Benson М. The Philosophy of Leibniz
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250 The
Philosophy
of
Leibniz
expressions
may be
synonymous,
the
metaphysics
has had to be
refined.
So it
turns
out
that
different
sentences
of the
same language
may
express
the
same
proposition
and
different
propositions
may be
made true
by the
same
fact,
with
the
corresponding arrangements, mutatis mutandis,
for
predicates, attri-
butes,
and
accidents. What
is
worse,
the
different
expressions
need
not
even
have
the
same structure. This
is
important, because
it
appears that
the
only
practical
way to
determine
the
structure
of a
proposition, attribute,
or
other
concept
is to
read
it off
somehow
from
that
of a
corresponding linguistic
expression.
In
earlier chapters
we
have seen
how
this problem stands
in the way of
deciding
exactly
what Leibniz means
by
several
of his
most important prin-
ciples
and
doctrines. Thus,
the
Identity
of
Indiscernibles,
interpreted
as
asserting
that
if A and B
fall
under
the
same concept (that
is, are
indis-
cernible
in
principle), then
A is
identical with
B,
becomes completely trivial
if
every predicate expresses
a
concept.
For if A is
different
from
B,
A
will
fall
under
the
concept expressed
by
"different
from
B',
while
B
will not.
As
Russell
and
others have
noticed,
10
to
give this principle
any
content,
we
must
somehow
limit
the
predicates that express concepts (properties).
The
salva
veritate
criterion
for
identity
is
heir
to the
same
difficulty,
which
in
this case
is
aggravated
by the
fact
that Leibniz himself sometimes applies
the
criterion
to
an
example
in
which
the
predicates
are of the
suspect
form.
What Leibniz says about relations, too,
is
incomprehensible
if
every pre-
dicate stands
for a
property.
The
claim that
the
relation
of
Loving between
Paris
and
Helen
"results"
from
the
properties
of
Paris
and
Helen
is
practically
empty
if
"loves
Helen"
expresses
one of the
properties
of
Paris. When Leibniz
asserts that every relation requires
"a
fundament
taken
from
the
predicament
of
Quality,"
11
he
plainly
does
not
intend
to
accept "loves
Helen"
as
expressing
such
a
fundament;
for he
adds
the
explicating clause
"or an
mtrinsic
acci-
dental
denomination." "Lover
of
Helen,"
of
course, would
be an
extrinsic
denomination
of
Paris.
It
is
therefore reasonably clear that,
for
Leibniz,
not
every predicate
can
express
a
concept (property),
or, at
least, that there must
be a
privileged class
of
predicates, which
he
never delineates satisfactorily, that represent
the
kinds
of
properties
or
qualities
he
considers fundamental.
Similar
problems arise about
the
structure
of a
proposition, since that
is
not
simply
determined
by the
structures
of the
corresponding sentences.
For
example,
does Leibniz mean
to say
that
'A
is
B'
and 'AB is an
entity'
are the
same proposition?
If so,
what
are the
subject
and
predicate
of
that proposi-
tion? What
is the
subject concept
of the
contingent truth "Every
man is
liable
to
sin"
(bear
in
mind that
the
subject concept
is
supposed
to
contain
the
pre-
dicate
concept)?
Is it
"Man"
or
"Every man,"
or are
there
in
this case
a
plurality
of
subject concepts, those
of
every existent man?
The
fact
is, I
fear,
that
in
general Leibniz's definiteness
of
intention
did
10 See Chap. 7,p.136
11 C9 (PM 134)
Concluding
Thoughts
251
not
reach
to
issues
of
this kind.
I am
confident that
he
could have coped with
them satisfactorily
if
they
had
been
brought
to his
attention,
but for
this
my
only support
is
faith
in his
genius.
Finally,
I
should like
to
include some thoughts about Leibniz's principle
of
Individuation, which,
as I
read him,
he
held
from
the
beginning
of his
career
to the
end.
The
principle
is
"that every individual
is
individuated
by its
whole being."
Of
course
the
meaning
of
this
is not
crystal clear,
but I
have said
that
in the
context
of
Leibniz's other doctrines
it
allows
of at
least
two
plau-
sible interpretations,
as
asserting
(1)
that
no two
individuals have every
property
in
common
or (2)
that every accident
of
every individual
is
unique
to
that individual.
Either
way, Leibniz clearly holds that
no
attribute
A of any
individual
X
is
so
slight
or
insignificant
that there could
not be
another individual that
resembled
X in
every respect
but
A.
This does
not
imply
that there could
be
such another individual
in the
same possible world with
the
first.
The
features
of
Adam that determine
him to be the
first
man may be
only
a
part
of his
total
makeup; hence, although there could
be
another
person
who
resembled
Adam
in all
those respects, that person could
not
exist
in the
same world with
Adam.
