Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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TherewassomesentimentintheUSgovernmentforimposingtheRogers

PlanontheIsraelis.ButthePresidenthadnostomachforitinthemiddleofthe

Laotiancrisis.Anditmadenostrategicsense.AslongasEgyptwasineffecta

Sovietmilitarybase,wecouldhavenoincentivetoturnonanallyonbehalfofa

Sovietclient.ThisiswhyIwasalwaysopposedtocomprehensivesolutionsthat

wouldberejectedbybothpartiesandthatcouldonlyserveSovietendsbyeither

demonstratingourimpotenceorbeingturnedintoashowcaseofwhatcouldbe

exactedbyMoscow’spressure.MyaimwastoproduceastalemateuntilMoscow

urgedcompromiseoruntil,evenbetter,somemoderateArabregimedecided

thattheroutetoprogresswasthroughWashington.



Infact,hadwebeenmorefinelyattunedtothesubtletiesofMideast

diplomacywemighthavediscernedthefirsthintsoffundamentalchangesinthe

Egyptianposition.InaspeechtotheEgyptianParliamentonFebruary4,inwhich

heacceptedanextensionofthecease‐fire,Sadathadsurfacedtheideaofan

interimagreement:apartialIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheSuezCanal,permitting

thereopeningoftheCanal,as the“firststageofatimetablewhichwillbe

preparedlatertoimplementtheotherprovisionsoftheSecurityCouncil

resolution[242].”Andasnoted,Egypt’sFebruary15replytoJarringincluded,for

thefirsttime,thewillingnesstosignapeaceagreementwithIsrael.(Ofcourse,it

wasconditionedonIsraeliwithdrawaltothe1967borders,whichIsraelwouldnot

accept.)



SadatconsideredthesestepsofFebruary1971asthebeginningofhislong,

arduous,andextraordinaryjourneytowardpeace.

Hisproposaltodiscussan

interimagreementalongtheSuezCanalbecamethefocusofdiplomacyin1971—

andaversionoftheconcepteventuallywasreflectedintheJanuary1974

disengagementagreementthatbeganthepeaceprocessafterthe1973war.His

willingnesstosignapeaceagreementwithIsraelwastobecomeadramatic

realityeightyear slater.OurperceptionofthesignificanceofSadat’smovesthen

wasunfortunatelystillbecloudedbythepresenceofover15,000Soviettroopsin

EgyptandhissigningofaFriendshipTreatywithMoscow.

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<<Contents>>

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TheIdeaofanInterimSettlement



HEconceptofaninterimwithdrawalfromtheCanalhadbeenborninthe

fertilemindofIsraeliDefenseMinisterMosheDayanduringthelate summer

of1970.InDayan’sformulationitrequiredamutualwithdrawalorthinning‐outof

militaryforcesonbothsidesoftheCanal.Dayan’sconceptwasnotthenan

officialproposaloftheIsraeligovernment,however,andwhenDayanvisited

WashingtoninDecember1970hewasobligedtodisavowitexceptasa

“theoreticalalternative”tothestandardIsraeliposition,whichwasthatIsrael

wouldnotgrantEgypttheboonofareopenedSuezCanaluntila finalpeace

agreement.Infact,Mrs.MeirhadaskedmewhatIthoughtof Dayan’sideawhen

ImetwithherattheShorehamHotelonOctober25,1970,duringhervisitto

WashingtoninconjunctionwiththeUN’stwenty‐fifthanniversary.I toldherthatI

hadnotstudieditindetailbutitseemedagoodidea.Theproposalwasrevivedat

thebeginningof1971whenanEgyptiangeneralonJanuary11approachedthe

headofourmissioninCairoand,speakinginSadat’sname,expressedinterestin

Dayan’sproposal.Next,SadatrepeateditpubliclyinhisFebruary4speech.

T

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Thereasonwhyaninterimaccordnevermaterializedin1971wasthesame

thatthwartedthecomprehensiveapproach:Thetwosideshadradicallydifferent

purposesinpursuingit.Egyptwantedaninterimagreementasthefirststep

towardatotalwithdrawal;Dayanputitforwardasameanstoforestallthat

prospect.ToDayan,apartialdisengagementhadtheattractionofbothshort‐

circuitingtheJarringdiplomacyandreducingthenegotiationtoalimitedscheme

thatcouldbemoreeasilymanagedbyIsrael’sdomesticpolicies.Aboveall,it

wouldpostponediscussionofthefinalborders.Ifimplemented,aninterimaccord

wouldstabilizetheSuezfrontandreducethepossibilityofhostilities;Egyptwould

belesslikelytolaunchawarifitstoodtolosetheeconomicbenefitofthe

reopenedCanal.ThisreasoningpersuadedMrs.MeirtoacceptSadat’ssuggestion

ofapullbackalongtheCanalinaspeechonFebruary9.



