalmoverthenextyear—astrategy

thatwouldonlymagnifyEgyptianrestlessnesswithSovietpolicy.



WiththeannualgatheringinNewYorkofforeignleadersfortheGeneral

Assembly,StatesprangintoactionagaintotrytobridgethegapbetweenEgypt

andIsrael.Rogers,inaUNspeechinearlyOctober,unveiledAmericanideasonan

interimSuezCanalagreement.Thiswascoupledwiththeproposalof“proximity

talks,”aprocedurebywhichanAmericandiplomatwouldshuttlebetweenthe

twodelegationshousedinnearbyhotelroomsinNewYork.Needlesstosay,

neitherEgyptnorIsraelexpectedanygoodtocomeoutofthissincethetwo

sides’positionsremainedirreconcilable;neithersidewaslikelytobemaneuvered

intoaconcessionbyahyperactivenegotiation.TheIsraelisespeciallywere

concernedthattheywouldagainbepressedintoafutilediplomaticeffortwithout

adequateAmericanassurancesonarmssupplyorfinaldestination;theirfears

werenoteasedwhenSadatvisitedMoscowinOctoberandreturnedwitha

communiquéthatpledgednewSovieteffortsto“strengthen”Egypt’smilitary

might.(EvenRogerswasmovedto“deplore”thatpledgepublicly.)



Bytheendof1971,thedivisionswithinourgovernment,theState

Department’ssingle‐mindedpursuitofunattainablegoals—andtheSoviet

Union’slackofimagination—hadproducedthestal emateforwhichIhadstriven

bydesign.



Then,inDecember1971,Nixontookastepthatbegantoestablishmy

operationalcontrolofMiddleEastdiplomacy.Mrs.MeirvisitedNixonon

December2andthetwoleadersreachedacrucialunderstandingonboth

strategyandtactics:Thequestforacomprehensivesettlementwouldbe

abandonedforthetimebeing.(EventheStateDepartmenthadconcludedthat

theroadhadcometoadeadend.)Instead, theeffortwouldbecontinuedto

reachaninterimagreementwithEgypt.Siscowouldconductthe“proximitytalks”

betweenEgyptandIsraelinfrontchannels.Buttherealnegotiationswouldbe

carriedoutbetweenIsraeliAmbassadorRabinandme,andalsobetween

Dobryninandme.Ifprogressweremadeinthesebackchannels,wecouldfeed

theresultsintothe“proximity”forum.Inotherwords,wehadfinallyestablished

intheMiddleEastthesamedual‐trackapproachthatcharacterizedourother

negotiations.OnlytheEgyptianswereasyetmissing;Ihadeveryconfidencethat

soonerorlatertheywouldjoin.



<<Contents>>



****



BackchannelExplorations



venwiththenewnegotiatingchannels,Isawnoneedforhaste.First,inearly

1972,SiscoandRabinhadtosettletheannualquestionofmilitaryaidfor

Israelinordertoavoidtheperiodicbrawlsthathadresultedfromtrying,futilely,

tokeepIsraelonashortleash.Wehadalways woundupgrantingIsrael’s

requests,butonlyafterpoliticaldisputesathome thatdidnotadvance

negotiations,yetmadetheAdministrationappearimpotent.Afterthiswasfinally

settled,Israel,inearlyFebruary,agreedtoState’s“proximitytalks”—onlytohave

theidearejectedbyEgypt.Inthemeantime,IsoughttoexplorewhattheSoviets

reallyhadinmind.Weretheoverturesforaninterimagreementadeviceto

changetheexistingdiplomaticpatternortodemonstrateourallegedpro‐Israeli

biastotheirclients?Aboveall,Icalculatedthatthelongertheprocesswenton,

themorelikelySadatwouldseektodealwithusdirectly.TheSovietsas

intermediariesweredefinit elyoursecondchoice.



