Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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popularitytosolvePoland’schroniceconomicills.Poland’smassivelyinefficient

industrieshadincreasedoutputbuthadbeenstockpilingunwantedgoodsuntilby

1970theirinventoriesreachedtheastonishingtotalof50percentoftheGross

nationalProduct.Twoconsecutivepoorharvestscompoundedconsumergoods

shortageswithafoodcrisis.Unemploymentaddedtotensions;inearly1970,two

hundredthousand“surplus”workerswerelaidoff.Thesefactorscombinedto

givePoland,from1966to1970,thesloWestrateofincreaseinrealwagesin

EasternEurope.



OnDecember13,barelyaweekafterthesigningoftheWestGerman

treaty,thePolishregimeraisedthepriceofmeatproductsbyamountsfrom10to

33percent.ThefirstsignoftroublecameinGdanskontheBalticcoast.Workers’

protestsledtorioting,whichspreadtotwonearbycities,SopotandGdynia.By

December15shipyardworkersinGdanskweremarchingonCommunistParty

headquarters.Twodayslatertankshadtobeusedtosuppressriotsintheportof

Szczecin.OnDecem ber18demonstrationsspreadtotheminingcityofKatowice.

OnDecember20,GomulkawasreplacedasPartysecretarybyEdwardGierek,

whotoldthepeoplethatthedisturbanceshadbeencausedby“hastyconceptsof

economicpolicy”which“wewillremove.”OnDecember23thePolishParliament

appointedPiotrJaroszewicztoreplacePremierJozefCyrankiewicz.He

immediatelyorderedfoodpricesfrozenfortwoyears.



Thesedramaticeventspresenteduswithtwochallenges.Themost

immediateone,andthefocusofUSgovernmentaldiscussion,washowwemight

reactiftheSovietssuppressedthePolishdisturbancesmilitarily.Unfortunately,

nearlythirtyyearsofpostwarhistoryhadleft littledoubtthatwehadalimited

capacityformilitaryintervention;contingencystudiesconfirmedthis.Ifwecould

notforestallSovietrepression,wewouldhavefewmeanstoundoit.



Contrarytomyviewsinthe1968Czechcrisis,Iwasconvincedthatthe

Sovietswouldbehighlyreluctanttounde rtakethemilitaryoccupationofa

countrythesizeandimportanceofPoland.Themostimportantaspectofthe

PolishriotswasthelessonstheSovietsmightdrawfromthem.Sovietpolicyhad

soughttoencourageWestEuropeandissociationfromtheUnitedStates,butin

encouragingamorenationalGermanpolicytheSovietUnionhadevokedsimilar

nationaltrendsinEasternEurope.AnagreementsolvingoneofPoland’snational

foreignpolicyproblemsonabilateralbasiswithBonnhadencouragedthePolish

governmenttoeaseitsdomesticproblemsonanationalbasisandthusfacedthe

SovietUnionwithcentrifugaltendenciesinitsempireinEasternEurope.Ithought

thatthePolishriotswoulddriveMoscowtowardtheUnitedStates.OnDecember

20IwrotethePresident:



TheSovietleadersmayalsobeinclinedtobelievethatOstpolitikhasanunsettlingeffect

onEasternEurope.Forexample,theymaybelievethatthetreatywithGermanyledGomulkato

concludehecouldpressunpopularpriceincreasesonthepopulation.Thus,Moscowmayalso

wantapauseinitsrelationswithBonn…



Atthesametime,withthisdétentewithBonnatleasttemporarilysloweddown,the

Sovietleaders,iftheychoosetomaintainsomeprospectofdétente,maybeinclinedtoshow

someimprovementintheirrelationswithus.



