Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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247
maritime terrorism
sions, used by military units such as the uS Navy SEALS and the British
Special Boat Squadron (SBS), are fully or partially enclosed and can carry
small groups of swimmers up to about 50 miles (80 km). ey are not sub-
marines; the swimmers depend on their own air supply and are therefore
constricted by the same physical limitations regarding depth and air use.
Like all diving equipment they require extensive and specialised training
if they are to be used effectively and safely. In 2005 a very experienced
SBS officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard van der horst, was killed during
a training exercise off Norway while exiting such a vehicle.
231
e uS has taken the swimmer threat to homeland targets seriously. In
2005 the uS Coast Guard launched a programme to train the members of
its law enforcement teams based in 13 ports around the uS in how to deal
with swimmer threats.
232
e teams were reportedly trained to use shore-
based sonar for general surveillance and boat-based imaging sonar to inves-
tigate suspicious returns, and practiced using nets and other “non-lethal”
means to incapacitate and capture their targets.
233
In 2007 the FBI issued
an advisory notice asking diving instructors to be on the alert for requests
for specialised training that might indicate “nefarious activity”.
234
Undersea warfare: submarines and submersibles. A submarine would present
the greater threat to shipping. e current assessment, however, is that the
technical and operational demands of submarine operations are too great
for the majority of states and beyond the capabilities of all known non-
state actors unless they received substantial assistance from a state with a
submarine service.
is does not mean that non-state actors are not trying to obtain such
a capability and, given that many navies currently assign ASW a relatively
low priority, this is a risk that needs to be kept under review. Governments
around the world are disposing of submarines and on the basis that any-
thing that can be sold will be sold, the expectation must be that at some
231 ‘SBS commander killed in accident’, BBC News, 16 March 2005; Michael
Smith, ‘SBS commander killed on assault exercise’, Daily Telegraph, 16 March
2005; and Sean Rayment, ‘SBS commander’s widow to sue MOD over diving
death’, Daily Telegraph, 27 Nov. 2005.
232 hosenball, ‘Look out below’.
233 Eric Lipton, ‘Coast Guard turns its eyes underwater’, New York Times, 2 Feb.
2005.
234 ‘FBI issues scuba industry alert over requests for specialized training, ‘nefari-
ous activity’’, UnderwaterTimes.com, 22 June 2007; ‘Scuba warning issued for
instructors’, AP, 27 June 2007; also Mimi hall, ‘uncle Sam to scuba divers: I
want you’, USA Today, 9 July 2007.
248
small boats, weak states, dirty money
stage one may end up being bought by insurgents or criminals. In 1997,
for example, a Russian immigrant to the united States was indicted for
attempting to procure a Russian submarine on behalf of unspecified Co-
lombian drug traffickers. e plan was to base the submarine in panama,
or another Central American country, pretending it was to be used for
oceanographic research. Instead it was to have rendezvoused with cocaine-
smuggling ships in the pacific and then run in to drop-off points along the
uS West Coast. According to the indictment, discussions were also held
regarding the provision of a party of 18-20 Russian submariners to crew the
vessels for two years.
235
e main axes of development, however, are semi-submersible craft,
mini-submarines and the exploitation of commercially available sport and
autonomous research submarines. e IRGCN are believed to operate a
fleet of semi-submersibles with attack capabilities, a technology they might
be willing to transfer to their proxies hizbollah and possibly hamas. Al-
though they would be an option for a number of other terrorist groups
it is criminal organisations that have shown the most interest in this type
of craft. Drug cartels used, and continue to use, ‘go-fast’ boats capable of
speeds up to 60 knots but because they leave a long tell-tale wake can be
spotted easily from the air. Semi-submersibles, although slow, appeared to
offer a cost-effective alternative but if powered by battery this would have
meant they could only travel underwater for relatively short periods. To
overcome this problem, Colombian drug gangs first employed large tubes
that were towed behind cargo ships or fishing vessels. Once this method
was recognised the gangs turned their attention to the development of
self-propelled, semi-submersibles (SpSS) using diesel engines for power.
e first semi-submersible was discovered in 1993 and their use has grown
steadily since then.
236
Although no one design solution has emerged, the
common features are a hull, which can be made of metal or wood but
more usually fiberglass, the bulk of which is below the surface, and a crude
“conning tower” protruding above the surface, through which fresh air
235 Mireya Navarro, ‘Russian submarine drifts into center of a brazen drug plot’,
New York Times, 7 March 1997. Also Douglas Farah, ‘Russian mob, drug cartels
joining forces’, e Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1997. Chris Kraul, ‘Drug traffick-
ers dive in’, LA Times, 6 Nov. 2007 also reports that the Cali cartel planned to
buy a Russian submarine in 1993.