Theanswerwassoonforthcoming.IbeganmydiscussionswithDobryninin

themiddleofJanuary1972andquicklyconfirmedthatGromyko’sflexibilityhad

beenmoreapparentthanreal.TheSovietswerestillasmuscle‐boundastheyhad

beenallthroughNixon’sAdministration.InflexiblyadvocatingthemaximumArab

program,unwillingtorunanyrisks,theyretreatedtostandardpositionseven

whendiscussinganinterimagreementalongtheSuezCanal.Dobrynin,like

Gromyko,waswillingenoughtoexploreadisengagement,provideditwas

integrallylinkedtoanoverallsettlement.IsummedupMoscow’sdilemmaagain

inamemorandumtothePresident:



TheirclientcannotwinawarwiththeIsraelis.Thereforeacontinuationofthepresent

simmeringcrisiscanonlyleadtooneoftwosituations:eitheraconvictiononthepartofthe

ArabsthattheiralliancewiththeSovietUnionisinadequatetoproduceasettlement,orawar

bytheEgyptianswhichwouldfacetheSovietswithadecisiononmilitarysupportandariskout

ofallproportiontoanythingthatcouldbeachieved.



Isuggestedastrategytobreakthelogjam.Themostsignificantelement—

whichlaterreappearedinsomeearlyproposalsoftheCarterAdministration—

wasanattempttobridgethegulfbetweenIsrael’sinsistenceonborderchanges

andtheArabdemandforthe1967frontiers.Thenotionwastoseparatetheissue

ofsecurityfromthatofsovereignty:Egyptwouldregainsovereigntyoverthe

entireSinai,butIsraelwouldbepermittedtomaintaincertaindefensepostsina

definedbeltonEgyptiansoil.Ipursuedthisintheprivatechannelwiththe

Israelis.RabinandDayanacceptedtheapproachandbyearlyin1972certain

principleshadbeenestablished:Israelsaiditwouldagreetowithdrawtothe

WesternsideoftheSinaipassesinreturnforanagreedcease‐firetolastuntil

early1974;EgyptcouldcrosstheSuezCanalwithpolicebutnomilitaryforces;the

linkagetoafinalsettlementwouldbekeptvague;Israelwouldnotinterferewith

thereopeningoftheSuezCanal.(Manyoftheseprovisions foundtheirwayinto

thefirstdisengagementagreementfinallynegotiatedinJanuary1974.)



TheSovietUnion,meanwhile,wasstillstuck.Dobryninindicatedin

February1972thatMoscowmightbewillingtodiscusstheconceptofseparating

securityfromsovereignty,but,likeGromykofourmonthsearlier,Moscow

retreatedassoonasitunderstoodthatwemightbereadytoexplorethesubject

seriously.InowthinkthatithadnounderstandingofanykindwithCairothat

gaveitflexibility.Dobryninnevercamebacktothesubject.



DuringMarch,Dobryninwaspressingmetoformulatea more

comprehensivepeaceprogramofourown;itwouldbeeasierforMoscow,he

said,toreacttoourproposalsthantodeviatefromtheArabpositiononitsown

initiative.Thiswasundoubtedlytrue.Atthesametime,wealreadyknewwhat

theArabreactionwouldbetoanyproposalsendorsedbyIsrael;theyhadrejected

themoftenenoughpublicly.IfweputforwardapositiondifferentfromIsrael’sin

aso‐calledprivatechannelthroughMoscow,Moscowwoulduseitto

demonstratewhatcouldbeachievedwithitsassistanceandwewouldbecaught

onceagainincrossfirebetweenthetwoparties.Butifweputforwardthrough

MoscowaproposalidenticalwithIsrael’s,Moscowwoulduseittoshowthe

futilityofdealingwithus.



