Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorism
small boat attacks against Navy ships. Despite this his predecessor as re-
gional CINC, General Anthony Zinni, had approved the decision to refuel
in Yemen.
37
Most importantly, this was not the terrorists’ first attempt. In January
2000 the same terrorist cell used the same technique to attack the uSS
e Sullivans, a destroyer from the same class as the Cole. e attack failed
because they overloaded the skiff, which foundered in shallow water before
it reached the ship.
38
More importantly, they learned from their failure:
before the second attempt the cell, according to Gunaratna, rehearsed the
operation, conducted a dry run to ensure the attack boat would not sink
again and even tested the explosives.
39
Al Qaeda and the link to 9/11. e Cole attack was undoubtedly the work
of Al Qaeda. Like the attacks on the uS embassies in east Africa in 1998,
and the attacks that would follow in 2001 on the targets in the united
37 e National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the united States, e
9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (authorized edn.), New York and London: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 190-5 [hereafter referred to as e 9/11Com-
mission Report]; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, e Age of Sacred Terror,
New York: Random house Trade paperback, 2003, pp. 323-4; peter L. Bergen,
Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Weidenfeld
& Nicholson, 2001, pp. 202-4; Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside
America’s War on Terror, London: e Free press, 2004, pp. 222-3, particularly
on the failures of inter-service communication that allowed the ship to be ex-
posed to unnecessary risk in the first place; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda:
Global Network of Terror, London: hurst, 2002, p. 49 and pp. 140-1, where he
recounts that bin Laden was so delighted by the success of the attack he actually
composed a poem in its honour and recited it at the wedding of his son; Shaul
Shay, e Red Sea Terror Triangle, New Brunswick & London: Transaction pub-
lishers, 2007 (orig. pub. 2005), pp. 125-8; Raphael perl and Ronald
O’Rourke,
‘Terrorist Attack on the uSS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress’, Con-
gressional Research Service, 30 Jan. 2001 (RS20721); and harold W. Gehman
Jr., Lost Patrol: e Attack on the USS Cole, uS Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.
127, no. 4, April 2001, pp. 34-7 on the inquiry that followed the attack and
the preventive measures that can be taken in the future. See also ‘Blast holes uS
warship’, BBC News, 12 Oct. 2000; ‘‘Asymmetric warfare’, the uSS Cole and
the Intifada’, e Estimate, vol. XII, no. 22, 2000, pp. 1-3; Daniel V. Smith,
‘Terrorist attack on the USS Cole’, JINSA Online, 13 Oct. 2000.
38 Benjamin and Simon, e Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 31-3; Clarke, Against All
Enemies, p. 213; Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda ., pp. 49 & 140; David Fairnie,
interview with author.
39 Rohan Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist
threat?’ in Richmond M. Lloyd (ed.), Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implica-
tions for the 21
st
Century. proceedings of a workshop sponsored by the William
B. Ruger Chair at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 6-8 Nov. 2006, p. 85.
198
small boats, weak states, dirty money
States itself, it demonstrated what a new generation of Islamist militants
were capable of planning and executing, coupled with their willingness
to exploit the freedoms of globalisation: freedom to move internationally,
freedom to communicate cheaply, securely and almost instantaneously;
freedom to raise funds around the world rapidly and anonymously; free-
dom to study the technology of the West (often at Western universities and
at Western expense) and to turn that knowledge against the teachers. how-
ever, it took the 9/11 tragedies in New York and Washington to finally
make the world aware of the horrific moral universe which that capability
was designed to serve.
Conceptually, however, none of these attacks, not even the attacks of
9/11, was very different from other terrorist “spectaculars”. e attacks on
New York and Washington did not represent a fundamental innovation
in terrorist methods, nor did they herald a significant change of direction.
Instead they built on the tried and tested foundation of terrorist tactics:
surprise and simplicity executed by means of known and straightforward
technology, coupled with the ability to observe and then exploit weaknesses
in the target’s security. It was the scale and audacity of the attack and, once
it became apparent, the scale and international reach of the group behind
it that took people’s breath away. president George W. Bush claimed that
those events changed the world; they did not, but the reaction to them
did.