236 Contrary to a 2001 State Department assessment. See Joshua Sinai, ‘Future
trends in worldwide maritime terrorism’, e Quarterly Journal, vol. III, no. 1,
March 2004, p. 53, Note 21.
249
maritime terrorism
for the crew and the diesel engine can be drawn. Although the “conning
tower” enables the crew to navigate the vessel more easily they remain, in
many cases, little more than extremely low-profile boats because, lacking
buoyancy tanks, they cannot submerge.
237
Such craft have a small enough
radar signature to generally avoid detection and are often able to reach the
coast of Central America from the pacific coast of Colombia, although
they might take two weeks to do so.
238
In 2006, for example, a submersible
reportedly capable of travelling about six feet (1.8m) below the surface was
intercepted in the pacific off Costa Rica.
239
A second report released within
days of the discovery appeared to contradict the original report when it sug-
gested the boat was a cigarette-style fast boat that rode low in the water be-
cause of the weight of the drugs it was carrying. It suggested that the three
pipes that had been reported as projecting above the surface were exhaust
pipes, not breathing tubes. Moreover, according to the Costa Rican coast
guard, the boat had a lead laminate covering to “conceal it from radar”.
240
is description, however, matches some of the designs based on ‘go-fast’
speedboats with sealed decks.
241
Of possibly greater interest in this case was
the fact that a Sri Lankan Tamil was on board; whether or not he had a
connection with the LTTE was never explained.
Construction standards appear to be as variable as the designs. Accord-
ing to Colombian Navy engineers some have GpS navigation devices and
satellite phones, are built almost entirely from fiberglass which would make
them almost impossible to detect using radar and, when equipped with
ballast tanks, would be able to cut through water almost seamlessly.
242
De-
velopment is continuing: Carbon fiber hulls have appeared and speeds have
increased from generally around eight knots (15kph) to in some cases 12 to
237 ‘Drug gangs expand their fleet’, Strategy Page, 2 Nov. 2007; ‘Insurgent sub-
mersibles’. Janes’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, June 2008, pp. 6-7..
238 ‘Cocaine smugglers threatening submarine’. e Star, 27
th
June 2008.
239 ‘Submarine with cocaine seized off Costa Rica’, Reuters, 20 Nov. 2006; ‘Sub-
marine carrying 3 tons of cocaine seized off Costa Rica’, USA Today, 21 Nov.
2006.
240 ‘Drug ‘submarine’ off Costa Rica was disguised boat’, Reuters, 22 Nov. 2006.
241 ‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 7.
242 Juan Forero, ‘Drug traffic beneath the waves’, Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2008. In
Feb. 2008, the Bogotá newspaper El Tiempo reported that humberto Cuevas,
who designed submersibles for the cartel boss Wilber Varela, had been arrested.
his designs were apparently prized especially because they rode more com-
pletely underwater than others and were consequently harder to detect: ‘Drug
lord’s sub designer in custody’, El Tiempo (Bogotá), 6 Feb. 2008.
250
small boats, weak states, dirty money
14 knots (22-26kph).
243
On the other hand, the crew of a semi-submersible
that sank off Tumaco in 2007 described their craft as a “death trap” while
others have been described as “floating coffins” without sanitary facilities
or adequate ventilation.
244
Two small drug-running submersibles were seized in 1997 and in 2005
another was discovered close to the pacific port of Tumaco that was eight
meters (26 feet) in length and described as capable of carrying around ten
tons of cocaine, worth about $200 million.
245
Also in 2005 the uS Coast
Guard intercepted a “submarine-like vessel” off the Galapagos Islands with
more than two tons of cocaine aboard.
246
At least two submersibles were
discovered during the first part of 2007, followed by two more in October,
each of which were described as 55 feet (17 meters) in length, powered by
a 350-horsepower Cummins diesel engine and capable of transporting five
tons of cocaine.
247
e usage rate appears to be increasing rapidly: Reports from Colombia
suggest 18 were discovered between 2005 and the beginning of 2007;
248
ac-
cording to uS Southern Command (SOuThCOM), 30 were discovered
during the first two months of 2008, the same number observed during
the whole of 2007. e craft seized in 2008 ranged in size from 45 feet
(14m) to 82 feet (25m) in length and although described as being “garage-
level technology” some apparently had a range of 2,000 miles at six knots
243 Elaine Silvestrini. ‘Authorities want to torpedo use of drug-smuggling subs’.
Tampa Bay Online, 26
th
June 2008; ‘Cocaine smugglers threatening subma-
rine’.
