Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorism
sibly take whatever time they needed to make their preparations. With
ammonium nitrate they could use a simple post-hole auger to drill holes at
intervals in the cargo, which they could then fill with diesel oil. ey could
use the auger or a digger for additional mixing. If a volatile gas carrier was
used it could be brought into a terminal area where the valves could be
opened to release the gas (although this is a complex operation in itself).
providing the wind was blowing in the right direction it might be possible
to site a detonation source ashore at the optimum height to ignite the gas
cloud as it passed over the target.
ere are three major problems with the buy or charter scenario. First, ter-
rorist organisations are frugal and conscious of costs. e attacks on 9/11 are
generally believed to have cost around $300,000, perhaps $500,000 at most;
the attack on the uSS Cole and the Madrid bombings both cost around
$50,000; the 7/7 attacks on London are estimated to have cost no more that
$1,000; while the Superferry 14 attack possibly cost no more than $400.
158
Any ship would need to be in good condition to avoid arousing suspicion.
LNG carriers are hugely expensive, and even the smaller LpG ships or bulk
carriers cost between $6 and $30 million. None of this, of course, might be
an obstacle to a state or a state-sponsored terrorist organisation.
Secondly, even if a ship could be chartered for less money, the organisa-
tion would still need to find a master and a trained crew. is requirement
is particularly pressing if the aim is to use a gas carrier, as releasing the gas
is a specialist undertaking. If they were sufficiently determined, however,
there is no reason why a terrorist group could not acquire or develop the
necessary skills and infiltrate a sufficient number of its members into a
legitimate crew.
159
It would probably take ten years or more, but it is still
likely to be easier to train a suicide bomber to be a Master than it would
be to persuade a Master to be a suicide bomber.
160
Finally, there is the
158 ‘Al-Qaeda operations are rather cheap’, e Economist, 10 April 2003, p. 45;
Michael Buchanan, ‘London bombings cost just hundreds’, BBC News, 3 Jan.
2006; Superfeery 14 estimate by peter Chalk, conversation with author July
2007.
159 Donna J. Nincic, ‘e challenge of maritime terrorism: reat identification,
WMD and regime response’, e Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, Aug.
2006, pp. 629-30.
160 Conning a large ship is not a task that can be learned quickly (nor can it be ac-
complished without a skilled crew). however, in his address to the conference
on ‘Civilian effects of maritime homeland security’ held at the university of
hull, 23 Sept. 2004, howard Goodrick of Farriby Marine pointed out that a
seafarer can start as a deckhand and become the Master of a cargo ship in eight
228
small boats, weak states, dirty money
problem of carrying off the deception throughout the period of cargo load-
ing, departure, the voyage and arrival at the target port. however dedi-
cated they were the crew would have to perform all the normal tasks of
ship handling without any apparent perturbation for many days, possibly
weeks. e 9/11 hijackers only had to keep their nerve for an hour or so.
e number of people involved and the timescale of the operation would
probably make detection by intelligence agencies hard to avoid. For these
reasons, the buy and even charter options are unlikely to be exercised, par-
ticularly in the case of oil or gas carriers.
Other ways in which large ships could be used as weapons have also
been suggested. First, for example, an oil tanker could be run aground
deliberately to cause oil pollution serious enough to close ports or even
critical chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca or hormuz, although
is it unclear how such action would serve known terrorist objectives.
161
Its
disruptive potential is also questionable: during the first Gulf War, Iraq
discharged between 834,000 and 1,500,000 tonnes of crude oil into the
northern persian Gulf without achieving noticeable military or strategic
effect. Tanker spills are much smaller: the Amoco Cadiz, for example, re-
leased 223,000 tonnes, the Exxon Valdez 37,000 tonnes.
162
Metrological
and hydrographical factors obviously mean that different types of oil spilled
in different quantities in different places have different effects; however, it
is unlikely that terrorists could block a chokepoint using pollution alone,
although they could cause some temporary disruption, forcing vessels to
divert until the spill has been cleared, and serious damage to fisheries and
low-lying coastal regions.
163
years, a span that was, and possibly still is, within Al Qaeda’s planning horizon.
Qualifying an LNG Master is likely to take longer.