40
It was the elements of scale and international reach which, when taken
together, led people to look for other possible scenarios where acts on a
similar scale could be carried out. e sea certainly offers scale. It is perhaps
not surprising, therefore, that some of that speculation focused on the mar-
itime domain. Two main reasons have been extended as to why terrorists
might mount attacks on water: first, that the seas are a largely unregulated
space which, in the case of weak states that are unable to police their territo-
rial waters effectively, extends right up to coast; secondly, that major ports
are inherently difficult to secure if they are to work efficiently; thirdly, few
terrorist incidents have occurred at sea and therefore, by some unaccount-
able law of averages, it is the turn of ships and seafarers to provide the next
vehicle and the next set of victims.
41
40 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing
the reat, New York: Random house, 2006, p. 167. Also Robert Jervis, ‘An
interim assessment of Sept. 11: What has changed and what has not?’ Political
Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 1, 2002, pp. 37-54.
41 See, for example, the comments made by Dr Tony Tan, the Deputy prime
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maritime terrorism
e attacks of 9/11 have a number of dimensions in terms of the targets
and methods and it is instructive to use the assaults on New York and
Washington to identify major elements in a successful terrorist attack, and
then transfer those elements to the maritime domain in order to see how
they might be replicated at sea. e 11 September attackers exploited the
inherent features of aircraft to turn them into guided weapons without any
form of modification. e targets on that fateful day were iconic symbols
of American power. e Twin Towers were also an economic target; their
destruction imposed a serious but not unsustainable cost on the Ameri-
can economy. e pentagon was transparently a military target. ey were
both, of course, also mass casualty targets.
Categories of maritime targets
With these elements in mind the possibilities for terrorism at sea can be
broken down into four broad categories:
1. Ships as iconic targets
2. Ships as economic targets
3. Ships as mass casualty targets
4. Ships as weapons.
Commentators and analysts have also looked at how ships could be at-
tacked and where.
Obviously, the only land-based targets that can be attacked by a ship
directly are on the shore—in other words, ports or fixed seabed structures
such as oil terminals or production platforms. Ships could, however, be
used to transport men, money or equipment that can then be used to at-
tack land targets; in other words they could be used as delivery vehicles for
weapons. While ships can be attacked anywhere they can travel, terrorists
are not navies and therefore, for practical reasons, are unlikely to mount ex-
ternal attacks against ships unless they are in a port or a short distance from
the coast. Some of the possibilities in these categories have been realised
already by terrorists while other remain only potential threats.
Ships as iconic targets. until the end of the Second World War the size of a
nation’s merchant marine was one measure of its power. Each ship was rep-
Minister of Singapore, quoted in Joshua ho, ‘Maritime counter-terrorism: A
Singapore perspective’, paper presented at the Observer Research Foundation
Maritime Counter-Terrorism Workshop, 29 –30 Nov. 2004, p. 4; Glass, ‘e
new piracy’; also peter Grier and Faye Bowers, ‘how al-Qaeda might strike the
uS by sea’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 May 2003.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
resentative of the state whose flag it flew. at link has now been broken.
Most ships today are registered in states that offer the ships owners some
regulatory, cost or tax advantage. Few cargo ships, therefore, are so closely
linked with any state, or so obviously serving the interests of that state, that
an attack on the ship would be seen as an attack on the flag state.
Warships, however, are different.
42
Apart from the attack on the uSS
Cole, which epitomised this, several other actual, attempted or planned
attacks have taken place: the attempted attack on the uSS e Sullivans in
Aden in 2000, the planned attacks on a uS warship in Singapore uncov-
ered in 2001, the planned attacks that were to have been mounted from
Morocco in 2002 on uS and British warships in the Straits of Gibraltar,
and the attempted attack in 2005 on the uSS Ashland and uSS Kearsage
while on a visit to the Jordanian port of Aqaba.
43
It is possible that other
planned or attempted attacks on warships have been disrupted.
