Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

simultaneously;thesehadbeenpreparedbymystaff,drawingoninteragency

preparationsforSALTdiscussions.Butheremattersstalled.Atmeetingson

February26andMarch5,Dobryninclaimedgeniallythatallhisleaderswereout

ofMoscowpreparingfortheforthcomingtwenty‐fourthSovietPartyCongress;it

wasthereforedifficultforthemtoconcentrateonso complexatopicasSALT.I

couldnotresisttheobservationthattheyseemedtohavenodifficultyfocusing

ontheevenmorecomplexandlaborioussubjectofBerlin,astowhichnotaweek

passedwithoutsomedetailedcommunicationfromMoscow.



Timewasbecomingcrucial,complicatedbyourownprocedures.The

officialSALTtalkswereresuminginViennaonMarch15.Wehadtoformulate

newinstructionsthatwereataminimumnotincompatiblewithwhatwasgoing

oninthespecialChannel.Atthesametime,Nixonwasseizedbythefearthat

Gerardsmith,ratherthanhe,wouldgetcreditfortheseeminglyimminent

breakthroughoflinkingoffensiveanddefensivelimitations. Hehadtakenenough

ofabeatingonVietnamandCambodianottosuccumbtothehumanemotionof

wantingthecreditfortheinitiativesidentifiedwithpeace.IreassuredNixonthat

suchabreakthroughcouldoccurinViennaonlyifMoscowmadea deliberate

choicetobypassthePresidentialChannel,notonlyonthisissuebutonallothers.

ThiswouldbeafatefuldecisionandagainsttheSovietinterest,atleastaslongas

Brandt’sEasterntreatieshunginthebalance.Still,theguerrillawarfare

continued,withDobryninonMarch12handingmeaSovietdraftthatwentback

ontheprincipleofsimultaneityofoffensiveanddefensivelimitations.Itcalledfor

anABMagreement“thisyear”confinedtonationalcapitals (NCA);offensive

limitationswouldbediscussedonlyaftersuchanagreementhadbeenreached

andonly“inprinciple.”ThisrestatementoftheformalSovietpositionattheSALT

talkscouldnotbeserious;Dobryninhadtohavesomethinginreserve.The

propositionwasbeingputforwardbytheSovietleadershipasafinalproofto

itselfthatitwouldnotgetanywhere;therewasnopointinaspecialChannelifit

merelyrepeatedthelower‐leveldeadlock.AssoonasIrejectedDobrynin’s

proposal,Dobryninimmediatelyshowedhishand:Hedidnotaskfortimeto

consultMoscow—whichwouldhavebeennormalhadthefirstschemebeen

serious—butsuggestedthatwetrytomergeSovietandAmericandraftsand

attempttobridgedifferences.Clearly,Dobryninhadbeenequippedwithsome

latitude;hewouldneverhaveofferedredraftsonhisownauthority.



OnMarch15wemettoexchangethenewdrafts.Dobryningavemean

abbreviatedversionofhisMarch12draft.ItdidnotchangetheSovietinsistence

thatanagreementonABMprecedeoffensivelimitations;itdiddroptheprinciple

thatABMbeconfinedtothecapitals.Our versioncontinuedtolinkoffensiveand

defensivelimitations,mymainaim.



DobryninandImetthenextdaytoattemptanamalgam.Whatemerged

cameclosetomeetingourprincipalrequirements.Instructions wouldbeissued

tothetwoSALTdelegationstoreachanABMagreement“immediately.”This

wouldbeaccomplishedbya freezeon“strategicoffensiveweapons,”bothICBMs 

andSLBMs.Modernizationandreplacementwouldbepermitted,butonlyby

weaponsofthesamecategory.Inotherwords,theSovietheavymissiles(SS‐9s),

whichweconsideredsuchathreattoourMinutemanland‐basedmissileforce,

wouldbefrozenatthecurrentlevel.



OnMarch25IsentDobryninwhatindiplomaticparlanceiscalledan“oral

note”—awrittenbutunsignedcommunicationwhosestatusisthatofthespoken

wordandwhichcanthereforebemoreeasilydisavowed.Itlaidoutourviewof

theprocedurestobeadopted.ThetermsofanABMagreementandthefreezeon

offensiveweaponswouldhavetobenegotiatedsimultaneouslyandcompletedat

thesametime.(IleftthenatureoftheABMlimitationtothenegotiators.)The

permittedlevelswouldbethenumberofweaponsoperationalorunder

constructiononthedatethefreezewentintoeffect.