But it
does imply that there could
be
another such individual,
not the
same one,
in
some possible world.
Here,
of
course,
it
must
be
assumed that
all the
features
or
properties
under consideration
are
logically independent
of one
another. Perhaps that
was
what Leibniz
was
getting
at
when
he
made
the
complete concept
of an
individual
consist
of a
kernel
of
mutually independent "simple" properties,
from
which
all of the
other properties would
follow.
If we do not
make
the
assumption mentioned,
we
shall have Leibniz holding that some possible
individual
could resemble Adam
in
being rational
and in
being
an
animal
without resembling
him in
being
a
rational animal.
As we
have seen earlier,
however, Leibniz gives
us no
examples
of
simple properties,
let
alone
a
general criterion
for
deciding whether
a
given predicate stands
for a
property
of
that type.
Leibniz's principle
is
indeed
a
principle
of
Individuation,
for to
indi-
viduate something
is to
distinguish
it
from
everything else, actual
or
possible,
or to
describe
it by a
description that
not
only
is
not,
but
cannot
be
satisfied
by
anything else. Now, consider some simple property
P of,
say, Julius
Caesar.
The
question arises: Could Caesar have
failed
to
have
the
property
PI
Or, in
terms
of
possible worlds:
Is
there
a
possible world
of
which'Caesar
exists
but is not
P'
is
true?
An
affirmative
answer
to
this
is
unacceptable,
Leibniz would hold, because
it
would involve
our
identifying
as
Caesar
a
pos-
sible person whose properties
differ
from
Caesar's
as
much
as or
more than
do
those
of a
possible person whom
the
Individuation principle distinguishes
from
him.
To
this argument
an
opponent might respond,
I
suppose, that
it
only shows that Leibniz's superessentialist view
is
already contained
in his
Individuation
principle—and
hence,
so
much
the
worse
for the
latter.
252
The
Philosophy
of
Leibniz
Let us
therefore look again
at his
superessentialism
in its own
right. Could
Caesar have failed
to
cross
the
Rubicon?
Or, to
take
the
strongest case: Could
there have
been
an
individual
who
failed
to
cross
the
Rubicon,
but who was
just
like Caesar
in all
respects
not
implying
or
implied
by
that
difference?
(We
leave open,
for the
moment,
the
question whether such
an
individual would
be
Caesar.) Leibniz's answer
to
this would certainly have
been
affirmative,
and I see no
reason
to
disagree.
So let us
suppose that
in
another possible
world
there
is a
concept
of an
individual
who is
just like Caesar except
for
what
is
involved
in the
cited difference. Now,
is
this individual Caesar?
We are
urged
not to
think
of
this
as a big
problem,
and not to
treat
it as
though
we
were looking
at a
distant world through
a
telescope, trying
to
make
out
whether
a
certain indistinctly perceived individual
in it is
really
our old
friend
Julius Caesar. Instead,
we are to
stipulate that
it is he.
'"Possible
worlds'
are
stipulated,
not
discovered
by
powerful
telescopes.
There
is no
reason
why we
cannot stipulate that,
in
talking about what would have
happened
to
Nixon
in a
certain counterfactual situation,
we are
talking about
what would have
happened
to
him."
n
But
hold
on for a
moment.
If
stipulating
a
possible world requires that
the
stipulated world
be
possible,
in
other words, that
the
counterfactual condi-
tions involved
be
satisfiable,
it may be
harder
to do
this stipulating than
it
looks.
We are
interested
in
what would have happened
if
Caesar
had not
crossed
the
Rubicon,
so we
stipulate
a
possible world
in
which that
is the
case.
But not
just that.
We
assume that
everything
else
in it is
pretty much
the
same
as
in
this world, except
for
such
facts
as are
inconsistent with
the
hypothesis
about Caesar's crossing.
In
particular,
I
suppose,
we
assume that
the
laws
of
biology
and of
physical science generally continue
to
hold.
These
kinds
of
assumptions alone,
as
Leibniz pointed out, threaten
to
give
us
quite
a
mess,
and
matters become
still
more complicated when
we
assume
in
addition that,
on the
whole,
the
same individuals exist
in the
posited world
as in
ours.
After all,
the
event called
"Caesar's
crossing
of the
Rubicon"
was the
result
of
myriad antecedent conditions
and
itself
led to a
limitless
ramification
of
consequences.
The
great preponderance
of
these
antecedents
and
consequences
are
completely beyond
our
ken,
of
course,
though
presumably knowable
in
principle.
If we did
know
the
whole story,
however,
we
might even
find
that under
the
given conditions
it was
impos-
sible
that Caesar
not
cross
the
Rubicon; perhaps
for the
crossing
not to
happen there would have
had to
occur certain antecedent circumstances that
in
turn
would
imply,
by the
relevant physical
and
biological
laws,
that
it
would
have
to
happen, after all.