44
Although
it would not have involved a ship it is worth noting that, according to the
operative tasked with the mission, Ibn Yahya al-Libi (who escaped from
uS detention at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan in 2005 and is now one of
Al Qaeda’s most senior leaders
45
), one of the operations that Abd al-Rahim
al-Nashiri, the leader of the cell that attacked the Cole and the Limburg (see
below), was planning prior to his capture was an attack on the headquarters
of the uS Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.
46
42 Auxiliaries could also fall into this category and have the advantage, from the
terrorists’ perspective, of being much less heavily armed.
43 For references on the Cole attack and the attempted attack on e Sullivans see
above. On the Singapore and Gibraltar attacks see below. For the Aqaba attack
see ‘Jordanians hunt rocket suspects’, BBC News, 20 Aug. 2005; ‘Jordanians
find rocket launcher used in attack on uS ships’, New York Times, 20 Aug.
2005; Tim Butcher, ‘Missile attack on uS ship in Jordanian Red Sea port’,
Daily Telegraph, 20 Aug. 2005; ‘Zarqawi ‘link to Jordan rockets’’, BBC News,
24 Aug. 2005.
44 Barbara Starr, ‘Sources: Warships targeted by Al-Qaeda’, CNN.com, 21 Nov.
2002.
45 On the escape see Mark Tran, ‘Terror suspects escape uS Afghan base’, e
Guardian, 11 July 2005; on his subsequent position within al-Qaeda see Sami
Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ‘Al Qaeda family feud’, Newsweek, 30 July 2007.
Also Michael Scheuer, ‘Abu Yahya al-Libi: Al Qaeda’s theological enforcer–part
1’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, vol. IV, Issue 25, 31 July 2007
and part 2, vol. IV, Issue 27, 14 Aug. 2007; Michael Moss and Souad Mekhen-
net, ‘Rising leader for next phase of al-Qaeda’s war’, New York Times, 4 April
2008.
46 Oliver Burkeman, ‘uS captures key al-Qaeda suspect’, Guardian Unlimited, 22
Nov. 2002; ‘uS hopes al-Qaeda captive will reveal future plots’, USA Today, 22
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maritime terrorism
Cruise ships, although they might be seen primarily as potential mass-
casualty targets, when carrying large numbers of Americans or Israelis have
an iconic status because of the nationality of those on board. Some cruise
ships, such as the Cunard-owned Queen Mary 2 and Queen Victoria, have
an iconic status simply because of what they are and the privilege they
represent.
47
e economic effects if a major cruise ship were attacked suc-
cessfully could also be extremely damaging.
48
Ships as economic targets. Al Qaeda’s strategy has an economic dimension.
49
In a tape released in 2004 bin Laden suggested the group had a “policy (of)
bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”
50
e al-Qaeda ideologue,
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, echoed this when he wrote about denying the West
access to Muslim markets and raw materials.
51
Oil is its obvious focus. In
Christopher Blanchard’s view it is based on a “sophisticated consideration
of the economic and military vulnerabilities of the united States and its
allies, particular with regard to the role of Middle Eastern oil…” he goes
on to point out that bin Laden has spoken regularly of the economic effects
of terrorist attacks and talked about the need for the Arab world to retain
its oil reserves, “as a great and important economic power for the coming
Islamic state”, and the effectiveness of economic boycotts. he suggests that
it is possible al-Qaeda could adopt a more protracted, attrition strategy
based on attacks against economic targets and critical infrastructure such as
oil facilities and pipelines.
52
Nov. 2002.
47 ‘e QE2 threat and the symbolic value of cruise ships’, STRATFOR Daily
Terrorism Brief, 13 April 2006. On the other hand Dragonette, ‘Maritime ter-
rorism: underway as before?’, p. 169 makes the point that the era of ‘ship as
symbol’ is over and that even the QE2 was honoured more by rumours than by
actual threats.
48 For a thorough assessment of those affects see Greenberg, et al., Maritime Ter-
rorism, pp. 79-85.