161 Luft and Korin, ‘Terrorism goes to sea’, p. 66. Authorities in the vicinity of the
Malacca Strait continue to issue warnings about the dangers of vessel hijacking
and the economic effects of blocking the sea lane: ‘Terrorism still a threat in
Malacca Strait: KL’s police chief ’, JoyoNews, 12 June 2007; ‘Terror, piracy still
threaten Malacca Strait–Malaysian exec’, Agence France-Presse, 2 Sept. 2007.
162 See ‘Major oil spills’ available at http://www.abelard.org/news/archive-oil1-2.
htm
163 On the possibility of using ships to commit environmental terrorism see Chalk,
Non-Military Security and Global Order, p. 27 and, more generally, Elizabeth L.
Chalecki, ‘A new vigilance: Identifying and reducing the risks of environmental
terrorism’, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Secu-
rity, Sept. 2001.
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maritime terrorism
Secondly, a large ship could be used as a blockship, or possibly several
large ships could be sunk in a coordinated pattern, to prevent movement
through a narrow strait or harbour entrance. ere are grounds for believ-
ing that this method could be effective and that terrorists have considered
using it to attack the Suez Canal, which was blocked by mines and war de-
bris between 1967 and 1975.
164
Manoeuvring a large ship to the optimum
location deliberately would demand considerable technical skill, patience
and luck (and in most cases would be impossible without the assistance of
tugs).
165
Such action could potentially cause severe disruption but, provid-
ing the necessary lifting gear is available, wrecks do not necessarily present
long-lasting obstacles.
166
In 2004 the Russian-owned, Liberian-flagged
tanker Tropical Brilliance ran aground in the Suez Canal as a result of steer-
ing gear failure. e Canal was blocked for less than two days and the non-
maritime press only took notice because the incident was blamed for the
shortage of “playstation 2” units in the run-up to Christmas.
167
Finally, large ships could be used as “kinetic” weapons in their own right
to be driven into ports or, more likely, other ships in ports with volatile or
dangerous cargoes to trigger some destructive event. is would only be
feasible in ports without a narrow entrance channel and where the assist-
164 private information, Aug. 2005.
165 Bateman, ‘Assessing the threat of maritime terrorism: issues for the Asia-pacific
region’, p. 85.
166 Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Smooth sailing: the world’s shipping
lanes are safe’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 3, May/June 2007, p. 11. however,
it is worth considering the case of the MV Tricolor. is 109m-long Ro-Ro car
carrier with a gross deadweight of around 50,000 tonnes was struck in fog in
the English Channel in Dec. 2002 by a container ship, the MV Kariba. e
Tricolor sank and came to rest on the Channel bottom but was only partially
submerged at low tide. Continuing heavy fog prevented an immediate salvage
operation and although other shipping was alerted the wreck was struck the
following day by the MV Nicola, which was eventually pulled free. To avert any
further collisions the French navy positioned a guard ship close to the wreck.
unfortunately this precaution was not enough to prevent the wreck being
struck again seventeen days later by the MT Vicky, which was also freed. e
Vicky was loaded with 70,000 gallons of kerosene. e wreck of the Tricolor was
lifted finally in Aug. 2003. See http://www.cargolaw.com/2003nightmare_tri-
color.html; ‘Inquiry into Channel collision’, CNN.com, 2 Jan. 2003 and ‘Ship
hits submerged cargo vessel’, BBC News, 1 Jan. 2003.
167 ‘Russian oil tanker jams Suez Canal’, Mosnews, 8 Nov. 2004; ‘Christmas short-
age due to Suez blockage’, I.T.Vibe, 7 Dec. 2004. A cargo ship that blocked
the Canal in 2006 was moved within twenty-four hours: ‘Suez Canal reopens
after blockage’, BBC News, 9 Feb. 2006; also Chalk, ‘Maritime terrorism in the
contemporary era’, p. 28.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
ance of neither a tug nor a pilot was required (although even a pilot is likely
to agree to whatever is suggested if he has a gun to his head). e united
States appears to be particularly vulnerable in this regard; for example, parts
of the ports of New York/New Jersey, Baltimore, Los Angeles/Long Beach,
San Diego, and Seattle where ships heading for the southern berths pass
downtown. Big ships, however, are not merely hard to control but require
a crew. e logistics of managing anything much bigger than a large motor
cruiser are therefore of a different order from hijacking an aircraft. Given
the current levels of airport security, ships are undoubtedly easier to board
than aircraft; the terrorists’ problem is how to direct that control once they
have it, and how to disguise the fact that they have it, because as soon as a
ship stops behaving normally it will attract attention and, if weapons are
available, possibly become a target itself.
e alternative, of course, would be to attack ships using small craft
rather than a less manoeuvrable larger ship, either when they are entering
a harbour, with the aim of blocking the entrance, or again when vessels are
discharging volatile cargoes, quite possibly with the aim of triggering the
sort of “chain reaction” that characterised the Texas City disaster. Experi-
ence with the Limburg has shown that for such an operation to be success-
ful there would almost certainly need to be a coordinated attack using sev-
eral fast-moving boats in order to deliver the requisite weight of explosive.
