Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorism
effective merger between a state and an organisation that uses terror. hiz-
bollah has penetrated many Lebanese institutions, including Beirut airport,
and it is perhaps significant that the missiles were fired from within its pe-
rimeter and the airport’s radar was used to track the Israeli ship.
278
Another
report suggested the radar was operated either by rogue elements within
the Lebanese armed forces or with the full knowledge of the Lebanese high
command.
279
e missiles could have been delivered directly from Iran (or
Syria) by air. Any firing team could have quickly exited the same way. e
Israeli view is that, with the exception of the long-range Shihab missile,
“hizbollah has everything Iran has.”
280
Furthermore, that the group tripled
its stock of C-802 ASCM’s once the war was over.
281
e other anti-ship weapons available and favoured by terrorists are in
most cases widely available, relatively cheap and simple to operate, but
puny in comparison with C-802s:
Anti-tank guided weapons: Although these are not ideal for the task
they could be converted for marine use. ey could easily penetrate the
relatively thin hulls of most ships and cause a great deal of damage and
even achieve a “mission kill” if they disabled the ship’s engine, but, because
their warheads are designed to penetrate heavy armour, it is just as likely
they would pass through the hulls and out the other side without explod-
ing. ey are relatively easy to use but would be difficult to control from a
small boat. Nor would obtaining these weapons be straightforward as they
are not commonly available, unlike RpGs and automatic weapons.
Rocket-propelled grenades (RpGs): ese were used extensively against
maritime targets during the Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” (and have also been
used by pirates, off Somalia in particular). ey have a limited effective
range, no more than 300-400 metres, and although they are of limited
use against ships, could possibly halt a vessel if the grenades were fired at
the engine spaces, or force the crew to abandon ship if they were aimed at
the accommodation block, in both cases causing a fire, or at the bridge to
disable it.
278 Confidential information.
279 Toby harnden, ‘Lebanese forces accused of helping hizbollah rocket attack in
Israeli ship’, Sunday Telegraph, 6 Aug. 2006.
280 harry de Quetteville, ‘Terrorists’ missiles are from Teheran armoury’, Daily Tel-
egraph, 17 July 2006; Toby harnden, ‘Iran admits it gave hizbollah missiles to
hit all Israel’, Sunday Telegraph, 6 Aug. 2006.
281 Barak Ravid, ‘Israel to uN: hezbollah has tripled its land-to-sea missile arse-
nal’, Haaretz, 31 Oct. 2007.
258
small boats, weak states, dirty money
Machine guns: ese could achieve a result similar to RpGs if fired at the
same areas. heavy weapons such as 0.5 calibre belt-fed guns would be par-
ticularly effective but lighter weapons, if they could be aimed accurately,
might inflict sufficient damage by causing fires, or death or injury to peo-
ple, to force a crew to abandon ship.
Mortars: Against a moving target mortars would be largely ineffective.
282
ey could, however, inflict damage to ships tied up alongside in a
port.
283
e portuguese Fp-25 group claimed credit for an unsuccessful
attack in 1985 when a 60mm mortar was used to attack NATO warships
in Lisbon harbour.
284
ere are, however, some warhead types that could
cause problems.
“Katyusha”-style rockets: When fired from multiple launch tubes these un-
guided rockets are primarily an area bombardment weapon for use against
static targets or concentrations of ground troops. Singly or in small num-
bers they are far less effective, although they can engender great fear in a
civilian population as the attacks on northern Israeli towns by hizbollah
demonstrated in 2006. ey can be used against ships in port: they were
used to attack the uS Navy ships visiting Aqaba in 2005. But, as that attack
demonstrated, because they lack any form of guidance they are inaccurate
and therefore of limited utility even though each 122mm rocket is capable
of delivering a warhead weighting around 33 pounds (15 kilos). ey can
also be fitted with non-conventional warheads, including RDDs, although
it is unlikely that any terrorist groups has such a capacity.
Man-portable Air Defence Systems (MANpADS): ese shoulder-
launched anti-aircraft weapons are widely available. e most common are
the Russian-made Strela (SA-7 and SA-14) and Igla (SA-16 and SA-18)
and the American “Stinger”. homing on an object’s infra-red emissions,
MANpADS could be fired against ships from shore locations or even small
boats in the hope of picking up the heat from the ships’ stacks. While in-
surgent and terrorist groups clearly have access to these weapons and have
282 Coffen-Smout, ‘pirates, warlords and rogue fishing vessels in Somalia’s unruly
seas’, p. 4 cites a March 1995 report of Somali pirates firing a mortar at the Long
Barda, a British racing yacht in the Gulf of Aden.