244 Kraul, ‘Drug traffickers dive in’; Silvestrini. ‘Authorities want to torpedo use of
drug-smuggling subs’
245 ‘Colombian police find drug sub’, BBC News, 26 March 2005.
246
‘Submarine-like vessel transporting cocaine seized in pacific’, News from Russia.
com, 15 Sept. 2005.
247 On the craft discovered in the first half of 2007 see ‘Colombian Navy seizes
sub in coke probe’; Jack Date and eresa Cook, ‘Feds nab suspected cocaine
smugglers in pacific’, AP, 22 Aug. 2007. On the discoveries in the second half
of the year see Kraul, ‘Drug traffickers dive in’.
248 Forero, ‘Drug traffic beneath the waves’; ‘Another cocaine-laden submarine
sinks off Colombia’, Reuters, 3 Jan. 2008; also ‘Colombia Navy seizes sub in
coke probe’, AP, 7 Aug. 2007; Kraul, ‘Drug traffickers dive in’; ‘Drug gangs
expand their fleet’ and ‘Drug sub war intensifies’, Strategy Page, 11 Jan. 2008.
‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 7 reports that the bulk of the increase
came in 2007 when nine vessels were discovered, eight of them in the pacific.
251
maritime terrorism
(11kph).
249
Even the range of the smaller boats could probably be extended
by in-transit refueling from pre-positioned bowsers.
250
In contrast insurgents groups appear to be more interested in acquir-
ing or building mini-submarines.
251
Whether criminals are also interested
is not clear. Although the costs and technical challenges would probably
deter them two “submarines” and a semi-submersible were discovered
close to Colombia at the beginning of 2008, each reportedly capable of
carrying over ten tons of cocaine. e semi-submersible was captured off
Buenaventura but the two “submarines” were scuttled before they could be
examined.
252
Outside the pacific region, a 33-foot (10m) “submarine” was
discovered in the estuary of the River Vigo in the north-west coast of Spain
in 2006. Its purpose appeared to be to ferry drugs from ships in interna-
tional waters to the Spanish coast.
253
e report issued by the Guardia Civil
indicated that it had a submersible capability but that the buoyancy system,
which needed to balance the weight of the fuel as it was consumed against
the weight of the cargo, was adjusted manually which would have been dif-
ficult to judge. e supposition is that the operator probably panicked and
abandoned the craft which was sinking when it was apprehended.
254
In 2000, however, a craft that appeared to be a true submarine was
found under construction in a suburb of Bogotá. It was steel-hulled, 100
feet (30m) long, and probably cost in the region of $20 million. It was
completed to a high engineering standard and the Spanish translations of
Russian manuals found in the building where it was being built suggested a
possible Russian organised crime connection.
255
Some estimates suggested
249 Jason Sherman, ‘SOuThCOM detects sharp boost in narco submarine
fleet size’, Inside the Navy, 10 March 2008, p. 13. A subsequent report from
SOuThCOM put the number of semi-submersibles discovered in 2007 at 40.
Mark D. Faram, ‘War on drugs goes underwater’, Navy Times, 28 April 2008.
250 ‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 8.
251 For an introduction to this category of weapons and related SDVs and midget
submarines see Joris Janssen Lok. ‘Mini-submarines and special forces pose
maximum threat’. Jane’s International Defence Review, 1
st
June 1998, pp. 63-8.
252 ‘Another cocaine-laden submarine sinks off Colombia’; ‘Operación conjunta
detecta semisumergible en aguas del pacífico Colombiano’, Armada Nacional
de Colombia, 3 Jan. 2008.
253 ‘Spanish police find ‘drugs’ sub’, BBC News, 14 Aug. 2006; Forero, ‘Drug traffic
beneath the waves’.
254 ‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 8.