Interestingly this appears to have been the planning behind the April 2004
attack on the two Iraqi oil terminals off Basra, examined above. e simi-
larities between these attacks and the ones mounted against the uSS Cole
and the Limburg indicate that lessons had been learnt and the necessary
skills transferred from Yemen to the Gulf.
168
Deception, disguise and diver-
sion, which were so vital in the Saint Nazaire raid, appeared to be impor-
tant elements here too: there are grounds for believing that the role of the
dhow in the Basra attack, which exploded when approached, was to divert
the attention of the terminals’ defenders, and in that it almost succeeded.
169
In Western harbours these elements could be achieved using the apparently
innocent activity of private yachts, speedboats or other pleasure craft to
distract attention from, or camouflage the intentions of, an attack boat—a
168 David Fairnie, interview with author, 2004. See also ‘Al Qaeda statement claims
Iraq boat attack’, Aljazeera.com, 26 April 2004.
169 David Fairnie, interview with author.
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maritime terrorism
tactic that has been used by the Sea Tigers who have hidden suicide boats
amongst fishing boats in order to infiltrate closer to their targets.
170
e weapons and methods of maritime terrorists
Clearly no one can be sure that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the
architect of 9/11, and al-Nashiri, Al Qaeda’s so-called maritime “master-
mind”, would not have found a way of using large ships if they had not
been captured. It is known that both considered the use of large ships for
attack purposes.
171
When it came to it, however, they used small boats.
Small boats. e reason for the use of small boats is straightforward: ter-
rorists are cautious. While it is true that they are constantly adapting
known and trusted tactics to new targets, developing existing weapons
and technology and looking at new technology, they are doing so across
a relatively narrow range.
172
Terrorists have a surprise advantage but a re-
source disadvantage. Instead of interpreting this as an opportunity to ex-
ploit the surprise advantage to the limit, they more often view it as a risk
that if things go wrong they will miss their chance. Consequently, they
prefer adaptation or incremental adjustment to revolutionary change.
is rule applied to the 9/11 attacks. Aircraft hijacking was a proven ter-
170 On Sea Tiger deception methods see Martin N. Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: Tac-
tics and technology of the Sea Tigers’, Jane’s IR, vol. 18, no. 6, June 2006, pp.
7 & 8. On uS concerns see ‘Coast Guard chief: Attack by small boats still pos-
sible’, Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 July 2004; Caroline Drees and Edgar Ang, ‘uS at
risk from boats packed with explosives’, Reuters, 1 June 2006; Eleanor Stables,
‘Mines, small boats may pose threat to uS ports’, CQ Homeland Security, 14
May 2007; Eleanor Stables, ‘DhS to increase focus on threat poised by small
watercraft’, CQ Homeland Security, 19 June 2007; Breanne Wagner, ‘Govern-
ment lacks clear plans to ID small vessels used as terrorist weapons’, National
Defense, Nov. 2007.
171 e 9/11Commission Report: on KSM see pp. 145-50; on al-Nashiri, pp. 152-3;
on KSM’s consideration of large ships, private information, Sept. 2005; on al-
Nashiri’s plans see Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, pp. 18-20.
172 For comments on their tactical conservatism see, for example, hoffman, In-
side Terrorism, p. 198; Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: eory, Tactics and
Counter-measures (2
nd
edn.), Cambridge up, 1989, p. 192; Chalk, ‘Maritime
terrorism in the contemporary era’, p. 21; peter Chalk, ‘past experience of mari-
time terrorism’, Jane’s IR, vol. 14, no. 12, Dec. 2002, p. 8; also paul Wilkin-
son, ‘Technology and terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 5, no. 2,
Summer 1993, pp. 4-5 who, whilst agreeing that terrorists might be tactically
conservative, shows they are prepared to embrace technical innovation. See also
Craig Whitlock, ‘homemade, cheap and dangerous: Terror cells favour simple
ingredients in building bombs’, Washington Post, 5 July 2007.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
rorist procedure. Aircraft as suicide weapons had been thought of by ter-
rorists already and had been demonstrated by Japanese kamikaze tactics
during the Second World War.