49 Matthew hunt, ‘Bleed to bankruptcy: Economic targeting tactics in the global
jihad’, Jane’s IR, Jan. 2007, pp. 14-17. For background on economic targetting
by terrorist groups see James M. Lutz. ‘Terrorism as Economic Warfare’, Global
Economy Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006..
50 ‘Bin Laden: Goal is to bankrupt the uS’, CNN.com, 1 Nov. 2004.
51 Brynjar Lia. Architect of Global Jihad: e Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab
al-Suri. London: hurst & Co, 2007, pp. 398-401.
52 Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and evolving ideology’, Con-
gressional Research Service, Report for Congress RL32759, 20 June 2004, p.
12.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
Tankers are certainly part of the oil industry’s critical infrastructure. Al-
most exactly two years after the attack on the uSS Cole, the Limburg (now
the Maritime Jewel), a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), was struck, again
off Yemen. On the morning of the attack a threat from bin Laden to “tar-
get key sectors of your economy until you stop injustices and aggression”
was broadcast by Arabic satellite television, and during a later recording he
praised the attack explicitly.
53
e Limburg, like the Cole, was attacked by a small, fast-moving craft
packed with explosives—probably, once again, a shaped charge. e boat
detonated against the side of the ship blowing a hole between six and eight
metres (20-26 feet) deep in the outer hull, (although only about one square
metre (11 square feet) in the inner hull). e tanker was partly loaded with
400,000 bbl of crude oil (it was en route to load a further 1.5 million bbl)
which formed a slick 45-miles (72km) long beside the Yemeni coast. e
timing of the attack, when the ship was picking up a pilot and therefore
almost stationary, and in the early morning when few crew were on watch,
indicates good research.
54
Again, Al-Qaeda carried out the attack. Again,
intelligence warnings had been received; in September the uS Navy had
alerted shipping about possible attacks against oil traffic.
e Limburg attack did have an economic effect but most of it fell on
Yemen. Insurance rates for ships calling at Yemeni ports increased immedi-
53 ‘Bin Laden hails anti-Western attacks’, BBC News, 14 Oct. 2002. Attacks on
cruise ships would also affect the tourist industry. For details on the immediate
effects following the Achille Lauro incident see Bohn, e Achille Lauro Hijack-
ing, p. 153.
54 For accounts of the attack and the reluctant acknowledgement by Yemen of
al-Qaeda involvement see, for example, ‘Craft ‘rammed’ Yemen oil tanker’,
BBC News, 6 Oct. 2002; philip Smucker, ‘We were bombed, says oil tanker
captain’, Daily Telegraph, 8 Oct. 2002; ‘Yemen ship attack was terrorism’, BBC
News report, 13 Oct.; ‘Militant ‘planned attacks’ in Gulf’, BBC News, 23 Dec.
2002; ‘Limburg saboteurs had inside information’, ICC News, 19 June 2003;
Shay, e Red Sea Terror Triangle, pp. 128-30; and Gunaratna, ‘reat to the
maritime domain: how real is the terrorist threat?’ p. 86. Al Qaeda also drew
attention to the operation’s cost effectiveness, pointing out that the suicide boat
only cost $1,000 and comparing this to the cost of an oil tanker: ‘Al Qaeda,
tanker insurance rates, mines among key war concerns’, Oil and Gas Journal, 31
March 2003. In this connection it is worth noting that the uSS Cole took 14
months to repair at a cost of over $250 million: Michael Richardson, A Time
Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, p. 18 and
John C.K. Daly, ‘Al Qaeda and maritime terrorism (part I)’, e Jamestown
Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. 1, no. 4, 24 Oct. 2003, p. 2.
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maritime terrorism
ately and substantially. As a direct consequence, shippers of all types of goods
shunned Yemeni ports; throughput of containers fell from 43,000 TEus in
September 2002 to 3,000 TEus in November and then almost ceased; three
thousand port workers were laid off. e rates were reduced after six months
for two reasons: first, because it became clear that the tactic was unlikely to
be repeated; secondly, because the Yemeni government issued Lloyd’s with
a letter of credit to cover any subsequent losses up to an agreed limit. e
OECD estimated that Yemen’s economic losses equalled one per cent of the
country’s 2001 GDp. e cumulative losses for the port were, however, so
substantial that the Singapore-based port operator pSA withdrew from the
project and handed its share back to the Yemeni government.
