Woodward D. Lloyd George and the Generals
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The Greek situation was soon eclipsed by a more ominous development in the
Balkans. German divisions began to arrive on Rumania’s frontier. Lloyd George,
realizing that Robertson was certain to block any effort to strengthen Rumania,
devised a clever plan to get him out of the way. On September 26, he wrote the
prime minister suggesting that Wully should immediately be sent to Russia to
confer with the generals there. “The Eastern Generals probably concentrate their
minds too exclusively on the East, and I am not sure that the Western Generals
are not inclined to commit a similar error by limiting their views too much to the
countries where their forces are operating,” he noted. Robertson, determined to
stand guard in the War Office, was not to be taken in by this stratagem and Lloyd
George’s proposal was dropped for the time being.
62
As Lloyd George feared, the German high command was preparing a powerful
counterstroke against the thinly equipped and poorly led Rumanian army.
Throughout the campaign Rumanian officers were seen “strolling about Bucharest
with painted faces, soliciting prostitutes or one another.”
63
One Rumanian general,
Robertson reported with disgust to the War Committee, was playing bridge in
Bucharest when his army was attacked.
64
As Robertson expected, pressure immediately began to mount from Britain’s
allies to beef up the Allied force in the Balkans after Erich von Falkenhayn’s Ninth
Army began its offensive on September 30, with the Serbian military attaché
urgently requesting 100,000 additional soldiers for Salonika. “Of course,”
Robertson explained to the War Committee, “the despatch of any large forces like
that was out of the question.” Russia, he emphasized, was the only Allied power
in a position to offer assistance.
65
The general staff’s supineness while enemy storm clouds gathered over
Rumania was the catalyst for an open breach between the secretary of state for
war and the C.I.G.S. on October 9. After listening to Robertson downplay the
German threat to Rumania and give his familiar defense of concentrating British
forces in the West, Lloyd George launched into a long tirade against what he
considered was the general staff’s and his civilian colleagues’ indifference to
developments in the Balkans. If Rumania went the way of Serbia, British prestige
“would have absolutely disappeared,” he thundered. An Allied conference must
be convened at once “to advise some measures which would enable our honour
to be saved.”
66
The War Committee was unmoved by Lloyd George’s emotional outburst. Even
if troops could be spared (and Robertson said none were available), the ministers
believed that they would arrive too late. Still, Lloyd George’s words embarrassed
the War Committee. If Britain sat on her hands while Rumania was destroyed, it
would be awkward, if not dishonorable.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Robertson could no longer restrain himself.
To his way of thinking, Lloyd George’s criticism of the general staff was
intolerable. Cornering the Welshman, he let himself go. If the War Committee
ignored his advice and sent reinforcements to the Balkans, he thundered, he would
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 97
“decline to be responsible for its execution.”
67
For the next few days the war in
Whitehall approached the intensity of the struggle on the Somme.
Robertson, who had more guile than is usually thought, mobilized his supporters
against Lloyd George, whom the “soldiers’ party” suspected of working with
F.E.Smith, Churchill, and Sir John French against the high command. Robertson
first took his case to his friend Repington, who immediately passed on Robertson’s
difficulties with Lloyd George to his volatile employer. Unable to get Lloyd
George on the telephone on October 11, Northcliffe invaded the War Office,
unleashing his anger on Lloyd George’s private secretary J.T.Davies. “You can
tell him that I hear he has been interfering with strategy,” he said, “and that if he
goes on I will break him.”
68
On that same day, Lloyd George received two letters, one from Gwynne
admonishing him with the words, “Why on earth can’t you let the army alone?”
The other letter was from Robertson, accusing him of undermining his authority
by meddling in the strategical direction of the war. A copy of his letter, Robertson
pointedly noted, was being sent to the prime minister— and to the king, too, he
might have added if he dared.
69
Not unnaturally, Lloyd George suspected collusion among Robertson, Gwynne,
and Northcliffe. And he was right. Robertson was in touch with the editor of the
Morning Post and he wrote Northcliffe, “The Boche gives me no trouble compared
with what I meet in London. So any help you can give me will be of Imperial
value.”
70
With the recent press attack on him still fresh in his mind, Lloyd George
struck back with the strongest letter he had ever composed to Robertson.
Exploiting Robertson’s indiscretions with Fleet Street, he stressed Northcliffe’s
visit to the War Office.