ThusbythemiddleofDecember1970thebargainingpositionbetweenus

andMoscowhad,inmyview,changed;wewere,infact,inthestrongestposition

sinceNixonhadcometooffice. WehadCienfuegosandJordanbehindus;wehad

demonstratedourdeterminationtoresistpressures;Moscowhadexperienced

thebrittlenessofitsEastEuropeandominion. Andwehadasafetyvalveofwhich

theKremlinwasasyetunaware.Abouttendaysearlierwehadreceivedthefirst

directcommunicationfromtheChineseleadershipproposinghigh‐leveltalks.



Aftersubmittingmymemorandum,Ihadseveralextensiveconversations

withthePresidentonthesituation.Itoldhimthatthemomenthadcometotest

theChannelbetweenDobryninandme.IconjecturedthattheSovietsmightbe

readytobreakthedeadlockonanumberofnegotiations;oftheseSALTand

Berlinwereespeciallyimportant,forSALTwouldinfluenceourdefensebudget

andBerlinwouldtestalliedcohesion.



Isaidthatwewereagainabouttofacethenowannualritualisticassaultby

Congressonourdefensebudget,thesymbolofwhichwastheantiballisticmissile

(ABM)thatwasalsoourchiefbargainingchipinSALTnegotiations.Forthe

identicalforcesofpreviousbattlesweremobilizing;thetrencheswerebeing

mannedbythesamefiguresnowsousedtotheconfrontationthatithadbecom e

anendinitself.Theannualdelegationofscientificandacademicfigureswould

appearatCongressionalhearings,allopposingABMasbothineffectualand

menacingtostrategicstability.Repetitionhadstillnotclarifiedhowbothofthese

criticismscouldbesimultaneouslyvalid.LeadingSenatorswouldtakeupthecall,

submittingresolutionstodictateourdeploymentsorournegotiatingstance—it

wastheVietnamsyndromeextendingintoallotherareasofpolicy.TheNewYork

TimesandtheWashingtonPostwouldsupplytheaccompanimentwithbiweekly

editorials.OurdefenseprogramwouldbecutfirstbytheAdministrationto

preemptCongressionalassaultsandthenagainbytheCongresstoassertits

prerogativeandtocarryoutthemythassiduouslyfosteredbyvariouspeace

groups:thatonlyiftheCongressemasculatedourmilitaryestablishmentwould

ourgovernmentbehaveresponsiblyandendthewarinVietnam.Byagreement

withtheSovietsorbyCongressionalimposition,onewayoranotherwewere

approachingtheunilateralabandonmentofABM.



ButoncethathappenedtheSovietswouldloseanyincentivetohalttheir

offensivebuildup.ThisiswhythePresidentandIinsistedontyinglimitationson

ourABMprogramtoafreezeonSovietoffensivede ployments.[

Theformalproposal

offreezingtheconstructionofoffensiveweaponswas,ofcourse,tobeappliedtobothsides.

Butsincewehadnonewdeploymentswecouldundertakeforafive‐yearperiod,wewerein

effecttalkingaboutaSovietfreeze.]TheDefenseDepartmentnotonlysupportedbut

pressedforthisproposal.InDecember1970IurgedthePresidenttoopen

negotiationstothatend;ifwefailed,Congressionalpressuresmightcauseusto

loseanyleverageontheSovietstrategicbuildup.



OnBerlinItoldthePresidentIthoughtanagreementwouldbedemanded

bytheGermanParliamentasthepriceofratifyingChancellorBrandt’streaties

withMoscow.Thatrequiredourapproval,asoneofthefouroccupyingpowers

(theUnitedStates,theSovietUnion,GreatBritain,andFrance),andprobablyour

activediplomacy.Ourpivotalroleconstrainedthenationalisticundercurrentsof

Ostpolitik;italsoforcedtheSovietstoseekoursupport.IdescribedtheSoviets’

probleminamemorandumtoNixon:



TheSovietsmayhavesomeconsiderableconcernthattheycannotgointoaParty

CongressinMarchwiththeirWesternpolicyinashambles—noBerlinprogress,nomoveto

ratifytheGermantreaties,noprospectforeconomicassistancefromtheWestGermans—but

thatweholdthekeytothisincreasinglycomplicatedtangleofissues.



