
generally complex eigenvalues are accommodated if
we allow Q to be normal, that is, QQ
= Q
Q.In
each case we require the eigenvectors of Q to span
the Hilbert space H.) This ‘‘evolution procedure’’ of
the quantum state is very different from U,owing
both to its discontinuity and its indeterminacy. The
letter R will be used for this, standing for the
‘‘reduction’’ of the quantum state (sometimes referred
to as the ‘‘collapse of the wave function’’). This
strange hybrid, whereby U and R are alternated, with
U holding between measurements and R holding at
measurements, is the standard procedure that is
pragmatically adopted in conventional quantum
mechanics, and which works so marvelously well,
with no known discrepancy between the theory and
observation. (In his classic account, von Neumann
(1932, 1955),‘‘R’’ is referred to as his ‘‘process I’’
and ‘‘U’’ as his ‘‘process II.’’) However, there appears
to be no consensus whatever about the relation
between this mathematical procedure and what is
‘‘really’’ going on in the physical world. This is the
kind of issue that will be of concern to us here.
Quantum Reality
The discussion here will be given only in the
Schro¨ dinger picture, for the reason that the issues
appear to be clearer with this description. In the
Heisenberg picture, the state j i does not evolve in
time, and all dynamics is taken up in the time
evolution of the dynamical variables. But this
evolution does not refer to the evolution of specific
systems, the ‘‘state’’ of any particular system being
defined to remain constant in time. Since the
Schro¨ dinger and Heisenberg pictures are deemed to
be equivalent (at least for the ‘‘normal’’ systems that
are under consideration here), we do not lose
anything substantial by sticking to Schro¨ dinger’s
description, whereas there does seem to be a
significant gain in understanding of what the
formalism is actually telling us.
There are, however, many different attitudes that
are expressed as to the ‘‘reality’’ of j i. (There is an
unfortunate possibility of confusion here in the two
uses of the word ‘‘real’’ that come into the discussion
here. In the quantum formalism, the state is mathe-
matically a ‘‘complex’’ rather than a ‘‘real’’ entity,
whereas our present concern is not directly to do
with this, but with the ‘‘ontology’’ of the quantum
description.) According to what is commonly regarded
as the standard – ‘‘Copenhagen’’ – interpretation of
quantum mechanics (due primarily to Bohr,
Heisenberg, and Pauli), the quantum state j i is not
taken as a description of a quantum-level reality at all,
but merely as a description of the observer’s
knowledge of the of the quantum system under
consideration. According to this view, the ‘‘jumping’’
that the quantum state undergoes is regarded as
unsurprising, since it does not represent a sudden
change in the reality of the situation, but merely in the
observer’s knowledge, as new information becomes
available, when the result of some measurement
becomes known to the observer. According to this
view, there is no objective quantum reality described
by j i. Whether or not there might be some objective
quantum-level reality with some other mathematical
description seems to be left open by this viewpoint, but
the impression given is that there might well not be any
such quantum-level reality at all, in the sense that it
becomes meaningless to ask for a description of
‘‘actual reality’’ at quantum-relevant scales.
Of course some connection with the real world is
necessary, in order that the quantum formalism can
relate to the results of experiment. In the Copenha-
gen viewpoint, the experimenter’s measuring appa-
ratus is taken to be a classical-level entity, which can
be ascribed a real ontological statu s. When the
Geiger counter ‘‘clicks’’ or when the pointer
‘‘points’’ to some position on a dial, or when the
track in the cloud chamber ‘‘becomes visible’’ –
these are taken to be real event s. The intervening
description in terms of a quantum state vector j i is
not ascribed a reality. The role of j i is merely to
provide a calculational procedure whereby the
different outcomes of an experiment can be assigned
probabilities. Reality comes about only when the
result of the measurem ent is manifested, not before.
A difficulty with this viewpoint is that it is hard to
draw a clear line between those entities which are
considered to have an actual reality, such as the
experimental apparatus or a human observer, and
the elemental constituents of those entities, which
are such thing s as electrons or protons or neutrons
or quarks, which are to be treated quantum
mechanically and therefore, on the ‘‘Copenhagen’’
view, their mathematical descriptions are denied
such an honored ontological status. Moreover, there
is no limit to the number of particles that can
partake in a quantum state. According to current
quantum mechanics, the most accurate mathemati-
cal procedure for describing a system with a large
number of particles would indeed be to use a
unitarily evolving quantum state. What reasons can
be presented for or against the viewpoint that this
gives us a reasonable description of an actual
reality? Can our perceived reality arise as some
kind of statis tical limit when very large numbers of
constituents are involved?
Before entering into the more subtle and con-
tentious issues of the nature of ‘‘quantum reality,’’ it
Quantum Mechanics: Foundations 261