Thenextday,March26,DobryninbroughttheSovietreplytoourMarch16

draft,whichitneitheracceptednorrejected.Theprincipleofafreezeonstrategic

offensiveweaponswasaccepted,butthedetailsweretobediscussedafteran

agreementondefensiveweaponshadbeenreached.Inthearcaneworldof

Sovietdiplomacy,whereanyconcessionmustbemadewithaminimumofgrace,

thisimplieda compromise:thattheagreementsbediscussedsuccessivelybut

signedsimultaneously.Thiswecouldnotaccept.OnceanABMtreatywasknown

toexist,wewouldbeunderirresistiblepressuretosign;theminutewehad

signed,theoffensivefreezewouldevaporate.(evenifwedidnotsignit,the

Congresswouldneve rvotefundsfortheABMprogram,sothattheidealoutcome

fromtheSovietpointofviewwouldbeanunconsummatedABMagreementin

whichtheUnitedStatesabandoneditsprogramunilaterally.)



Weweremakingprogress,butatanexcruciatinglyslowpace.Ileftno

doubtthatwewouldinsistontheprinciplesofthenotesubmittedtheprevious

day.Dobryninallowedthathisleaderscouldnothavehadanopportunityto

studyit.Fortunately,hewouldsoonbeinMoscowtobriefthempersonally,since

hehadjustbeenrecalledonceagainforconsultation.InthestyletowhichIhad

becomeaccustomed,Moscowwasslowingdownnegotiationsfurtherbythe

simpledeviceofremovingitsnegotiator.



AllthistimetheformalSALTnegotiationsproceededinVienna,adding

anothercomplicationbecauseournegotiatorswereunawareofthespecial

Channel.AttheendofMarchGerardSmithspeculatedinabackchanneltome

thathehadgone aboutasfaraspossibleunlesshewasgiventheauthorityto

includeforward‐basedsystemsinthenegotiations.PaulNitze,representingthe

DefenseDepartment, suggestedthatweacceptanABMbaninreturnforafreeze

andeventualreductionofSovietheavyICBMs(theSS‐9s).Domestically,pressures

continuedtobuildonustoaccepttheSovietABM‐onlyproposal.Timemagazine,

theWashingtonPost,andSenatorMuskiewereamongtheadvocates.Senator

Symingtoncomparedthe“safeguard”ABMprogramtoacompanymaking

parachutesthatadvertises“ifitdoesn’tworksenditbackandwewillgiveyou

anotherone.”

Infairness,oursecretstyleofnegotiationsleftusvulne rableto

thesepressures;ourcriticsdidnotknowthatwecoulddobetter.Ontheother

hand,hadtheyknowntheywouldhavepressedustoacceptthecurrentSoviet

proposals,whichwewerestillseekingtoimprove.



Indeed,sincepublicdebateonoffensiveweaponsfocusedonholdingup

theonlynewoffensiveprogramwehad,deploymentofthemultiplewarhead

(MIRV),theUnitedStateswasperenniallyonthevergeofbeingforcedtogive

up—beforeanySALTagreement—thetwostrategicweaponssystemswewere

building.



Fortunately,onApril23DobryninreturnedfromMoscowandtookusoff

thehook.Hehande dmeanotethat,intheglaciallydeliberatestyleofSoviet

negotiators,acceptedourproposalthattheoffensivelimitationscouldbe

discussedbeforeanABMagreementwascompleted;itwasagooddefinitionof

simultaneity,thoughphrasedinoneofGromyko’sdoublenegatives.Wehad

achievedourprimarygoal;typically,however,theSovietstookawayaprevious

concession:TheagreementwastobedependentonouracceptinganABM

systemlimitedtonationalcapitals.YetagainthePolitburodissipatedmoral

capitalwithoutanyprospectofgain.Dobryninmusthaveknown—evenif

Gromykowasreluctanttoaccept—thatNCAwaslastyear’swindfall.Ontheother

hand,theSovietswouldnothavegonethisfariftheywerenotwillingto gothe

restoftheway.OnApril26,inanotheroralnote,Iofferedawayoutby

suggestingthatthedecisiononthenatureofsitestobepermittedintheABM

agreementbedeferredtosubsequentnegotiations. However,thenoteputthe

SovietsonnoticethattheAmericanpositionwouldbebasedonthesystemwe

wereactuallybuilding(thatis,thedefenseofmissilesites)andnotonsome

hypotheticalsystemcenteredoncapitals.Dobrynincouldnotforgoscoringthe

debatingpointthat,afterall,theSovietswereonlyacceptingourABMproposal

ofthepreviousyear.Iacknowledgedthisslightlye mbarrassingtruthbutmade

clearthatwewouldnotbudge. 



