Encyclopedia of Russian History

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When NATO was established, the first secre-

tary general, Lord Ismay, allegedly quipped that its

mission in Europe was “to keep the Americans in,

the Russians out, and the Germans down.” During

the Cold War, the principal function of NATO was

to provide common defense against the Soviet bloc.

NATO also ensured that American and European

security remained interconnected, and provided a

formula for the reintegration of postwar Germany

into the Western security system. Finally, NATO

provided a platform for consultations on issues

outside the alliance, both formal and informal.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some ar-

gued that NATO had completed its mission and

ought to be dissolved. However, the alliance has en-

dured and undergone considerable transformation.

It assumed “out-of-area” responsibilities by inter-

vening in the Balkans, providing stabilization forces

in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), and intervening and pro-

viding stabilization forces there (KFOR) in Kosovo.

It also offered assistance to the United States dur-

ing the 2001 campaign in Afghanistan and con-

tributed to peacekeeping afterwards.

The new 1999 Strategic Concept, which out-

lines NATO’s broad goals and means, has made

conflict prevention and crisis management the fun-

damental security tasks of the alliance. Another

NATO task since 1990 has been to stabilize post-

communist central and eastern Europe. Through

the Partnership for Peace program (PfP), which al-

lows NATO to cooperate with nonmembers; the

Membership Action Plan (MAP), which assisted

applicants preparing for the 2002 round of en-

largement; and greater cooperation with Russia in

the new institutional setting of the NATO-Russia

Council, the alliance has contributed to the post-

communist transition. The landmark in this

process was the 1999 enlargement that brought

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the

alliance. Three years later, at a summit in Prague,

NATO invited an additional seven members to join

in 2004.

The future of NATO is unclear. Critics argue

that NATO has outlived its usefulness as a defense

organization and has become merely a political fo-

rum with residual military structures. They point

to the fact that in the fifty-plus years of NATO’s

history, the core Article 5 has been invoked only

once, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,

terrorist attack on the United States; yet U.S. mil-

itary operations against Islamic terrorists have not

been conducted as NATO operations. A contribut-

ing factor in the progressive downgrading of

NATO’s military value has been the widening ca-

pability gap between the United States and its Eu-

ropean allies. In addition, the allies have found it

difficult at times to reach consensus on the area of

operations, with the Americans arguing for a global

role, while the Europeans take a more traditional

regional view. Fissures within NATO surfaced pub-

licly during the 2003 war with Iraq, with France

and Germany openly opposing the U.S. position.

The American decision to rely on the “coalition of

the willing” raised questions about the long-term

viability of the alliance.

The proponents of NATO argue that it is too

early to proclaim its end as the premier Euro-At-

lantic security organization. They point out that

NATO has responded to change by undertaking

fundamental reforms, seeking to adjust its struc-

tures and its military capabilities. At the Prague

summit on November 21 and 22, 2002, the alliance

established the NATO Response Force (NRF) of

twenty thousand for deployment into crisis areas,

becoming fully operational in 2006. The nations at

the summit set goals for reorganizing their armed

forces in order to increase their mobility and allow

sustained operations outside their territory. The

next important step in reforming NATO was taken

at the defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels on

June 12 and 13, 2003: NATO approved a new mil-

itary command structure to reflect its new mis-

sions and its transition to smaller forces. The new

command structure envisions the creation of a new

Allied Command Operations, based at SHAPE in

Mons. SACLANT will cease to exist, replaced by the

Allied Command Transformation to oversee the re-

structuring of NATO’s military. The number of

commands will be reduced from twenty to eleven,

and their responsibilities redefined.

These structural changes, combined with the

development of “niche capabilities” by the member-

states, suggest that, given political consensus,

NATO may yet reinvent itself with a new division

of tasks and specializations in place. The long-term

viability of the alliance will also be affected by

whether the emerging defense capabilities of the Eu-

ropean Union complement or duplicate NATO’s.

Most important, the future of NATO will be de-

termined by the future state of transatlantic rela-

tions.

See also: COLD WAR; WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Goldgeier, James M. (1999). Not Whether But When: The

U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1999). The Long Entanglement:

NATO’s First Fifty Years. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Kay, Sean. (1998). NATO and the Future of European Se-

curity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Michta, Andrew A., ed. (1999). America’s New Allies:

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. Seat-

tle: University of Washington Press.

NATO Handbook. (2001). Brussels: NATO Office of In-

formation and Press.

North Atlantic Organization. Available from <http://

www.nato.int>.

Osgood, Robert E. (1962). NATO: The Entangling Alliance.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Szayna, Thomas S. (2001). NATO Enlargement, 2000–2015:

Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning

and Shaping. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

NDREW

A. M

ICHTA

NORTHERN CONVOYS

“Northern Convoys” is the widely used name of

one of the shortest and most dangerous routes of

transportation of lend-lease cargoes to the USSR by

its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition from 1941 to

1945. Running from Scottish and Icelandic ports to

Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, they extended for

2,000 miles (3,219 kilometers) and took ten to

twelve days to cross. Until the end of 1942, North-

ern Convoys that went to the USSR had “PO” in-

dex; those returning from the USSR, “OP”; the

subsequent Northern Convoys carried indices “JW”

and “RA.” The defense of cargo transports was car-

ried out by the Allied, mainly British, Navy. In

1941 the route was passed by seven convoys to the

USSR (from trial “P” or “Derwish” in August 1941

up to PO-6), and four convoys to Great Britain.

