Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorism
To be truly effective, moreover, the primer needs to be distributed thor-
oughly throughout the fertiliser. Whatever method was used to introduce a
primer the mixture would be crude, bearing in mind the large volume of a
ship’s cargo, unless the terrorists were able to use a crane or digger of some
sort. Despite these doubts there is always the risk that, providing the terror-
ists were able to detonate it, the sheer volume of material might be enough
to overcome this problem. Two further points, however, are also worth
making. First, ammonium nitrate is anhydrous, so that mixing it on or
near water could jeopardise its effectiveness because its explosive potential
declines once it becomes wet. Secondly, the agricultural grade is less suit-
able for making into ANFO than the explosive grade. Given that terrorists
dislike risk, and the risk of failure in an attempt to transform fertiliser grade
ammonium nitrate into an explosive at sea is high, the likelihood of its use
as the explosive contents of a ship bomb is relatively low.
114
Terrorists could, of course, hijack a ship transporting ready-assembled
ANFO. In 2003 the Greek authorities intercepted the freighter Baltic Sky
that claimed to be en route from Tunisia to Sudan. On board they discov-
ered 750 tons of ammonium nitrate based explosive plus 8,000 detonators.
115
To find such a large quantity on one ship was, in their view, “extremely rare”
and, according to the Greek Minister of Shipping (in something of an exag-
geration), “tantamount to the power of an atomic bomb”.
116
e halifax and Texas City explosions were huge. But ports that are
large enough to accommodate large ships are themselves large places and
hard to destroy. e alternative to ANFO would be conventional explo-
sive. Obtaining it in the quantities necessary is no easy matter. Admittedly,
however, terrorists have moved large shipments of explosive by sea in plas-
tic form and as assembled bombs. With Libyan help the provisional IRA
was transporting two tons of Semtex aboard the Eksund (out of a total arms
114 See Christine Gorman, ‘how garden-variety fertilizer becomes killer bombs’,
TIME, vol. 145, no. 18, 1 May 1995, on industrial and amateur mixing meth-
ods and the rather sorry results that can obtain when the mixing has been insuf-
ficient.
115 ANFO is the commercially manufactured version of the ammonium nitrate/
fuel oil mixture. It is widely used because it is more powerful than dynamite yet
much more stable. .
116 Jonathan howland, ‘hazardous seas: Maritime sector vulnerable to devastat-
ing terrorist attacks’, JINSA Online, 1 April 2004, p. 2; ‘Greece traces route
of seized ship’, CNN.com, 24 June 2003; Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global
Trade, pp. 45-6.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
delivery of 150 tons) when the French authorities intercepted it in 1987.
117
prior to 2007 the LTTE had lost at least three ships, the Yahata, the Ahat
and the Comex-Joux 3, to explosions, the first two self-detonated to avoid
capture and the third destroyed by Sri Lankan aerial attack, but most are as-
sumed to have got through.
118
Michael Richardson, for example, names the
Swene, which successfully delivered sixty tons of TNT and RDX in 1994
and the Stillus Limassul that landed 32,400 mortar bombs in 1997.
119
at said, blowing up people and things is only one option. Gassing
people is another. Although terrorists groups have shown an interest in
acquiring or making their own chemical agents none, with the exception
of the Aum Shinrikyo group which attempted to release poison gas on the
Tokyo subway in 1995, have pressed this interest to the point of produc-
tion.
120
e assumption therefore must be that terrorists are more likely to
look for commercially available chemicals that are toxic and flammable and
transported regularly in large quantities, such as Vinyl Chloride Monomer
(VCM), Methyl Chloride, Ammonia and propylene Oxide. In 1995, for
example, a tanker loaded with about 18,000 tons of pressurised anhydrous
ammonia lost control of its steering and came close to crashing into the
Golden Gate Bridge. If the tanks had ruptured, thousands of people could
potentially have been poisoned.
121
A true parallel with 9/11, however, would be to exploit the destructive
potential of a ship’s cargo without augmentation.
122
In this scenario oil and
117 peter Foster, ‘Arms seized as terrorists are set free’, Daily Telegraph, 29 July 2000;
Stewart, e Brutal Seas, p. 322.