In
short, there
is no
guarantee whatever that
our
suppositions
or
"stipu-
lations"
are
even consistent.
An
expressed counterfactual hypothesis will
usually
seem
innocent
enough
by
itself,
but
when
the
tacit ceteris paribus
assumption
is
added,
the
matter becomes very complicated.
12 Kripke (1972).267
Concluding
Thoughts
253
It
is
interesting also
to
consider cases
in
which
the
counterfactual hypo-
thesis
about
an
individual involves
a
relatively
drastic departure
from
that
individual's
actual state. What
if
Julius Caesar
had had all the
most prominent
attributes
of
Moses?
If we
take these
one at a
time,
the
hypothesis again
may
appear harmless enough.
We
might think that Caesar could have
had a
beard,
could have spoken Hebrew,
and in
general could have resembled Moses
in
each
of
many other such
superficial
respects.
But
when enough
of the
attri-
butes
are
taken together,
the
balance tilts over
to the
other side,
and we are
inclined
to say
that
any
person
with
all
those attributes would
be
Moses,
not
Caesar-in-Moses'-clothing.
Thus,
the
common intuition
is
that
there
is
some limit, however indefinite,
to how
different
an
individual
could
be and
still
be the
same
individual.
Small
changes
are
conceivable; very large ones
are
not. Caesar could have
been
a
bit
taller,
but he
could
not
have been
an
inkstand.
In
chapter
8 I
have tried
to
construct
an
argument
from
Leibnizian prin-
ciples
to the
Leibnizian conclusion that
in
this case
the
common intuition
is
incoherent.
13
From
his
view that
there
is a
"continuum
of
forms" between
anything
and
anything
else—for
example, between Caesar
and an
inkstand-
it
would seem
to
follow
that
if
tiny changes
are
allowed
as
preserving cross-
world
identity,
we
have
the
unacceptable conclusion that anything could have
been
anything. Therefore,
the
notion that
the
attributes
of an
individual
can
be
plausibly divided into
two
nonempty classes,
the
essential
and the
acci-
dental, must
be
given
up.
Either
all are
accidental
or all are
essential;
the
first
alternative
is
absurd;
ergo,
no
individual could have lacked
any
attribute that
he
does
in
fact
have.
I
believe that Leibniz would have diagnosed
his
opponents' disagreement
with this
as
resulting
from
a
failure
to
think through
the
consequences
of our
most
fundamental
assumptions about what
it is to be an
individual.
And the
least that
can be
said
for his own
point
of
view,
I
think,
is
that
it may
have
a
salutary
effect
in
warning
us
against being
too
casual
in
assuming that this
or
that feature
of our
world could
be
changed while everything else
is
left
the
same.
One
might even imagine that
an
increasing awareness
of the
dangers
of
such assumptions, rather than some
shift
in
economic status
or
some regret-
table
effect
of the
aging process,
is
what explains
why
people
tend
to
become
more
and
more conservative
as
they grow older.
At the
outset
of
this book
I
asked
the
reader's
indulgence because, since
in
Leibniz's philosophy everything
is
connected with everything else, there
is
no
"natural" place
for the
expositor
to
begin. Alas,
for the
same reason,
there
is
also
no
natural
place
to
end.
13 Chap. e, sec.s
Bibliography
Leibniz's immense
Nachlass
of
manuscripts
and
letters
is
reasonably completely
cataloged
in
Bodemann's
two
volumes, listed
in
section
1
below, under
the
abbrevi-
ations
LBr and LH. I
have cited unpublished manuscripts
and
letters,
as is
customary,
by
reference
to
these catalogs.
A
bibliography
of
Leibniz's writings published before
1935
is E.
Ravier, Biblio-
graphic
des
oeuvres
de
Leibniz
(Paris:
Alcan,
1937);
corrections
and
additions
to
this
are
given
in P.
Schrecker,
"Une
bibliographic
de
Leibniz"
(Revue philosophique
de la
France
el
de
I'etranger
63
[1938]:
324-46).
The
huge secondary literature
on
Leibniz
is
covered,
up to
1980,
in
Albert
Heine-
kamp's
new
edition
of the
Leibniz. Bibliographie:
Die
Literatur
iiber
Leibniz (Frank-
furt:
Klostermann,
1984).
Also
very
helpful
to
scholars
is
Wilhelm
Totok's
Leibniz
Bibliographie, vol.
14 of his
Handbuch
der
Geschichte
der
Philosophic
(Frankfurt:
Klostermann,
1981,
297-374).
This work, organized
by
topic, lists publications
appearing
in the
years
1920-78.
Finally,
an
ongoing
and
complete bibliography
of all
publications concerning
Leibniz,
whether texts
or
secondary literature (including reviews), appears
at the end
of
each volume
of
Studia
Leibnitiana.