Small boats are terrorists’ preferred choice for external attack. ey are
often fast and if not fast can accelerate rapidly, which is often more impor-
tant. ey are highly manoeuvrable. ey can be hard to detect because
they sit low in the water and often possess a low or non-existent radar sig-
nature. ey are inexpensive enough to be used in multiples, so that they
can mount attacks from different directions, and are anonymous enough
to be hidden amongst other small craft such as fishing vessels or pleasure
boats.
173
While most attacks using small boats have been carried out using
suicide operatives, craft of this size could be adapted for remote operation
in the future.
Some ships, such as the philippine inter-island ferries, have been attacked
using planted bombs; a few, such as the Sanya, have been attacked using
mines or limpet mines but the majority of maritime terrorist strikes to date
have been carried out using small boats.
174
e uSS Cole and the French
tanker Limburg were struck by small boats equipped with IEDs. Al Qaeda’s
exemplars, the Sea Tiger branch of the Sri Lankan LTTE separatist move-
ment, have used small boats in “swarms” and for the majority of their sui-
cide missions.
175
e attack on the Cole was a copy of the Sea Tigers’ suicide
attacks on the Sri Lankan naval ship Edithara in 1990, which was badly
damaged, and the surveillance command ship Abeetha, hit off point pedro
in 1991, which sank.
176
e LTTE attacked and sank the SLN offshore
173 James pelkofski, ‘Before the storm: Al Qaeda’s coming maritime campaign’,
uS Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 131, no. 12, Dec. 2005, p. 22; also Chalk,
‘Maritime terrorism in the contemporary era’, p. 28.
174 pelkofski, ‘Before the storm’, p. 22.
175 Walter Jayawardhana, ‘Tamil Tiger leader says Osama bin Laden-led al Qae-
da copied terrorist tactics from Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, Go2lanka.
com, 12 Dec. 2002; see also Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Sea Tiger success threatens the
spread of copycat tactics’, Jane’s IR, vol. 13, no. 3, March 2001, pp. 12-16. Al-
though largely discounted, other reports have suggested that the links between
the LTTE and al-Qaeda might amount to more than emulation. Rashmee Z.
Ahmed, ‘Osama hand in glove with LTTE’, e Times of India, 22 Sept. 2001.
176 Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: Tactics and technologies of the Sea Tigers’, pp. 7 &
10; V. Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’, e Hindu, 28 July
2004; Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist
threat?’ p. 88. On the LTTE’s maritime capability generally see Anthony Davis,
‘Tamil Tigers seek to rebuild naval force’, Jane’s IR, March 2005, p. 39 and two
articles by
Rohan Gunaratna: ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terror-
233
maritime terrorism
patrol vessel the Sagarawardene in a similar fashion in 1994.
177
e attack
on the Basra oil terminals was attempted using small boats.
178
e planned
attacks on NATO warships transiting the Straits of Gibraltar in 2002, as
well as the attacks planned in 2003 and 2005 on Israeli cruise ships calling
at Turkish ports, were to have been carried out using small boats.
179
Small boats have disadvantages. Although a small boat appears to be
analogous to a car, in fact the number of steps (or “evolutions”) needed to
prepare a boat for a bomb run are considerably more than are necessary to
prepare a car or truck. A discrete preparation area is required. undertaking
the necessary work in a port of harbour would risk discovery. A car might
be rigged in a garage but a boat would require more space and would then
need to be taken to a slipway or beach to be launched. Suitable sites tend
also to be used by smugglers and other criminals and are therefore gener-
ally known and watched by the police. Small boats, furthermore, cannot
operate in adverse sea-states. ey can be disabled or destroyed relatively
easily, although this is true only if the requisite weapons and the men with
the training to handle them are available. Fast-moving boats, particularly
if they are operating in numbers and approaching from several directions,
have proved hard to hit even by trained marksmen. When the Royal Navy
deployed to the Gulf in 2003, small boat attacks mounted by Al Qaeda
operatives were regarded as the biggest threat they might face.
180
e uS
ism’, Jane’s NI, Oct. 2001, pp. 24-9, and ‘Trends in maritime terrorism–the Sri
Lankan case’, Lanka Outlook, Autumn 1998, pp. 27-9.
