Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorism
e Achille Lauro attack. e most famous attack of all was mounted on
the Achille Lauro in 1985. It was, however, a failure and, most probably, a
mistake. Terrorists from the Abu Abbas faction of the palestine Liberation
Front (pLF) boarded the ship at the start of its voyage in Genoa.
15
Several
explanations have been advanced to explain their objectives. One sugges-
tion is that they aimed to ram the ship into the oil installations at the Israeli
port of Ashdod, the ship’s destination. perhaps the most persuasive was
that their aim was not to hijack the ship but to wait until the passengers
had disembarked and, while they waited to board buses for a tour of the
holy Land, massacre some of them and bargain for the lives of the remain-
der in exchange for pLF prisoners held by Israel.
16
however, shortly after
the ship left Alexandria where, thankfully, the majority of passengers had
disembarked for an overland trip, a member of the cabin staff interrupted
them while they were cleaning their weapons. Caught in flagrante, so to
speak, they made the best of a bad job, took over the ship, separated the
passengers by nationality and threatened to kill a hostage every hour until
their demand for the release of palestinian terrorists held by Israel was met.
ey selected two passengers for death but only one was killed, 69-year-
old Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound American Jew whose body was
tossed over the side.
17
Israel refused to negotiate. In the absence of another
plan the terrorists secured a deal with Egypt, surrendering the ship in return
for safe passage to Tunis. e united States, however, was not party to the
Maritime Target, 4 March 1973; Menefee, TMV, p. 32 where he refers to the
Sounion-Sana. Katz, who refers to the ship as the SS Soniyon, and Lorenz sug-
gest that the mine might have detonated prematurely as Black September later
claimed it was designed to explode when the ship reached haifa. Samuel M.
Katz, Guards Without Frontiers, London: Arms and Armour press, 1990, p. 155
and Akiva J. Lorenz, ‘e threat of maritime terrorism to Israel’, Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemora-
tion Center, 1 Oct. 2007, p. 7.
15 e pLF was itself made up of three factions only one of which, that led by
Abbas, was loyal to Yasser Arafat, the head of the pLO. Michael K. Bohn, e
Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudices of Terrorism, Wash-
ington, DC: potomac Books, 2004, p. xv.
16 Katz, Guards Without Frontiers, pp. 172-3. Lorenz points out that pLF internal
documents refer to the hijacking as the ‘Ashdod port operation’: Lorenz, ‘e
threat of maritime terrorism to Israel’, p. 14.
17 e terrorists were keen to take on reinforcements and killed Klinghoffer in
an attempt to pressure Syria into allowing the ship to dock at one of its ports.
Dragonette, ‘Maritime terrorism: underway as before?’, p. 166 and Bohn, e
Achille Lauro Hijacking, p. 10.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
deal and forced the hijackers’ plane to land at a NATO airfield in Italy.
18
e Italians, while they arrested the actual hijackers, knowingly allowed the
terrorist leader, Mahmoud Abul Abbas, to escape. e end, in other words,
was unsatisfactory for everyone. e uS did not gain because it wanted to
try Klinghoffer’s murderers under uS jurisdiction. e international com-
munity did not gain because, while the hijacking led directly to the 1988
uN Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SuA), this is a flawed agreement as discussed below.
e terrorists did not gain either, for although the event demonstrated the
publicity that could be generated, and that damage could be inflicted on
the tourist industry, it also showed how difficult it is for hijackers to make
a successful escape from a ship. Nonetheless, as Samuel pyeatt Menefee
notes, the case of the Achille Lauro, “like the Potemkin mutiny, will con-
tinue to be an icon in discussions of violent maritime crime”.
19
e City of poros, Nile cruise boats and Chechen hijacking. In contrast to
the Santa Maria and the Achille Lauro, the attack on the City of Poros south
of Athens in 1988 was much bloodier. Eleven people died and 98 were
injured when three Arab passengers tossed grenades and sprayed the ship
with automatic fire. e origins and purpose of the attack remain unclear.
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility and there is evidence that the Abu Ni-
dal organisation was involved.