118 Davis, ‘Tiger international’.
119 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 26. See also G.h. peiris, ‘Seces-
sionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational impulses’ in A.p.S. Gill
and Ajai Sahni, e Global reat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political
Linkages, New Delhi: Bulwark Books for e Institute of Conflict Manage-
ment, 2002, pp. 111-12 and Raymond Bonner, ‘Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka:
Deadly and armed to the teeth’, New York Times, 7 March 1998.
120 For a discussion of Aum Shinrikyo and the responses to its use of poison gas see,
for example, hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 121-4; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror
in the Mind of God (3
rd
edn.), Berkeley and London: university of California
press, 2003, pp. 103-18; Walter Lacqueur, No End To War: Terrorism in the
Twenty-First Century, New York and London: Continuum, 2003, pp. 144-5.
121 Rogers, ‘Bay at risk for chemical disaster’.
122 It is noteworthy that amongst the information taken from Muhammed Naeem
Noor Khan’s computer was that Al Qaeda had indeed investigated whether an
oil tanker could be used as a weapon: peter Foster, ‘Secret arrest yielded ‘treasure
trove’’, Daily Telegraph, 3 Aug. 2004.
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maritime terrorism
gas are painted as presenting the most serious risk. e destructive power of
both is obvious. Despite this their weapon potential is open to some doubt.
e primary problem is how to get them to explode or ignite or, more par-
ticularly, how to get them to explode or ignite on demand.
Crude oil is not like gunpowder. e oil on the Torrey Canyon, for ex-
ample, that ran aground off the Cornish coast in 1967, only burned once it
had been subject to massive air attack, including the use of napalm.
123
Re-
fined oil is less difficult to ignite—particularly gasoline, kerosene and, ob-
viously, aviation spirit—but is usually transported in smaller quantities.
124
Crude oil vapour, which is often vented during a voyage and is present in
empty tanks, presents a greater danger. erefore, rather than tankers “in
load” it can be empty tankers that represent a risk if they are not rendered
safe (“inerted”) correctly, or tankers with some tanks full and others empty,
as was the case with the Limburg.
125
however, even if the cargo or the va-
pour does ignite, the tanker’s hull is likely to contain the lateral force of any
explosion, thus forcing most of the destructive energy skywards.
126
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
127
is largely methane with smaller fractions
of ethane and propane that has been cooled to minus 163 degrees Celsius
123 ‘1967: Bombs rain down on Torrey Canyon’, BBC News On is Day, 29 March
1967. According to the report the RAF and RN dropped 62,000 lbs of bombs,
5,200 gallons of petrol, 11 rockets and large quantities of napalm. Despite the
huge fire and tower of smoke this caused, which could be seen 100 miles away,
the ship refused to sink.
124 e accidental explosion at the Buncefield oil depot north of London in 2005
demonstrated the explosive and destructive potential of refined oil products.
e depot was reported to be storing 7.7 million gallons of refined petrol, par-
affin and, possibly, aviation fuel (compared to a total capacity of 16 million
gallons), a portion of which was ignited. however, although the explosion was
heard 100 miles away and resulted in a fire that was described as the ‘possibly
the biggest incident of its type in Europe since 1945’, only two people were
seriously injured. See, for example, Sally pook, ‘It’s like a vision of dooms-
day’, Daily Telegraph, 12 Dec. 2005 and ‘Clues destroyed as inferno rages’, BBC
News, 12 Dec. 2005.
125 When crude oil is discharged from a tank volatile gasses remain. A spark can
ignite these and set off an explosion. To prevent this happening tanks are
rendered inert by pumping exhaust gases—which consist mainly of carbon
dioxide—from the ship’s engines into the empty spaces. On the relevance of
this to the Limburg see Rupert herbert-Burns, ‘Terrorism in the early 21
st
cen-
tury maritime domain’ in Joshua ho and Catherine Zara Raymond, e Best
of Times, e Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, Singapore:
World Scientific publishing/IDSS, 2005, p. 165.
126 private information, Aug. 2005.
127 is section and the one following are based on Martin N. Murphy, ‘Tanker
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
(minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit) to form an odourless, non-toxic liquid.
Cooling the gas reduces it to 1/600 of its volume which makes it economi-
cal to transport over distances in excess of 3,000 kilometres (around 1,800
miles) and practical to move by sea. When it has been returned to its gase-
ous state it is supplied to industrial and residential customers as “natural
gas”. It is valued because it burns with a high radiant heat and, depending
on the methane content, little smoke. It can be dangerous.