255 Sinai, ‘Future trends in worldwide maritime terrorism’, p. 53; ‘Drug subma-
rine found in Colombia’, BBC News, 7 Sept. 2000; ‘Colombia: e Submarine
252
small boats, weak states, dirty money
it would have been capable of transporting up to 200 tons of cocaine at
snorkel depth to rendezvous sites around the Caribbean and, perhaps, off
the American coast. Another report has suggested it might have been capa-
ble of diving much deeper, perhaps to as much as 330 feet (100 meters),
256
but to operate it as a submarine the cartel involved, which has never been
identified, would still have needed to draw on at least a nucleus of trained,
experienced personnel from a submarine-operating navy.
e Sea Tigers have long sought a fully submersible capability and,
along with some anti-Israel insurgent groups, have pioneered the use of
sub-surface equipment by non-state actors. Reports circulated that the or-
ganisation was planning to buy mini-submarines from the DpRK and a
submarine from South Africa, but no evidence emerged to indicate that
these purchases were made.
257
In 2003 there was a report that the group
had obtained 34 underwater scooters in Denmark and smuggled them into
Sri Lanka via Colombo’s main airport without the knowledge of the Sri
Lankan authorities.
258
Most famously they attempted to build a submarine
Door’, Semitronic, ND.
256 Forero, ‘Drug traffic beneath the waves’.
257 private information, Dec. 2005. however one website, which in other respects
appears accurate, does claim that the Tigers have a midget-submarine in their
inventory, of what is described as ‘unconventional indigenous design and con-
struction with sonar’: ‘LTTE’s Military Capability’, TamilTigers.net, ND (but
no later than 2005). Also Gunaratna, ‘Sea Tiger success threatens the spread
of copycat tactics’, p. 14. at the Tigers attempted to purchase a submarine
in South Africa is not perhaps as surprising as it appears. In the late 1990s
the country was emerging from the apartheid era and there was widespread
sympathy for fellow ‘liberation’ movements amongst the country’s new ruling
elite. is sympathy extended to the LTTE who were able to set up at least two
training camps and purchase arms. See Rohan Gunaratna, ‘LTTE in South Af-
rica’, Frontline, vol. 15, no. 25, 5-18 Dec. 1998 and ‘LTTE in South Africa II’,
Frontline, vol. 15, no. 24, 21 Nov.-4 Dec. 1998; also Nirupama Subramanian,
‘SA takes stand on LTTE: Lanka rests easy’, Indian Express, 19 Nov. 1998, who
mentions Sri Lankan concern that the LTTE might have purchased ‘at least one
South African helicopter’. On continuing concerns about LTTE connections
in South Africa and possible contact there between the LTTE and hizbollah
see B. Raman, ‘Action against LTTE’s gun-running’, International Terrorism
Monitor: paper no. 190. South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 2138, 16 Feb.
2007.
258 ‘LTTE use talks to obtain underwater scooters’. e Island, 17 March 2003. See
also the discussion about the use of such equipment by the LTTE in R.S. Vasan.
‘Incident Analysis: Sinking of SLN Dvora Craft on 22
nd
March 2008’. South
Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 2652, 28
th
March 2008.
253
maritime terrorism
in phuket, ailand, but their efforts were discovered.
259
ree more mini-
submarines were then discovered under construction in a village south
of the town.
260
According to Gunaratna, when the phuket boatyard was
closed the LTTE moved their boat-building operations to New Zealand
where they constructed craft to be used in suicide operations.
261
Reports
emanating from India in 2007 suggested that the Sea Tigers were renewing
their efforts to develop some sort of sub-surface capability, probably in or-
der to transport supplies safely across the increasingly patrolled palk Strait
but also, allegedly, to attack shipping in the Indian Ocean.
262
e larger
LTTE submarine discovered in phuket might have been used to transport
divers but in all probability was being built to transport supplies.
263
Operating and building mini-submarines, however, might be within the
compass of a wider range of terrorist groups. In 1999 there was a report
that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had made enquiries about
buying a mini-sub from North Korea.
264
In 2002 a conference in Singapore
was briefed about what was described as a non-pressurised “mini-subma-
259 On the submarine find in ailand see ‘e LTTE in South East Asia: With
special focus on ailand’, Svik.org, 2005, p. 7; Anthony Davis
, ‘Tracking Ti-
gers in phuket: A secret Tamil guerrilla base embarrasses Bangkok’, Asiaweek.
com, vol. 29, no. 23, 16 June 2003; Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from
maritime terrorism’, p. 26, and Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Mini submarine–A vessel of
choice with drug cartels and terrorists’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no.
1313, 30 March 2005. Gunaratna also reports that the Sea Tigers attempted
to build a submarine in India but their efforts there were also disrupted. Gu-
naratna: ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, pp. 26 & 28.
260 Sakhuja
, ‘Mini submarine’; ‘ree more mini-subs found in Rawai’, e Nation
(Bangkok), 5 June 2000.