During the spring of 1942, in order to cut the

Allies’ northern sea route, the Nazi German head-

quarters sent large fleets and aircraft forces to oc-

cupied Norway. As a result, in July 1942, almost

the entire convoy PO-17 was defeated (twenty-

three of thirty-six transports were sunk). Thirteen

of forty cargo ships were lost in September 1942

in PO-18. In total, from 1941 to 1945, forty-one

Northern Convoys, which consisted of 839 trans-

ports, were sent to the northern Soviet ports, of

which 741 arrived safely. Sixty-one were lost, and

thirty-seven returned to their own ports. Thirty-

six Northern Convoys of 738 transports were sent

from Soviet ports; of these, 699 reached their ports

of destination, thirty were lost, and eight turned

back. In addition, thirteen transports were lost dur-

ing single passages and on berths in ports. While

covering Northern Convoy 22, Allied fighting

ships, including two cruisers and seven destroyers,

were sunk.

In total, four million tons of cargo were deliv-

ered to the Soviet northern ports of the USSR, in-

cluding 4,909 aircraft, 7,764 tanks, and 1,357

guns. Northern Convoys have added one more

heroic page to a history of World War II and fight-

ing cooperation of the USSR with the countries of

the anti-Hitler coalition.

See also: NORTHERN FLEET; WORLD WAR II

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ruegg, Bob, and Hague, Arnold. (1992). Convoys to Russia:

Allied Convoys and Naval Surface Operations in Arctic

Waters, 1941–1945. Kendal, UK: World Ship Society.

Woodman, R. (1994). The Arctic Convoys, 1941–1945.

London: John Murray.

IKHAIL

UPRUN

NORTHERN FLEET

The Northern Fleet is the largest of the four Russ-

ian naval fleets. It differs from the Baltic and Black

Sea Fleets in that it (like the Pacific Fleet) has

operated nuclear-powered vessels for more than

forty years. In fact, two-thirds of Russia’s nuclear-

powered vessels are assigned to the Northern Fleet

at the Kola Peninsula. The others are based at Pa-

cific Fleet bases near Vladivostok. The Northern

Fleet is organized into departments with separate

spheres of responsibility. Other duties are divided

among government committees and ministries.

While the navy is responsible for the nuclear sub-

marines and the three shipyards that service and

maintain them, the State Committee for the De-

fense Industry (Goskomoboronprom) maintains

the other shipyards. The Ministry for Atomic En-

ergy (Minatom) is responsible for the nuclear fuel

used in naval reactors, and the Ministry of Trans-

port is in charge of shipments of new and spent

nuclear fuel by railroad.

NORTHERN CONVOYS

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Before the Soviet collapse in 1991, nuclear sub-

marines from the Northern and Pacific Fleets reg-

ularly patrolled the east and west coasts of the

United States, the South China Sea, and outside the

Persian Gulf. During the early twenty-first cen-

tury, however, Russian nuclear submarines are

rarely seen in these waters. The number of nuclear-

powered submarines in operation in the Northern

Fleet decreased from 120 during the late 1980s to

less than forty in 2001. The Northern Fleet has six

naval bases and shipyards on the Kola Peninsula to

serve its nuclear vessels: Severomorsk, Gadzhievo,

Gremikha, Vidyaevo, Sayda Bay, and Zapadnaya

Litsa. Its main base and administrative center is

Severomorsk, a city with a population of 70,000

situated 25 kilometers (15.5 miles) north of Mur-

mansk on the eastern side of the Murmansk Fjord.

Three nuclear-powered Kirov-class battle cruisers

are based in Severomorsk: Admiral Ushakov, Admi-

ral Nakhimov, and Peter the Great. However, no nu-

clear submarines are permanently stationed there.

Safonovo, a rural town in the Severomorsk area,

is the repair center for nuclear submarines and sur-

face vessels, including the largest Northern Fleet

submarines, such as the Typhoon class.

The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula

became apparent to Russian military planners with

the rise of German naval power in the Baltic Sea

and the outbreak of World War I. Recognizing the

need for access to ice-free harbors in the north, Rus-

sia built a modern port in Alexandrovsk (today

called Polyarny) at the mouth of the Murmansk

Fjord in 1899. A naval force dedicated to the north-

ern region was established shortly after the out-

break of World War I. In 1917, a railroad line was

built to Murmansk, connecting the rest of Russia

to an ice-free port open year round. Not until Josef

Stalin’s visit to Polyarny during the summer of

1933 was the Soviet Fleet of the Northern Seas ac-

tually established, however. Renamed the Northern

Fleet in 1937, it consisted (before World War II)

of just eight destroyers, fifteen diesel-powered sub-

marines, patrol boats, minesweepers, and some

smaller vessels. During World War II, supplies from

the Western Allies were transported by convoy to

Murmansk and then taken by railroad to military

fronts in the south. A major naval buildup began

after World War II in an effort to catch up with

the United States. The first Soviet nuclear subma-

rine (the K-3 Leninsky Komsomol) was commis-

sioned to the Northern Fleet on July 1, 1958, just

four years after the commissioning of the first

American nuclear submarine, the Nautilus. During

the period from 1950 to 1970, the Northern Fleet

grew from the smallest to the largest and most im-

portant of the four Soviet fleets.