283 however, Khalid Sheik Mohammed apparently planned to use mortars to hit
a plane as it took off from London’s heathrow Airport: David Leppard, ‘Al-
Qaeda’s heathrow jet plot revealed’, e Sunday Times, 9 Oct. 2005.
284 MIpT Terrorism Knowledge Base Incident profile: popular Forces of April 25
attack Military Target, 28 Jan. 1985.
259
maritime terrorism
used them against air targets, there has been no recorded incident of their
use against ships.
285
Without exception, terrorists would have a much higher chance of suc-
cess with any of these weapons if they were fired from the shore against
ships stationary in port or moving only very slowly through a narrow chan-
nel. ey could be mounted on small craft but achieving a successful hit is
problematic without a stabilised mounting.
Ships as delivery systems for weapons
e bigger the bang, the bigger the effect: e threat that has attracted the
most attention is the use of a freight container to deliver a bomb.
286
e
idea is that, theoretically at least, terrorists could pack a bomb into a con-
tainer in Karachi and explode it on arrival in Kansas.
287
e headline threat envisages two types of device. e first is a nu-
clearweapon. If a terrorist group was able to steal an already assembled
device in working order or, alternatively, if it was able to obtain the nec-
essary technology and components and if it was then able to assemble
them; if the terrorists were able to deliver either device to the target; and
if they were able to detonate it successfully, then we would no longer
be worrying about maritime security. e rules of the game would have
changed.
288
however, it is important not to overstate the threat by equat-
ing the destructive power of a crude device with the sophisticated weap-
ons possessed by major states.
289
285 For more details on the widespread availability of MANpADS see ‘MANpADS
proliferation’, Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring project
ISSUE Brief no. 1, 13 Jan. 2004.
286 On the history of the container and its fundamental role in the globalisation
phenomenon see Marc Levinson, e Box: How the Shipping Container made
the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger, princeton up, 2006.
287 OECD, Security in Maritime Transport, pp. 8-9.
288 For a comprehensive review of the issues see Michael Levi, On Nuclear Ter-
rorism, Cambridge and London: harvard up, 2007. is does not mean that
al-Qaeda is not necessarily trying despite the difficulties. See David Ignattius.
‘portents of a nuclear al-Qaeda’. Washington Post, 18 October 2007; Michael
posner, ‘Intelligence officers call al Qaeda nuclear threat real’, GovernmentEx-
ecutive.com, 2 April 2008.
289 Colin S. Gray. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Weidenfeld
& Nicholson, 2005, p. 257. See also Clarke C. Apt, ‘e economic impact of
nuclear terrorist attacks on freight transport systems in an age of seaport vulner-
ability’, Cambridge, MA: Apt Associates, Inc. 30 April 2003. Executive Sum-
mary. For a wider perspective see Jonathan Medalia. Terrorist Nuclear Attacks
260
small boats, weak states, dirty money
e second is a “dirty bomb”, that is, a high explosive device wrapped
in radiological material, which is designed to spread contamination and is
known, more precisely, as a Radiological Dispersion Device or RDD. It is
important that this threat is also not exaggerated.
290
First, terrorists would
have considerable difficulty in obtaining the components and then assem-
bling a working device. Secondly, while contamination would undoubt-
edly cause serious problems, a radiological weapon is not a nuclear weapon.
It is possible that the explosion (not radiation) could kill people close to the
detonation,
291
but how many would die from subsequent radiation poison-
ing is questionable. It is the prevailing weather conditions and terrain that
will determine the extent of the contamination, and the amount and type
of the radioactive material that will determine the number of casualties.
Tests have demonstrated that up to 100 times more radioactive material is
need to contaminate an urban than a rural area.
292
Most analysts believe no
more than ten people would die from radiation poisoning; other analysts
suggest that the only people likely to receive a lethal dose would die in the
blast.
293
e expectation is that fear of radiation will lead to panic and that
more people will be killed trying to escape than from the radiation itself.
294
Nonetheless, the incident in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed
a 30 pound (14 kg) container of Caesium in an Moscow park show that
such groups are prepared to use such material to achieve their ends.