177 Atul Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, Journal of Indian
Ocean Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, Dec. 2000, p. 242 & 245.
178 Jonathan howland, ‘Counter maritime terror, uS thwarts attacks, builds up
foreign navies’, JINSA Online, 17 June 2004; ‘Raid disrupts Iraqi oil exports’,
BBC News, 25 April 2004.
179 On Gibraltar see, for example, Daly, ‘Al Qaeda and maritime terrorism (part
I)’, pp.1- 2; Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Casablanca: Al Qaeda’s maritime node’, Institute
of peace and Conflict Studies, Article no. 1039, 21 May 2003; Gunaratna, ‘e
threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist threat?’, p. 86; ‘Moroc-
co ‘uncovers al-Qaeda plot’’, BBC News, 11 June 2002; also the reports in the
compendium edition of the Gibraltar Panorama for w/c 6 June 2002: ‘Claim
that al-Qaeda team visited Gibraltar’ and ‘Terror plan in Gibraltar Strait’. On
Turkey see, for example, ‘Istanbul bombing suspects charged’, BBC News, 25
Feb. 2004; ‘Syrian admits Israeli cruise ship plot in Turkey’, International Her-
ald Tribune, 12 Aug. 2005; Sezer, ‘Terror suspect: ‘I was going to attack Israeli
ships’’; Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist
threat?’, pp. 84 & 87; also private information, Aug. 2005.
180 ‘Al Qaeda biggest threat to navy’, BBC News, 10 March 2003.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
Navy subsequently issued a similar warning with a particular emphasis on
oil supplies.
181
From the terrorist perspective, small boats are simple, cheap, easy to
handle, fast (or innocently slow) and anonymous enough to be able to min-
gle inconspicuously with other small marine traffic while at the same time
being capable of delivering a useful weight of ordnance. A Rigid-hulled
Inflatable Boat (RhIB) or small recreational craft should be capable of
delivering the equivalent of a car bomb, between 250 and perhaps as much
as 2,200 pounds (0.11 to 1 tonne); a large recreational boat should be able
to deliver the equivalent of a truck bomb—6,600 pounds, up to about
27 tons (3 to 25 tonnes), although at the upper range these loads would
have a serious effect on a boat’s performance; quantities of explosive greater
than twenty-seven tones would ordinarily require a small freighter. To pro-
vide some comparison, the 7/7 rucksack bombs in London each weighted
around 22 pounds (10 kilos); the Cole bomb was probably around 500
pounds (227 kilos), while of the two most infamous truck bomb attacks,
the bomb used to demolish the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983
weighed about six tons (5.4 tonnes) and that used in the attack on the
Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996 was around 12 tons
(10.8 tonnes).
Small boats are also more appropriate to the less “spectacular”, less am-
bitious and more opportunistic attacks that appear to be the method of
choice across much of the terrorist spectrum.
182
Large attacks take time
to plan and prepare and if mounted in North America, Australia, Singa-
pore or most of Europe run a more significant risk of detection given the
higher prevailing alert levels. Western intelligence and police services talk
regularly of disrupted terrorist operations and although the number and
scale of those operations is rarely revealed, there is little reason to doubt
that possible attacks have been thwarted. In response, terrorist groups have
shortened their operational cycle in an attempt to avoid detection.
183
e
181 Stefan Ambrogi, ‘uS Navy says al Qaeda poses major threat from sea’, Reuters
AlertNet, 3 July 2006.
182 On the change from ‘spectacular’ attacks to less ambitious targets see, for ex-
ample, Brian Michael Jenkins and Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Misjudging the Jihad:
Briefing Osama on all the war’s wins and losses’, San Francisco Chronicle, 13
Nov. 2005; Raphael perl
, ‘Trends in terrorism’, Congressional Research Service,
21 July 2006 (RL33555); Robert Block, ‘how terrorists’ goals may be melding’,
Wall Street Journal, 6 July 2007.
183 private information, Dec. 2005.
235
maritime terrorism
result has been generally less well-planned, but also less disruptive, attacks.
Nonetheless, terrorist groups can be highly adaptable and it cannot be as-
sumed that this situation will continue; in fact, the plots to hijack multiple
aircraft after they left London’s heathrow Airport in 2006 and to attack
Frankfurt Airport in 2007 both demonstrated that al Qaeda remains intent
on mounting “spectacular” operations and, despite the huge international
intelligence and police effort that has been assembled against it since 2001,
has rebuilt much of the necessary capability.