See also: BALTIC FLEET; BLACK SEA FLEET; PACIFIC FLEET

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burns, Thomas S. (1978). The Secret War for the Ocean

Depths: Soviet-American Rivalry for Mastery of the Seas.

New York: Rawson Associates.

Jordan, John. (1982). An Illustrated Guide to the Modern

Soviet Navy. New York: Arco.

Nilsen, Thomas; Kudrik, Igor; and Nikitin, Alexandr.

(1996). The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Ra-

dioactive Contamination. Oslo: Bellona Foundation.

Nitze, Paul H., and Sullivan, Leonard. (1979). Securing

the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Al-

liance Options: An Atlantic Council Policy Study. Boul-

der, CO: Westview Press.

OHANNA

RANVILLE

NORTHERN PEOPLES

Russia’s Northern Peoples (Malochislennye narody

severa, literally, “numerically small peoples of the

north”) constitute a distinct legal category of na-

tive peoples who live in the north, number less than

fifty thousand each, and pursue traditional ways

of life. During the early Soviet period, such a cat-

egory was created as the focus for a special set of

policies, informed by the state’s belief that, due to

the “backwardness” of these peoples, they needed

special protection and help to reach the stage of

communism. The number of peoples belonging to

this group varied over time, but at the end of the

Soviet period it included twenty-six peoples: Sami,

Khanty, Mansi, Nenets, Enets, Nganasan, Selkup,

Tofalar, Evenki, Even, Yukagir, Chukchi, Chuvans,

Eskimos, Aleut, Koryak, Itelmen, Dolgan, Ket,

Negidal, Nanai, Ulchi, Oroki, Orochi, Udege, and

Nivkhi. Together, these peoples numbered slightly

under 182,000 in 1989.

The Northern Peoples inhabit an immense

swath of Russia, from the Kola Peninsula to the

Bering Sea, the Chinese border, and Sakhalin Island.

They belong to numerous language groups, and

have distinctive cultures, traditions, and adapta-

tions to diverse ecosystems. At the outset of the

Soviet era, most pursued traditional activities that

included reindeer herding, hunting, fishing, and

marine mammal hunting. Most were nomadic and

NORTHERN PEOPLES

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

lived in small kin-based groups. Most were orga-

nized into clans, although these had been disrupted

by the twentieth century. During the tsarist period,

most had been subjugated, and were required to

pay a tribute of furs (yasak) to the state. Some mis-

sionary activity had occurred, but most groups re-

mained largely animistic.

The Soviets brought sweeping changes to the

Northern Peoples, introducing compulsory school-

ing (first in their own languages, but soon after-

ward in Russian) and health care; imposing

collective farms, confiscating reindeer and hunting

equipment; and repressing leaders, wealthier indi-

viduals, and shamans. The Soviets also settled as

much of the population as possible in newly cre-

ated villages. These policies radically disturbed the

local family structures and the transmission of

knowledge from elder to younger generations. Al-

cohol abuse and violent death became rampant, and

by the end of the Soviet period, life expectancy of

the Northern Peoples averaged a generation less

than the (already low) Russian level. At the same

time, the state nurtured a small indigenous intelli-

gentsia, including doctors, teachers, writers, artists,

and political leaders. Within these leaders the

state engendered the larger, composite identity of

“Northern Peoples,” laying the foundation of a

common, pan-native response, once the political

climate allowed for such.

The late Soviet policy of glasnost enabled the

Northern Peoples to publicly address their horrific

situation for the first time. A strong nativist move-

ment ensued, with the organization of the Russian

Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North

(RAIPON) in 1990. Native leaders lobbied for laws

that would protect native rights, with special fo-

cus on the issue of native lands, which had been

subject to extensive resource extraction and envi-

ronmental degradation. Key federal legislation out-

lining native rights and mechanisms for land claims

was finally adopted in 1999–2001. One outcome

of the legislation has been the increase in the num-

ber of peoples included in the designation; several

groups who were not considered distinct peoples

during the Soviet period, among them the Shors,

Teluets, and Kereks, have achieved recognition as

Northern Peoples since 1991. The number of na-

tive persons claiming membership in the overall

NORTHERN PEOPLES

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

A group of Dolgans stand together at their camp near the village of Syndassko, Russia, in 1993. © J

ACQUES

ANGEVIN

/CORBIS SYGMA

group has also increased, largely due to revitalized

pride in native identity. While political reforms

have encouraged native political development, eco-

nomic reforms, including reduced northern subsi-

dies, have severely challenged Northern Peoples’

livelihoods.

See also: EVENKI; CHUKCHI; DOLGANS; KHANTY; KORYAKS;

MANSI; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONAL-

ITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; NENETS; SAMI

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fondahl, Gail; Lazebnik, Olga; Poelzer, Greg; and Robbek,

Vassily. (2001). “Native ‘land claims,’ Russian style.”