Concerns have risen because of the dramatic increase, both actual and
planned, in the volume of LNG traded internationally and the consequent
increase in the number of LNG tankers plying the world’s sea routes.
128
In
2003 there were approximately 1,153 LNG and LpG tankers in the world’s
fleet (compared with over 16,000 oil tankers of a similar capacity).
129
Of
these, 151 were LNG tankers.
130
On the basis of figures available in 2006,
it took 34 years for the world’s fleet to reach 100 ships; the next 100 were
built over eight years; the expectation was that the two years following
would see another 100 more.
131
LNG is safe if handled properly. e ships
used to transport it are usually amongst the best built, best run and best
maintained in the fleet. ere is little danger while the LNG is on the
ship. Since 1952 there have been several accidents involving LNG carriers
but none have led to LNG ignition.
132
e terminals where the gas is dis-
charged and regassified are usually isolated and all are subject to regulations
that stipulate the distance between the complex and human habitation,
including the well-known terminal at Everett, near Boston, MA that has
caught the attention of several commentators,
133
as this is the point on the
transportation cycle where the risks are greatest.
134
terror: e unfounded fear of liquefied gas ships’, Jane’s IR, vol. 19, no. 12, Dec.
2007, pp. 20-4.
128 ‘Liquid natural gas terrorism’, Jane’s TSM, 12 Sept. 2007; John McLaughlin,
‘LNG is nowhere near as dangerous as people are making it out to be. percep-
tion is the problem’, Lloyd’s List, 8 Feb. 2005.
129 OECD, Security in Maritime Transport, p. 12; uK p&I Club Issue 8, ‘e car-
riage of liquefied gasses’.
130 uS Energy Information Administration, ‘World LNG shipping capacity ex-
panding’, 2004.
131 ‘Gas fleet up 50% in two years’, Fairplay, 6 July 2006.
132 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 44.
133 Stephen Flynn, e Edge of Disaster, New York: Random house, 2007, pp. 20,
27-8 & 32-4; Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 15; and James A. Fay, ‘Spills and
fires from LNG and oil tankers in Boston harbour’, 26 March 2003.
134 ere have been 13 serious accidents at LNG plants since 1944. paul parfomak,
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maritime terrorism
LNG does not explode; or, to be precise, the chance that it would ex-
plode in an unconfined space is extremely small and could only occur under
the most extreme conditions. Methane, the primary component of natural
gas, is relatively insensitive to initiation compared to heavier hydrocarbons.
Explosive test data show that unless the vapour contains more than to 20
per cent ethane and propane it will not detonate in open air.
135
As LNG is
typically purified until it is more than 90 per cent methane, this eventual-
ity is unlikely. If LNG vapour was to explode then, historical experience
suggests it would need to be confined and contain the requisite fractions of
ethane and propane. Even then the chance of triggering an explosion using
an external explosive device is remote.
136
If LNG is to be used as a weapon a series of steps need to take place, each
one of which has to be successful even though each one has a significant
chance of failure. e tank containing the LNG has to be breached. Suf-
ficient liquid has to be released to form a pool. is must not be ignited
immediately. Instead it needs time to warm and form a cloud that must
rise and drift over an area where it could cause damage. Once this cloud
hits a suitable ignition source it must be within the flammability range and
that range must be maintained consistently through the cloud such that
the flame can burn back to the pool, which is the fuel source, where it will
form a “pool fire”.
It is the science of LNG that makes so many aspects of this possible sort
of attack questionable. Once LNG has spilt from a ship’s containment
vessel it begins to warm. At minus 162 degrees Celsius (minus 259 degrees
Fahrenheit) it will begin to return to its gaseous form and mix with air.
LNG becomes flammable when the air-fuel mixture is between 5.3 and
14%. If the liquid is released in a quantity large enough not to vaporise
immediately it may form a pool of LNG on the surface of the water (al-
though wind and wave action mean that this is not inevitable), and this, if
ignited, would form what is known as a “pool fire”. Such a fire would emit
very high level of radiant heat; estimates of the distance at which burns
from a pool fire would occur after 30 seconds’ exposure range from 500
metres (500 yards) to 2,000 metres (1.25 miles); the 2004 study by the uS
Department of Energy’s Sandia Laboratories suggests about 1,600 metres
‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security: Background and issues for
congress’, Congressional Research Service, 16 March 2005, RL32073, p. 11.