184
Small boats also have their limitations. hitting a target with any ac-
curacy, even one that is stationary, is difficult. It is most unlikely that one
small craft could sink a large ship. e attack on the Limburg, which in-
volved only one suicide craft that caused serious but not irreparable dam-
age, suggests that the coordinated action of several small boats is required
to deliver the requisite weight of ordnance to achieve what the military call
a “mission kill”, at least on a ship of that size. is is exactly what the Sea
Tigers did when they employed a “swarm” of small craft to sink the Saga-
rawardana, the SLN’s largest warship, in 1994.
185
Such attacks require de-
tailed planning and extensive practice. In states with vigilant internal secu-
rity preparing the boats, launching them undetected, conducting practice
runs, manoeuvring them in restricted spaces such as harbours or operating
them at sea in other than calm conditions are highly risky and demanding
activities. e Limburg attack also demonstrated that an explosive charge
detonated against the outer hull of a double-hulled vessel would not neces-
sarily breach the inner hull, meaning that the damage caused would not
necessarily disable the ship. e suggestion has been made that maritime
terrorists could solve this problem by mimicking developments in land at-
tacks whereby one car or truck bomb is used to breach the target’s defences,
paving the way for a second which drives through the debris before being
detonated closer to the target causing the maximum damage.
186
Replicating
this tactic at sea, particularly if the target was still moving or able to defend
itself, would be extremely difficult. An immediate follow-on attack would
184 Tim Shipman, ‘Bin Laden sidelined as al-Qaeda threat revives’, Sunday Tel-
egraph, 16 Sept. 2007; Con Coughlin, ‘Al Qaeda ‘as strong today as it was on
9/11’’, Daily Telegraph, 13 Oct. 2007.
185 Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: tactics and technologies of the Sea Tigers’, p. 10;
Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, p. 28; Vijay Sa-
khuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’, Observer
Research Foundation Occasional Paper, April 2006.
186 ‘Group claims attack: Double suicide bombings’, AP, 25 April 2007.
236
small boats, weak states, dirty money
run into turbulence and back-wash, a vessel attempting an attack after a
short delay would have to take aim at a breach that might already be par-
tially submerged or shrouded by flames and smoke, and one after a longer
delay might be observed and destroyed.
Sinking a vessel, however, may not be necessary; disabling it or damaging
it sufficiently to capture the media’s attention may be all that is required,
as the attack on the Cole demonstrated. A supertanker drifting in a narrow
sea lane with oil pouring from its ruptured tanks might not be enough to
close as Strait, waterway or harbour entrance but it might grab the world’s
headlines, following the precedent set by the Limburg (although that at-
tack barely made it to the front pages). e sight of a white cruise ship, its
hull blackened by fire, coupled with the eye-witness accounts of the trau-
matised passengers who heard the massive explosion, might be enough to
shut down an industry overwhelmed by the subsequent insurance claims. A
large yacht loaded with enough high-performance explosive might be able
to damage or temporarily close one of the panama Canal locks. Exposed
and vulnerable beaches, resorts, shopping malls and industrial plants could
be assaulted by raiding parties landing from small boats. All of these are
more likely scenarios than the use of large ships as weapons.
Naval mines. Small craft equipped with Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs), a combination that is known as a Water-borne Improvised Ex-
plosive Device (WBIED), undoubtedly present currently the most sub-
stantial maritime terrorist threat. e more discreet but very effective
supplement, or alternative, is the mine. As the uS commander of the
amphibious task force off Wonsan during the Korean War, Rear Admiral
Allen E. Smith, said: “We have lost control of the sea to a nation without
a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels utilised at the
time of the birth of Christ.” It is hard to better this as a description of
maritime asymmetric warfare.
187
eir efficacy was demonstrated in 1984 when, between 9-10 July and
20 September, some twenty vessels struck anchored mines in two areas
of the Red Sea, the first at the southern end close to the Bab el-Mandeb
strait and the other at the northern end close to the entrance to the Suez
Canal. Further incidents occurred right up until April 1985 when the pan-
amanian-registered bulk carrier Mariner II struck the final mine and sank.
187 Edward J. Marolda, ‘Mine warfare’, Naval historical Center, 26 Aug. 2003. See
also Scott C. Truver, ‘Mines and underwater IEDs in uS ports and Waterways:
Context, threats, challenges and solutions’, NWCR, Winter 2007, p. 109.