The Canadian Geographer 45(4):545–561.

Pika, Aleksandr, ed. (1999). Neotraditionalism in the Russ-

ian North: Indigenous Peoples and the Legacy of Pere-

stroika. Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute

Press.

Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North

website. Available at <http://www.raipon.org/>.

Slezkine, Yuri (1994). Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small

Peoples of the North. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press.

Wessendorf, Kathrin, and Køhler, Thomas, trs. (2002).

Towards a New Millenium. Ten Years of the Indigenous

Movement in Russia. IWGIA Document No. 107.

Copenhagen: International Working Group on In-

digenous Affairs.

AIL

A. F

ONDAHL

NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH

Geographically driven relations between northern

Norway and the Russian Arctic coast predate the

Slavic and Scandinavian colonization of the north-

ern periphery of Europe starting in the twelfth cen-

tury. Norwegian Vikings referred to the White Sea

region as Bjarmeland, and had at least sporadic con-

tacts with the local inhabitants by 900

. Nor-

wegian trading expeditions to the northern Dvina

estuary took place regularly until the early thir-

teenth century, and there were at least occasional

journeys into the Russian interior. A 1276 law code

refers to Norwegian commercial expeditions via the

Baltic to Novgorod.

Interest in the northern fisheries attracted a

growing number of settlers to the Arctic coast in

the Middle Ages. Commercial and military interac-

tion in the area included raids that sometimes esca-

lated to open warfare. The Norwegian-Novgorodian

peace treaty of 1326 reaffirmed the status quo and

ensured free shipping and trade. No formal border

was demarcated and many regions were de jure

placed under joint administration in the fourteenth

century. Some Norwegian settlers may have lived

on the Kola Peninsula early on, and the Norwe-

gians claimed control over the peninsula for cen-

turies, notwithstanding its steady Russification.

The Russian word murmasky, referring to the

northern Kola coast, is derived from nordmann

(“Norwegian”).

The Norwegian fortress of Vardøhus near the

present-day border was built around 1300, whereas

the main economic center on the Russian side came

to be the Orthodox Solovki Island monastery in the

White Sea. The first Russian town in the region,

Kola (near the present-day Murmansk), was not

founded until 1583, but soon had a Norwegian

guesthouse. Perhaps during the fifteenth century,

but definitely by the 1550s, another Orthodox

monastery was founded in the ill-defined border

region of the Pechenga Valley. The monks regu-

larly traded with Vardøhus. Norwegian merchants,

often from the ports of Bergen (with historic mo-

nopoly rights over the northern waters) and Trond-

heim, regularly attended the Russian border market

of Kegor, as well as Kola. However, trade with the

Murman coast appears to have stagnated during

the seventeenth century and been limited to local

products. Merchants from Bergen and Trondheim

periodically also visited the Russian port of Ark-

hangelsk, especially to ship sporadic Russian grain

subsidies to Denmark-Norway. Conflicting territo-

rial claims made border disputes quite common

during the sixteenth century and the early seven-

teenth century, and the Norwegian castellan of

eastern Finnmark made symbolic visits to Kola to

demand tribute from the local population until

1813.

Regular commercial contacts between the

neighboring coastal regions, with Vardøhus as the

main center, were well established by the late sev-

enteenth century, driven primarily by Russians.

Russian flour, cloth, hides, and tallow became im-

portant products for the northern Norwegian

economy. By the 1760s, Russian vessels made an-

nual trips to the Finnmark and Troms coasts, and

Russian fishing in northern Norwegian waters was

common. This was countenanced with some limi-

tations by the Danish government because of its

good relations with Russia. Norwegians are known

to have settled in northern Russia starting in the

NORWAY, RELATIONS WITH

1067

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

eighteenth century. The interaction between Norwe-

gians and Russians produced a unique local pidgin

language known as russenorsk, “Russian Norwe-

gian.” The regime of open borders continued until

an 1826 treaty delineated the frontier and granted

two-thirds of the shared territory to Russia.

Trade in northern Norway was gradually lib-

eralized in 1789 as part of a plan to stimulate the

region’s economic development. New port towns

were built and direct Russian trade with Norwe-

gian fishermen was formally authorized. Most re-

maining restrictions were eliminated in 1839, and

regular steamship traffic between northern Russia

and Finnmark began during the 1870s. Up to 350

Russian ships visited northern Norway each year

during the course of the eighteenth century. At-

tempts to control Russian trade and fishing in Nor-

way became more serious during the period when

Norway was under Swedish rule. All foreign fish-

ing was formally banned in 1913.