261 Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist
threat?’ pp. 83-4.
262 Walter Jayawardhana, ‘Tamil Tigers are also developing a mini submarine for
gun running, drug smuggling and piracy’, LankaWeb, 30 March 2007; ‘LTTE
might be trying to acquire submarine: Report’, Zee News, 30 March 2007.
263 Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Maritime terrorism, piracy and
crime’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed), Terrorism in Asia Pacific: reat and Response,
Singapore: Eastern up, 2003, p. 84
. e then Sri Lankan ambassador to ai-
land believed the reverse to be true; that the vessel was intended primarily for
offensive operations.
‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 9
264 Sakhuja
, ‘Mini submarine’. e attempt, which was apparently recorded in
documents discovered when AFp troops overran the MILF’s ‘Buliok’ camp in
2003, involved the planned purchase of a vessel 45 feet (14m) in length capa-
ble of carrying six people including two divers: ‘Mini-subs: the next terrorist
threat?’ Journal of Electronic Defense, July 2003 and ‘philippines: New concerns
arise with rebel submarine plan’. Stratfor, 14
th
March 2003.
254
small boats, weak states, dirty money
rine” capable of carrying six swimmers that had been captured from al-
Qaeda or an associated group in Southeast Asia.
265
ere was no informa-
tion as to whether this vessel was the only one the group or groups involved
had in their possession. e same report indicated the al-Qaeda had also
developed an explosive-packed “human torpedo” that, like the Sea Tiger’s
semi-submersible equivalent, was designed to explode on impact with a
target. It was not made clear if the group or groups had acquired more
such vessels and undertaken additional development work. In Colombia it
has been suggested that FARC might have colluded in the construction of
some submersibles that have been used to transport cocaine.
266
Finally, anti-Israel groups are know to have adapted small submersible
leisure craft and it appears eminently possible that insurgents groups might
similarly adapt autonomous submarines, remotely controlled devices de-
signed for scientific research, which are coming onto the market in in-
creasing numbers.
267
Given their limited budgets, however, such groups are
unlikely to be tempted to splash out on the exclusive, luxury submarines
designed only for the extremely wealthy as an act of ‘martyrdom’ conduct-
ed using such a craft might be seen as one of sybaritic immolation rather
noble sacrifice.
268
Stand-off weapons. As warships push out their defensive perimeters, first
through the use of small arms and floating booms, and perhaps later with
the installation of sophisticated weapons such as the Mini-Typhoon elec-
tro-optical guided chain gun and small, fast-reaction missiles, and as small
craft are increasingly kept away from high value targets such as oil tankers,
gas carriers and cruise ships in ports and harbour approaches, so terrorists
will need the capability of inflicting unacceptable levels of damage from
a greater distance. e threat from aerial or more sophisticated stand-off
weapons may therefore increase.
Small single engined private planes could conceivably be used as flying
bombs in a manner similar to the way the 9/11 attackers used large airlin-
ers. Al Nashiri is believed to have considered this option.
269
It is unlikely
265 Newman, ‘Terrorists feared to be planning sub-surface naval attacks’.
266 ‘Cocaine smugglers threatening submarine’; ‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s
T&SM, pp. 6 & 8.
267 ‘Insurgent submersibles’. Jane’s T&SM, p. 9
268 Jessica Dicker. ‘private subs plumb deep pockets, deeper waters’. CNNMoney,com,
3 August 2007.
269 ere is a report that al-Nashiri was undertaking flight training in a small Gulf
emirate prior to his arrest; the suggestion is that this could have been a prelude
255
maritime terrorism
that one small, single-engined plane on its own not augmented by explo-
sives, or even several small planes, could do great damage to a building, as
incidents in Tampa, Milan and New York demonstrated.
270
e effect they
might have on a ship could be more worrying. Although a plane of this type
is usually smaller and lighter than a medium-sized car, the heavy engine
block could be forced through two or three bulkheads if it was driven into
the side or deck of a ship, even at the relatively modest speeds of which such
aircraft are capable. is purely kinetic effect would be increased if it was
carrying explosives. e suggestion that a plane of this size might be capa-
ble of delivering a charge weighting hundreds of pounds seems far-fetched,
but a charge measured in tens of pounds would appear to be achievable.