20
It is possible that this bloody incident was
18 For background on how this was accomplished see Terry White, Swords of
Lighting: Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare, London: Brassey’s,
1992, p. 239.
19 Menefee, TMV, pp. 11, 29 & 33-36 and Bohn, e Achille Lauro Hijacking,
pp. 1-19 on the hijacking itself and pp. 20-44 on the interception and capture
of the terrorists. ere have been several other accounts including, for example,
parritt, Security at Sea, pp. 13-15; Bruce hoffman, Inside Terrorism, London:
Gollancz, 1998, p. 145; Brittin, ‘e law of piracy’, pp. 163-5; paul Wilkinson,
‘Navies in a terrorist world’, Jane’s NR, 1987, pp. 170-2; Dragonette, ‘Maritime
terrorism: underway as before?’, pp. 165-6; and Cable, Navies in Violent Peace,
pp. 94-5. On the specific point about it being a military success but a political
failure for the uS see Charles T. Eppright, ‘‘Counterterrorism’ and convention-
al military force: e relationship between political effect and utility’, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 20, no. 4, 1997, p. 341.
20 Dominique Chambon, ‘Once a terrorist, always a terrorist’, International Re-
view, Winter 1993-94 cites French reports that Abu Nidal carried out the attack
at the behest of Libya, while Kupperman and Kamen suggested that Abu Nidal
undertook the attack to grab hostages which they would then have used to
stop Greece extraditing to Italy Mohammed Rashid, a terrorist wanted in con-
nection with the 1982 bombing of a pan Am flight from Tokyo to honolulu:
Robert h. Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, ‘Greece, haven for terrorists’, New York
189
maritime terrorism
not an attack at all but a shoot-out between two rival terrorist groups,
21
although Menefee suggests the intention was to seize hostages in exchange
for terrorists held in Israeli jails and in this sense the action was akin to the
hijack of the Yori, a Greek freighter, in Karachi harbour in 1974.
22
e
City of Poros was the last passenger ship to be attacked at sea (until Somali
pirates attacked the Seabourn Spirit in 2005), although others have been
attacked on the Nile between 1992 and 1996 by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya,
which was the same group that massacred tourists at Luxor in 1997.
23
at
is not to say that cruise ships may not become targets in the future. When
Al Qaeda’s chief of maritime operations, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, was
captured he was, according to press reports, found with a 180-page dossier
that listed cruise ships as one of the group’s “targets of opportunity”.
24
On the other hand attacks have been mounted against ferries. Interest-
ingly, another theory regarding the City of Poros attack suggested that it
might have had its origins in a 1986 plan to attack a ferry in the English
Channel, which was abandoned when the British and French stepped up
their security.
25
In 1996 Chechen rebels seized a ferry, the Avrasya, on its
way from Trabzon in Turkey to Sochi in Russia and took the 220 passen-
gers hostage in an attempt to force Russian forces to lift their siege of 250
Chechens trapped in the Dagestani village of pervomayskoye.
26
e hijack-
Times, 16 Dec. 1988. however, a report in a Danish newspaper suggested that
the firing was, in fact, a shoot-out between Abu Nidal terrorists and Mossad
agents, the last act of a drama that had started when Mossad blew up a car in
Athens that was to have been driven on board the ferry. ‘Danish newspaper
explains City of poros slaughter’, Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs,
Oct. 1988, p. 39.
21 Confidential information.
22 Menefee, TMV, p. 32.
23 Menefee, TMV, p. 40 and Bob Newman, ‘Terrorists feared to be planning sub-
surface naval attacks’, CNSNews.com, 3 Dec. 2002.
24 See ‘Al-Qaeda new tactics, targets ocean liners’, CSIS Transnational reats Up-
date, vol. 2, no. 4, Jan. 2004, pp. 3-4; Newman, ‘Terrorists feared to be plan-
ning sub-surface naval attacks’; Zachary Abuza, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
Keeping Al-Qaeda at bay’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol.