Aswewereapproachingagreement,abizarreincidentinterruptedour

effortsonMay2.VladimirSemenov,theSovietSALTnegotiatorinVienna,

suddenlybroachedtoSmithoveraprivatedinnertheveryproposalforanABM

agreementlimitedtocapitals,followedbyafreezeonICBMstobediscussedafter

theABMagreementwasconcluded,whichhadbeenrejectedbymesixweeks

before.Inotherwords,SemenovputforwardtheoldSovietpositionafter

Dobryninhadalreadyconcededsimultaneity.Sinceitwentfarbeyondanything

theSovietshadpreviouslyconcededatVienna,andhecouldnotknowthathe

wasbeingofferedwhatwehadalreadyrejectedandimproved,Smiththought

himselfonthevergeofa breakthrough.Heurgedacceptance—thusindicating

whatpressureswewouldhavefacedhadthenegotiationremainedinformal

channels.TothisdayIdonotunderstandwhatGromykohopedtoaccomplishby

thismaneuver.Perhapshecouldnotresistthetemptationofexploitingour

doublechannelsystemandgaveauthoritytoexplorehowfarourformal

negotiatorswerewillingtogo.PerhapshesoughttotestwhetherthePresident

couldmaketheprogramIhadputforwardstick.Conceivably,hewantedtogive

Semenovapartoftheaction,andSemenovinturnwantedtoprovethathecould

dobetterthanDobrynin.(OneshouldnotassumethattheSovietsystemismore

immunetobureaucraticinfightingthanours;inalllike lihood,itismorevirulently

pronetoit.)



Whateverthereason,Semenov’smove,aswellasraisingdoubtsabout

Sovietgoodfaith,ineffectcircumventedthePresidentialChannel.Italsostarteda

formalconsiderationwithinouragenciesthatsoonescalatedtomediaand

Congressionalpressuretoacceptthis“compromise.”IwasinPalmsprings,

ostensiblyonvacation,inrealitytosetuptheChinatrip.IthereforeaskedAlHaig

tochallengeDobrynin.Dobryninhadnorealexplanation.Hepointedoutthat

Semenovhadputforwardthe“old”position,asifthiscouldsomehowexcusethe

maneuver.Dobryninpromisedtogetmattersundercontrol.



Afewdayslater,onMay9,Semenovreturnedtotheattack,choosingas

occasionthistimeaboattriphostedbytheAustriangovernmenttodemonstrate

hisaddictiontobypassingtheChannel.SemenovtookSmithasideandproposed

thattheyconcentrate“thisyear”onreachinganABMagreement,afterwhich

therewouldbeanintensivenegotiationforanoffensiveagreement.Deployment

ofICBMswouldbehalted“forsomeperiod”whilethesenegotiationsproceeded.

(Hehadnowgraduatedfromthepositionofsixweeksbeforetothenext‐to‐last

one.Hestillinsistedonconsecutivenegotiationsandcontinuedtoexclude

submarine‐launchedmissiles.)Smithwasjubilantaboutthenewapparent

“breakthrough.”Iwasinadilemma.IcouldhardlytellSmiththathehadbeen

handedshopworngoods,thatSemenov’sofferhadbeensupersededbyabetter

oneinachannelofwhichhewasignorant.ThebestIcoulddowassuggestthat

Smithreturnwithinaweektoreviewthebidding.



InthemeantimeIdecidedtotrytobringmatterstoaheadwithDobrynin.

IndealingwiththeSovietsapointisinevitablyreachedwhereitisimportantto

makeclearbrutallythatthelimitsofflex ibilityhavebeenreached,thatthetime

hascomeeithertosettleortoendthenegotiation.Thisisamorecomplexmatter

thansimplygetting“tough.”Ifthelineisdrawntooearly,theSovietswillinfact

breakupthenegotiation.Ifthelineisdrawntoolate,theymaynolongerbelieve

thatthechallengeisserious.Successinnegotiationsisamatteroftiming,and

nowheremoresothanwithMoscow.