ToSadat,however,disengagementincludedamuchmoreextensiveIsraeli

withdrawalthanthelimitedpullbackDayanenvisioned.Dayanproposeda

withdrawalorthinningoutofforcesoneachside;SadatsuggestedinNewsweek

ofFebruary22thattheIsraelisshouldpullbackto“alinebehindElArish”(more

thanhalfwayacrosstheSinai)andallowaUNforcetotakeoverSharmel‐Sheikh.

SadatalsoinsistedthatEgyptianmilitaryforceshadtocrosstheCanal,where

DayansawitasamutualwithdrawalfromtheCanal.Mostimportant,Sadatmade

theagreementconditionalonanagreedtimetablefortotalwithdrawalalongthe

linesoftheRogersPlan.ThistheIsraelistotallyrejected.



Disengagementhadnochanceofsuccessaslongasithadtobenegotiated

togetherwithanoverallsettlement.Andiftherewasnochanceofsuccess,Isaw

noreasonforustoinvolveourselves.Ouraceintheholewasthatifweplayed

ourcardsright,wecouldproducetangibleprogressindiplomacywhilethe

Sovietscouldpromiseonlyhelpinwar.Butforthisstrategytoworkwehadtobe

effectual;wecouldnotwasteourprestigeonfutilemaneuvers.Tosucceed,an

interimagreementthereforehadtobeseparatedfromthecomprehensive

settlement;iftheywerelinked,wewouldmerelydissipateourinfluenceby

chasingamiragethathadallthedifficultiesofthecomprehensiveschemesit

purportedtoreplaceandthatwewerenomoreabletoproducethanMoscow.



Nevertheless,intheabsenceofanyotheralternative,theState

DepartmentenergeticallypickeduptheinterimagreementassoonasJarring’s

missioncollapsedattheendofFebruary.StateinthefirstweekofMarchbegan

privatelydiscussingthemeritsofa possibleinterimstepwiththeIsraelis,

broachingspecificideaswithRabinasearlyasMarch6.Thespeedwithwhich

Statemoved—onlyeightdaysafterIsrael,onFebruary26,hadrejectedthe

Jarringproposalandwithbarelytimeforanassessmentonnextsteps—could

hardlyalleviateIsrael’scongenitalapprehensionthatitwouldagainberushed

headlongintoadiplomacywhichwouldlinkaninterimwithafinalsettlement

alonglinesitopposed.Intheabsenceofagreedobjectivesitprovedimpossibleto

bridgethegulfbetweenthetwosides’conceptionsbyprocedurallegerdemain.At

varioustimeseachsidewasledtobelievethatwesympathizedwithitsversionof

theinterimconcept;disillusionment,frustration,andstalematewerethe

inevitableresult.



Myideawastouseaninterimagreementtobreaktheimpasse.Once

achieved,suchastepwouldeasethewaytofurtheradvances.ButIalsoparted

companywiththoseinIsraelwhoregardedaninterimdisengagementasawayto

avoidanyfurtherwithdrawals.Onthecontrary,thechiefutilityofa

disengagementalongtheCanalinmyviewwastolaunchaprocessofnegotiation

thatmightultimatelyleadtope ace withsomeoralloftheArabstates.(Thiswas,

ofcourse,theconceptof“step‐by‐step”progress,whichunlockedthepeace

processin1974.)



Nixonhadgivenmeamandatetoexplorewhatwasfeasiblebutnotto

negotiateit.Inpursuitofthis,Ibroachedtheideaofa separateinterim

agreementwithDobryninonMarch22,1971,toseewhethertheSovietswere

preparedtoabandonthelinkageto adetailedcomprehensiveplan.I pursuedthe

conceptwithAbbaEbaninmid‐MarchandwithEgypt’srepresentativein

Washington,AshrafGhorbal,onMarch25.Myapproachwastouseaninitialstep

togettheprocessofwithdrawalandmutualacceptanceunderwayevenwithout

acommitmenttoultimategoals.SinceDobryninwasunwillingtodiscussmy

approach,negotiationsreturnedtoregularchannelsandthere,notunexpectedly,

itturnedoutthatthepartieswerenotyetreadytoagreeonevenalimited

accord.