55
e wider affects of the attack were much more limited. e oil price
increased by 1.3 per cent within hours but fell back quickly, admittedly in a
period of slack demand. In a tight oil market, one that was also troubled by
the affects of political turbulence particularly in the Middle East, that out-
come might not be so benign. Nonetheless, to be able to inflict economic
hardship of sufficient severity to bring about a change of policy, a terror-
ist group would need to reduce world oil supply by a significant amount.
prior to his capture al-Nashiri was also reportedly planning an operation
to attack several oil tankers as they passed through the Strait of hormuz.
56
55 Murphy, ‘Slow alarm’, p. 4; Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, pp.
70-1; Rashmi Jain, Securing the Port of New York and New Jersey: Network-
Centric Operations Applied to the Campaign Against Terrorism, Appendix 1-4,
Stevens Institute of Technology, 2004, p. 4.
56 Al-Nashiri was reportedly the ‘mastermind’ behind both attacks. For a biogra-
phy of al-Nashiri go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_al-Rahim_al-Nashiri.
On his importance and his role within al-Qaeda see e 9/11Commission Re-
port, pp. 152-3; on his capture see ‘Top al-Qaeda operative arrested’, CNN.com,
22 Nov. 2002; ‘‘Al Qaeda Gulf chief ’ held by uS’, BBC News, 22 Nov. 2002;
‘Suspected Qaeda chief cooperating’, CBS News, 22 Nov. 2002; and ‘Al-Qaeda
operative talking’, CNN.com, 23 Nov. 2002. ere is some suspicion that in
Yemen he worked with the Aden-Abyan Islamic Group: Koknar, ‘piracy and
terrorism are joining forces’, and ‘Aden-Abyan Islamic Army’, GlobalSecurity.
org, ND. Concern was raised when several members of the group escaped from
a Yemeni jail in 2006: Francis harris, ‘Terrorist alert over Yemen jail breakout’,
Daily Telegraph, 6 Feb. 2006; also Andrew McGregor. ‘Al-Qaeda’s Great Escape
in Yemen’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, vol. III, Issue 5, 7 Feb.
2006. is escape was the reason why Yemen was returned to the Lloyd’s Joint
War Committee list of ‘at risk’ areas for the first time since the listing was lifted
following the Limburg attack. For details on the escapees’ whereabouts see Gre-
gory D. Johnsen, ‘Tracking Yemen’s 23 escaped jihardi operatives–part 1’, e
Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. V, Issue 18, 27 Sept. 2007, pp.
5-7. e central figure in this escape was Jamal al-Badawi who had escaped
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
he was presumably hoping that if he sank several ships close together these
would block the Straits for a sufficient period of time to bring about the
necessary market disruption.
57
One tanker sinking and probably even sev-
eral tanker sinkings would not be enough (although they would certainly
provoke a howl of environmental rage).
ere are disadvantages in mounting attacks on economic targets at
sea. From a terrorist’s point of view, tankers have the advantage of being
isolated and vulnerable once they leave a protected anchorage; the disad-
vantages are that they require specific skills to attack successfully and that
several successful attacks may be required to achieve the desired economic
disruption.
58
From simulations conducted by Securing America’s Future
previously from another prison in 2003. e escape in 2006 was made through
a tunnel dug between the prison and a nearby mosque by sympathisers burrow-
ing into the prison from the outside. For domestic political reasons the govern-
ment of president Saleh dealt leniently with both detainees and escapees as part
of a policy designed to discourage them from committing militant acts within
the country’s borders. is stance, coupled to the procedural obstacles that had
been put in the way of the original FBI investigation of the Cole bombing, led
the uS government to become increasingly frustrated with Yemen’s excessive
generosity towards those it viewed as international terrorists. See Craig Whit-
lock, ‘probe of uSS Cole bombing unravels’, Washington Post, 4 May 2008 and
Ali h. Soufan, ‘Coddling terrorists in Yemen’, Washington Post, 17 May 2008.
