Lefebvre Georges. Napoleon

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From Tilsit to Waterloo

1807–1815

The Imperial

Conquests after Tilsit

(1807–1812)

THE CONTINENTAL

SYSTEM (1807–1809)

Although England contrived to put a good face on it, it seemed for some

months that the Treaty of Tilsit would bear fruit. The Continent submitted to

Napoleon, and the blockade, reinforced by the decrees of Milan, appeared

to close it to British commerce.

But the Continental System had scarcely come into being before it was

jeopardised by the defection of the East, and more especially by the rising in

Spain, which Napoleon had provoked but was then unable to put down.

ENGLAND AWAKENS

When she heard about the interview at Tilsit, England realised that the

Franco-Russian entente of 1801 had been restored and saw the danger

confronting her. After losing Germany, she now risked having the Baltic

closed to her once more. But thanks to Canning’s prompt decision, she stole

a march on her enemies. True, Gustavus IV seemed in a secure position: he

had just resumed hostilities on 3 July and Cathcart had led ten thousand

men into Pomerania. But Denmark was an uncertain quantity, and there was

erroneous news that she was mobilising her ﬂ eet; besides, Bernadotte could

occupy the country from Hamburg in a very few days. Canning was hot-

blooded, and had the temperament of a ﬁ ghter: he did not lose a single

moment. Though he knew of the interview of 16 July, he did not begin to

get the details – and then in very incomplete form – till the twenty-ﬁ rst;

and he only learned of the treaty’s signature on 8 August through a French

the imperial conquests after tilsit (1807–1812)

240

newspaper. On 18 July Admiral Gambier was ordered to proceed to

Copenhagen with a huge squadron, and arrived there on 3 August, while

Cathcart, who had evacuated Pomerania and received reinforcements, was

approaching with thirty thousand men. The Prince Royal at Kiel was notiﬁ ed

that he must enter into alliance with England and supply her with ships.

When he refused, his capital was blockaded and then bombarded on 2

September. He capitulated on the seventh. Canning then tried in vain to win

over the Danes, attempted to induce the Swedes to occupy the Danish archi-

pelago, and in despair of success was even inclined to leave the English

troops there, though his colleagues were in favour of evacuation. But the

Danish ﬂ eet was taken in possession, and the following year Moore landed

in southern Sweden, so that Admiral Saumarez was able to move freely into

the Baltic and escort merchant shipping, which was the essential thing.

On the eve of the Berlin decree, the big export industries already consti-

tuted an element of prime importance in the English economy. It could not

fail to be affected by any crisis involving these industries. They depended

largely on European trade with the United States for their markets, and in

certain cases for the provision of their raw materials; and they were there-

fore particularly vulnerable to the threat of blockade, especially if accompa-

nied by a closing of the United States to English commerce. Nor must we

forget the dependence of England on Northern Europe for her naval supplies

and cereals, or the weaknesses of her banking system and her balance of

payments. But there is no denying the power and elasticity of the British

economy. The technical progress already achieved and her capitalist system

gave her an assured superiority over France. England had undergone a veri-

table demographic revolution, in the course of which the population of

Great Britain had risen from 10,943,000 in 1801 to 12,597,000 in 1811.

This acted as a stimulus to the whole economy, and in particular supplied

industry with a decisively expanding home market and an abundant and

cheap supply of labour. English agriculture had become the best in Europe

as far as technique was concerned; and although the agricultural revolution

had upset traditional rural society, it ensured that a rapidly expanding popu-

lation need only depend on imports for a smaller portion of its foodstuffs.

The oligarchy constituted by the great landowners who governed England

were conﬁ dent of their own destiny, and gave evidence of an almost unshake-

able will to win. The most powerful section of the middle classes – the

London bankers and merchants and big businessmen – had long been ﬁ rmly

linked with the aristocracy, and were as doggedly opposed to France, seeing

how she threatened their commercial and colonial interests. The industrial-

ists, however, enjoyed a much lower social status in general, and their role

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the continental system (1807–1809)

in politics was as yet a very minor one. The workers were the people who

had most to fear from the blockade, for it might well lead to unemployment

and high prices, thus making their living conditions even worse – though

they were already wretched enough in all conscience. But the social frame-

work of the country, buttressed still further by the Combination Acts of

1799 and 1800, was, as has been emphasised, ‘reassuringly strong’. Nothing

less than an intense and prolonged crisis had any chance of setting the

middle class against the oligarchy and driving the proletariat into revolt.

Far from allowing itself to be intimidated by the Berlin decree, the Tory

government reinforced the mercantile character of the British blockade at

the expense of the neutral countries. Persons of importance had long been

insisting on measures against them under the Navigation Acts. The builders

and shipowners were indignant that neutral ﬂ ags covered forty-four per

cent of the ships leaving British ports in 1807, instead of the twenty-eight

per cent which had been the ﬁ gure for 1802. The trade of the United States

was more prosperous than ever, their exports in 1807 rising to 108 million

dollars, almost sixty million of which consisted of colonial goods, partly

from the colonies of England’s enemies. The planters in the Antilles were full

of complaints about the fall in the price of sugar, but the Whigs had shown

little readiness to listen to these grievances. On 7 January 1807 they did no

more than extend the 1756 regulations about coastal shipping between

enemy ports that excluded English ships. From February Perceval proposed

to compel neutrals trading with France to pass through a British port, a

measure of retaliation that seemed to be demanded for the honour of the

country. Once in ofﬁ ce,

Perceval proceeded to act. Although all trading

with the enemy was again forbidden, it was made clear that there would be

no change in the licence system, which allowed traders to infringe these

regulations wherever the national interest required. They were solely aimed

at the neutrals, and their purpose was ‘to subordinate the trade of the whole

world to the development of the navy and the shipping of Great Britain’. By

Orders in Council on 11, 15 and 25 November and 18 December 1807, any

neutral vessel sailing to or from an enemy port would be obliged to unload

its cargo in one of a number of specially designated British ports, and be

subject to customs duties – which were now notably increased – and would

have to take out a licence. In addition, there was a ban on importing certain

goods, such as quinine and cotton, into France. In theory at any rate, neutrals

were still allowed to transport direct to their own countries goods from

enemy colonies and even to export grain and raw materials from their place

* [As chancellor of the exchequer, March 1807.]