AtthesametimewehadamajorinterestinimprovinglifeinBerlin:to

maintainthemoraleofitspopulationandespeciallytoeliminatethisperennial

pretextforSovietblackmail.Unfortunately,theBerlinnegotiationswerebogged

downinamazeofbureaucraticandlegalistic complexity.Everyproposalhadto

movethroughacumbersomeFour‐Powermachinery,whichincidentallyexcluded

thecountrywiththebiggeststakeintheoutcome,thefederalGermanRepublic,

whoseofficialsattendedonlythemeetingsofanalliedconsultativegroup.Given

thedifficultyofnegotiatingeveryproposalwithineachgovernment,then

betweentheWesternpowers,andfinallywiththeSoviets,progresswasglacial.

Everychangeinvolvedweeksofcontroversy,comprehensibleonlytothefew

lawyerswhoseoddspecialtywasthearcanesubjectofthePotsdamAgreementof

1945anditslaterlegalhistory.



Forusthenegotiationspresentedspecialcomplexities.Ontheonehand,

wecouldbringaboutanimprovementofaccessto BerlinandmoveOst p olitikinto

amultilateralframeworkonlyifwewerepreparedto sustainaprolonged

deadlock;thiswouldbringhometotheSovietsthattheyneededaBerlin

agreementmorethanwedid.Tosomeextent,wehadalreadyaccomplishedthis.

Ontheotherhand,unlessskillfullyhandled,aprolongedstalemateofferingno

hopeofsolutioncoulddamageUS‐Germanrelationsseverely.Wecouldbecome

thewhippingboy,accusedbyBrandtofblockinghispolicies,andchargedbyhis

opponentswithhavinglethimgettoofaroutfront.IftherewereanotherBerlin

crisis,theonuscouldfallonus.WewereconstantlybeingtoldbySoviet

diplomatsthatFranceandtheFederalRepublicblamedusforslowprogresson

Berlin.ThoughtheSovietintentionwasclearlytosowdiscord,thereporthad

undoubtedlyakerneloftruth;ourallieswerenotabovedeflectingSovietwrath

tous,andFranceinparticularseemedwillingtobewooed.



Brandt’sstateofmindsurfacedina letterhewrotetoNixononDecember

12,urging—notwithoutimpliedcriticism—anaccelerationofBerlinnegotiations.

Brandtrecommendedthatthetalksgointo“continuousconference.”Inthese

circumstanceswecouldpreventtheBerlin negotiationsfromgettingoutof

controlonlyifweplayedanactiverole;anyotherpositionmightwindupwith

eitherdangerousconcessionsoraBerlincrisis.Ihadanotherreason,transcending

thetacticalhandlingofspecificnegotiationstotestthefeasibilityofapolicyof

mutualrestraint.Throughallturmoilandcrises,despitemyfirmcommitmentto

preventSovietgeopolit icalgains,Ifeltamoralandpoliticalobligationtoexplore

theopportunitiesofcoexistence,nomatterhowunpromisingtheprospects.

Everypoliticalleaderoweshispeopletherealityaswellastheappearanceof

exertinghisbestefforttosparemankindanuclearholocaust.Skepticswere

concernedlestsuchapolicy,byblindingfreepeoplestotheirdanger,undermined

theirreadiness



BreakthroughonTwofronts



Todefendthemselves.TheschismsoftheVietnamwarmovedmeinthe

oppositedirection.The“peaceissue”hadbeenexploitedbysomedeterminedto

underminegovernmentalcredibilityandperhapsthecohesionofoursociety.

Theycouldnotbeleftamischievousmonopoly.IfweweretoresistSoviet

expansionism,wehad,paradoxically,todemonstratethatallpeacefulinitiatives

hadbeenexhausted.Ihadthenretained,andstilldo,theconfidencethatfree

peoplescanaccomplishboth,lookingtotheirsecuritythroughstrongde fenses

whilesimultaneouslyexploringtheambiguousprospectsforpeace.Indeed,if

theycannotpursuebothobjectives,theywillfailinboth.