135 G.A. Melham, et al., ‘Managing LNG risks: Separating the facts from the
myths’, ioMosaic Corporation White Paper, Aug. 2006, p. 4.
136 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
(approximately 1 mile) beyond which, it suggests, the public safety impact
would in most cases be low.
137
Differing assumptions about the breach
size, the number of tanks involved, the volume of the spill, essential LNG
fire properties and environmental conditions explain the variations. In the
opinion of many experts a pool fire, particularly one over water, is, because
of thermal effects, the most serious LNG hazard.
138
If a pool did form but ignition was avoided at that stage, the gas would
warm and rise to form a “plume” that would drift with the wind. Standard
procedure would be to evacuate everyone upwind to behind line-of-sight
shelter of such a release. If those portions of the “plume” that were within
the gas-air flammable range ignited, the expectation is that the fire would
burn back from the ignition source to the pool in a manner known as
“deflagration”, which is a sub-sonic burning movement through the gas
cloud (as compared to “detonation”, which is a supersonic movement that
generates much greater over-pressure). e fire would ignite any readily
flammable objects in its path but although the assumption is often made
that the gas cloud would drift a considerable distance, it seems more likely
that it would encounter an ignition source before it penetrated far into a
populated area. LNG vapours are also less dense than air and as they warm
will eventually rise and disperse above most ignition sources. Asphyxiation
and cryogenic effects from the extremely cold gas cloud might be a risk to
workers very close to a release but for everyone else the risk would be very
low, lower even than the burn hazard.
A “super-sized” pool fire can be extinguished. however, given that it
would only burn so long as there was gas available, and given the high radi-
ant heat, it usually makes sense to let it burn itself out.
139
Moreover, the
heat emitted has only been measured in relatively small-scale experiments.
Small pool fires emit relatively little smoke. e size of the fire envisaged
as a result of a tanker breach would mean that sufficient heat would be
emitted to vary the heat characteristics observed in small fires. e effect of
137 Sandia National Laboratories. ‘Guidance on risk analysis and safety implica-
tions of a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) spill over water’, Sandia Report,
Dec. 2004 (SAND2004-6258), p. 19 [hereafter referred to as the Sandia Re-
port].
138 parfomak, ‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security’, p. 9.
139 It is frequently asserted that LNG fires cannot be extinguished: see for example
Fay, ‘Spills and fires from LNG and oil tankers in Boston harbour’, p. 2; Jerry
havens, ‘Terrorism: Ready to blow?’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 59,
no. 4, 2003, pp. 16-18; and Flynn, e Edge of Disaster, p. 32. is is, however,
incorrect.
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maritime terrorism
smoke on heat flux in fires where the pool exceeds 35m (115 feet) in diam-
eter is theoretical and has never been verified in large-scale experiments.
140
e question of heat transfer also appears to be misunderstood (or mis-
represented). It takes time for heat to go from one object to another, de-
pending on a range of factors including distance, thermal conductivity,
humidity and density. hence, while the temperature of a flame may be
extremely high, the temperatures of surrounding objects will not rise for
some time, if ever. Candles burn at a temperature only slightly less than
LNG, yet if one is left burning in a cold church, for example, it will not
prevent the worshippers from shivering. It simply does not transfer its heat
quickly enough to make a discernable difference to its surroundings and to
overcome all the sources of heat loss.
Terrorists are averse to failure and dislike risk. ey want to feel sure
that if they mount an attack there is a strong likelihood that it will suc-
ceed. Depending on the vagaries of a “pool” that would be affected by sea
conditions, a gas cloud that would move with the whim of the wind and
would probably rise quickly above most human habitation and, if it did not
warm sufficiently to rise above that habitation, would probably be ignited
before it penetrated it to any depth, would appear to fall into the high risk
category. Gas clouds might drift for 20 miles (32km) or more over the sea
or over desert but the chance they would do this over a town or city before
hitting an ignition source is extremely unlikely.
Releasing the gas is a highly technical undertaking and manoeuvring a
large LNG ship would require a crew and tugs; therefore, if terrorists are to
succeed in breaching a ship’s tank it is likely they will do so with a device
that is itself an ignition source, such as an explosive-laden boat.
141
A 2002
report by Lloyd’s Register of Shipping examined the possible outcomes of
a missile or small boat attack on an LNG tanker at the Everett terminal. It
concluded that under certain circumstances it was possible a loss of con-
tainment could occur as a result of shock action, and that this loss could
present a hazard.