Whatlaterdevelopedintoadeliberate devicethatwewouldusemorethan

oncewasimposedbynecessity—orSovietclumsiness—inMay1971.OnceSmith

returnedtoWashington,Semenov’sproposalwouldbecomethesubjectof

formalinteragencydeliberation; itwouldbeoutofcontrolofthePresidential

Channel.OnMay11IhadaratherbluntconversationwithDobrynin.TheSoviets,

Isaid,mightthinktheycouldplayoffourtwochannelsagainsteachother;and

indeed,wemighthavesomedifficultyconvincingtheagenciesthatwhat

Dobryninhadalreadyconcededwasinfactachievable.Buthecouldnotdoubt

thatsoonerorlaterthePresident’stenacityandmycontrolofthebureaucratic

machinerywouldgetmatterstowherewewantedthem.Theprice,Itoldhim,

wouldbelossofconfidenceintheseriousnessofaprivate,directChannel.The

President’sangeratwhathecouldonlyconstrueasadeliberatemaneuverto

deprivehimofcreditwouldbemassive. Idemandedananswertoourproposalof

April26withinforty‐eighthours.Otherwisewewouldshiftthewholesubject

intoofficialchannels. WewoulddothesamewithBerlinnegotiations.OnMay12

Dobryninbroughttheanswer.TheSovietUniondroppeditsinsistenceontheNCA

system.Itacceptedsimultaneityofnegotiationinlimitingofoffensiveand

defensivesystems.ByMay15wehadagreedonanannouncementtobemade

onMay20andonthetextofaprivateexchangeoflettersbetweenNixonand

Kosygin.



ThissuccessgaveNixonconsiderableanguish,forhewouldnowhavetotell

hisSecretaryofStatethatnegotiationshadbeengoingonformonthswithouthis

knowledgeandwereonthevergeofbeingconsummatedbyaformal

announcement.Hisfirstinstinctwasto claimthatasuddenSovietcommunication

hadunexpectedlyproducedabreakthrough.(Thiswastheexplanationgiven

sevenweekslaterformytriptoPeking.)I counseledagainstanaccountthatthe

recordswouldnotsustainandthatmischievousSovietnegotiatorscouldexploit.

Nixon’snextideawastosuggestthathehadwrittentoBrezhnevinJanuaryand

thathehadjustreceivedareply.This,too,Iadvisedagainstonmuchthesame

grounds.NixonfinallyhandledtheembarrassmentbylettingHaldemanbreakthe

newstohisoldfriend.TheobloquylaterheapedonHaldemanmustnotobscure

thefortitudewithwhichhedischargedmanysuchthanklessandessentially

demeaningtasks.Rogersacceptedtheprofferedexplanation—theapocryphal

Brezhnevletter—withacomposurethatdidhimcredit.



ThetaskofbriefingGerrySmithwaslefttome.Itwasnotapleasant

assignment.Whatevermydisagreementwithsmith’sviewsonpolicy,I respected

hisprofessionalismandloyalty.Itwasboundtobepainfulforhimtobeexcluded

fromaculminationofyearsofwork.Itwouldhave beentoomuchtoexpectour

chiefnegotiatortoagreethatnegotiationsinformalchannelswouldhavebeen

farmoreprotracted;Idoubtifwecouldhavesustaine dourultimatepositionin

thefaceofthepublicpressurestoyield.IshowedSmithalltheexchangeswith

theSovietsandasummaryofmyconversations. Smithconductedhimselfwith

courtesyandrestraint.Thoughhelaterprivatelyexpressedunderstandable

bitterness,whensuchconductcouldhavedetractedfromthefirstmajor

achievementoftheNixonAdministrationinEast‐Westrelationsheputnational

unitybeforehisownfeelings.



AtnoononMay20,1971,NixonsteppedbeforetheWhiteHousepress

corpsandsprangwhatwastobethefirstofmanysurprisesthatyear.Hereadthe

textoftheannouncement,whosesparse(andsomewhatconvoluted) words

scarcelydidjusticetothelaborsoftheprevioussixmonthsandtoitsintrinsic

significance:



TheGovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,afterreviewingthecourse

oftheirtalksonthelimitationofstrategicarmaments,haveagreedtoconcentratethisyearon

workingoutanagreementforthelimitationofthedeploymentofanti‐ballisticmissilesystems

(ABMs).Theyhavealsoagreedthat,togetherwithconcludinganagreementtolimitABMs,they

willagreeoncertainmeasureswithrespecttothelimitationofoffensivestrategicweapons.



