
350
Moral philosophy
contemplation.
272
Javelli claimed
that in the
Theages Plato
had
referred
to
man's highest good
as the
speculation about divine beings,
thus
including
the intelligences
as
well
as
God;
but in the
Symposium
he had
specified
that
our happiness consisted primarily
in the
contemplation
of
God.
273
In the
view
of
Fox-Morcillo, Plato's belief
that the
contemplation
of God was
man's supreme good was
not
only
apparent
in his own
works, above
all the
Philebus
and
Republic,
but was
also confirmed
in the
writings
of
Apuleius,
Albinus,
Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, Porphyry
and all the
rest
of the
Platonists.
274
It was
a
fundamental
tenet
of
Platonic philosophy
that
this contemplation
of God
could
not be
perfectly achieved until
the
soul
had
freed
itself
from
its
connection with
the
body. Many Renaissance Platonists
interpreted
this
to
mean
that the
supreme good could only
be
attained after death, when
the
soul permanently escaped from
its
corporeal prison. As Lorenzo
de'
Medici
wrote,
our
soul would never find
pure
truth
while
it
was weighed down
by
the
terrestrial
burden
of the
body.
275
Plato, according
to
Landino,
had
denied
that we
could
attain
happiness until
we
were liberated from
our
earthly chains
and
restored
to our true
nature.
276
Leone Ebreo described
how
the
soul, when released from
its
bodily prison, became united
to God
and shared
the
eternal
joy
experienced
by
angels
and
other immaterial
beings.
277
A
number
of
Platonic dialogues were adduced
as
evidence
in
support
of
this
view:
the
Phaedo,
Symposium,
Republic
and
above
all the
Epinomis,
now
considered
to be of
doubtful authenticity.
278
Ficino also held
that the
soul could
not
attain
knowledge
of God and
thereby become Godlike until
it had
separated
itself
from
the
body.
279
He
272.
Della Barba 1554, p. 98: 'la felicità nostra consiste nel vedere Dio'; Vieri 1577, sig. b 8
V
: 'il sommo
bene dell'anima è cercare Dio . . . così dice . . . Platone nel Fedone'.
273.
Javelli 1651, p. 325: 'Licet . . . Plato in divinorum entium speculatione nostram beatitudinem
locaverit,
primo tamen in Dei Maximi speculatione; ... et quidem quod in huius divinissima
speculatione nostram reposuerit felicitatem patet in
Symposio
[210E-212B].'
274.
Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 126: 'In . . . Dei contemplatione constimi foelicitatem [Plato] existimavit;
atque
hanc etiam
esse
ipsius sententiam, non modo ex
eius
scriptis constat, sed omnes Academici
uno ore confirmant. Id enim Apuleius Alcinousque de
ilio
testatur; idem fatetur Plotinus . . .,
Iamblichus,
Proclus, Porphyrius ac reliqui omnes.'
275.
Medici
1914,11,
p. 51
(Aìtercazione):
'mai non trova la nostr'alma | la pura verità formosa e bianca, |
mentre l'aggrava
este
terrestre salma'.
276.
Landino 1980, p. 71: 'negat Plato beatos nos
esse
posse,
nisi
postquam a terrenis vinculis soluti in
naturam
nostram liberi redierimus'.
277.
Leone Ebreo 1929, pp. 46-7.
278.
Vieri
1577,
p. 158: 'Platone ci dimostra, che la beatitudine non s'ha in questo mondo ma nell'altro, e
nel principio dell'Epinomide [973c], un'altro [luogo] simile nell' Assiocco [370
B-D],
molti altri
ancora ne
sono
nel Fedone, nelle
Leggi,
nella Republica, et nelle lettere'; Talon 1583, p. 1079. After
citing
Republic
608c
and
Phaedo
67A, wrote: 'Idemque Plato scribit in Epinomide et in Convivio';
Zwinger
1566, p. 15: 'Neminem ... in hac vita beatum fieri posse, sed post mortem tantum, Plato
diserte in Epinomide testatur.'
279.
Ficino 1937, 11, pp. 96-7; 1964-70, 11, p. 249 (xiv.i): 'anima ab huius corporis vinculis exempta
puraque
decedens, certa quadam ratione fit deus'.
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