142
however, it went on to say that any resulting fire would
140 Gordon Milne, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping; interviews with author, Dec. 2005
and April 2007; havens, ‘Terrorism: Ready to blow?’ ere is a powerful case
for mounting experiments on a larger scale. Interestingly, one operator has of-
fered to donate a sacrificial ship for just such an experiment, although some
cynics have suggested this is merely a way of avoiding disposal costs: ‘Explosive
proof of gas safety’, Fairplay, 25 May 2006.
141 Davis, ‘piracy and terrorism should not be conflated’.
142 E. Waryas (Lloyd’s Register America, Inc.), ‘Major disaster planning: understand-
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
be less serious than that which could result from a petrol or LpG release.
143
e reason for this is that a missile or bomb would ignite the escaping gas
immediately it passed through the breach or, at worst, in close proximity
to the ship, and no “plume”, or “long distance delayed ignition flammable
cloud”, would form.
144
It is also possible that the fire would be confined
to the contents of one tank and not engulf the whole ship.
145
It has been
suggested that cryogenic damage could result in the cascading failure of
adjacent tanks.
146
is is possible but whether or not the resulting effects
would be significantly worse than a single tank fire is open to doubt. e
fire would burn longer but it would not burn any hotter.
Other studies have not concurred with this assessment and uncertainty
will characterise this debate until large-scale tests are undertaken.
147
For
that reason, LNG ships are at present only allowed into ports under strict
supervision and are under close guard whilst they are there, even though
the Sandia Report concluded that risks from accidental spills are small and
the risks from intentional acts can be contained.
148
On the balance of prob-
ing and managing your risk’, paper presented to the Fourth National harbor
Safety Committee Conference, Galveston, TX, 4 March 2002, pp. 11 & 24.
143 Ibid., p. 12.
144 Gordon Milne, interviews with author, Dec. 2005 and April 2007; parfomak,
‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security’, p. 9; havens, ‘Terrorism:
Ready to blow?’
145 Gordon Milne, interviews with author, Dec. 2005 and April 2007. On the pos-
sibility of cascading failure see Sandia Report, p. 15; Ben Raines and Bill Finch,
‘Study talks about possible LNG disaster as result of accident’, 12 July 2003.
146 Ben Raines and Bill Finch, ‘LNG study: explosions possible’, Mobile Register, 7
Dec. 2003.
147 parfomak, ‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security’, p. 12; Ben
Raines and Bill Finch
, ‘holes in LNG study’, Mobile Register, 4 Dec. 2003..
148 On the security arrangements see parfomak, ‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) in-
frastructure security’, pp. 13-19; Sandia Report, p. 14. Immediately following
9/11 the uSCG prevented an LNG ship from entering Boston harbour. No
reason was given apart from heightened security. See ‘LNG Matthew banned
from Boston’, MarineLog.com, 27 Sept. 2001; Stephen E. Flynn, ‘e unguard-
ed homeland’ in James F. hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, How Did is Happen?
Terrorism and the New War, Oxford: publicAffairs, 2001, p. 185; Clarke, Against
All Enemies, p. 15. e publication of the Sandia Report has not dissuaded port
authorities and many opinion formers, particularly those that might be affected
by the construction of new LNG terminals, from being extremely nervous of
LNG operations. husick and Gale, for example, posit a scenario that they sug-
gest could circumvent current port security precautions: Lawrence A. husick
and Stephen Gale, ‘planning a Sea-borne Terrorist Attack’, Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute, 21 March 2005; while Richard A. Clarke reviewed a variety of
225
maritime terrorism
abilities, therefore, while LNG presents an accident risk, that quality alone
does not make it an obvious terrorist weapon.
Liquefied petroleum Gas (LpG), because it detonates with an associated
damaging pressure wave, has somewhat greater potential as a weapon. It is
a hydrocarbon gas which can be predominantly propane or predominantly
butane or a mixture of both. If liquefaction is undertaken at atmospheric
pressure it must be reduced to minus 42 degrees Centigrade (minus 44
degrees Fahrenheit), but it can also be stored in liquid form under pressure
of about eight atmospheres without the necessity of cooling.
149
Very few risk studies have been carried out on LpG, certainly on large-
scale events. Most of the data has been extrapolated from LNG studies.