TheIsraelisinmid‐Aprilproducedapaperwiththedetailsoftheir

approach:anIsraelipullbackofunspecified(butshort)distancefromtheCanal;

noEgyptiantroopstocrosstheCanal;somethinningoutofEgyptiantroopson

theEgyptiansideoftheCanal;acease‐fireofindefiniteduration;andnolinkage

whatevertofurtherwithdrawals.Rabin, infact,showedmetheproposedIsraeli

positionpaperbefor esurfacingitattheStateDepartment.Ipersuadedhimto

convincehisgovernmenttomodifysomeelementsthatwouldhavemadethe

negotiationatotalnonstarter.Asitwas,thefinalIsraeliversionwascertaintobe

unacceptabletoEgypt.



Rogerswasneverthelessdeterminedtoacceleratewhathebelievedtobea

hopefulventure.OnApril19hesecuredthePresident’sauthorizationtovisit

severalMiddleEastcountriestofindcommongroundbetweenEgyptandIsrael

onaninterimsettlement.IexpressedmydoubtstoNixoninamemorandumof

April22:



Itwouldbeespeciallyworrisomewerehispresencetoacceleratethediplomaticprocess

andfurthertointensifythecurrentstalematebetweenIsrael,theArabs,theUSandUSSR.For

thisreason,IbelieveitisimportantthatyoucautiontheSecretarynottodepartfromthe

currentstateofplaywithoutkeepingusfullyapprisedandreceivingyourspecificapprovalfor

anydeparturefromthestatusquo.



ButIcoulddonomorethanwarn.Sincehewasunwillingtoconfronthis

Secretaryonthisissue,Nixonhadnowaytoenforcetheabovestricturesevenif

heagreedwithmyanalysis,whichwasfarfromaforegoneconclusion.



RogersvisitedtheMiddleEastatthebeginningofMay1971.His

discussionsinIsraelandEgyptmadethefundamentaldifferencesexplicit.Sadat

wantedEgyptiantroopstobeabletotakeuppositionsonbothsidesoftheCanal;

Israelviolentlydisagreed(exceptforDayan,whothought,wisely,thatsome

Egyptianpolicepresencemightbepermissible).SadatinsistedonanIsraeli

commitmentinprincipletothe1967borderslinkedtotheCanalaccord.Israel

wouldmakenosuchcommitment(althoughDayantoldSiscothathewasone of

thefewinthegovernmentwhodidseetheinterimstepaspartofacontinuing

peaceprocess).Rogers’striphadnoresultexcepttogetDayaninsometroubleat

homewhenthedifferencesbetweenhisgovernment’spositionandhisown

becamepubliclyknown.Inanastuteanalysis,HalSaunderswrotemeonMay19

thathefearedSadatmighthavebeencountingonRogerstodeliveraCanal

agreement;Sadat,whohadjustcarriedoutthemassivepurgeofpro‐Soviet

elementsinhisgovernment,probablyneededdiplomaticprogress“tomakehis

policyworkandsurvivepolitically…Thedoorisopenforamajorletdownifthere

isnomovementnow.”WhenRogerssentNixonareportonhistrip,Iattachedmy

ownanalysisinthesamevein:



Thesoberingthoughtinallofthisisthat,whileSadatmoved[topurgehisopponents]

mainlytosecurehisownposition,theUShasbecomeunintentionallybutcloselyinvolved.By

coincidenceoftiming,theSecretary’svisitandtheexpectationofaCanalsettlementwillbe

linkedinmanymindswithSadat’sbigmove.Ifhecannotdemonstratesuccessforhispolicyof

seekingnegotiation,theUS—regardlessofthemeritsofthecase—maybearmuchoftheonus.



<<Contents>>



****



ThePhantomMemorandum



Tthispoint,thequestforaninterimagreementturnedintoadetectivestory.

Itwasbecomingincreasinglydifficulttofindoutwhowasproposingwhatto

whom.TheWhiteHousecouldnolongertellwhetherthepartieswereputting

forwardtheirownviewsorelseinterpretationsofourstoforceusinto supporting

publiclywhatwehadtoldthemprivately.Intheprocess,someofourdiplomats

carriedoutanextraordinarymaneuverofwhichtheWhiteHousewascompletely

ignorant.Inafollow‐uptotheRogerstrip,ourdiplomaticrepresentativeinCairo

helpedtheEgyptiansdrafttheirowncounterproposalonaninterimsettlement.