57 president Bush included a number of maritime incidents in the list of thwarted
terrorist attacks issued in 2005: peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, ‘Bush says
10 plots by al-Qaeda were foiled’, e Washington Post, 7 Oct. 2005. Amongst
them he alluded to a disrupted attempt to attack ships in the Straits of hormuz.
is was probably the attempt by al-Nashiri to launch small attack craft from
a mother ship. For a report on this plan see Julian Borger, ‘plot to sink warship
on 9/11’, e Guardian, 21 Feb. 2003. Also private information, Oct. 2005.
e president may also have been referring to the attack on the uSNS Walter
S. Diehl, an American naval oiler, which on 23 April 2002 repelled an attack
as it traversed the Straits of hormuz. Whether this was the work of terrorists
or pirates or a practice run by the IRGCN could not be determined: Newman,
‘Terrorists feared to be planning sub-surface naval attacks’ and Adam Geibel,
‘Cyclones, Firebolt and the persian Gulf pirates’, Strategy Page, 22 Oct. 2003.
however, private sources have indicated to the author that the attack amounted
to a substantial assault. Contrary to press reports that mentioned six boats, a
total of 40 boats were actually involved, most of which were organised in three
waves to distract the crew’s attention to one side of the ship while the final wave
of six speedboats approached from the starboard direction, among which was
hidden a boat carrying what appeared to be a suicide bomber. is wave was
also spotted and driven off. Several other similar or attempted attacks on uSNS
ships have occurred in the Gulf, all of which have been denied by uS authori-
ties.
58 Ed Blanche, ‘Terror attacks threaten Gulf’s oil routes’, Jane’s IR, vol. 14, no. 12,
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maritime terrorism
Energy (SAFE), it is estimated that a four per cent global shortfall in daily
supply would result in a 177 per cent increase in the price of oil.
59
Oil
supplies and prices are currently underpinned by Saudi Arabia’s excess ca-
pacity. Any significant disruption in that supply, which is already coming
under pressure as world consumption increases, would put a serious strain
on the global economy.
60
Kubarych in his review of the global economic
response to the oil “shocks” of the past 30 years, makes a similar point.
he argues that although the effect of the oil price rise that began in 2002
has so far been less damaging that the original “shock” of 1973-75, these
supply constraints, coupled with rising demand from economies such as
China and India, mean that the oil market is becoming tighter.
61
Given
this vulnerability but at the same time recognising every terrorist group’s
need to conserve resources, it makes more sense for them to attack produc-
tion facilities, export terminals and refineries directly even though they are
likely to have higher levels of security and might well be actively defended.
If such attacks succeeded, however, the effect that could be achieved might
be extremely serious, depending on the state of the global market.
62
is is indeed what terrorist groups have tried to do. Multiple attacks
were mounted against oil installations in Iraq, including 366 recorded
attacks on pipelines between 2003 and 2007 that seriously reduced that
country’s oil production and pushed back its reconstruction process.
63
In
2002 al-Qaeda reportedly planned to attack the Saudi refinery and loading
complex at Ras Tanura.
64
A successful attack on this facility could poten-
tially take out ten per cent of the world’s traded energy supply.
65
In 2006
Dec. 2002, p. 7.
59 hunt, ‘Bleed to bankruptcy’, p. 15.
60 Ibid., p. 15. e uAE has made plans to build pipelines and terminals that will
enable it to circumvent the Straits in the event of a blockage: Matt Chambers,
‘Just in case’, Wall Street Journal, 27 Aug. 2007.
61 Roger Kubarych, ‘how oil shocks affect markets: Consider the five most recent
scenarios’, e International Economy Magazine, Summer 2005.
62 Neal Adams, Terrorism and Oil. Tulsa: pennWell, 2003
; Adam porter, ‘Global
refinery shortage shifts power balance’, BBC News, 2 Oct. 2005.