Political relations became more tense during the

nineteenth century because of Russian concern about

perceived Norwegian expansionism in the Arctic. In

contrast, the Norwegian administration in the

United Kingdom of Sweden-Norway often found

itself moderating the growing Swedish Russopho-

bia. However, its pragmatism was repeatedly tem-

pered by fears that Russia might be eyeing some of

the ice-free harbors of Finnmark. The accelerating

Russian settlement on the Kola Peninsula and the

steady stream of immigrants to northern Norway

from Russian-controlled Finland heightened the

sense of alarm during the second half of the nine-

teenth century. The Norwegian popular mood be-

gan to favor a more nationalistic policy in the

north. Systematic Norwegianization was seen as a

way to effectively control the ethnically mixed ter-

ritory. Russia was perceived negatively because of

its authoritarianism even though it was the only

great power lending active support to Norwegian

independence in 1905, albeit clearly with a view to

weakening Sweden. Newly independent Norway

unsuccessfully sought to regain control of the

Russian borderlands at the Versailles Conference.

The October Revolution led to a freeze in Rus-

sian-Norwegian relations, with devastating conse-

quence to some northern Norweigian communities,

as well as a geographic separation when Finland

gained control of the Pechenga-Petsamo region. Al-

though the Finnish threat in some ways replaced

the weakened Bolshevik regime as a source of con-

cern, diplomatic relations between Norway and the

Soviet state were not established until 1924. The

Norwegian government actively sought to curb the

activities of leftist pro-Soviet organizations and

reinforced the garrisons in northern Norway. Dur-

ing World War II the Norwegian government-in-

exile was very worried about Soviet territorial

ambitions in northern Norway. Its fears seemed

confirmed when the Red Army temporarily occu-

pied eastern Finnmark in 1944. The Soviets also

claimed some of the Norwegian-controlled north-

ern Atlantic islands (Bear Isle, Spitsbergen).

Norwegian Russophobia and a sense of vul-

nerability after the German occupation led to a

strong cross-party consensus in favor of NATO

membership in 1949. Although it continued to dis-

trust the Soviets, the Oslo government adopted a

pragmatic stance, de-emphasizing the defense of

Finnmark and prohibiting the stationing of foreign

troops and nuclear weapons in the country.

Intergovernmental relations remained formal, and

most Norwegian-Russian interaction was localized

to the northern border regions. Perestroika and the

collapse of the Soviet Union did a great deal to re-

store the historically close ties between northern

Russia and Finnmark, and during the early twenty-

first century there are many lively economic, po-

litical, and cultural ties.

See also: COLD WAR; FINLAND; SWEDEN, RELATIONS WITH;

VIKINGS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kirby, David. (1990). Northern Europe in the Early Mod-

ern Period: The Baltic World, 1492–1772. London:

Longman.

Kirby, David. (1995). The Baltic World, 1772–1993: Eu-

rope’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. London:

Longman.

Larsen, Karen. (1948). A History of Norway. Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press.

Libaek, Ivar. (1991). History of Norway: From the Ice Age

to the Oil Age. Oslo: Grondahl and Son.

ARMO

T. K

OTILAINE

NOVGOROD, ARCHBISHOP OF

The archbishop was the highest ecclesiastical office

and symbolic head of the city—Lord Novgorod the

Great. The chronicles refer to him as vladyka, a term

meaning “lord,” or “ruler,” reflecting his duties as

the representative of the city. He resided within the

NOVGOROD, ARCHBISHOP OF

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

city’s fortress (detinets), met with Western ambas-

sadors and Russian princes, mediated disputes in

the city, and officiated in the city’s main Cathedral

of St. Sophia.

The Novgorodian office of bishop traditionally

dates to the reign of Vladimir, who brought in

Ioakim of Cherson in 989, but there is little firm

evidence of its existence until the mid-1030s, when

Luka Zhidyata served. The bishop received tithes

from fines and wergild payments, but from the late

1130s onward a fixed income from the prince’s

treasury was set. Landholding, however, consti-

tuted the basis of the church’s wealth, and by the

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Novgorodian

Church was the largest landholder, employing re-

ligious and secular workers and even hiring sol-

diers.

Following Novgorod’s independence from Kiev

in 1136, the first election of the bishop occurred in

1156 when the “people of the entire town,” per-

haps in a meeting of an assembly (veche), chose

Arkady. However, the ability of Novgorod to se-

lect its own archbishop did not make the Church

independent of the metropolitan, who still con-

firmed candidates. After Arkady’s death in 1163,

Ilya was appointed (not elected) first archbishop of

Novgorod in 1165. The next election of an arch-

bishop occurred in 1186 when townsmen, prince,

hegumens, and priests selected Gavriil, Ilya’s

brother. After 1186 it became customary for the

townspeople, prince, and clergy to elect their arch-

bishops in a veche, but it is not clear whether all

free Novgorodians participated. When there was no

clear candidate the city utilized lots (for example,

in 1229 and 1359): Three names were placed on

the altar of St. Sophia and one would be chosen.

Sometime during the thirteenth century the

archbishop came to preside over the Council of

Lords (Sovet gospod), the highest executive and ju-

dicial body. It consisted of some fifty to sixty mem-

bers, including the sitting lord mayor and chiliarch

(commander of troops), former lord mayors, and

current mayors of the five boroughs. The meetings

took place within the archbishop’s quarters, and

later in the archbishop’s Palace of Facets, con-

structed in 1433. The Novgorodian Judicial Char-

ter notes that referral hearings convened in the

archbishop’s quarters.

