
Second, credit derivatives are the first mechanism via which short sales of credit
instruments can be executed with any reasonable liquidity and without the risk of a
short squeeze. It is more or less impossible to short-sell a bank loan, but the
economics of a short position can be achieved synthetically by purchasing credit
protection using a credit derivative. This allows the user to reverse the “skewed”
profile of credit risk (whereby one earns a small premium for the risk of a large loss)
and instead pay a small premium for the possibility of a large gain upon credit
deterioration. Consequently, portfolio managers can short specific credits or a broad
index of credits, either as a hedge of existing exposures or simply to profit from a
negative credit view. Similarly, the possibility of short sales opens up a wealth of
arbitrage opportunities. Global credit markets today display discrepancies in the
pricing of the same credit risk across different asset classes, maturities, rating cohorts,
time zones, currencies, and so on. These discrepancies persist because arbitrageurs
have traditionally been unable to purchase cheap obligations against shorting
expensive ones to extract arbitrage profits. As credit derivative liquidity improves,
banks, borrowers, and other credit players will exploit such opportunities, just as the
evolution of interest rate derivatives first prompted cross-market interest rate arbitrage
activity in the 1980s. The natural consequence of this is, of course, that credit pricing
discrepancies will gradually disappear as credit markets become more efficient.
Third, credit derivatives, except when embedded in structured notes, are off-balance-
sheet instruments. As such, they offer considerable flexibility in terms of leverage. In
fact, the user can define the required degree of leverage, if any, in a credit investment.
The appeal of off- as opposed to on-balance-sheet exposure will differ by institution:
The more costly the balance sheet, the greater the appeal of an off-balance-sheet
alternative. To illustrate, bank loans have not traditionally appealed as an asset class
to hedge funds and other nonbank institutional investors for at least two reasons: first,
because of the administrative burden of assigning and servicing loans; and second,
because of the absence of a repo market. Without the ability to finance investments in
bank loans on a secured basis via some form of repo market, the return on capital
offered by bank loans has been unattractive to institutions that do not enjoy access to
unsecured financing. However, by taking exposure to bank loans using a credit
derivative such as a Total Return Swap (described more fully below), a hedge fund can
both synthetically finance the position (receiving under the swap the net proceeds of
the loan after financing) and avoid the administrative costs of direct ownership of the
asset, which are borne by the swap counterparty. The degree of leverage achieved
using a Total Return Swap will depend on the amount of up-front collateralization
any, required by the total return payer from its swap counterparty. Credit derivatives
are thus opening new lines of distribution for the credit risk of bank loans and many
other instruments into the institutional capital markets.
A key
distinction
between cash
and physical
settlement:
following
physical
delivery, the
Protection
Seller has
recourse to the
Reference
Entity and the
opportunity to
participate in
the workout
process as
owner of a
defaulted
obligation.