I have found complaints against action taken by the Army Council and
myself lodged with the Press—even before they ever reached me…. I feel
confident that you must agree with me that this state of things is an outrage
on all the best traditions of the service, and must tend to impair discipline
in all ranks of the army, and I am certain that I shall receive your assistance
and that of the Army Council in putting an end to this injurious practice.
As for his alleged “interference” in strategy, Lloyd George noted:
It ought to be decided whether I have the same right—although I am War
Secretary—to express an independent view on the war in the discussions
which take place as any other member of the War Council—or whether, as
long as I am War Secretary, I must choose between the position of a dummy
or a pure advocate of all opinions expressed by my military advisers…. You
must not ask me to play the part of a mere dummy. I am not in the least
suited for the part.
71
98 WIZARD IN THE WAR OFFICE
The Army Council did go on record opposing “unauthorized communications
from official sources to the Press.”
72
But this was an empty victory for Lloyd
George. In his battle with Robertson, Lloyd George stood almost alone. Robertson
was confident of the backing of the king, much of Fleet Street, and prominent
Unionists and Liberals. If necessary, he was even prepared to hand in his
resignation. Lloyd George consequently was forced to lay low for the moment,
telling Asquith that he was not conspiring with Sir John French, Churchill, and
Smith and swearing “that he had implicit confidence in both Haig and Robertson
and if either of them were to go he knew no one who could fill their places.”
73
Asquith, who saw merit in Lloyd George’s criticism of the army’s employment
of its artillery, rather enjoyed the whole episode for it put Lloyd George on the
defensive for a change.
74
Avoiding an open confrontation with the C.I.G.S., Lloyd George maneuvered
in other ways during the following days to help Rumania.
75
The French gave him
valuable assistance, with Joffre telling London on October 10 that the Eastern
Army, if reinforced with four divisions, two British and two Italian, might succeed
in driving Bulgaria from the war with the assistance of the Russians in Dobrudja.
When the War Committee discussed Joffre’s proposal, Robertson continued to
argue that nothing useful could be done in the Balkans. Rumania, he insisted, was
not in grave danger; if she “made her dispositions properly she ought to be all
right. She was different from Serbia.” Lloyd George was generally subdued,
prepared to let Joffre’s request do his talking for him. In the end, the War
Committee, in an attempt to mollify the French and give the appearance of helping
Rumania, agreed to send an additional division to Salonika. But to the dismay of
Lloyd George, the ministers made it clear that this division could only be employed
to fulfill the original role of the Eastern Army:keeping Bulgarian troops tied down
in Macedonia.
The Welshman’s every move was being carefully observed during this period
by Robertson. Robertson feared that Lloyd George, lacking support at home, might
attempt to undermine the general staff by working with the French, especially
Albert Thomas. On October 11, Robertson reported to the king that Paul Mantoux,
the French history professor who served as an interpreter for Thomas at meetings
with Lloyd George, had left London for Paris. Since Mantoux was suspected by
the War Office of being Lloyd George’s secret link with the French government,
this probably meant that Paris would soon demand an Anglo-French conference
on the Balkans.
77
Sure enough, an Anglo-French conference was arranged for Boulogne on
October 20. When the War Committee discussed the conference, Lloyd George
suggested that the British minister of munitions, Montagu, should attend, although
munitions was not on the agenda. This was an obvious ploy to assure the attendance
of Thomas, the French minister of munitions, an avid Balkanite. Later, when Lloyd
George met Thomas at Boulogne, he remarked with tongue in cheek, “Hullo,
Thomas, fancy seeing you here!”
78
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 99
At the Boulogne conference, Lloyd George broke ranks with the British
delegation, siding with the French, who wanted to strengthen the Eastern Army.
Put in an awkward position by the French, who promised to provide their fair share
of troops, the British reluctantly agreed to consider the French proposal that Britain
provide yet another division. But the British government remained as adamant as
ever about extending the original role of the Eastern Army.
79
Lloyd George, angered that a decision had once again been put off, was given
a lift on October 23 by a visit from Thomas, who had been sent to London by
Briand to lobby for a major effort in the Balkans. “‘Full of beans’” Lloyd George
went off to the War Committee the next day “in a most Machiavellian state of
mind.”
80
The ministers sat uncomfortably in their chairs. Another Balkan disaster seemed
imminent. Rumania, like Serbia before her, might soon be under the Teutonic heel,
an event that might have serious political repercussions on the home front.