The archbishop did not directly control the

city’s monasteries, which fell under the jurisdiction

of one of the five district hegumens (heads of

monasteries). The monasteries were ultimately un-

der the jurisdiction of the archimandrite, who also

was chosen by the veche.

Moscow conquered Novgorod in 1478, and

two years later Grand Prince Ivan III arrested and

imprisoned Archbishop Theophilus. Ivan forced

Theophilus to resign and replaced him with Gen-

nadius in 1484, bringing the archbishopric more

firmly under the metropolitan of Moscow. In

1489 Ivan confiscated most of the archbishop’s

estates and half the lands of the six wealthiest

monasteries. These lands became the basis of

Moscow’s system of military service landholdings

(pomeste).

See also: BIRCHBARK CHARTERS; CATHEDRAL OF ST.

SOPHIA, NOVGOROD; NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER;

NOVGOROD THE GREAT; POSADNIK; PRIMARY CHRON-

ICLE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; VECHE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Birnbaum, Henrik. (1981). Lord Novgorod the Great.

Columbus, OH: Slavica.

AWRENCE

N. L

ANGER

NOVGOROD JUDICIAL CHARTER

The Novgorod Judicial Charter exists in a sixteenth-

century fragment but was likely first compiled

around 1471. By then Novgorod faced a growing

military threat from Moscow. In 1456 Moscow

imposed the Treaty of Yazhelbitsy, which limited

Novgorod’s independence in foreign policy, forced

the city to cede important territories, and imposed

a heavy indemnity payment. Novgorod retained its

internal administrative structure, but the city be-

came torn politically between pro-Lithuanian and

pro-Muscovite factions. Moscow decisively de-

feated Novgorod at the Shelon River and imposed

a huge indemnity of sixteen thousand rubles.

Grand Prince Ivan III received Novgorodian delega-

tions at the mouth of the Shelon and concluded a

peace based on the earlier Yazhelbitsy Treaty. The

Charter was probably drawn up at this time or

soon thereafter, as it reflects Novgorod’s adminis-

trative structure and liberties before Ivan’s arrests

of some leading Novgorodians in late 1475 and

1476, and his annexation of the city in 1478.

The Charter records that the archbishop, lead-

ing political officers, and urban free population

(mayors [posadniki], chiliarchs [tysyatski], boyars,

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well-to-do or ranking men [zhiti lyudi], merchants,

and taxable population) from all five boroughs,

who, having met in Yaroslav’s court in an assem-

bly (veche), and having conferred with Grand Prince

Ivan III and his son, agreed to the provisions of the

Charter. The incomplete Charter abruptly ends in

the midst of Article 42. Much of the Charter con-

cerns the prerogatives of the city’s judicial system.

Significantly, the first four articles asserted the

rights of the courts of the archbishop, mayor, and

chiliarch. The archbishop conducts his court ac-

cording to the canons of the Church, and the chil-

iarch retains the independence of his court. The

mayor, however, must conduct his judicial pro-

ceedings with that of the grand prince’s lieutenant

(namestnik). Although this appears as a limitation

of the mayor’s prerogatives, it likely reflects long-

standing practice, as the text notes that they are to

direct the court jointly in accordance with traditional

custom. On the other hand, Article 5 affirmed the

prohibition against removing the mayor, chiliarch,

lieutenant of the archbishop, and all their judges

from their courts. The grand prince’s lieutenants

and judges (tyuny, who were probably slaves) re-

tained a customary right of review.

Heavy fines were exacted according to status

for slandering or intimidating the mayor, chiliarch,

any of the other judges, or the decisions of trial by

combat (the latter a common feature of the Pskov

Judicial Charter). Boyars paid fifty rubles, the well-

to-do (non-aristocratic wealthy merchants and

landowners) twenty rubles, and the remaining free

urban population (molodshi, or young ones) ten

rubles to the grand prince and Novgorod. These

were all prohibitive fines designed to preserve the

integrity of the courts. Cases were to be tried and

completed within a month, but land disputes could

take up to two months; the Charter also stipulated

the fees the courts and their officials received.

Court procedures required the two litigants (or

their representatives) and no others to confront one

another and conduct their cases. Participants in-

cluding all judges had to kiss the cross, attesting to

their truthfulness and Christian faith. Failure to

kiss the cross resulted in the loss of the case. Sons

could kiss the cross on behalf of their widowed

mothers; if a son refused, then the widow could

kiss the cross in her home in the presence of the

bailiffs. Character witnesses could be called, but the

Pskov populace and slaves could not serve as char-

acter witness, although a slave could testify against

another slave. Litigants were normally given two

weeks to rebut witnesses. Boyars and the wealthy

conducted referral hearings within the archbishop’s

residence, which meant that they were probably

under the jurisdiction of the Council of Lords. The

Charter carefully regulated procedures concerning

postponements.

Of particular interest are the Charter’s refer-

ences to the administrative subdivisions of the city.