271
e end result would be the equivalent of a small car bomb which, if un-
leashed against any cargo ship that lacked the reinforcement that is usual
on gas and nuclear carriers, could cause considerable damage. If employed
against a passenger ferry or cruise ship the psychological effect would be
terrifying, although the actual numbers of killed and injured would depend
on the depth to which the aircraft penetrated the interior spaces. however,
loading the explosive onto a small aircraft would present problems given
the size of the airframe and the layout of most cabins, while the pilot would
need to be highly skilled in order to locate and take accurate aim at the
target even if it was stationary.
Terrorists have already used missiles against ships. On 14 July 2006 an
Israeli Navy corvette, the INS Hanit, patrolling off the coast of Lebanon,
was badly damaged by a device fired from an area under the control of the
Iranian-backed hizbollah group. First reports suggested it was some sort of
light aircraft or drone packed with explosives.
272
Later reports made it clear
that the vessel had been hit by a missile, probably a C-802, a specialised,
subsonic, Iranian anti-ship weapon based on a Chinese design which car-
to a maritime attack. Blanche, ‘Tanker terror: Gulf’s oil routes under threat’.
270 ‘Small plane crashes into Florida building’, BBC News, 6 Jan. 2002; ‘plane hits
Milan skyscraper’, BBC News, 18 April 2002; ‘Aircraft hits New York building’,
BBC News, 12 Oct. 2006.
271 Richard A. Clarke in his report on LNG risks suggests that small planes should
be capable of delivering 700 pounds (318kg) of explosive: Clarke, ‘LNG facili-
ties in urban areas’, p. 80. he nonetheless rates the likelihood of success against
an LNG carrier using this method as low. e obvious comparison is with Japa-
nese World War II kamikaze attacks. ese used a variety of aircraft capable of
carrying a variety of bombs; most however were armed with 500kg (1,100lbs)
bombs while a few could carry 750kg (1,650 lbs) devices.
272 ‘Israel confirms 4 sailors missing from naval ship’, Reuters, 15 July 2006.
256
small boats, weak states, dirty money
ries a 165 kilogram (383 lb) warhead.
273
A second ship, the Moon Light, a
Cambodian freighter with an Egyptian crew, that was sailing nearby was
hit by another missile at about the same time.
274
e evidence suggests that
the attack was a two-missile salvo. Why the second missile missed the Han-
it is unclear but could be explained on the basis of a simultaneous “high/
low” attack: the first, high-level missile could have been intended as bait to
distract the Hanit’s defence systems away from the second, sea-skimming,
missile. Both would have been guided to their targets using the missiles’
own guidance systems; the high flying missile could have overflown the
Hanit and then “locked on” to the Moon Light 36 kilometers (22 miles)
away as its next visible target. If this scenario is correct, then the missile
that actually struck the Hanit could either have been another C-802 or a
C-701 TV-guided missile.
275
Initial reports suggested that the strikes oc-
curred roughly 50 miles (80 km) off the coast but, given the Israeli ship’s
mission, 12-15 miles (20-25 km) seems more realistic and it could have
been as close as eight to ten miles (around 16 km).
276
Finding and targeting the ships would have been a sophisticated opera-
tion.
277
e assumption until now has been that only states are capable of
buying, maintaining and operating such sophisticated weapons and that
they would not allow them to be used even by their proxies. While this
remains the assumption, the evidence in this case is equivocal. ere was
no confirmation that Iranian forces, which in this case meant operatives
from the Al Quds section of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, were
in Lebanon when the attack took place, but the fact that they could not
be found does not mean they were not there. If they were not, then these
firings represent either a substantial increase in terrorist fire power or an
273 Mark Mazzetti and om Shanker, ‘hizbollah’s unexpected firepower’, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 19 July 2006; Ramit plushnick-Masti, ‘Israel: Iran aided
hizbollah attack’, e Mercury News, 15 July 2006; ‘hizbollah brings out Ira-
nian Silkworm to hit Israel corvette’, DEBKA-file, 15 July 2006.
274 ONI, WWTTS Report, 26 July 2006.
275 ‘INS hanit suffers Iranian missile attack’, Defense Update News Commentary,
17 July 2006; Jonathan howland, ‘Iran, China intent on countering navies’,
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs Online, 18 Jan. 2007. For a detailed
analysis see Kirk Spencer and Trent Telenko, ‘An analysis of the hizbollah anti-
ship missile strike: e attack on the INS Ani–hanit’, Israel Resource Review, 25
July 2006.
276 ‘INS hanit suffers Iranian missile attack’.
277 Spencer and Telenko, ‘An analysis of the hizbollah anti-ship missile strike’;
Matt hilburn, ‘hizbollah’s surprise’, Sea Power, Sept. 2006.