Robertson, however, continued to argue that it was too late to do anything if
Rumania collapsed before the spring of 1917.
Lloyd George adroitly exploited the situation. He proclaimed that “the only
answer to give the French was that it was too late. If we sent 2 divisions
away from the Somme, it would be the old story of Loos, if there was a
failure on the Somme. They would say that if we had only had those 2
divisions, all would have been well. He did not feel disposed to send them
two divisions. He thought Roumania would probably make peace before
they got there. The Germans would thoroughly frighten the Roumanians by
their proximity to Bucharest, they would say that if they would take their
oil and their corn, but would pay for it….
The Welshman’s gloomy prognostication elicited exactly the response he had
expected. Bonar Law and others took exception to his statement. If troops were
sent, it might encourage the Rumanians and Russians to fight on. With the political,
rather than the military aspects of the situation being stressed, Robertson was put
on the defensive. The politicians were his equal in arguing the political effects of
a military operation. In the end, the War Committee, over Wully’s objections,
decided to send an additional division from the western front to the Balkans.
81
Although Lloyd George clearly relished this triumph over the general staff, he
saw no reason to rejoice. As early as June, he had urged the War Committee to
improve the offensive potential of the Eastern Army. But the general staff’s view
had prevailed. Now, once again the British were reacting too late to German
initiative in southeastern Europe. Robertson had discounted the German threat to
Rumania and argued that the Eastern Army was too weak and disorganized to
launch a successful offensive against the Bulgarians. On both counts he was
wrong. Not only was Rumania about to be overrun, but the Eastern Army (before
most of the reinforcements arrived) captured Monastir in mid-November. Denied
100 WIZARD IN THE WAR OFFICE
reinforcements by the vacillations of the Allies, Sarrail, however, was unable to
exploit his victory.
82
Lloyd George had reached the breaking point by the end of October. Robertson
had dictated British military policy throughout 1916, and Lloyd George believed
that his strategy had brought Britain closer to defeat than victory. The Germans
were in the ascendancy in southeastern Europe and he viewed the Somme
offensive as “a bloody and disastrous failure.”
83
His frustration over his
emasculated and feeble position in the War Office was best summed up by the
bitter comment he made to Aitken: “I am the butcher’s boy who leads in the
animals to be slaughtered—when I have delivered the men my task in the war is
over.”
84
In the next few weeks Lloyd George resorted to every ploy in his considerable
bag of tricks to overthrow the generals and increase his influence over the direction
of the war. Initially he attempted to use his position as secretary of state for war
in the councils of the Allies to mobilize the civilians against a repetition of the
generals’ 1916 strategy.
NOTES
1. Hankey Diary, June 6, 1916, 1/1.
2. Ibid., June 10, 1916, 1/1.
3. Entry of January 31, 1916, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 91.
4. Entry of June 6–8, 1916, Diaries of C.P.Scott, pp. 216–17.
5. Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916, pp. 207–8.
6. Esher to Robertson, June 21, 1916, Esher MSS, 2/16.
7. Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916, pp. 208–9.
8. Entry of June 13–17, 1916, Diaries of C.P.Scott, p. 218.
9. Entry of March 11, 1916, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 102.
10. Entry of June 15, 1916, Lord Riddell’s War Diary, pp. 190–91.
11. Memorandum by Stamfordham, June 17, 1916, and Stamfordham to George V, June
17, 1916, RA GV K951/16–17.
12. Morning Post, June 7 and 13, 1916.
13. Daily Chronicle, June 17, 1916.
14. Memorandum by Stamfordham, June 17, 1916, RA GV K951/16.
15. See Lee to Lloyd George, June 18, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, D/l/1/21.
16. Memorandum by Lloyd George, June 17, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, D/18/2/19.
17. Lloyd George to Asquith, June 17, 1916, Asquith MSS, 30.
18. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:460.
19. Lee to Lloyd George, June 18, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, D/l/1/21.
20. Montagu to Asquith, June 20, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, D/17/16/5.
21. Hankey Diary, June 24, 1916, 1/1.
22. Robertson to Lloyd George, June 24, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, D/18/8/18.
23. Lloyd George to Robertson, June 26, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/19/3.
24. Entry of July 26, 1916, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 109.
25. War Committee, February 29, 1916, CAB 42/9/7.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 101
26. Ibid., July 6, 1916, CAB 42/16/1.
27. Ibid., July 28, 1916, CAB 42/16/8.
28. Robertson to Haig, July 7, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/22/51.
29. War Committee, July 11, 1916, CAB 42/16/5.
30. Robertson to Haig, July 29, 1916, Haig MSS, no. 107. Haig, incidentally, was greatly
provoked by this letter, noting: “Not exactly the letter of a C.I.G.S.!… He ought to
take responsibility also!”