150
Because LpG can be transported under pressurised rather than refrigerated
conditions, which can be the case with LpG ships, then if a shipboard tank
containing the liquid under pressure were to be breached, it would vaporise
very rapidly. Such a sudden drop in pressure can cause the liquid to boil,
which releases vapour. is, in turn, triggers a greater wave of overpres-
sure which may cause the vessel to fragment. As with any terrorist attack,
however, an ignition source is likely to be present and therefore, as LpG
is flammable, the rapidly-expanding gas would form a fireball in which a
blast wave would pass through the burning gas. e consequences of such
explosions can be extremely serious.
however, this outcome is not guaranteed. For example, on 12 October
1984 the fully laden panamanian-registered LpG carrier the Gaz Foun-
tain, which was similar in construction to an LNG carrier, was struck by
three armour-piercing Maverick missiles launched from an Iranian aircraft,
after loading 20,000 tons of pressurised butane and propane at Ras Ta-
nura.
151
Two of the missiles exploded on or above the deck, causing little
terrorist attack methods: Richard A. Clarke, ‘LNG Facilities in urban Areas:
A Security Risk Management Analysis for Attorney-General patrick Lynch,
Rhode Island’, Good harbor Consulting, May 2005, Ref: GhC-RI-0505A.
Clarke, who has built up a well-paid consultancy practice that advises on the
dangers of LNG shipments, has been accused of exaggerating the risks: ‘Well-
paid fear-mongering’, e Providence Journal, 26 Nov. 2006.
149 James A. Fay, ‘Risks of LNG and LpG’, Annual Review Energy, vol. 5, 1980, p.
91.
150 Op. cit., pp. 92 & 101.
151 Martin S. Navias and E.R. hooton, Tanker Wars: e Assault on Merchant Ship-
ping during the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-1988, London: I.B. Tauris, 1996, p. 84;
Anthony h. Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, ‘e tanker war and the lessons
of Naval Conflict’, CSIS Working Paper, 26 Sept. 1993, p. 8.
226
small boats, weak states, dirty money
damage, but the third penetrated the deck creating a six-metre square (65
square feet) hole in a butane tank.
152
e attack occurred outside the port.
Although the containment system was breached, fire-fighting vessels were
able to extinguish the huge jet fires and save the ship and most of the car-
go.
153
Arguably, however, the consequences could have been much more
serious if the missile had penetrated the side of the vessel, rather than the
roof of a tank, as LpG could have spilled onto the water causing a pool
fire.
154
In 1986 AS-12 missiles struck the panamanian-registered Leegas.
her rear tank exploded, causing a major fire, which wrote off the vessel.
155
ere have been six other incidents in which LpG carriers have been fired
on by 4.5 inch shells or RpGs. In each case the damage was minor.
156
What is probably the most serious incident on record took place in
November 1974 when the Yuyo Maru 10, a combination LpG/oil prod-
ucts tanker loaded with butane and propane in the fully refrigerated tanks
and naphtha in the wing tanks, collided with a bulk carrier in Tokyo Bay.
Naphtha spilled from a 24 metre (80 foot) gash that extended below the
water line. e naphtha ignited immediately and enveloped most of both
vessels; as a consequence, 34 crew members from both vessels died. LpG
vented from the safety valves and burned continuously. e fire spread to
the other Naphtha tanks. Yet although this fire could not be contained
no rupture or explosion of the LpG tanks took place, despite the collision
damage, and the fierce and continuous burning continued until the ship
was sunk using naval gunfire and torpedoes.
157
e assumption that underlies all the examples examined above is that,
as in 9/11, terrorists will hijack or otherwise take over the vessel they need
for their mission. ere is an alternative: they could buy or charter a ship
that was involved in the trade regularly and wait for an appropriate cargo,
or buy or charter a ship and buy the cargo they want. ey could put their
own crew on board and, if they could find a discreet location, could pos-
152 parfomak, ‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security’, p. 13.
153 Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), ‘Safe
havens for disabled gas carriers’ (3
rd
edn.), 2003, p. 12. No LNG tankers were
hit during the Iran-Iraq ‘Tanker War’. is incident might be the one that
OECD and Michael Richardson refer to as an LNG attack. OECD Security in
Maritime Transport, p. 12; Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 43.
154 parfomak, ‘Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security’, p. 13.
155 Navias and hooton, Tanker Wars, p. 144 plus private information.
156 private information, July 2006.
157 SIGTTO, ‘Safe havens for disabled gas carriers’, pp. 9-10.