Mystrategyhadnotchanged.UntilsomeArabstateshowedawillingness

toseparatefromtheSoviets,ortheSovietswerepreparedtodissociatefromthe

maximumArabprogram,wehadnoreasontomodifyourpolicy.TheSoviets

nevermanagedtosquarethiscircle.Inthemeantime,theyincreasedourdisquiet 

bysigning,onApril9,1972,theFriendshipTreatywithIraq,whichwassoon

followedbyasubstantialflow ofmodernmilitaryequipment.Whilenegotiating

onthebasisofmaximumterms,theSovietswerealsocreatingtheconditionsfor

maximummilitarypressure.



AfterthestartofHanoi’sEasteroffensiveonMarch30,Iinterruptedthe

privateMiddleEasttalkswithDobryninasasignofdispleasurewiththeSoviet

armsshipmentsthathadmadetheNorthVietnameseoffensivepossible.

ExchangesontheMideastwerenotresumeduntilmyvisittoMoscow,April20‐

24,toprepareforthesummit.OnthatoccasionGromykopresentedadocument

foracomprehensivesettlementthatimpliedthemostrigidinterpretationofthe

concessionshehadmadeduringthepreviousfall. Hearguedthataseparate

Egyptian‐Israelinegotiationwasadmissiblebutonlyifaccompaniedbya

settlementofthe“global”issues.Andagain,whatevertheSovietspromised

wouldnotbecarriedoutuntileveryprovisionofanoverallagreement—which

IsraelwouldneversignwithoutthemostmassiveAmericanpressure—hadbeen

implemented.Gromykocontinuedtodrainthepreviouslyofferedwithdrawalof

Sovietmilitarypersonnelofmuchofitss ignificance. First,itwouldnotbecarried

outuntilacomprehensivesettlementhadbeenachieved(inotherwords,aftera

processthatinourestimatewascertaintobesoprolongedasto makethe

agreementnearlymeaningless);eventhen,SoviettroopswouldstayinArab

countriesinproportiontoAmericanpersonnelinIran.Dependingonhowthat

wascalculated,theremightbenowithdrawalsatall.



Gromykothenhelpfullyofferedawayaroundourdomesticobstacles.He

suggestedthatwemightnegotiateanagreementondisengagementalongthe

SuezCanalpubliclyaslongasheandIsimultaneouslyreachedasecret

understandingonthetermsofacomprehensivesettlement,whichwouldbe

surfacedandimplementedimmediatelyafterour1972Presidentialelection.Even

withlegendaryself‐confidenceanddevotiontosecrecy,Ididnotbelievethatthis

couldpossiblywork.Thesuggestionwasrefused. 



ThebaneofSovietdiplomacyisitspersistentquestformaximum

advantage.Sometimestheconstantpressureerodesresistance;butoftenit

backfiresbyremovinganyincentiveforaseriousdialogue.Inthemidstofa

VietnamoffensivefueledbySovietarms,buffetedbyalreadymassivedivisionsat

home,andfacinganelection,noPresidentcouldbetemptedbyaproposition

thatimposedonusalltheburdensofforcingasettlementonanallyinreturnfor

nodiscerniblebenefit.Anditwasbasedonawrongestimateofourstrategyand

ourpossibilities. TheSovietleadersactedasiftheirpresenceintheArabworld

werepermanent,tobemanipulatedatwillbytheKremlin.Earlier,onMarch17,I

hadpointedouttoDobryninthattheirpositionwasnotasbrilliantashewas

wonttopictureit;theKremlin’scurrentpolicyguaranteeditsclientsonly

stalemate,or,infact,defeatinawar.DobryninhadrepliedthatMoscowalsohad

theoptiontoincreaseitsmilitarypresenceinEgyptdramatically.Iwasskeptical:

first,becauseIwasconvincedthatMoscowwouldstopwellshortofcommitting

itsownforcesinwhatcouldeasilyescalateintoadirectconfrontationwiththe

UnitedStates;second,andprincipally,becauseIbegantosensethatourstrategy

wasbeginningtowork,atleastwithrespecttoEgypt.