TheincidentnotonlyrevealedtheStateDepartment’sbiastowardaninterim

accordthatwasastagetowardanagreed(andunattainable)comprehensive

settlement;moreworrisome,theAmericaninabilitytoimplementtheproposal

(aftertheEgyptianshadputitforwardwithwhattheyfeltwasourblessing)

magnifiedCairo’sdisillusionmentwithAmericandiplomacy;theythoughtus

eitherincompetentordeceitful.



OnlythreeweeksafterwarddidtheWhiteHousehaveanyinklingofwhat

hadtakenplaceinCairo.EvidentlywhathappenedwasthatDonaldBergus,head

oftheUSInterestsSectioninCairo,[

Thiswasnotanembassysinceweofficiallyhadno

diplomaticrelations.]metwithEgyptianForeignMinistryofficialsonMay23to

discussanEgyptianpositionpaper.WhentheEgyptianssoughtBergus’sadvice,

heapparentlywroteoutdetailedideasandlefthisnoteswiththeEgyptians.

Bergus’sdraft,whenitbecameknown,boreastrikingresemblancetotheformal

EgyptianproposalthatwasultimatelysubmittedtousbySadatonJune4.Itwas

anextraordinaryprocedure,whichIremainconvincednoprofessionaldiplomat

ofBergus’sexperiencewouldhaveundertakenwithoutauthorizationfrom

higher‐ups.Itwasalsoboundtofailandleaveusoutona limb.Whenwordofthe

Bergusmemorandumlaterleakedtothepress,theStateDepartment disavowed

it,sayingthatitdidnotrepresentanofficialUSposition.

TheEgyptianswerenow

doublyangry,stungbythedisavowalandbitterthatwecouldnotdeliveronwhat

theyhadassumedrepresentedourownidea.TheIsraeliswereenragedthatwe

wereencouragingEgypttoputforwardtermswhichtheyhadtoldustheywould

neveraccept.Iwasannoyed—toputitmildly—thatnoneofthesemoveshad

beendisclosedtothePresidentoftheUnitedStates.



Thencameanotherbombshell,ofevengreaterimportance.OnMay27,

1971,SadatsignedaFriendshipTreatywiththeSovietUnion.Inhis

autobiography,SadattreatsthisagreementasakindofsoptoSovietsensibilities

afterhehadpurgedandjailedallthetoppro‐Soviet elementsinEgyptian

politics.

Inowbelievethistohavebeentheprincipalmotive—thoughnoneofus

understoodSadatatthetime.ButsurelyitreflectedalsoanewSovietboldness

andSadat’sfrustrationwitherraticAmericandiplomacy.Itwasboundtoalarm

theIsraelisandmakeaninterimsettlementevenhardertoachieve.Not

surprisingly,Statehadamoresanguineassessment.RogersreportedtoNixon

thattheFriendshipTreaty“strengthens[Sadat’s]handvis‐à‐vishisownmilitary

byitsemphasisonlong‐rangemilitarysupport.Itcouldhelpmaintain[his]

flexibilityonaSuezCanalsettlement.”(StateandtheCIAmadeexactlythesame

analysisoftheSovietUnion’sFriendshipTreatywithIndia,signedlessthanthree

monthslater.)IwrotethePresidentonMay31thatIdisagreedwithRogers’s

assessment:



TheEgyptianArmyisdependentonSovietsupport.Inturn,Sadatisatthemoment

dependentonhismilitaryforhisbaseofpower,havingpurgedthepartyandthebureaucracy.

RatherthanstrengtheningSadat’sflexibilitywithrespecttonegotiatingtheCanalsettlement,

thetreatycouldgivetheSovietUnionavetooverthefuturenegotiations.Thus,whateverthe

outcomeofthenegotiations—andafterall,theSovietsarethechiefbeneficiariesofaSuez

settlement—recenteventsmayhaveenhancedSovietlong‐terminfluence.Certainlythe

Sovietsarecommittedtoengagethemselvesasneverbeforeincaseofresumptionof

hostilities.



IcannottellwhoseinterpretationNixonaccepted.Myonlyclueisthatin

themarginofmymemorandumheexpressedhisworrythat“wemustnotallow

thistobeapretextforescalationofarmstoIsrael.Wesho uldassistonlyin

responsetoincontrovertibleevidenceofSovietmilitaryaidwhichweevaluateas

significantlychangingthebalanceofpower.”Nixonsaidmoreorlessthesame

thinginanewsconferenceonJune1. Wewereindangerofconfrontationwith

Egypt,Israel,andtheSovietUnionsimultaneously.