63 ‘Attacks cripple Iraq oil exports’, BBC News, 15 June 2004; John C.K. Daly,
‘e reat to Iraqi oil’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2,
no. 12, 17 June 2004; ‘Insurgent attacks on Iraq’s oil sector’, Reuters Founda-
tion AlertNet, 8 June 2006. Statistic on pipeline attacks from hunt, ‘Bleed to
bankruptcy’, p. 15.
64 Blanche, ‘Terror attacks threaten Gulf’s oil routes’, p. 7.
65 Analysts have suggested this might be achieved by using a passenger jet to dive
206
small boats, weak states, dirty money
it attacked the huge Saudi export facility at Abqaiq using a combination of
suicide car bombers and gunmen in a failed attempt to break through the
main gate.
66
e result was a $2 increase in the oil price.
67
Later in 2006, oil
facilities in Yemen were struck.
68
In 2007 Saudi Arabian security forces ar-
rested 100 men who had been trained in Iraq and were apparently planning
to attack oil facilities in the Kingdom.
69
So far, however, there has only
been one attack on a maritime-based faciltiy. In April 2004 a dhow and two
other, smaller boats approached the Al-Basra (previously known as Mini al-
Bakr) and Khawr al-Amaya oil terminals located about six miles (10 km)
off Basra, through which all of Iraq’s oil exports pass. An interception boat
was sent to investigate the dhow. As it pulled alongside the dhow exploded,
killing three uS sailors. e two smaller craft then ran towards the termi-
nals at high speed but, unlike the boat that attacked the Limburg, exploded
before they made contact.
70
Reportedly a fourth boat was involved, which
might well have had a command function.
71
e then leader of Al Qaeda
in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the incident. Oil
prices rose but fell back quickly as they had done after the Limburg attack.
72
bomb the site. hunt, ‘Bleed to bankruptcy’, p. 17.
66 ‘Al Qaeda says it hit Saudi oil facility’, Aljazeera.net, 25 Feb. 2006; ‘Q&A: Saudi
oil attack’, BBC News, 24 Feb. 2006; ‘What if?’ e Economist, 27 May 2006.
Simon henderson, ‘Al-Qaeda attack on Abqaiq: e vulnerability of Saudi oil’,
the Washington Institute for Near East policy PolicyWatch no. 1082, 28 Feb.
2006 makes the point that Abqaiq has been built with a great deal of redun-
dancy built in and would therefore be difficult to knock out completely. Fighter
aircraft are reported to be on quick reaction alert to intercept any attempted
aerial attack.
67 hunt, ‘Bleed to bankruptcy’, p. 16
68 Chris heffelfinger, ‘Al-Qaeda oil attack thwarted in Yemen’, e Jamestown
Foundation Terrorism Focus, vol. III, no. 37, 26 Sept. 2006, pp. 3-4; ‘Qaeda
claims Yemen oil attacks, vows more strikes’, Reuters, 7 Nov. 2006; Dominic
Moran, ‘‘Al-Qaida’ hits back in Yemen’, ISN Security Watch, 17 Nov. 2006.
69 Damien McElroy, ‘Saudi Arabia arrests over 100 terror suspects’, Daily Tele-
graph, 29 Nov. 2007.
70 Louis Miexler, ‘Oil terminal attack costs Iraq $28m’, AP, 25 April 2004; ‘Blasts
target Iraqi oil terminals’, BBC News, 25 April 2004; philip Sherwell and Colin
Freeman, ‘Suicide boats close oil port as 42 die in Iraq’, Sunday Telegraph, 25
April 2004; Josh White and Bradley Graham, ‘uS to change tactics after Gulf
attacks’, e Washington Post, 27 April 2004; James Glanz, ‘15 miles offshore,
safeguarding Iraq’s oil lifeline’, New York Times, 6 July 2004; Daly, ‘e threat
to Iraqi oil’.
71 ‘Oil terminal to open after suicide attack’, e Age, 26 April 2004.
72 ‘Oil prices rise on fears of attacks on Iraqi resources’, Taipei Times, 27 April