InthelongtermIfeltaperiodofinternationaltranquillitywasboundto

presentmoreproblemstotheSovietUnionthantoussinceitscohesionwasin

partmaintainedbytheconstantevocationofanexternaldanger.Alongperiodof

peace,Iwasconvinced,wouldunleashmorecentrifugaltendenciesinthe

totalitarianstatesthanintheindustrialdemocracies.Astagnatingeconomy,

restlessnationalities,anddissidentswouldabsorbmoreandmoreofSoviet

energies.ThegeopoliticalprospectsoftheSovietUnionwouldbecomemore

problematicalasChinabecamestrongerandJapanthrewoffthetraumaof

defeat.TimewasnotnecessarilyontheSovietside.



IbegantestingthehunchthattheSovietleadersmightbereadyforserious

talksinalongconversationwithDobryninonDecember22,twodaysafterI

wrotetoNixononthePolishuprising.IreiteratedourconvictionthatMoscow’s

recentpolicieswereincompatible withimprovedrelations:thedeceptionat

Cienfuegosandthesubsequentattempttotestthelimitsofourunderstandings

there;SovietaggressivenessintheMiddleEast;theharassmentoftheBerlin

corridors;thedelayinreleasingthetwoerrantAmericangenerals.Afundamental

decisionwasnecessary.Ifthepolicyofpettyadvantagewerecontinued,

pinprickscouldeasilybecomewounds;suspicionscouldenlargefailureof

communicationintocrisis.Buttherewasthepos sibilityofamoreconstructive

relationship.IproposedthatweusetheChanneltosolvesomeoftheoutstanding

issuesonabasisofstrictreciprocity.Somethingshouldandcouldcomeoutofour

talksotherthanmutualrecriminations.



SinceDobryninwaswithoutinstructions,hecouldonlysumupthe

establishedSovietpositioninaconciliatoryfashion.Buthea g reedontheneedto

breaktheice.Heassuredmethathisgovernmentwascommittedtoreachan

understandingwiththeUnitedStates.Heagreedthatweshouldbothreview

negotiatingrecordstofindareasofpossibleflexibility.



OnJanuary6,Dobryninlefta noteaboutBerlinatmyWhiteHouseoffice;I

wasinSanClementewiththePresident.Incharacteristicfashionitimplieda

concessionbyvoicingacomplaint;Gromykospecializedindoublenegativesin

diplomaticcorrespondenceaswellasinper‐sonalconversation.Onthisoccasion

thecomplaintwasthattheUnitedStateshadnotliveduptoacommitment

allegedlymadebyNixoninhistalkwithGromyko.NixonhadsaidthattheUnited

StatescouldnotshowgreaterflexibilityonBerlinunlesstheSovietsaccepted

Berlin’sorganiccordtotheFederalRepublic.Moscowhadinthemeantimemade

aDelphicutterancethatcouldbeinterpretedasrecognizinganumbilical

connectionwithout,however,spellingoutitsnatureoranySovietobligationto

seeitrespected.Gromyko’snotepointedtothatutteranceasadazzling

concessionopeningupthepossibilityofnegotiatingsimultaneouslyon“all

questions…asakindofpackage.”TheSovietsknewbetterthanthat;Nixon’s

remarkhadbeenoneofthosemetaphoricalflourishesbywhichheadsof

governmentavoidcomingtogripswithoperationalissues.ButwhateverNixon’s

intention—andhisbasicmotivehadbeentogetthroughtheBerlinpartofhis

briefwithoutmakinganycommitment—Dobrynin’snotein itsconvolutedway

showedthattheyweregettingreadytoshifttheirposition.Theyhadhitherto

insistedthattheBerlintalksfocusonreducingWestGermanactivitiesinthecity

inreturnforlittleotherthantheconfirmationoftheexistingstatus.Nowthey

werehintingatareadinesstomoveonSovietguaranteesofaccessand

improvementinlifeinBerlin.Onthisbasisaseriousnegotiationwaspossible.