II, Issue 9, 6 May 2004, p. 5; according to Koknar, ‘piracy and terrorism are
joining forces’, the document specified cruise ships of over 140,000 tons with
more than 5,000 passengers as the preferred target. In 2008 there were only two
ships that came close to meeting al-Nashiri’s reported criteria.
25 Menefee, TMV, pp. 36-8 and parritt, Security at Sea, p. 17.
26 Dragonette, ‘Maritime terrorism: underway as before?’, p. 166.
190
small boats, weak states, dirty money
ers sailed the ferry to the mouth of the Bosporus where they surrendered
after being denied permission to pass through.
27
e Superferry 14 attack and other attacks on ferries in the Philippines.
e deadliest ferry attack to date took place in the philippines, involving
the 10,000-ton Superferry 14 which suffered an explosion and subsequent
fire as it left Manila Bay in 2004. e explosion killed 63 people and of
the 717 people who jumped overboard a further 53 died or were presumed
dead.
28
Although this was the worst incident, attacks on ferries are a com-
mon occurrence in philippine waters; most have been carried out by ter-
rorist groups such as the ASG and MNLF, usually in an attempt to extort
money from ferry operators.
All these attacks have one thing in common. At no time was there any
sense that any terrorist group had grasped how attacks from the sea could
significantly affect events on land.
Seafarers’ attitudes
e 2007 Nautilus survey on seafarers’ attitudes to piracy also asked similar
questions about their attitudes to terrorism. Many of those expressing con-
cern worked on passenger ships or ferries; 27 per cent said they were “very”
concerned and 61 per cent they were “mildly” concerned. Overall, 53 per
cent saw terrorism as the major threat compared to 43 per cent who saw
piracy as more worrying.
29
e current and developing legal regime. e difficulties encountered by the
legislators of many countries when trying to categorise terrorism are multi-
plied many times when the attempt is repeated in the international arena.
e only way in which contentious issues can be dealt with effectively is
to remove contentious terms and labels and replace them with specific
offences designed to address, say, the smuggling of narcotics or nuclear
material about which it is hard for states to disagree. e result of such a
step-by-step process is that progress towards an effective international anti-
terrorism regime has inevitably been slow.
27 Menefee, TMV, pp. 40-1; ‘Ship hijacked as Chechen siege expands’, CNN
World News, 16 Jan. 1996.
28 Michael D. Greenberg, et al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, Santa
Monica: RAND, 2006, p. 95. human Rights Watch, ‘Lives destroyed: Attacks
against civilians in the philippines’, July 2007, pp. 12-15.
29 hand, ‘Survey reveals human cost of piracy’.
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maritime terrorism
e united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (uNCLOS)
draws a distinction between acts committed for “private ends” and those
committed for “political ends”. e requirement that a pirate act has to
be committed for “private ends” has its origin in the distinction between
piracy and privateering. e latter was piracy under license. providing pri-
vateer captains abided by the conditions of their licenses, they were virtu-
ally immune from prosecution. is immunity was recognised by all states
including those of their victims. Although the Declaration of paris of 1856
abolished privateering, the distinction between private and public ends was
maintained because courts (and states) wanted to differentiate between pira-
cy and acts of maritime depredation carried out by insurgents or rebels. is
distinction was drawn repeatedly by jurists and in court judgements. e
case of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual, a case heard before the English Courts
in 1909, is regarded as seminal.
30
By affirming that a loss as a result of a
rebel incident was not piracy, as public ends were being pursued not private,
it shaped the definition of piracy for twentieth-century international juris-
prudence. e consequence of this continuing distinction is that so-called
“political” acts are excluded, including those that involve internal seizure, as
in the case of the Achille Lauro, or are perpetrated by states, as in the case of
the uSS Pueblo.
31
Above all, of course, because “political” acts are excluded
from the piracy provisions, uNCLOS cannot be used against terrorists.
In the wake of the Achille Lauro seizure, the IMO prepared a study of
the problem of terrorism on board or against ships. is led in 1988 to the
Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, now referred to more often as the SuA or “Rome”
Convention. Based on aviation precedents, it was designed to deal with
politically motivated violence at sea.