295
e fear that the radiation from a “dirty bomb” would be sufficient to
cause a rise in long-term cancer deaths, or render the contaminated area
on Seaports: reat and Response. Congressional Research Service, RS21293;
updated 13 Aug. 2003.
290 For a through examination of the issues see peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl
Loeb, ‘Dirty bombs: e threat revisited’, Defence Horizons no. 38, Jan. 2004
and James L. Ford. ‘Radiological dispersal devices: Assessing the transnational
threat’, Strategic Forum no. 136, March 1998. Rosoff and van Winterfeldt in
their analysis of possible ‘dirty bomb’ attack scenarios on the ports of Los Ange-
les and Long Beach concluded that ‘the health impacts will be relatively small’:
h. Rosoff and D. von Winterfeldt, ‘A risk and economic analysis of dirty bomb
attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach’, Risk Analysis, vol. 27, no.
3, June 2007, p. 541.
291 peter D. Zimmerman and James M. Acton, ‘Radiological lessons: Radiation
weapons beyond ‘dirty bombs’, Jane’s IR, June 2007, p. 19.
292 Ford, ‘Radiological dispersal devices’.
293 peter D. Zimmerman, et al., ‘Seize the Cesium’, New York Times, 1 Aug. 2007.
294 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: e Risks and Consequences of the Ultimate
Disaster, London: Constable and Robinson, 2006, pp. 57 & 59.
295 Ford, ‘Radiological dispersal devices’.
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maritime terrorism
uninhabitable for years—thus justifying the designation “weapons of mass
disruption”—is based on what could be unjustified assumptions. Research
on the after-effects of the hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs led to the for-
mulation of the Linear No reshold (LNT) model in 1958 that related
radiation exposure to long-term cancer deaths. however, the hiroshima
and Nagasaki victims received doses of radiation that were far higher than
anything that had been experienced before. More recent research, based
largely on the effects of the Chernobyl disaster, which led to 56 attribut-
able cancer deaths rather than the 100,000 predicted by Greenpeace on the
basis of the LNT model, has raised questions about whether low doses of
radiation have the same effect as higher doses; it suggests that contrary to
the prevailing theory, there is a threshold and low doses—certainly below
100 millisieverts (mSv) and probably below 200 mSv—will not cause any
rise in long-term cancer-related fatalities.
296
providing these results have
not been distorted by under-reporting or misdiagnosis, it is likely that irra-
diated areas could be brought back into productive use much more quickly
than previously thought.
297
Nonetheless, jihadist terrorists clearly have the
ambition to use unconventional weapons to cause catastrophic numbers
of deaths (which a “dirty bomb” would not do) and incite unprecedented
levels of fear (which a “dirty bomb” might engender, unless members of the
public are better informed about the potential consequences), and there are
indications of this interest continuing despite the technical difficulties.
298
however, although Zimmerman and his colleagues are dismissive of many
of the fears surrounding the direct effects of a “dirty bomb” attack they do
point to the risks associated with what they call “I-cubed” attacks, involv-
ing the ingestion, inhalation or immersion of radioactive material.
299
296 A sievert, like a rad, is a measure of radiation dose or dose equivalent. A rad
(which used to be called a roentgen) represents 0.01 joules of energy deposited
per kg of body tissue. A sievert is equal to 100 rads. Zimmerman and Acton
‘Radiological lessons: Radiation weapons beyond ‘dirty bombs’’, p. 20.
297 For a summary of this research see Nick Davidson, ‘Chernobyl’s ‘nuclear night-
mares’’, BBC News, 13 July 2006.
298 Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthen-
ing Ourselves, Santa Monica: RAND, 2006, p. 81; Tom harper, ‘Dirty bomb
threat high and rising’, Sunday Telegraph, 17 June 2007. Also Josh Meyer, ‘Al
Qaeda said to focus on WMDs’, LA Times, 3 Feb. 2008.
299 peter D. Zimmerman, ‘e smoky bomb threat’, New York Times, 19 Dec.
2006 and Zimmerman, et al., ‘Seize the Cesium’. For a fuller discussion see
Zimmerman and Acton ‘Radiological lessons: Radiation weapons beyond ‘dirty
bombs’, pp. 21-2.
262
small boats, weak states, dirty money
e risk is therefore there.