IrecommendedtoNixonthatwereturnapositivereplywhichwouldinsist

onSovietguaranteesofaccessandaclearlydefinedlegalstatusforWestBerlin.

AndIproposedlinkingtheBerlinnegotiationstoprogressinSALT;SALT,inturn,

wewouldmakedependonSovietwillingnesstofreezeitsoffensivebuildup.

Nixonapproved.DobryninhadbeencalledbacktoMoscowforurgent

consultation.ThiscouldmeanthattheSovietleaderswantedtobeoutoftouch

becauseofacrisistheyknewtobeimminent,orthattheywishedtoavoidan

answertoaquery,orthattheywereinde edengagedinaseriouspolicyreview.

Thelatterhypothesiswasthemoreplausibleinthisinstance;Dobryninhad

delayedhisdeparturebytwenty‐fourhourssothathecouldgetourresponseto

thefeeleronBerlin.



OnmyreturnfromSanClemente,DobryninandImetonthemorningof

January9,1971,attheSovietembassy.Thetwo‐hourmeetingturnedouttobea

crucialone.IputforwardnewpropositionsontwosubjectsthatIclearedin

principlewithNixon.ThefirstwasouransweronBerlin.ItoldDobryninthatit

wassenselesstoengageinanabstractexegesisoftheconversationbetween

GromykoandNixon.WewantedtwothingsfromtheSovietUnion:first,

improvedaccessforWestBerlinand,second,aSovietguaranteeofthenew

accessprocedures.Wedidnotwantto havethefreedomofBerlindependonthe

goodwilloftheEastGermanregime,againstwhichwehadlittleleverage.Ifthe

Sovietleaderswerepreciseonthesetwo points,wewouldengageourselves

moredirectlyintheBerlinnegotiations.Wewouldbepreparedtoconduct

exploratorytalksintheChannelandiftheywentwellfeedtheirresultsintothe

establishedFour‐Powermachinery.Thiswouldinevitablyinvolveconsultation

withWestGermanofficials;wewouldreachnounderstandingswiththeSoviets

notapprovedinadvancebyBonn.Iwasproposing,asImadeclearinalater

conversation,anopportunityforgreaterspeed,notforgreaterconcessions.



WithrespecttoSALT,Iproposedtobreakthedeadlockoverthelinkage

betweenABMandoffensivelimitations.[

TherewasnoPresidentiallettertoBrezhnev,

orPresidentialmeetingwithDobryninonJanuary9,assomeaccountssuggest,

butan

initiativebyme—approvedbythePresident—inthePresidentialChannelwithDobrynin.(The

firstcommunicationbetweenNixonandBrezhnevtookplaceinAugust1971.)

]Itold

DobryninwewouldaccepttheSovietproposaltonegotiateanABMtreaty

providedtheSovietsundertooktobeginnegotiationsimmediatelyonoffensive

limitations;thetwonegotiationswouldc oncludesimultaneously.Theoffensive

limitationwouldconsistofanundertakingthatneithersidewouldstart

constructionofnewland‐basedICBMswhilethenegotiationsweregoingon.We

wouldputforwardlateranewproposalonsubmarine‐launchedmissiles.The

resultscouldbeexpressedinanexchangeoflettersbetweenthePre sidentand

Kosygin(stillassumedbyustobeNixon’sinterlocutor).