<<Contents>>



****



EgyptOpensaSecretChanneltotheUnitedStates



adathadvisitedMoscowinFebruary1972.Thingswerenotgoingsmoothly

betweenEgyptandtheSovietUnion.OnApril8,Ifeltconfidentenoughto

adviseNixonthattheSoviet‐Egyptianrelationshipwasclearlymorereservedthan

inNasser’stime.WeunderstoodthatSadathadaskedforadvancedweaponsand

Sovietdiplomaticandmilitarysupportonascalereminiscentofwhatwas

extendedtoIndiaduringitsconflictwithPakistan,includinghelptoenableEgypt

tobuilditsownarms;hehadbeengivenassurancesofweaponsbutnoblank

checkofdiplomaticormilitarysupport.EgyptwaspressuringMoscow,but

Moscowhadclearlycalculated—aswehadhoped—thatsincewehadgonetothe

brinkoverPakistan,achallenge tothesurvivalofIsraelwouldcreate

uncontrollablerisks.AndtheKremlindidnotstandtogainfrombuilding upin

EgyptanarmsindustrythatwoulddrasticallyreduceCairo’sdependenceon

Sovietsupplies.ItoldNixonmyimpressionwasthattheSovietswereholding

Sadatatarm’slength,fearfuloftherisksofall‐outsupport,andawaitingmytalks

withDobrynin.Asusual,theywantedeverything:Egyptiansubservience,

minimumrisk,andthecompleteArabprogram.Butdiplomacyrarelyworksthat

way:Thosewhograbforeverything,whoforgetthatpoliticsistheartofthe

possible,intheendmayloseall.



AmoretangiblereasonformyconfidencewasthatinthefirstweekofApril

1972EgypthadopenedasecretchanneltotheWhiteHouse.



OnApril5,ahighEgyptianofficertoldanAmericanofficialinCairothat

EgyptwasdissatisfiedwithexistingdiplomaticchannelstotheUnitedStates.In

hisgovernment’sviewitwasessentialwecommunicateatthePresidentiallevel,

bypassingbothfo reignministries.TheEgyptianssuggestedthateitherHelmsorI

visitCairo;alternatively,HafizIsmail,myoppositenumberasnationalsecurity

advisertoPresidentSadat,mightcometoWashington.IcannotsaythatIwas

shockedoroffendedbythepropositionthatbothsidesbypasstheForeign

Ministers.Indeed,Iconsidereditthepreconditionofsuccess.Whenthereportof

thenewEgyptianapproachreachedmeonApril8,Iimmediatelywroteonita

notetoAlHaig,mydeputy:“Al:HowaboutIsmailtoWashington?”



Yet,preoccupiedwiththeVietnamoffensiveandthenmyforthcomingtrip

toMoscow,wedidnotrespo ndimmediately.Wewantedto seewhatMoscow

wouldhavetoofferintheChannel.WealsoheardthatSadatwouldvisitMoscow

againattheendofAprilandwedidnotproposetogivetheEgyptianpartya

responsewhichmightleaktotheSoviets.Aboveall,ameasuredpacefittedin

withourstrategyofcreatinginEgyptthemaximumrestlessnesswiththestatus

quo.SoitwasnotuntilApril29,whileSadatwasinMoscow,thatwefinallysenta

replytoawaithimonhisreturn.Wesaidthatwewereindee dinterestedina

secrethigh‐levelmeeting;arepresentativeofPresidentSadatwouldbewelcome

intheUnitedStatesforthatpurpose.Butnomeetingcouldtakeplaceuntilafter

theMoscowsummit.Wecalculatedthattheprospectofameetingafterthe

summitwouldserveasagreaterincentiveforrestraintthananearliertalkwhich

inthenatureoffirstcontactswasboundtobeinconclusive.Twoweekslaterthe

Egyptiansrepliedthatourproposalwasbeingstudied,andthatwewouldreceive

aformalreplyinJuneafterthesummit.Thisfittedinnicelywithourstrategy.