31. Memorandum by Churchill, August 1, 1916, CAB 37/153/3.
32. Hankey Diary, August 1, 1916, 1/1.
33. Robertson to Haig, August 1, 1916, Robertson MSS, 1/22/62.
34. War Committee, August 5, 1916, CAB 42/17/3.
35. Ibid.
36. Esher to Lloyd George, August 5, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, E/2/ll/l. The French
protested that Haig was dragging his feet, but Lloyd George told Robertson that the
British commander in chief was “playing absolutely the right game.” See Robertson
to Haig, August 29, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/22/72.
37. This, incidentally, is what Churchill had warned against in his August 1
memorandum.
38. H.C.Deb., 5th series, vol. 85 (August 22, 1916).
39. Lloyd George to D.M.O., September 4, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, E/1/5/6.
40. Robertson to Haig, September 7, 1916, Haig MSS, no. 108; also see Robertson,
Soldiers and Statesmen, 2:127, and Repington, First World War, 1914–1918, 1:323.
41. Memorandum by Robertson, September 9, 1916, CAB 42/19/6.
42. War Committee, September 12, 1916, CAB 42/19/6.
43. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, 2:567, and Captain G.C.Wynne, //
Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (1940), p. 121.
44. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1:323.
45. Haig to Lady Haig, September 13, 1916, Haig MSS, no. 144.
46. Sassoon to Northcliffe, September 14, 1916, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8.
47. For Lloyd George’s version of this interview, see memorandum by Stamfordham,
October 12, 1916, RA GV Q1200/6.
48. Haig Diary, September 17, 1916, no. 107.
49. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, 2:566.
50. Sassoon to Northcliffe, September 14, 1916, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8.
51. Northcliffe to Sassoon, September, 1916, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8.
52. Morning Post, September 28, 1916.
53. Lloyd George to the editor, Morning Post, September 29, 1916.
54. Robertson to Haig, October 9, 1916, Robertson MSS, 1/22/80.
55. See Foch’s comments to Wilson about French’s conversation with him in Wilson
Diary, October 17, 1916.
56. Robertson to Haig, September 25, and Haig to Robertson, September 28, 1916,
Robertson MSS, I/22/74 and 76. Haig, who distrusted newsmen as much as
politicians, opposed any personal attack on Lloyd George in the press. On the other
hand, he was beginning to realize the importance of having the press on his side in
the “Westerner”-“Easterner” debate. See Sassoon to Northcliffe, September 29 and
October 6, 1916, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8, and Rawlinson Diary, October 15, 1916,
1/7.
57. Esher to Haig, September 25, 1916, Esher MSS, 2/17.
102 WIZARD IN THE WAR OFFICE
58. War Committee, September 1, 1916, CAB 42/19/1.
59. Ibid., September 18, 1916, CAB 42/20/3. For the most complete discussion of the
Rabegh question, see V.H.Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914–
1918 (1971), pp. 87–95.
60. War Committee, September 1, 1916, CAB 42/19/1.
61. Ibid., September 18, 1916, CAB 42/20/3.
62. Lloyd George to Asquith, September 26, 1916, and Robertson to Lloyd George,
September 27, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, E/2/23/5 and E/1/5/2.
63. Cruttwell, History of the Great War, p. 293.
64. War Committee, October 3, 1916, CAB 42/21/1.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., October 9, 1916, CAB 42/21/3.
67. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 2:128.
68. Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916, p. 323, and Northcliffe to
Sassoon, October 18, 1916, Northcliffe MSS, vol. 8.
69. Gwynne to Lloyd George, October 11, 1916, Lloyd George MSS, E/2/14/1, and
Robertson to Lloyd George, October 11, 1916, Robertson MSS, I/19/7. Gwynne also
wrote Asquith imploring him to put Lloyd George in his place. Gwynne to Asquith,
October 11, 1916, Gwynne MSS, 14.