WhatIwasproposingonbothSALT andBerlinwasamechanismto

shortcutthecumbersomemachinerythatmadestalemateprobableandpublic

acrimonycertain.Anysuccessfulnegotiationmustbebase donabalanceof

mutualconcessions.Buthowtoarriveatthisbalanceisacomplexprocess.The

sequenceinwhichconcessionsaremadebecomescrucial;itcanbeabortedif

eachmovehastobedefendedindividuallyratherthanaspartofamosaicbefore

thereciprocalmoveisclear.Intheformativestagesofanegotiationsecrecyis

thereforevital,astheCarterAdministrationlearnedwhenitseffortsatopen

diplomacyexplodedseveralpromisinginitiatives.Speedalsoisoftenofthe

essence.Everynegotiationreachesacriticalpointwhereitwillmoverapidlytoa

conclusionorlapseintostagnation.Thisiswhenthehighestlevelsofgovernment

mustengagethemselvestoovercomebureaucraticinertia.IhadofferedDobrynin

amechanismandanassuranceofsecrecyandspeed.



Dobryninaskedsomepenetratingquestions.Whilehewasatit,hetriedfor

abreakthroughontheMiddleEastaswell,butIputhimoff;Ididnotthink

conditionswereripe.Dobryninbynowknewmewellenoughnottohaveillusions

aboutmyintentiontoconductthetwonegotiations—BerlinandSALT—in

tandem.AndIhadlearnedenoughabouttheSovietsystemtobecertainthatthe

Sovietleadershipcouldmovewithdispatchwhenitwantedto.Dobrynin

promisedanearlyreply;Iwassurethatthiswasonepromisewhichwouldbe

kept.



Dobryninwasbackinlessthantwoweeks;onJanuary23hecametothe

MapRoombubblingwithenthusiasm.ThePolitburo,hesaid,hadstudiedour

propositionswithgreatinterest.Hehadseenallthetopleadersandhecouldtell

methatconditionsforasummitwerenowexcellent.(Ihadnot,infact,raised

thatpointonJanuary9,butDobryninnodoubtsawsomemileageinplayingon

Nixon’spresumedeagernessforapublicitycoup.)TheSovietleaderswouldprefer

JulyorAugust;Septemberwould,howe ver,alsobesuitable.Ofcourse,some

progresshadtobemadefirst.Buteverybodywasnowquiteoptimistic.Having

deliveredhimselfoftheSovietconceptionoflinkage,Dobryninturnedtoours.

TheSovietleadersweredelightedthatIwaswillingtoengagemyselfintheBerlin

talks.TheyhadbeentoldbyBrandtandBahrthatofalltheAmericanleadersI

understoodGerma nconditionsbest.(Thiswasprobablytrue;atthesametime

Moscowmusthavedecidedthatplayingonmyvanitycoulddonoharm.)Though

formalpositionswouldnotbeputforwarduntilthetalksactuallybegan,Dobrynin

couldtellmenowthatthesuggestionthattheSovietUnionprovidesome

guaranteeofaccesswasbeingstudiedseriouslyinMoscow.Ashespoke,itwas

becomingplainthatthepressureforarapidBerlinagreementwasonMoscow.It

nowhadbeguntoseethatitwouldnevergetitscherishedEasterntreatiesunless 

therewereaBerlinagreement.Anditwouldpayapriceforthat.



AstoSALT,Dobryninwasnotyetinapositiontobedefinitive.However,

therewasagoodpossibilitythatMoscowwouldaccepttheideaofcombininga

defensivetreatywithanoffensivefreeze.Heraisedanumberofpractical

questions.Onewasasdifficultasitwasembarrassing—whic h ofthemany

versionsoftheABMschemethathadbeenadvancedeitherintheSALTtalksorto

theCongresswerewereallyinterestedin.Icouldonlysaylamelythatwehadnot

yetdecided;itwasoneofthosecaseswherewhatistrueisnotnecessarily

plausible.ItwasnoteasyfortheSovietstofindtheirwayamongour

Congressionalposition(thethree‐sitesystemprotectingICBMs),ourformalSALT

proposal(NationalCommandAuthorities,thatis,WashingtonandMoscow),and

thepersonalconvictionofourSALTnegotiator(whichwasforatotalban).Imade

clearthatSALTwouldbekeptinstepwiththeBerlinnegotiations.