Inthemeantime,thereweremountingindicationsthattensionsbetween

EgyptandtheSovietUnionweregrowing.Sadat’sAprilvisittoMoscow

apparentlyheightenedhisworrythattheSovietUnionmightsettleforthestatus

quointheMiddleEast.EvenanairliftofadvancedSovietequipmentinApriland

Maydidnotreducehisunderlyinguneasiness.OnMay22IsentNixonmy

assessmentthattherelationshipbetweenSadatandtheSovietswasnowoneofa

worriedclienttohispatronratherthanthatofequalpartnerswithconfidencein

eachother.



Lateron,IcametoknowSadatasoneofthefewtrulyoutstandingleadersI

havemet.Hepossessedthatcombinationofinsightandcouragewhichmarksa

greatstatesman.Hehadtheboldnesstogotoa warnoonethoughthecould

sustain;themoderationtomovetopeaceimmediatelyafterward;andthe

wisdomtoreverseattitudeshardenedbydecades.Butin1972noneofthiswas

apparent.Sadathadmademanythreatsthathehadnotcarriedout.IntheJarring

negotiationshehadbeenmoreflexiblethanhispredecessor,buthehad

apparentlynotyetrenouncedNasser’sdelusionthathecouldinsiston

unfulfillable demandsbecauseofthebackingofSovietarms.Wehadnoregular

dialoguewithhim. Noneofouremissarieshadevermanagedtopenetratethe

charmingmannertodiscoverwhatSadatreallythought.Untilthesecretchannel

openedinApril1972,mostofourseriousdealingshadbeenthroughMoscow.My

reactiontothisoverture,therefore,waslargelytactical:tocontinuetobring

hometoSadatthefutilityofhiscoursewhileopeningadialoguebywhichwe

hopedtochangeit.



ThiswasalsothebackgroundtoourMoscowsummitdiscussionsonthe

MiddleEast.BecauseofVietnamandSALTpreoccupations,thesecameonlyat

theendofthesummit,when,aswesawinChapterXXVIII,inalong‐nightsession,

GromykoandIworkedoutsome“generalworkingprinciples”foranoverall

settlement;theirvaguenesswasboundtoraiseadditionalquestionsinSadat’s

mind.

TheprincipleswereweakerthanResolution242;theystatedthatborder

rectificationswerepossible(omittingthemodifier“minor,”whichhadbecome

sacramentalinofficialdocuments);theformulationswereambiguousaboutthe

extentofintendedIsraeliwithdrawals.IhaveneverunderstoodwhyGromyko

acceptedthem,unlessitwasexhaustion—afterall,heattendedevenmore

meetingsthanIdidinMoscowandworkedevenlongerhours.Inallevents,the

principlesquicklyfoundtheirwayintotheovercrowdedlimboofabortedMiddle

Eastschemes—asIhadintended.



GromykoandIalsoagreedonthetextofafinalcommuniquéthatdidno

morethanurgea peacefulsettlementandendorsetheJarringmission;itoffered

noconcreteguidelinesforitoranyothernegotiations.Thisblandcommuniqué

wastohavehistoricconsequences.Itwasa“violentshock”toEgypt,Sa dat

recordsinhismemoirs.

Itprovedtobeadecisiveblowtohisrelationswiththe

SovietUnion.



Allthistime,theEgyptianswerebeingtreatedtotheunnervingexperience

ofourthree‐tiereddiplomacy.Theywereexchangingmessageswithusthrough

thesecretchannel;theywerereceivingtheSovietversionofoursummit

conversationsandmytalkswithDobrynin;[

TheSovietsdidnotbriefSadatonthe

summitconversationsuntilfiveweeksafterward,whichcompoundedhisdisillusionmentwith

Sovietpolicy.