Butnothingwasdestinedtoworksmoothlyinthisnegotiationwiththe

Soviets.TheagreedstatementhadbarelybeenreleasedwhenIwasinformed

thattheSovietnewsagencyTASShadpublishedadifferentversionimplyingthat

thediscussionofoffensivelimitationswouldcome“after”insteadof“together

with”anABMaccord.Inotherwords,wewerefacedwithanattempttoslippast

ustheearlierSovietpositionintheformofapressrelease.WhenIbroughtthisto

Dobrynin’sattention,hearguedlamelythatTASSmusthavedoneitsown

retranslationfromaRussiantext(anextraordinaryexplanation,consideringthat

theoriginalstatementhadbeennegotiatedinEnglish).Unfortunately,Dobrynin

argued,itwasnowtoo latetoreachMoscowbecauseofthetimedifference.I

toldhimthatIwouldbeconducting abriefingontheannouncementintwohours.

IwouldeitherdiscussSovietduplicityorpresenttheagreedtextasthefirst

importantsteptowardimprovedrelations.Itwasuptohimto choose.The

Ambassador’singenioussolutionwastohavethecorrectEnglishtexttypedon

Sovietembassystationery.Itwasthusavailable,intime,forthespecialistsin

credibilitygapswhowerealreadyunlimberingtheirheavyartillery.Itwas

probablytheonlytimethatapressreleasewithaSovietletterheadwas

distributedfromtheWhiteHousepressoffice.



ThebreakthroughofMay20wasonthesurfaceprocedural.Itsettledthat

offensiveanddefensivelimitationswouldbeconcludedsimultaneously.[

Some

academicarmscontrolexpertscontinuedtobelievethatthePresidenthadacceptedtheSoviet

proposal;theypraisedNixonforagreeingtoanABM‐onlyagreementwhenhehaddoneexactly

theopposite.

]Buttherewasmoretotheagreementthanthewordsthat

announcedit.Foronething,wehadputbeforethePolitburotheessenceofour

SALTposition.TheSALT agreementof1972confirmedwhattheMay1971

understandingimplied:TheSovietshadineffectacceptedafreezeonnewstarts

ofstrategicmissiles;theyhadconcededasublimitonheavymissiles;theyhadin

effectdroppedtheirclaimthatouraircraftbasedabroadbecounted;andwehad

putthemonnoticethatsubmarine‐launchedmissileswouldhavetobelimitedor

accountedfor.Inaddition,wehadmanagedtoslideoffourill‐advisedNCA

proposalofthepreviousyear.Inshort,thefinalagreementnegotiatedayear

laterreflectedinitsbasicaspectstheexchangesleadinguptotheMay20

announcement.



LongaftertheSALTaccordsweresignedinMay1972itbecamefashionable

tocriticizetheiralleged“inequality.”Itistruethatafreezepreservedforfive

yearsthenumericalgapbetweentheSovietandUSmissileforcesthathad

developedovertheprecedingdecade.Butasaresultofdecisionsofour

predecessors,noAmericanprogramsexistedthatcouldpossiblyproducenew

missilesforatleastfiveyears.MelLairdpointedoutatanNSCmeetingthatthe

earliestdateforthenewsubmarineswewereplanningwas1977;heproved

overoptimisticbyatleasttwoyears.IntheintervaltheAdministrationpressed

forwardwithdevelopmentofnewprogr ams—Trident,B‐1,MinutemanIII,ABM,

andMIRV—inthefaceofactiveandvocalCongressionalopposition.Thefreeze

onnumbersthusstoppednoAmericanprogram;itdidarrestacontinuingSoviet

programthatwasdeployingover200ICBMsandSLBMsayear.Inexchangefor

thisweacceptedalimitonABM,ourbargainingchip,whichourCongresswason

thevergeofkillinganyway.



Thatweachieveditdespiteanobviouslyweakbargainingposition—we

were,afterall,unabletoargueplausiblythatwecouldbuilduprapidlyifthe

agreementfailed—wasduetoseveralfactors.TheSovietleadershipchosenotto

exploitthedomesticpressuresunleashedbytheVietnamwar;itcametothis

decisionnotoutofcharitybutbecauseitrecognizedthatthespecialChannel

mightrepresentitsonlychanceforafundamentalagreementinNixon’sfirst

term.AndtheleadersweresufficientlywaryofwhatwasconsideredNixon’s

“unpredictability”—whichwas reallyhiswayofforcinganissue—nottogamble

onaseemingdomesticdiscomfiturewhosethinbaseinAmericaDobrynin,for

one,understoodbetterthanmanyofourcritics.



Moreimportant,theSovietscouldnotriskacrisiswithusiftheywanted

theBerlinagreementconcludedortheGermantreatiesratified.Thislinkagewas

nevermadeexplicit,butitwasclearlyreflectedinthepaceofournegotiations.