SovietdiplomatsneverfailtogothroughanendlesscatalogueofSoviet

proposals.Thetheoryseemsto bethatonecannevertellwhenaninterlocutor

mightabsentmindedlyorinadvertentlyyieldupaconcession;ataminimum,the

leadershipinMoscowseemstorequiretangibleproofthatitsrepresentativehas

notfailedforlackofpersistence.AfterIdisposedagainofallofDobrynin’sold

standbys—theEuropeanSecurityConferenceandMiddleEastleadingthelist—

weagreedtomeetregularlyandsystematicallyonceIhadsetuptheappropriate

procedures.



Iwasgettingmyselfengagedintwonegotiationsofalmosttheological

complexity.BerlininvolvedthevitalinterestsofthreeotherWesternalliesand

theSovietUnionandtwoalreadyestablishedforums.SALTwasaddressedina

formalnegotiationalternatingbetweenHelsinkiandViennaandbackstoppedbya

bewilderingmazeoftechnicalandsubstantivecommittees,someofwhichI

chaired.Unlessgreatcarewastaken,wecouldwindupblowingallthefuses.



<<Contents>>



****



TheChannelBecomesOperational



ytheendof1970IhadworkedwithNixonfornearlytwoyears;wehad

talkedatlengthalmosteveryday;wehadgonethroughallcrisesinclosest

cooperation.Hetendedmoreandmoretodelegatethetacticalmanagementof

foreignpolicytome.DuringthefirstyearorsoI wouldsubmitforNixon’s

approvalanoutlineofwhatIproposedtosaytoDobryninortheNorth

Vietnamese,forinstance,beforeeverymeeting.Herarelychangedit,thoughhe

rarelyfailedalsotoaddtough‐soundingexhortations.Bytheendof1970Nixon

nolongerrequiredthesememoranda.Hewouldapprovethestrategy,usually

orally;hewouldalmostneverinterveneinitsday‐to‐dayimplementation.After

eachnegotiatingsessionIsubmittedalengthymemorandumandanalysis.Nixon

thushadeveryopportunitytodeterminewhetherhiswisheswerebeingcarried

out.ButIcanrecallnooccasionafter1971wherehealteredthecourseofa

negotiationonceitwasintrain.IknewwhatNixonwantedtoaccomplish.Wehad

jointlydevisedthestrategy.Hedidnotbelievethattheconductorneedbeseen

toplayeveryinstrumentintheorchestra.

B



ButifIcouldbesureofNixon’sbacking,Iwasonthinicewiththerestof

thegovernment.Theriskofanynegotiationinalargebureaucracyisthatthose

whoareexcludedcanalwaysclaimthattheycouldhavedonebetterandthe

fewerengagedthemorearetemptedtodoso.Uninvolvedintheprocessof

mutualadjustment,theycanemphasizemaximumobjectives;unawareof

obstacles,theycanblameeveryconcessiononinadequatetoughnessor

negotiatingskill.TheproceduresIdevelopedenhanceddecisivenessin

negotiations,buttheymadeitmoredifficulttodevelopaconsensusbehindthe

results.



Thentherewastheproblemofmasteringthesubject.Mystaffwastoo

smalltobackstoptwocomplexsimulta neousnegotiations.Thecontrolof

interdepartmentalmachineryservedasasubstitute.Itenabledmetousethe

bureaucracywithoutrevealingourpurposes.Iwouldintroduceasplanningtopics

issuesthatwereactuallybeingsecretlynegotiated.InthismannerIcouldlearn

theviewsoftheagencies(aswellasthenecessarybackground)withoutformally

“clearing”mypositionwiththem.WhatIproposedto Dobryninwouldreflecta

bureaucraticconsensusandwasprobablytougherthanaformalnegotiating

positionwouldhavebeen.Foragenciesusuallytakeaharderlineininteragency

planningmeetings,whereitispossibletoacquireareputationforvigilance