]andtheywereexposedtotheregularStateDepartmentovertures

towinEgypt’sagreementtoentertheproximitytalks.Itmusthavebeena

bewilderingsetofprocedures—thoughitleftCairoinabetterpositiontoknow

whatmessageswerebeingpassedthaneithertheWhiteHouseorState.Forkey

StatecableswerenotonlynotshowntotheWhiteHouseforclearance;sofarasI

cantellnow,recordsofStatetalkswithkeyArabswerenotevensenttothe

WhiteHouseaftertheevent.Wethereforeoftenlearnedwhathadbeen

transmittedinStatechannelsonlyafterithadbeenplayedbackinareporting

telegramfromsomeArabcapitalbriefedbyCairo.Thus,forexample,wedidnot

learnofasecretoverturetoCairoforproximitytalksuntilwell afterthefact,nor

didweknowofaconversationbetweenSiscoandPrinceSultanofSaudiArabiain

June—inwhichSiscosoughttoengageSultan’shelpinpersuadingEgypttoagree

tosuchtalks—untilitwasmentionedinareportfromRiyadhonJuly18.Equally,

StatedidnotknowofoursecretchanneltoCairo.(Idoubtthatmanytextbooks

onpoliticalsciencewillcommendtheseprocedures.)



Strangelyenough,exceptforthenervousstrainontheparticipants,our

proceduresdidnodamage.Egypthad,afterall,initiated thesecretWhiteHouse

contactbecauseithadlostconfidenceinnormaldiplomaticprocedures.Andin

June,CairoturneddowntheStateproposalforproximitytalks—without,

however,significantlyreducingState’slegendarydedicationtotheunattainable.



Sadatwasnowplayingforhigherstakes.OnJuly13,wereceivedan

ambiguousmessagethroughthesecretchannel.Itreiteratedthewillingnessto

sendaseniorrepresentativetoWashington,providedwehadsomethingnewto

propose.IntheabsenceofanydifferentinitiativeCairosawnopointinameeting.

Thecorollarywas,ofcourse,thatwecouldproduceahigh‐levelEgyptian

representativebythesimpledeviceofindicatingthatwewerewillingtoexplore

newapproaches.



BeforewecouldfullyassesstheimplicationsofthisDelphicmissivecame

theJuly18,1972,bombshellofSadat’sannouncementthathehadterminated

themissionofthemorethan15,000SovietmilitaryadvisersandexpertsinEgypt.

Theyweretobewithdrawnwithinaweek;militar yinstallations andequipment

setupinEgyptsince1967weretobecomeEgyptianproperty.



ThedecisioncameasacompletesurprisetoWashington.(ThatdayI was

onmywaytoParisforasecretmeetingwiththeNorthVietnamese.)Tobesure,

mystrategyhadsoughttoinduceCairotolessenitsrelianceontheSovietUnion.I

hadexpectedthatatsomepointdowntheroad,Sadatwouldbepreparedto

offertotradeSovietwithdrawalforprogresswithus.But,stillhandicappedbymy

underestimationoftheEgyptianPres ident,Ineverguessedthathewouldsettle

theissuewithonegrandgesture,andunilaterally.Myfirstreactiononhearing

thenewswasthathehadactedimpetuouslyandforfeitedanimportant

negotiatingasset,fornoreturn.TwodayslaterIpreparedalongerandmore

reflectiveanalysis:



IthasbeenapparentinthelasttwomonthsthattheEgyptianshaveresigned

themselvestothefactthattherewillbelittlediplomaticmovementontheArab‐Israeliproblem

thisyearbecauseoftheUSelections…Despitethisapparentlyrationalcalculation,Sadathas

facedthedilemmaofhowtoavoidallowinginactiontoproduceapermanentfreezeofthe

situation…FrustrationoverthelackofmovementontheArab‐Israeliissuehasbeenhighin

Cairo.



TheUS‐USSRSummitconfirmedthesensethatnothingwasgoingtohappenthisyear

andbroughttoaheadcriticismoftheSovietrolethathadbeengoingoninCairoevenbefore

thesummit.Heikal,theinfluentialeditorofAlAhramwhofavoredtalkswiththeUSlast

summeronaninterimsettlement,beganaseriesofpublicdebatesabouttheSoviet‐Egyptian

relationshipinApril…