the imperial conquests after tilsit (1807–1812)

242

of origin to ports under Napoleon’s control. With these exceptions, it looked

as though maritime trade would become a British monopoly. In taxing

neutral cargoes, the English reckoned to prevent them from carrying the

produce of foreign colonies whose competition reduced the proﬁ ts of the

British colonists; and by refusing licences they could, if need be, bring

neutral shipping to a standstill. This was precisely what the shipowners and

the planters would have liked to happen.

The English were delighted at Canning’s enterprise and at all these meas-

ures. They did not question the burdens which the government, foreseeing

that England was likely to be isolated, imposed upon the country in order to

enable it to face its enemies single-handed. Taxes were increased, and

Castlereagh set about strengthening the army, which had been somewhat

neglected by the Whigs. On 13 April 1806 Windham had repealed Pitt’s Act,

suspended the militia ballot system and given up the recruitment of regulars

from among the militia, to return to the system of ordinary enlistment. He

had shown his dislike for reliance upon volunteers. Life service had been

abolished, and replaced by service contracts of from seven to twelve years.

Castlereagh re-established the militia ballot and encouraged volunteers, but

transformed them into a local militia under government control. He returned

to Pitt’s system for recruiting regiments of the line, and drew twenty-one

thousand regulars from the militia. In 1807 and 1808 he added forty-ﬁ ve

thousand recruits, while the army lost only ﬁ fteen thousand men. At the

beginning of 1809 there were two hundred thousand soldiers available in

Great Britain, thirty thousand being held in readiness for expeditions on the

Continent. It was thus possible to resume Pitt’s policy with more ample

means, though the cost was heavy. By 1807 the yield of direct taxation had

risen from £3 million in 1804, and £6 million in 1806, to £10 million.

Expenditure rose from £76 million in 1804, and £106 million in 1806, to

more than £120 million in 1808. The burden was all the heavier because

exports went down markedly in 1807 and 1808, though bread remained

cheap. Yet England kept a stout heart as she watched the Continent rallying

to Napoleon, for she was persuaded that his success would be short-lived.

EUROPE CLOSED TO ENGLAND (1807–1808)

Napoleon had come back to Paris on 27 July 1807. He was ofﬁ cially given the

title of Grand , like Louis XIV after the Peace of Nijmegen, and on 15 August

there were brilliant festivities in honour of la Gloire and the Grande Armée. It

looked for a short while as if there would certainly be peace on the Continent,

and general peace would surely follow before long. Napoleon himself had

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the continental system (1807–1809)

remarked that the achievements of Tilsit would settle the destinies of the

whole world. And so these festivities were genuinely popular, and Napoleon

once more became for a time the national leader. The creation of the kingdom

of Westphalia was ofﬁ cially announced on 18 August, and soon afterwards

Jérôme’s marriage to Catherine of Württemberg was celebrated. Then in

September and October Napoleon held court at Fontainebleau. As he had

done after Austerlitz, he now resumed the work of administration, carrying

out a purge of the judiciary in 1807, and organising the Université in 1808.

Particularly striking was his increasingly marked taste for personal despotism

and his preference for the aristocracy. On 19 August 1807 he abolished the

Tribunate, and on the ninth he had in effect dismissed Talleyrand by decorating

him with the title of vice-grand-elector, condemning his venality, and probably

being unable to forgive his tacit disapproval. In October 1805 Talleyrand had

presumed to advise a conciliatory line towards Austria, wishing to console her

for the loss of Italy and Germany at the expense of Turkey. This policy has often

since been praised, but was in fact chimerical, for Austria would have taken

anything offered to her without for a moment forgetting her deeply felt losses.

At Warsaw, Talleyrand had shown contempt for the Poles, and after Friedland he

said – in complimenting the victor – that he was particularly delighted with

this triumph because he was certain that it would be his last. Napoleon could

no longer put up with a servant who showed such independence, and replaced

him by Champagny, who was never more than a good clerk, though – most

unfortunately, as it turned out – he continued constantly to consult his

ex-minister. At the same time he continued to organise the new aristocracy,

distributing eleven million in rentes to the military chiefs, re-establishing entails

and ﬁ nally constituting in 1808 a fully ﬂ edged imperial nobility.

At the same time he began to adopt a sharper attitude towards foreigners.

In October 1807 there was scene after scene at Fontainebleau as he stormed

at the envoys of Etruria, Bremen and Portugal: ‘If Portugal does not do what

I want, the House of Braganza will no longer be on the throne in two

months’ time.’ There was no need for these threats, for his plans were already

drawn up; but he was showing himself less and less capable of self-control.

‘Napoleon has not only ceased to recognise any limits,’ wrote Metternich;

‘he has completely thrown off the mask.’ ‘Now that he has made an agree-

ment with Russia,’ Champagny admitted, ‘he is no longer afraid of anyone.’

The world had now become a keyboard on which he could play whatever

tune fancy brought into his head.

To begin with, the alliance lived up to expectations. True, Alexander was

in no hurry to break with England, and allowed Budberg to receive Wilson,

an amateur diplomat who came in as an intermediary. Canning did not