300
Even so, the idea that terrorists would at-
tempt to deliver either type of weapon in a shipping container is inherently
implausible for two reasons. First, the point has already been made that
terrorists have an aversion to failure, seek to minimise risk and are wary of
anything other than incremental innovation. ey plan, they practice, and
they do all they can to ensure things will not go wrong. To steal or to as-
semble either type of device, but especially a nuclear device, would require
any terrorist group to invest a substantial amount of time and money. It
truly would be a one-shot deal. e risk of detection would be substantially
higher than with other operations because the group would have to interact
with actors outside its normal range of the experience in order to obtain
either a weapon or the requisite skills and components.
Secondly, terrorist groups always want to be in control.
301
Given the
investment necessary to build or obtain a nuclear or radiological device it is
hard to imagine that they would entrust anything so valuable to the vagaries
of the international, inter-modal transport system. Containers get lost, they
are stolen, delayed, dropped, broken open, left out in the sun, drenched
with seawater, lost overboard and set on fire. Sophisticated weapons are
often sensitive to changes in temperature and humidity, vibration and the
natural pitch and roll of ships at sea. In many cases their mission readiness
declines if they are not maintained frequently.
302
Obviously most contain-
ers are delivered without serious mishap, but that cannot be guaranteed.
Consequently, it is hard to know for certain when or even if a container
will be delivered to where it is supposed to go. If a terrorist group wants to
detonate a container remotely while it is still in the system it has no way of
knowing where precisely it will be; if, for instance, it is in the middle of a
stack of thousands of containers which would mask an electronic signal. All
in all there are simply too many things that can go wrong.
A state actor might be able to engineer a greater degree of control by us-
ing a state-owned shipping line but, as James Jay Carafano has suggested, a
more realistic threat would be to use a ship, which could be less than 300
gross tons, as a launch platform for a short range ballistic missile such as a
Scud, position it close to the coast, fire the missile and scuttle the ship. If this
were done over very deep water, proving who was responsible might be al-
300 is discussion has been informed, in part, by the author’s interviews with
Bruce Stubbs, June 2004 and Aug. 2006.
301 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, p. 82.
302 James Jay Carafano, ‘Missing the real missile threat’, Washington Post, 26 July
2006.
263
maritime terrorism
most impossible.
303
Alternatively a ballistic missile could be fired “from a ship
by peeling back the top, erecting it, launching it at good distance, covering
back up and moving away”, a procedure which the ballistic missile prolifera-
tion report commissioned by the uS Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield
stated that a rogue state had already accomplished.
304
If a terrorist group did want to use such devices and did not have access
to a missile the alternative, and much more likely, scenarios are that they
would be assembled inside the target country using as many locally avail-
able components as possible,
305
or that they would be brought in using
smaller craft. e use of a car or panel van, a small aircraft, or a small boat
such as a fishing smack or private yacht sailed into a small port or beached
on an isolated stretch of coast, is a cheaper and more reliable method than
using the container system.
306
As the head of the uS Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office remarked in 2007: “giving up a nuclear device, putting it
in a container and letting it float around the world for a couple of weeks is
probably folly”. he, too, observed that more attention should be devoted
303 Ibid. e uS Coast Guard has also acknowledged this possibility: Wagner,
‘Government lacks clear plans to ID small vessels used as terrorist weapons’ as
has the uS. Department of homeland Security: ‘Small vessel security strategy’,
April 2008, p. 14 which refers to a vessel as small as 200 tons being suitable as a
launch platform although substantial cooperation between the ship’s crew and
the launch team would be required if the launch was to be achieved success-
fully..
304 David A. Kier, ‘Cruising for trouble’, e Washington Times, 24 Nov. 2005.
305 Randall J. Larsen,
‘Rethinking border security’, e Institute of Homeland Secu-
rity White paper, 1 Nov. 2005, pp. 3-5; also ‘uS port security unlikely to stop
nukes: experts’, Reuters, 7 Nov. 2006.