For all
these aids, students
of
Leibniz
owe a
huge debt
of
gratitude
to the
scholars
of
the
Leibniz
Archiv
of the
Niedersa'chsische
Landesbibliothek,
Hanover.
The
following
bibliography
lists
only items that
are
cited
in
this book
or
that have
influenced
my
view
of
matters discussed therein.
The
first
section comprises
the
works
cited
in the
notes
by
abbreviation,
in
alphabetical order
of the
abbreviations;
the
second section includes general literature.
1.
Texts,
Translations,
and
Other
Works Cited
by
Abbreviation
A
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Sdmtliche
Schriften
and
Briefe.
Heraus-
gegeben
von der
Deutschcn Akademie
der
Wissenschaften
zu
Berlin.
Darmstadt,
1923ff.,
Leipzig,
1938ff.,
Berlin,
1950ff.
Cited
by
series,
volume,
and
page.
Leibniz,
Gottfried Wilhelm.
New
Essays
on
Human Understanding,
Trans,
and
ed.
(with
notes)
P.
Remnant
and J.
Bennett. Cambridge, 1981. Because
254
y
Bibliography
255
the
pagination
of
this translation
is
identical
with
that
of the
Academy text
(A.6.6),
one
citation serves
for
both.
Al
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Trans.
H.
Alexander,
Manchester,
1956.
B&C
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Hauptschriften
zur
Grundlegung
der
Philo-
sophic,
Trans.
A.
Buchenau
and E.
Cassirer.
2
vols.
Leipzig,
1906.
Burk
Burkhardl, Hans.
Logik
and
Semiotik
in der
Philosophie
von
Leibniz,
Munich,
1980.
C
Couturat, Louis,
ed.
Opuscules
et
fragments
inedits
de
Leibniz: Extraits
des
manuscrits
de la
bibliotheque
royale
de
Hanovre,
Paris, 1903; Reprinted
Hildesheim,
1961.
CL
Couturat, Louis.
La
Logique
de
Leibniz,
Paris,
1901.
D
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Opera
omnia,
nunc
primum
collecta
....
Ed.
Ludovicus
Dutens.
6
vols. Geneva,
1768.
E
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Opera
philosophica quae extant.
Ed. J. E.
Erdmann, Berlin,
1840.
F
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Oeuvres
de
Leibniz.
Ed. A.
Foucher
de
Careil.
2ded.
7
vols. Paris,
1867
ff.
Fasz.
1
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Vorausedition
zur
Reihe
VI—Philosophische
Schriften—in
der
Ausgabe
der
Akademie
der
DDR.
Faszikel
1.
Minister,
1982.
Fasz.
2
Leibniz,
Gottfried
Wilhelm.
Vorausedition
zur
Reihe
VI—Philosophische
Schriflen—in
der
Ausgabe
der
Akademie
der
DDR. Faszikel
2.
Minister,
1983.
FC
Foucher
de
Careil,
A.,
ed.
Nouvelles lettres
et
opuscules inedits
de
Leibniz,
Paris,
1857; Reprinted Hildesheim, 1971.
G
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Die
philosophischen
Schriften.
Ed. C. I.
Gerhardt.
7
vols.
Berlin,
1857-90;
Reprinted Hildesheim,
1965.
GBr
Gerhardt,
C. 1.
Briefwechsel
zwischen
Leibniz
und
Christian
Wolff.
Halle,
1860; Reprinted Hildesheim, 1963.
GM
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Mathematische
Schriften.
Ed. C. I.
Gerhardt.
7
vols. Halle,
1849-63;
Reprinted Hildesheim,
1971.
Grua
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
Textes
inedits
d'apres
de la
bibliotheque
provinciale
de
Hanovre.
Ed. G.
Grua.
2
vols. Paris, 1948.
H
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Theodicy. Trans.
E. M.
Huggard, London,
1952.
Jag
Leibnitiana:
Llementa
philosophiae arcanae
de
sumtna
rerum.
Ed. I.
Jagodinski,
Kazan,
1913.
Klopp
Die
Werke
von
Leibniz,
erste
Reihe:
Historisch-politische
und
staats-
wissenschaftliche
Schriften.
Ed. O.
Klopp.
11
vols. Hanover,
1864-84.
L
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical
Papers
and
Letters. Trans.
L.
Loemker.
2d ed.
Dordrecht,
1969.
LBr
Bodemann,
E. Der
Briefwechsel
des
Gottfried
Wilhelm
Leibniz.,
Hanover,
1889;
Reprinted Hildesheim, 1966.
LH
Bodemann,
E. Die
Leibniz-Handschriften
der
Koniglichen
offentlichen
Bibliothek
zu
Hannover, Hanover,
1895;
Reprinted Hildesheim,
1966.
ff
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