32
ere is a widespread and not wholly
30 Timothy h. Goodman, ‘‘Leaving the Corsair’s name to other times’: how to
enforce the law of sea piracy in the 21
st
Century through regional international
agreements’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 31, no.1,
1999, pp. 147-8.
31 It was p.W. Birnie who noted that uNCLOS took no account of the 1970 In-
ternational Law Association Report that defined piracy simply as ‘unlawful sei-
zure or taking control of a vessel by violence, threats thereof, surprise, fraud or
other means’. Johnson, who was the rapporteur, felt that both internal seizures
and hijackings should also be defined as piracy. Birnie, ‘piracy: past, present and
future’, pp. 170-1. See also Natalino Ronzitti, ‘e law of the sea and the use
of force against terrorist activities’ in Ronzitti. Maritime Terrorism and Interna-
tional Law, p. 2.
32 For a full discussion of the Convention and the thinking that underlay the ap-
proach taken see Treves. ‘e Rome Convention’, pp. 69-90.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
erroneous assumption that the SuA is concerned solely with terrorist acts.
In fact the word “terrorism” does not occur in the text. e drafters, quite
sensibly, decided that defining terrorism was too sensitive, too political and
too much of a waste of time to be attempted and therefore adopted the
term “unlawful acts” as an acceptable euphemism. Consequently, the Con-
vention addresses specific actions, such as ship seizure and violence by those
on board, that could result in physical injury, or damage to the ship or its
cargo. Because it took as its models the hague and Montreal Conventions
against aircraft hijacking it has two important differences compared to the
piracy provisions found in uNCLOS: first, the SuA Convention is appli-
cable everywhere, even in territorial waters, providing the ship under attack
is coming from or proceeding to an international destination; secondly,
state parties must enact domestic legislation to make Convention offences
punishable under their laws:
33
the main aim of the Convention is legal
prosecution, not physical prevention; its central purpose is to ensure that
states either prosecute or extradite. It does not, in contrast to treaty and
customary law on piracy, recognise or authorise preventative police activity
at sea. Furthermore, it is not relevant if the violence on board is insufficient
to compromise maritime safety, it is inapplicable to the intra-state coastal
traffic that accounts for so many maritime movements in the world’s ter-
ritorial and archipelagic waters, and it is not, of course, applicable to non-
signatory states which, unfortunately, include Somalia and many of the
states in Asia where concern about maritime terrorism and piracy is most
acute.
34
e result has been that, apart from one minor case in uS waters,
SuA has never been invoked.
If the Achille Lauro seizure sparked a legal rethink, then 9/11 ignited a
counter-terrorism revolution. In the maritime domain this resulted in two
important changes. e most immediate was the adoption of the uS-in-
spired International Ship and port Facility Security (ISpS) Code. Although
this started life as an initiative in the G8, it built upon existing parts of the
1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and gained international
33 Roach, ‘Enhancing maritime security in the straits of Malacca and Singapore’,
p. 105.
34 See Robert C. Beckman. ‘Combatting piracy and armed robbery against ships
in Southeast Asia: e way forward’, Ocean Development and International Law,
vol. 33, 2002, pp. 321-2 & 329; R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, e Law of the
Sea (3
rd
edn.), Manchester up, 1999, p. 211; Luis Jesus, ‘protection of foreign
ships against piracy and terrorism at sea’, pp. 391-4; halberstam, ‘Terrorism on
the high seas’, p. 292.
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maritime terrorism
legal force because it was implemented as amendments to Chapters V and
XI of that Convention. Since 1 July 2004 these amendments now apply to
all vessels over 300 Gross Registered Tons (GRT) on international voyages
and to ports servicing international traffic. e aim of the Code is to intro-
duce a risk management approach to ship and port security, an approach
that has worked in the fields of safety and environmental protection, largely
successfully, for over a decade. In both these fields success has depended
on making changes to often entrenched attitudes and working practices,
changes that take time to have effect and are engendered almost entirely as
a consequence of sustained managerial pressure. On the basis of this experi-
ence, it is likely that ISpS will succeed only if owners and managers in the
ship and port industries are convinced that the increased costs that are an
inevitable concomitant of such changes will either yield commercial ben-
efits or be borne equally by competitors, not just in their own countries but
around the globe. It will also succeed only once an active, day-to-day com-
mitment to security has been accepted, and demonstrated, by seamen and
port workers at all levels, whatever their training or background. Results to
date have therefore been patchy but progress is being made.