306 Larsen, ‘Rethinking border security’, p. 6; also Randall J. Larsen,
Statement
before the homeland Security Subcommittee on the prevention of Nuclear
and Biological Attack, uS house of Representatives, 19 April 2005; James Jay
Carafano, ‘port security and foreign-owned maritime infrastructure: Statement
before the house Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcom-
mittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation’, e Heritage Foundation,
9 March 2006, p. 4. e uSCG’s technology adviser, Guy omas, also agrees
with this assessment: ‘Most of us believe it will come in a small boat.’ Stew Mag-
nuson, ‘Maritime domain roadmap seeks to ID all vessels’, National Defense,
Jan. 2007; also Wagner, ‘Government lacks clear plans to ID small vessels used
as terrorist weapons’. Karl Schultz, the head of uS Coast Guard’s Miami sector,
admitted in 2007 that the ‘small boat threat…continues to present technology
and policy challenges and remains a primary maritime security concern’: Alice
Lipowicz, ‘Maritime security: Better tracking of small craft needed’, Washington
Technology, 29 Nov. 2007. See the responses proposed in uS. Department of
homeland Security, ‘Small vessel security strategy’.
264
small boats, weak states, dirty money
to the threat from what he termed “non-port of entry venues” such as
unguarded stretches of coastline or land border.
307
Terrorists might, and
probably do, use containers to smuggle equipment, components, money
and even personnel, but they are unlikely to use them to move anything as
valuable or as sensitive as a nuclear or radiological device.
e global shipping network: a vulnerable system
Despite all the security precautions implemented since 2001 the global ship-
ping network is a relatively “soft” target. Although the difficulties involved
make delivery of a WMD device using the international container system
and “spectacular” attacks on ports or chokepoints unlikely, the system itself
is vulnerable to disruption with multiple entry points, many of them in
weak states.
308
(It is also, in theory, vulnerable to disruption from blockages
of vital waterways caused unintentionally by pirate action.) e system is
also vulnerable because of its complexity. Barnes and Oloruntoba point
out that security incidents can occur at any time in large, highly complex
systems such as supply or shipping networks—either suddenly, or slowly in
ways that are unrecognisable until the disruption occurs. ey identify two
types of vulnerability: the first emerging from the operational complexity
within a port and the second as an attribute of maritime movements with
ports as nodes which, when taken together, form a system of systems that
can generate considerable uncertainty, as well as operational sequences that
can cause or contribute to errors or losses.
309
Similarly the Cranfield School
of Management in its study also identified dual vulnerabilities: internal,
caused by sub-optimal interaction and cooperation between entities within
the supply chain; and external, caused by natural causes or events such as
terrorism.
310
e economic effects of any serious disruption could be felt
307 Jon Fox, ‘uS nuclear detection official doubts threat by sea’, NTI Global Se-
curity Newswire, 25 May 2007; also Stables, ‘DhS to increase focus on threat
poised by small watercraft’.
308 For a description of the system see OECD, Security in Maritime Transport, pp.
25-9. Also Maarten Van de Voort and Kevin A. O’Brien, ‘‘Seacurity’: Improv-
ing the security of the global sea-container shipping system’, RAND Europe,
MR-1695-JRC, 2003.
309 paul Barnes and Richard Oloruntoba, ‘Assurance of security in maritime supply
chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management’, Journal of
International Management, vol. 11, 2005, pp. 527-8. Also Cranfield School of
Management, ‘Supply chain vulnerability: Executive report’, Jan. 2002, p. 6.
310 Cranfield School of Management, ‘Supply chain vulnerability’, p. 2.
265
maritime terrorism
globally and the psychological effects of incidents triggered by terrorist ac-
tivity could reach into people’s everyday lives.
Superficially this appears to be little different from the observation made
by Alfred ayer Mahan over a hundred years ago when he called the sea
the “great highway”,
311
and warned that the global maritime transport sys-
tem that used it was delicate. Greater volumes, however, are being carried
with greater efficiency than ever before. According to the World Bank, glo-
bal maritime trade amounted to 21,480 billion ton-miles in 1999 and was
expected to grow to 35,000 billion ton-miles in 2010 and 41,800 billion
ton-miles by 2014.
312
Greater efficiency is being achieved through greater
concentration. To achieve this ships have had to get bigger. By way of com-
parison, the average size of the ships sunk by u-boats in the North Atlantic
between 1942 and 1944 was around 5,500 gross tons; the average size of
the ships in the uK managed fleet now is around 26,000 gross tons.
313
Redundancy, reserves, buffer stocks, have all been stripped away because
they cost money and security no longer appeared to be an issue. e drive
for efficiency, predicated on never-ending, low-cost security, means that
in many ways the global shipping system is more delicate now than it was
then Mahan was writing.
