Финансово-экономические дисциплины
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Perkins John. Confessions of an Economic Hitman
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004. 277 pages.

With a presidential election around the coer, questions of America’s military buildup, environmental impact, and foreign policy are on everyone’s mind. Former Economic Hit Man John Perkins goes behind the scenes of the current geopolitical crisis and offers bold solutions to our most pressing problems. Drawing on interviews with other EHMs, jackals, CIA operatives, reporters, businessmen, and activists, Perkins reveals the secret history of events that have created the current American Empire, including: How the defeats in Vietnam and Iraq have benefited big business; The role of Israel as Fortress America in the Middle East; Tragic repercussions of the IMF’s Asian Economic Collapse; The current Latin American revolution and its lessons for democracy; U.S. blunders in Tibet, Congo, Lebanon, and Venezuela. From the U.S. military in Iraq to infrastructure development in Indonesia, from Peace Corps volunteers in Africa to jackals in Venezuela, Perkins exposes a conspiracy of corruption that has fueled instability and anti-Americanism around the globe, with consequences reflected in our daily headlines. Having raised the alarm, Perkins passionately addresses how Americans can work to create a more peaceful and stable world for future generations.
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Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Dec. , 2001), pp. 1369-1401 We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. Th...

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35 P We use a unique data set detailing the nancial activities of a drug-selling street gang to analyze gang economics. On average, earnings in the gang are somewhat above the legitimate labor market alternative. The enormous risks of drug selling, however, more than offset this small wage premium. Compensation within the gang is highly skewed, and the prospect of future riches, not current wages, is the primary economic motivation. The gang enga...

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Cambridge University Press, 1990. - 159 p. Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction....

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2008 Abstract: We use a new dataset from Burundi to analyze the role of local institutions as determinants of income, distinguishing between three distinct dimensions of the institutional framework: (i) property rights security, (ii) local political leadership and (iii) social capital. Using measures of conflict intensity during the civil war as instruments for local institutional quality, we demonstrate that property rights security is the most...

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Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XLII (March 2004) pp. 72–115 Most economists accept that, in the long run, open economies fare better in aggregate than do closed ones, and that relatively open policies contribute significantly to development. Many commentators fear, however, that in the shorter run, one of the steps towards openness—trade liberalization— harms poorer actors in the economy, and that, even in the longer run, successful open...