NotknowingSadat,Ihadto concludethathewasstillplayingNasser’s

game.Furthermore,Sadat’simpatiencewasbecomingevidentinrepeated

declarationsthat1971hadtobethe“yearofdecision”intheMiddleEast.Our

strategyhadtobetofrustrateanyEgyptianpolicybasedonmilitarythreatsand

collusionwiththeSovietUnion.ThereforeSadat’sFriendshipTreatywiththe

Soviets,whateveritsmotives,didnotgalvanizeustohelphimashemighthave

hoped.Onthecontrary,itreinforcedmydeterminationtoslowdowntheprocess

evenfurthertodemonstratethatSovietthreatsandtreatiescouldnotbe

decisive.



Nevertheless,theStateDepartmentremainedeagertopressahead.Onthe

dayIleftforAsia(andChina),July1,Siscosounde doutAmbassadorRabinabout

avisittoIsraeltodiscussaninterimsettlement. (Itwashardlyacoincidencethat

thisnewStateDepartmentinitiativecamewhenIwasleavingfora twelve‐day

absenceabroad!)WhileinAsia,Imanaged,asIhavedescribed,topersuadethe

PresidenttoholdanymajorMideastdecisionsinabeyanceuntilIreturned;he

usedthepretextofcallinganNSCmeetingonthesubjectforJuly16,whichany

newinitiativeswouldhavetoawait.TheJuly16NSCmeeting,whenitconvened,

wascharacterizedbyPresidentialcomplaintsaboutthepro‐Israellobby;Laird’s

objectionstofurtheraircraftsupplytoIsrael;andRogers’seagernessforSisco to

visitIsrael.Attheendofthemeeting,NixonauthorizedtheSiscotriptoexplore

whethertherewasanyflexibilityintheIsraeliposition.Therewasnot.Histrip

producedsolittlethatSiscodidnotevenbothertostopinCairoontheway

home.



Atthispoint,aftermytriptoChinaandthecollapseoftheState

Department’spur suitofaninterimsettlement,Ibecameoperationallyactivein

MiddleEastdiplomacyforthefirsttime.



<<Contents>>



****



BecomingInvolved



hatfinallygotmeinvolvedintheexecutionofMiddleEastdiplomacywas

thatNixondidnotbelievehecouldriskrecurrentcrisesintheMiddleEast

inanelectionyear.Hethereforeaskedmetostepin,ifonlytokeepthingsquiet.

MyfirstmovewastoexplorewhethertheSovietswereinfactwillingtomoderate

theirproposals;ifnot,Iintendedtodrawthemintoprotractedandinconclusive

negotiationsuntileithertheyorsomeArabcountrychangedtheirposition.The

SovietswerestillcomplainingaboutunilateralAmericandiplomacyintheMiddle

East,whichreflectednotsomuchMoscow’sresentmentatbeingleftoutasits

eagernesstodramatizeourfailuretobringanyprogress.Ithereforetemporized

inmytalkswithDobrynininthefirsthalfof1971.ButaftertheJuly15China

announcementweheld outtheprospectofsuperpowercooperationinthe

MiddleEastinasoo thingletterthatNixonsenttoBrezhnevonAugust5.Nixon

hadmadeasimilarsuggestioninanewsconferencethenightbefore.Dobrynin

askedmeonAugust5whatwehadinmind.Havingnoconcreteideasinmind

(noryetamandatetoofferany),Isaiditsimplyreflectedourgeneralreadiness

forbroadlybasednegotiations.BrezhnevrepliedtoNixononSeptember7,

reaffirmingSovietinterestinaMiddleEastsettlement.Brezhnevexpressed

dismaythatwehadbrokenoffearlierdirectdealingswithMoscowonthe

subject.



TheseSovietoverturescameagainstthebackdropofastep‐upofSoviet

militaryactivityinEgypt.Forexample,inSeptemberIsraelshotdownaSoviet

attackbomber—anSU‐7jet—overtheCanal;anEgyptiansurface‐to‐airmissile

destroyedanIsraelireconnaissanceplane.EgypthadmovedsomeofitsSAMsites

evenfartherforward;thiscouldnothavebeendo newithoutSovietconcurrence

andcooperation.Atthesametime,theStateDepartmentwashintingthatwe

woulddelayfurtheraircraftshipments toIsraelunlessIsraelshowedgreater

flexibility.Mrs.MeirwroteNixononSeptember17,reiteratingIsrael’sconceptof

aninterimsettlement,butalsoexpressing“graveconcern”overthestoppageof

deliveryofPhantomjetstoIsraelatatimeofanincreasingSovietmilitary

presenceinEgypt.