Each borough, street, hundred, or row could send

two people to a court or investigation. Unfortu-

nately, the Charter does not clarify the social com-

position or administrative responsibilities of the

urban divisions, which have been the subject of

much historical debate. Novgorod consisted of five

boroughs, which were divided into hundreds,

streets, and rows. The boroughs were under the ju-

risdiction of boyars, and the hundreds were origi-

nally administered by a complex arrangement of

princely and urban officials that, by the late twelfth

century, was dominated by the city’s boyars. The

streets and rows may have reflected the interests

or administration of the general population of

lesser merchants and craftsmen.

See also: NOVGOROD THE GREAT; PSKOV JUDICIAL CHAR-

TER; SUDEBNIK OF 1497

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kaiser, Daniel, tr. and ed. (1992). The Laws of Russia, Se-

ries 1, Vol. 1: The Laws of Rus’, Tenth to Fifteenth Cen-

turies. Salt Lake City, UT: Charles Schlacks, Jr.

Vernadsky, George. (1969). Medieval Russian Laws. New

York: Norton.

AWRENCE

N. L

ANGER

NOVGOROD THE GREAT

Novgorod the Great was a city-state located in

northwestern Russia, existing from the mid-tenth

century to its annexation by Muscovy in 1478.

Although Novgorod was named in the Lau-

rentian redaction of the Primary Chronicle as the

political seat occupied by Ryurik in 862, archaeo-

logical evidence indicates that the city was founded

in the mid-tenth century. Located on the Volkhov

River near its origins at Lake Ilmen, the city quickly

emerged as a leading commercial center. Shortly af-

ter Prince Vladimir adopted Christianity for Kievan

Rus, Novgorod became the seat of a bishopric and

became a major ecclesiastic and cultural center. Its

political institutions represented an alternative to

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the strong princely regime developing in north-

eastern Russia. At the peak of its power, Novgorod

controlled lands stretching from the Baltic Sea to

the White Sea and the northern Urals Mountains,

but it was subjugated by Muscovy in 1478.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY

As Kievan Rus formed, Novgorod emerged as the

second most important city of that state. Kiev’s

princes appointed their sons or other close associ-

ates to govern Novgorod. Thus, when Svyatoslav

died in 972, his son Vladimir was serving as prince

in Novgorod. Similarly, when Vladimir died in

1015, his son Yaroslav was ruling Novgorod. Both

Svyatoslav and Vladimir were able to use troops

from Novgorod and Scandinavia to secure their

own positions as princes of Kiev. Although it has

been argued that Prince Yaroslav of Kiev intended

Novgorod to become the hereditary seat of his son

Vladimir, most scholars concur that Novgorod

continued to be ruled by appointees of the Kievan

princes. This arrangement distinguished Novgorod

from the other major towns of Kievan Rus, towns

which, during the eleventh century, became patri-

monies of different branches of the Rurikid dy-

nasty.

In 1136 the Novgorodians asserted their right

to name their own prince. For the next century

they selected princes from the Rurikid dynastic lines

that ruled in Chernigov, Smolensk, and Vladimir-

Suzdal and that competed for power in Kievan Rus.

Novgorod’s affiliation with a particular dynastic

branch frequently gave its princes advantages over

their competitors. Novgorod consequently also be-

came an object of contention among the rival

dynastic branches, which sought to influence Nov-

gorod’s choice of prince through political, eco-

nomic, and military pressure. In 1148–1149 and

again in 1169 Novgorod clashed violently with

Suzdalia, which was able to block supplies, in-

cluding food, to the city. By the second quarter of

the thirteenth century, princes from Vladimir-

Suzdal had gained dominance in Novgorod.

In the absence of a single branch of the dynasty

permanently ruling the city and its associated

lands, Novgorod developed a political system that

was unique within the lands of Rus. Princes exer-

cised considerable authority and were responsible

for defending the city. But they were obliged to re-

side outside the city and to govern in conjunction

with the city’s administrators, its mayor (posad-

nik) and militia commander (tysyatsky), who were

elected from Novgorod’s wealthy, landowning

elite, known as the Novgorodian boyars. In addi-

tion, the city irregularly convened a town assem-

bly, or veche. The bishops of Novgorod, elevated to

archbishops in 1165 and regarded as significant

unifying influences in the city, also participated in

the city’s administration, its diplomatic affairs, its

economic activities, and its judicial system. The

functions of these offices and institutions and di-

vision of authority among them remain imperfectly

understood; scholars have therefore characterized

Novgorod variously as a republic with its popular

town assembly and as an oligarchy politically

dominated by a few boyar families.

The Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus in the pe-

riod from 1238 to 1240 did not reach Novgorod.

But in 1259, the Mongols accompanied by Prince

Alexander Nevsky (r. 1252–1263), who had led the

defense of Novgorod from the Swedes at the Neva

River in 1240 and from the Teutonic Knights at

Lake Peipus in 1242, forced Novgorod to submit to

a census and pay tribute. Novgorod continued to

recognize the grand princes of Vladimir, all of

whom were also princes of Moscow after the mid-

fourteenth century, as its own.

During the fourteenth century local officials

played a greater role in the city’s governance and

administration. Tensions between them and their

princes developed as disputes arose over the princes’

demands for tribute payments and control of ter-

ritories in Novgorod’s northern empire, including

the North Dvina land, which Grand Prince Vasily

I (r. 1389–1425) unsuccessfully tried to seize in

1397. The conflicts between Novgorod and

Moscow reached critical proportions in the fifteenth

century. Novgorod occasionally, in the late four-

teenth and fifteenth centuries, turned to Lithuania

for a prince and resisted making tribute payments

to Moscow. In 1456 Grand Prince Vasily II (r.