e second change was a substantial increase in the number of activities
covered by the SuA Convention, coupled with the introduction of provi-
sions to allow the boarding of vessels suspected of involvement in terrorist
activity. e previous reluctance to recognise or authorise preventative con-
stabulary activity at sea was set aside. While it was the IMO Legal Commit-
tee that brought these revisions forward for consideration, they were based
in large part on uS practice. An important element of this was the concept
of “deemed permission”. is had emerged out of the experience the uS
gained from the operation of 23 agreements with Caribbean and Central
American states (plus the uK). ese agreements enabled it to board flag
vessels of those countries, if it believed they were being used to smuggle
narcotics. Some of these were so-called “shiprider” agreements whereby
an official of a signatory state travelled aboard a uS ship, available to grant
immediate permission to board when a suspect vessel was intercepted. In
others cases the flag state was asked for permission to board if one of its flag
vessels came under suspicion; if the flag state had not responded within a
specified time (usually two or four hours) then permission was deemed to
have been given. In the case of the uK, the uS was given permission in
advance to board any uK flagged vessel within a designated sea area.
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In 2003 the Aruba Agreement, or to give it its full title, “e Agreement
concerning cooperation in suppressing illicit maritime and air trafficking in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the Caribbean area, 2003”,
was signed, although at the time of writing it still lacks sufficient ratifications
to come into force. is was a multilateral agreement that supplemented
but did not replace these bilateral agreements. Most Caribbean states were
involved in the negotiations that led up to the Agreement plus four external
powers with Caribbean territories, the uS, the uK, France and the Neth-
erlands. e anticipated benefit of the additional multilateral agreement is
that states in addition to the uS who are parties to it, and have the requisite
naval or coast guard assets, can enforce its provisions. however, because
the uS has more naval assets in the region than any other state, the bilat-
eral agreements remain the most important. Significantly, the Agreement
makes a simple distinction between territorial waters and the high seas, and
permits signatories to engage in reverse hot pursuit (or “pursuit and entry”
in uS parlance) of suspect vessels under certain conditions. is is valuable
because the geography of the region meant that, heretofore, “go-fast” boats
could move up the island chain all the way from the South American coast
to Florida, safe in the knowledge that if they were spotted by a law enforce-
ment vessel (which was likely to be that of an external power), they could
run for the territorial waters of a small island state and shelter there safely as
the pursuing ships could not follow them. e various bilateral agreements,
and the multilateral Aruba Agreement, have stripped away that sanctuary.
e weakness of the Aruba Agreement is that because of sovereignty con-
cerns, instead of following the simplest course—that a state by ratifying the
agreement allows the vessels of external powers free access to its territorial
waters when in pursuit of narcotics smugglers—states prior to ratification
can choose from a “menu” of options that range from the fact that the
agreement itself constitutes the necessary permission, through “shiprider”
arrangements, to case-by-case notification to “deemed” permission. is is
not entirely satisfactory but it does mean that the communication chan-
nels and procedures that have been established between states can make
permission easier to obtain, and could also prove useful in other cases such
as piracy or terrorism, even though neither the bilateral nor the multilateral
agreements cover either specifically.
35
35 For a full discussion of the Agreement see William Gilmore, ‘Agreement con-
cerning co-operation in suppressing illicit maritime and air trafficking in nar-
cotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the Caribbean area, 2003’, London:
e Stationery Office, 2005.