Ifanegotiationonaninterimaccordwastobreak,ratherthanharden,this

impasse,perhapsanewtackwasrequired.IwroteNixononSeptember23:



Theproblemwiththeinterimsettlementisthattoomuchhasbeenattempted.The

initialideawassimplyamutualthinningoutonbothsides.FromthatitmushroomedtoSadat

insistingonmovinghisforcestothekeySinaipasses.Toachievethat,theUSwouldhaveto

pressIsraelalmostashardastogetanoverallsettlement.



Themainhopenow,itwouldseemtome,wouldbetoreduceEgyptianexpectationsto

apointwherechangesthatmightrealisticallybeexpectedinIsrael’spositioncouldproducean

understanding.Becauseofficialpositionsaretiedtogreaterexpectations,itmaybethatthe

onlywayofachievingthis—ifitwerepossibleatall—wouldbethroughlessofficialexchanges

toseewhatmightbepossible.



Mymentionof“lessofficialexchanges”waspromptedby,amongother

things,aSovietoverturetome.DobryninforewarnedmeonSeptember20that

Gromyko,whenhemetwiththePresidentonSeptember29,wouldpropose

puttingtheMideastissueintothespecialChannel.IwarnedDobrynin,inturn,

thatatbestthiswouldbeaslowprocess,requiringsomeexplorationtoseeifit

wasworthwhile.TheMiddleEastwasmuchmorecomplexthanevenBerlin

(whichwehadjustconcludedsuccessfullyintheChannel);thefactorsweremuch

lessinourcontrolandtheindiscretionofthepartiesinvolvedwasofepic

proportion.



Theprospectofanotherbackchannelnegotiationwouldalsorequire

contactwithEgypt.IhadhadatalkonSeptember16withaformerstudentof

mine,AliHamdiel‐Gammal,directoroftheprestigiousCaironewspaperAl

Ahram,whotriedtosetupaconfidentialmeetingbetweenmeandhischief

editor,MohamedHeikal,aconfidantofSadat.GammalinvitedmetoCairo;he

discussedasanalternativetakinguptheofferofaprivatebusinessexecutiveto

hostameetingathishomebetweenmeandHeikal.[

Heikallaterturneddownthe

invitationandthemeetingnevertookplace.Notuntilthespringof1972didCairofinda

reliablechannel.]Then,inearlyOctober,YitzhakRabin,too,urgedmetoget

involvedpersonallyintheinterimaccordnegotiations;hetoldmeconfidentially

thatIsraelmightbemoreflexibleinitstermsifIwereinvolvedandithad

Presidentialassura ncesthatthedemandswouldnotbeopen‐ended.I toldboth

GammalandRabinthatifIdecidedtoengagemyself,theirrespective

governmentswouldhavetofaceuptotheharddecisionsrequired.Egyptwould

havetogiveupitspreconditionofacommitmenttototalwithdrawal;Israel

wouldhavetobepreparedtoputforwardareasonablepackage.Theonlypoint

instakingPresidentialprestigewastomakeprogress.



Bythistime,thePresidenthimselfwaspushingtheideaofmymoreactive

involvement—ifonlyforthedamage‐limiting purposeofkeepingthingsquiet

untilafterthe1972election.WhenForeignMinisterGromykometwithNixonon

September29,1971,wewentthroughtheusualritualbywhichalargermeeting

includingStateDepartmentparticipantswascutshortsothatNixonandGromyko

couldthentalkprivatelyinhishideawayintheExecutiveOfficeBuilding.Nixon

acceptedGromyko’ssuggestionthatDobryninandIundertakeaserious

explorationofMiddleEastissues—thoughnotwithoutlinkingitagaintoSoviet

helponVietnam.



IsubsequentlyvisitedtheSovietEmbassyontheeveningofSeptember30

foratwo‐hourprivatemeetingwithGromyko.Irepeatedtohimthedifficultiesof

settlingtheMiddleEastintheChannel,incontrasttoBerlin.OnBerlin,theparties

affectedallwantedanagreement;thiswaslessthanclearintheMiddleEast.I

pointedoutthatIdidnotwanttogetinvolvedonbehalfofthePresidentunless

therewasagoodchanceofachievinganagreement;thiswaswhyI proposed

exploratorytalksfirst.TherealissuewasnotthedetailofwhethertheIsraelis