1425–1462) defeated Novgorod militarily. The en-

suing Treaty of Yazhelbitsy curtailed Novgorod’s

autonomy, particularly in foreign affairs. When

Novgorod nevertheless sought closer relations with

Lithuania in 1470–1471, Grand Prince Ivan III de-

feated Novgorod at the Battle of Shelon (1471). In

1478 he removed the symbolic veche bell, replaced

Novgorod’s local officials with his own governors,

and effectively annexed Novgorod to Muscovy.

COMMERCE

Novgorod’s political importance derived from its

commercial strength. Its location on the Volkhov

River, which flowed northward into Lake Ladoga,

gave it access through the Baltic Sea to Scandinavia

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and northern Europe. It thus became the northern

Rus terminus of the route “from the Varangians to

the Greeks,” which followed the Dnieper River to

Kiev and beyond to the Black Sea and Byzantium.

Novgorod was also linked by waterways and

portages to the Volga River, the route to Bulgar on

the Volga, Khazaria, the Caspian Sea, and the Mus-

lim East.

Novgorod’s commerce was the main source of

silver for the Russian lands. In the tenth century,

silver dirhams were imported from the Muslim

East. Some were reexported to the Baltic region;

others circulated in the lands of Rus. From the

eleventh century, when the Islamic silver coins

were no longer available, Novgorod imported

silver from its European trading partners. In addi-

tion, Novgorod imported European woolen cloth,

weapons, metals, pottery, alcoholic beverages, and

salt. From the east and Byzantium it imported silks

and spices, gems and jewelry, and glassware and

ceramic pottery.

Novgorod not only functioned as a transit cen-

ter, reexporting imported goods; it also traded its

own goods, chiefly wax, honey, and fur. By the end

of the twelfth century Novgorod extended its au-

thority over a vast northern empire stretching to the

White Sea and to the Ural Mountains. It collected

tribute in fur from the region’s Finno-Ugric popu-

lations; its merchants traded with them as well. By

these means it secured a supply of luxury fur pelts

for export. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

it also exported large quantities of squirrel pelts.

During the tenth and eleventh centuries Nov-

gorod’s main European trading partners were Scan-

dinavians. By the twelfth century they had

established their own trading complex around the

Church of St. Olaf on the market side of the city.

From the twelfth century, German merchants, who

established their own trading depot at Peterhof,

were successfully competing with the Scandina-

vians for Novgorod’s trade. In the 1130s Prince

Vsevolod transferred control over weights and

measures—the fees collected for weighing and mea-

suring goods that were sold in the marketplace—

and judicial authority over trade disputes to Nov-

gorod’s bishop, the wax merchants’ association,

which was associated with the Church of St. John,

and the tysyatsky.

Novgorod’s commerce survived the invasion of

the Mongols, who encouraged the transport of im-

ported and domestic goods as tribute and as com-

mercial commodities down the Volga River to their

capital at Sarai. Although disputes led to occasional

interruptions in Novgorod’s trade with the Hansa,

as in 1388 to 1392 and in 1443 to 1448, it per-

sisted until 1494, when Grand Prince Ivan III closed

Peterhof.

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Novgorod was one of the largest cities in the lands

of Rus. In the twelfth century it covered an area of

over one thousand acres. With the exception of the

area containing the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which

was set within a citadel from the mid-eleventh

century, Novgorod was an open city until the late

fourteenth century or early fifteenth century,

when a town wall was built. The Volkhov River

divided the city into two halves, the Sophia side on

the west bank and the market side on the east. It

was further subdivided into five boroughs (kontsy)

and streets.

Novgorod’s population in the early eleventh

century is estimated to have been between ten and

fifteen thousand and to have doubled by the early

thirteenth century. Estimates for the fifteenth cen-

tury range from twenty-five to fifty thousand. The

wealthiest and most politically active and influen-

tial strata in Novgorod’s society were the boyars

and great merchants. Lower strata included mer-

chants of more moderate means, a diverse range of

artisans and craftsmen, unskilled workers, and

slaves. Clergy also dwelled in and near the city.

Peasants occupied rural villages in the countryside

subject to Novgorod.

Civil strife repeatedly occurred within the city.

In the extreme, riots broke out, and victims were

thrown off the bridge into the Volkhov River. But

more commonly, order was maintained by the

combined princely-local administration that regu-

lated business and adjudicated legal disputes. The

populace relied on formal documentation issued by

city officials for business transactions, property

sales and donations, wills, and other legal actions.

Birchbark charters, unearthed in archaeological ex-

cavations, attest that it was common for Nov-

gorodians to communicate about daily personal,

household, and business activities in writing. The

bishops’ court also was a center of chronicle writ-

ing.

The urban population dwelled in a wooden city.

Roads and walkways were constructed from split

logs. Urban estates owned by boyars and wealthy

merchants lined the roads. While they dwelled in

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