70. Robertson to Northcliffe, October 11, 1916, quoted in Reginald Pound and Geoffrey
Harmsworth, Northcliffe (1959), p. 508, and Gwynne to Rawlinson, October 17,
1916, Rawlinson MSS, 1/8.
71. Lloyd George to Robertson, October 11, 1916, Robertson, 1/19/6.
72. See Army Council (190), October 13, 1916, W.O. 163/21.
73. Memorandum by Stamfordham, October 12, 1916, RA GV Q1200/6.
74. Hankey Diary, October 12, 1916, 1/1.
75. It should be noted that Haig once again played the role of peacemaker, telling a
dubious Robertson that Lloyd George, who could do “a great deal of good,” should
be “humoured.” Esher Diary, October 26, 1916, 2/17.
76. War Committee, October 12, 1916, CAB 42/21/6.
77. Robertson to Wigram, October 11, 1916, RA GV Q1200/4, and Hankey Diary,
October 16, 1916, 1/1.
78. War Committee, October 18, 1916, CAB 42/22/2, and Hankey Diary, October 19–
20, 1916, 1/1.
79. Allied Conference, October 20, 1916, CAB 28/1 /I.C.-11, and Hankey Diary,
October 19– 20, 1916, 1/1.
80. Entry of October 24, 1916, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 119.
81. Ibid., and War Committee, October 24, 1916, CAB 42/22/5.
82. Tanenbaum, General Maurice Sarrail, pp. 127–28.
83. Hankey Diary, November 1, 1916, 1/1.
84. Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916, p. 320.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 103
6
Lloyd George Attempts to Overthrow the
Generals
As the third year of campaigning approached an end, the strain on the nation was
great. Whiskey was weaker and dress duller. Houses were in need of paint, fences
in need of repair, and roads in need of surfacing. Wounded soldiers in their
distinctive blue jackets abounded and telegrams informing parents and wives of
the death of loved ones fell like leaves as the Somme offensive continued into the
mud and snow of November. Death played no favorites. Asquith lost two nephews
and his oldest son, Raymond; Hankey, his brother Donald. Lloyd George, who
had two sons in khaki, was luckier. Undersea assault by the German submarine
was taking a terrible toll on shipping. Walter Runciman, the president of the Board
of Trade, warned the government that “my expert advisers believed that I am far
too sanguine in advising the War Committee that the complete breakdown in
shipping will come in June, 1917; they are convinced that it will come much sooner
than June."
1
Britain’s deteriorating financial situation was another matter of grave
concern.
Robertson’s blunt and sober assessment of the progress of the war added to the
penetrating gloom. Germany, he admitted, despite the extensive Allied attacks in
1916, was “fighting with undiminished vigour.”
2
This statement was a tacit
admission by the general staff that it had underestimated the staying power and
resources of Germany. Robertson, in fact, told Lloyd George that Britain would
“be well advised not to expect the end at any rate before the Summer of 1918.
How long it may go on afterwards I cannot even guess.”
3
Robertson’s remarkably
accurate forecast was a crushing disappointment to the civilians. To be sure,
Robertson had never promised that the Somme offensive would defeat Germany.
Nor had he underestimated British casualties.
4
But the ministers expected more—
whether it had been promised or not—from the high command’s “Western”
strategy. The major achievement of the offensive, which had gone on long after
Verdun had been relieved, was the terrible punishment inflicted upon the German
army. But in killing Germans, was the British army itself being bled to death?
Historians still argue over British casualties, a vital question in any assessment
of Lloyd George’s opposition to the high command’s strategy. British as opposed
to German losses during the Somme and Passchendaele offensives have attracted
the most attention. The student has a startling disparity of figures from which to
choose for the official record provides two vastly different sets of figures. In 1922,
the War Office published its Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire
during the Great War, which asserted that British losses in the West from 1915
to 1918 were approximately 3 to 2 the corresponding German losses. Only in 1918,
when the Germans launched their great attacks against the British, were German
losses greater than British losses.
5
As the conflict between Lloyd George and the generals continued after the war
in the publishing houses, German casualties were drastically revised upward and
British casualties downward in the British official history by its compiler,
Brigadier-General J.E.Edmonds, who argued that the Germans distorted their
casualty figures by not including lightly wounded. But it has been convincingly
shown that Edmonds’s calculations of German casualties bear little, if any,
relationship to his evidence.