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maritime terrorism
e Aruba Agreement grew out of, and built upon, the 1988 united
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs And psy-
chotropic Substances. It incorporated lessons from it. perhaps the most
pertinent with regard to ship-boarding was that the 1988 “Drug Traffick-
ing” Convention requires states to extend their domestic counter-narcotic
legislation to ships of their own flag. On the other hand, it allows them,
but does not require them, to extend that legislation to foreign nationals
on foreign or “stateless” vessels transiting their territorial waters. e fact
that many states have not introduced the legislation necessary to cover for-
eign nationals on such ships is not unusual: states tend to implement the
mandatory parts of any agreement but do not make use of the discretionary
powers those agreements often give them. unfortunately, this can make
nonsense of whatever has been agreed. A successful arraignment depends
on the necessary domestic legislation being in place. e consequence of
such omissions for the 1988 Convention has been that if ships that fall into
either category are suspected of transporting narcotics, and boarded under
its terms, it was possible that foreign nationals and stateless persons could
not be arrested even if narcotics were found. e Aruba Agreement closed
this lacuna. All parties to the Agreement are required to enact legislation
covering foreign and stateless vessels within their jurisdiction. International
law learns as its goes along and is developing all the time. erefore, if the
Aruba Agreement can be seen as an advance on the 1988 “Drug Traffick-
ing” Convention, it can also be seen as a stepping stone towards the revi-
sion of the 1988 SuA Convention.
e most important change introduced by the 2005 protocols to the
SuA Convention was that it became an offence under Article 3bis to in-
timidate or coerce a state and to use a vessel as a platform for the discharge
of an explosive, radiation or BCN (Biological, Chemical, Nuclear) weapon.
It also became an offence, under the same article, to use a vessel to trans-
port such weapons or their components and precursors knowing that they
are intended to cause harm. Just as required under the original 1988 SuA
Convention, signatory states must make prohibited acts criminal under
their own national laws and take whatever steps are required to ensure they
can be enforced. Furthermore, under Article 8bis, ships can be boarded if
there are grounds for believing they have contravened Article 3. however,
while this new ship-boarding provision reflects elements of uS experience,
as with the multilateral Aruba Agreement, and in contrast to many of the
individual bilateral agreements that the uS has signed with Caribbean
196
small boats, weak states, dirty money
states, the details of uS practice have not been accepted wholeheartedly.
e new protocol contains numerous safeguards and restrictions and, criti-
cally, the default position is that boarding can only take place if the flag
state gives its permission. Ships remain “islands of territoriality” on the sea.
Nonetheless, flag states can agree in advance, by notifying the Secretary-
General of the IMO, that under Article 8bis.5(e), if the boarding state has
not received permission within four hours such permission is deemed to be
given, and under Article 8bis.5(f) a state can also agree in advance that its
permission is given without the need for a response. In fact, under Article
13, states can make whatever arrangements they wish to realise the intent of
the protocol. ese changes were adopted in October 2005 and now await
the necessary ratifications to come into effect. however, to place these new
arrangements in perspective, the rules for boarding and inspecting fish-
ing vessels under the “Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement” are—as Rüdiger
Wolfrum, a member of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
has pointed out—less onerous than those required to inspect ships for sus-
pected terrorist activity.
36
A global threat on the global medium?
e USS Cole attack. In October 2000, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
uSS Cole was severely damaged and nearly sunk in Aden harbour. Seven-
teen uS servicemen died and 39 were injured. One of the most advanced
warships afloat, designed to protect carrier battle groups, proved incapa-
ble of defending itself against two men in a rubber dinghy packed with a
500lb. (227 kg) shaped charge, even though it was on full “Bravo” alert,
with armed guards on deck. It has been suggested that the Cole was un-
lucky, that it was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, but this
assertion is difficult to sustain in the face of the numbers of warnings that
were received. In 1997, the NSC had sent a memo to the pentagon warn-
ing specifically about risks to uS ships in port. e uS Navy had access to
the wealth of other intelligence about Al Qaeda. In particular, as General
Tommy Franks admitted, CENTCOM had long anticipated frogman and
36 ‘Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the uN Convention on
the law of the sea relating to the conservation and management of straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory species, 1995’; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Fighting
terrorism at sea: Options and limitations under international law’, Twenty-
eighth Doherty Lecture organised by the Center for Oceans Law and policy,
university of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, delivered in
Washington, DC, 13 April 2006, p. 14.