(forexample,duringtheweekofSemenov’sindiscretionIaskedRushtodelaya

meetingwiththeSovietAmbassadorinBonnonsomepretextfortwoweeks.)

AndtherewasnopossibilitythattheGermanParliamentwouldratifyBrandt’ s

EasterntreatiesunderColdwarconditions.Wehadourownreasonsfornot

wishingtocompoundEast‐Westtensions,butwewerepreparedtoriskthis

prospectbyholdingoutforaSALTagreementweconsideredcompatiblewithour

security.



Domestically,theMay20agreementgaveusbreathingspace.Itbriefly

quietedthecriticswhowereallegingtheAdministration’sinsufficient

commitmenttopeace;itputtorestthedefensedebatefortheremainderof

Nixon’sterm.OnceitbecameobviousthatSALT wouldprobablysucceed,the

pressuresforvariouskindsofmoratoriadwindled.TheABMremainedinan

embryonicstage,butthishadbeeninevitableforayear.Indeed,weobtaineda

higherpriceforitthanwouldhavebeenthoughtprobableaftertheSenate

ArmedservicesCommitteeinMay1971votedtoconfinedeploymenttotwosites

evenintheabsenceofaSALTagreement.



Withinthegovernment,furthermore,theMay20agreementwasa

milestoneinconfirmingWhiteHousedominanceofforeignaffairs.Forthefirst

twoyearsWhiteHousecontrolhadbeenconfinedtotheformulationofpolicy;

nowitextendedtoitsexecution.Simultaneously,threemajorinitiativeswere

beingnegotiatedofwhichtheregularbureaucracywasignorant:theMay20SALT

agreement,theBerlinnegotiations,andtheopeningtoChina.Ihavealready

indicatedthatIdonotconsiderthisaprocedurethat canstand

institutionalization.Butithastobeequallystressedthatthedepartmentsdid

littletoencouragePresidentialconfidence. Theirtendencytotakeadvantageof

Nixon’sreluctancetoengageinface‐to‐faceconfrontationstemptedhimintoan

endlessguerrillawartocircumventhisownsubordinateswhomhenever

consideredashisown.Whichcamefirst—Nixon’ssuspicionsofalifetimeorthe

distrustofhimbyagovernmentstaffedbytheoppositionforadecade—isa

chickenandeggquestion.Nixon—assistedbyme—foundhisownmethodof

solvingtheproblem.Itwascertainlydisruptiveofdepartmentalmorale.To

individualslikesmith,itwasunfairanddemeaning.Itwasalsotoughonthe

nervesoftheNSCstaff,whohadthesoleresponsibilityofbackstoppingthree

majornegotiationssimultaneouslyinthemidstoftheLaosoperation.Andalotof

energywasconsumedinservicingduplicativechannels.ButNixonjudgedthat,

givenhisconvictionandpersonalityandsubordinates,hecouldachieveresultsno

otherway.



WithrespecttotheMay20understandinghehadeveryreasontoworry

thatinregularchannelsitwouldhavedraggedonformonthswhileour

departmentsdebatedamongthethreeABMoptionsandthevariousversionsof

thefreeze,andleakedtheirfavoritesche mestotrytopreempthisdecisions.The

SovietswouldhavebeenpressingconstantlyforanABM‐onlyagreementand

successfullymobilizingstrongmedia,academic,andCongressionalpressureonus

toacceptit.TheessentiallinkageofBerlinandSALTnegotiationswouldhave

beenalmostcertainlylostgiventheimpossibilityoffine‐tuningofmovesbytwo

entirelydifferentbureaucracies,eachconvincedthatitsresponsibilitywas

sufficientlydifficultandworthwhileonitsmeritstojustifyproceeding

independently.



TheMay20agreementalsoplayedaminorroleinourChinainitiative.It

showedPekingthatwehadanoptiontowardMoscow,whilegivingusan

opportunitytodemonstratethatweunderstoodfundamentalChineseconcerns.

WeusedthePakistanichanneltoinformtheChineseleadersofourdecisionand

thereasonsforit,makingclearthatwerejectedanyambitions tocondominium.

TheMay20agreement,finally,wasthefirstsustainedUS‐Sovietnegotiationon

thePresidentiallevel—theforerunnerofothersintheyearsahead.Thetwo

nucleargiantswerebeginningtofeeltheirway—withmanyupsanddowns—

towardsomegroundrulesofcoexistence.



<<Contents>>



****



TheBerlinnegotiation