6
Furthermore, as Liddell Hart has pointed out: “An
examination of the figures of dead and wounded throughout the war shows that
in the German casualty lists the average ratio was 1 to 2.35 and the British lists 1
to 2.27. That difference in itself shows that the German figures did not exclude
the lightly wounded, and thus shatters Edmonds’s absurd contention that 33
percent should be added to the German casualty figures for a fair comparison.”
7
That Edmonds was more interested in protecting Haig’s reputation through
dubious accountancy than in revealing the historical truth is revealed by statements
he made to Liddell Hart between the wars.
8
Edmonds freely admitted that he held
Haig’s tactics in contempt, once remarking, “I have to write of Haig with my
tongue in my cheek. One can’t tell the truth. He was really above the average—
or rather below the average—in stupidity. He could not grasp things at
conferences, particularly anything technical.”
9
On another occasion he said, “H.
had no comprehension of light railways, concrete, or other siege-war matters. He
‘shoved the thing along’ merely.”
10
In sum, “trade-unionism,” as Edmonds himself
admitted, was his great weakness as a historian.
11
As the daily parade of ambulances from Charing Cross carrying the wounded
from the western front continued, Lloyd George thought that he detected a growing
disenchantment with the generals among his colleagues. This, along with his
genuine fear that Britain would lose the war unless the civilians asserted
themselves over the military, emboldened him. To pressure Asquith, he began
talking once again of resignation and of taking his case to the people. He told
Hankey on November 1 that he, Albert Thomas, Signor Bissolati, the Italian
Socialist leader, and others “would all resign simultaneously & tell their respective
fellow countrymen that the war was being run on wrong lines, & that they had
better make peace rather than repeat the experiences of 1916.”
12
As always resignation was viewed as a last resort. Before taking this drastic
step, Lloyd George hoped to seize the initiative from the generals with a twofold
plan. First, he revived his suggestion to send Robertson to Russia to give him a
broader outlook. Second, aware that the Allied generals planned to meet in mid-
November to plot future strategy,
13
he hoped to arrange a meeting of the Allied
ministers to discuss strategy before the generals presented their governments with
their usual fait accompli.
LLOYD GEORGE AND THE GENERALS 105
On November 3, he launched his campaign to overthrow the generals at a War
Committee meeting which, at Hankey’s suggestion, did not include “that old
dragon Robertson.”
14
Free from Wully’s fierce scowl, Lloyd George dominated
the proceedings as never before. He first read a telegram from the Rumanian
statesman Take Jonescu, who implored the British to save his beleaguered state.
The secretary of state for war then turned to a minute which he had requested from
Robertson on the duration of the war. Robertson’s forecast that the war would last
at least until 1918, Lloyd George said, was “one of the most serious documents
on the war that he had read.” He went on to say:
We were not getting on with the war. We were now at the end of the third
campaign of the war. Yet the enemy had recovered the initiative; he had in
his occupation more territory than ever before; and he still had some four
millions of reserves. At no point had the Allies achieved a definite, clear
success. Continuing, Mr. Lloyd George said that the offensive on the Somme
had three objects in view:—
(1.) To relieve Verdun. In this it had succeeded.
(2.) To break through the German line or capture some important strategic
position. In this respect it had failed.
(3.) To detach troops from the East so as to enable the Russian offensive to
succeed, or to protect Roumania. In this respect also it had failed.
How then, Mr. Lloyd George asked, is the war to be brought to an end?
What, he asked, is the plan of the Entente Powers? To be successful in the
plan pursued up to the present time it is essential that the anvil should be
more damaged than the hammer…the enemy was more careful of his men
than we were. The enemy, he pointed out, also had the advantage of being
able to give ground, and thus to avoid losses.
15
… Mr. Lloyd George then
referred to certain other considerations [shipping, food, finances], in regard
to which the position of the Allies is difficult…. There was also, he pointed
out, the possibility that it might become difficult to keep the Entente Powers
together. Further it was essential to keep up the spirit of people at home,
and this might not be easy where there were no definite victories. The people
of this country firmly believed that the Somme offensive means breaking
through the German lines, and there would be great disappointment when
they discovered that this was not likely to happen.
Lloyd George next reminded the ministers that the public would hold the
politicians responsible—not the generals. It was time for the civilian leaders to
meet and “take stock of the situation.” The “first object of the Conference should
be to insist that West should confer with East.” To achieve this goal, a military
conference should be held in Russia, “which should be attended by the principal
106 LLOYD GEORGE ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW THE GENERALS