314
at shipping system consists of key points joined together by well-
trodden pathways across the oceans. In modern parlance these pathways
are known as SLOCs—Sea Lines of Communication. Most of the key
points are ports. Some, however, are narrow passages—“chokepoints”—
that geography imposes on maritime movement, forcing the pathways
together.
315
ey are not getting any wider but more and bigger ships
311 Alfred ayer Mahan, e Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, New
York: Dover, 1987, p. 25.
312 Sakhuja, ‘Indian Ocean and the safety of sea lines of communication’.
313 e North Atlantic figure is calculated from the tables in John Terraine, Business
in Great Waters, London: Leo Cooper, 1989, pp. 767-9. e current uK fig-
ure was calculated based on the figures in uK Department of Transport (uK),
Transport Statistics Report: Maritime Statistics 2002, London: e Stationery
Office, 2003, p. 10.
314 Anna Bernasek, ‘e friction economy’, Fortune, vol. 145, no. 4, 18 Feb. 2002,
pp. 104-10; Stephen E. Flynn, ‘port security is still a house of cards’, FEER,
Jan./Feb. 2006; Cranfield School of Management, ‘Supply chain vulnerability’,
p. 1.
315 ‘Chokepoints’ need not be at sea. piracy is an increasing problem on the River
Danube and occurs particularly at Cernavoda where ships queue to enter the
channel to the Romanian Black Sea resort of Constanta: Bojan pancevski, ‘pi-
rates of the Danube give shipping owners the blues’, Sunday Telegraph, 23 July
266
small boats, weak states, dirty money
are passing through them; the volume of oil passing through the Malacca
Straits is expected to double to 20 million bbl per day by 2020, for exam-
ple. Even in this age of services the world depends upon trade, that is, the
safe and reliable exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods. Any-
thing that threatens the points or the pathways is, axiomatically, a threat to
international security.
316
Of the 80 per cent of the world’s trade that moves
by sea, 75 per cent needs to transit one of the world’s five major choke-
points: the panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, the
Straits of hormuz or the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. A significant
and prolonged disruption of any of these points would have a serious effect
on world trade.
317
As discussed earlier, blocking any of these chokepoints
would not be easy.
318
Nonetheless, harassing activity involving, for exam-
ple, heavy machine gun and RpG fire on ships, suicide boat attacks and
the random use of mines, if used individually, is unlikely to block a major
waterway but could encourage some shipping to divert and the remainder
to demand additional protection, including possibly convoy, all of which
would add substantially to insurance and transport costs. If such attacks
were ‘layered’, each weapon reinforcing the effect of another, and particu-
larly if they were mounted in straits where the littoral states were unwilling
or inadequately prepared to take counter action, or resisted offers of outside
assistance, then the disruption could be prolonged unnecessarily.
319
2006.
316 Amongst a wide literature see, for example, OECD, Security in Maritime Trans-
port, p. 14 & pp. 19-21; Burnett, Dangerous Waters, pp. 11 & 147-8; Chalk,
‘reats to the maritime environment’, p. 11; henry J. Kenny, An Analysis of
Possible reats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes, Alexandria, Va.:
Centre for Naval Analyses, Feb. 1996; Donna J. Nincic, ‘Sea lane security and
uS maritime trade: Chokepoints as scare resources’ in Tangredi, Globalization
and Maritime Power, pp. 143-69; John h. Noer, ‘Southeast Asian chokepoints:
Keeping sea lines of communication open’, Strategic Forum, no. 98, Dec. 1996;
Reynolds B. peele, ‘e importance of maritime chokepoints’, Parameters,
Summer 1997, pp. 61-74; Jeremy Stoker, ‘Nonintervention: Littoral operations
in the littoral environment’, NWCR, Autumn 1998; Vego, Naval Strategy and
Operations on Narrow Seas, pp. 42-3, 51 & 88-90.
317 Ijaz, ‘e maritime threat from Al-Qaeda’. Also Jerry Frank, ‘Big business gets
political over rising global risks’, Lloyd’s List, 24 Jan. 2008.
318 Blair and Lieberthal, ‘Smooth sailing: e world’s shipping lanes are safe’, pp.
8-11.
319 Eric Watkins, ‘Obstacles to closer counter-terrorism cooperation in the Ma-
lacca Straits’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. V, Issue 13, 6
July 2007, pp. 10-12.