Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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operatedonanunsentimentalassessmentofthenationalinterest.Onceonecut

throughthestrident,self‐righteousrhetoric,Mrs.Gandhihadfewpeersinthe

cold‐bloodedcalculationoftheelementsofpower.Thepoliticalrelationshipin

substancewasthusfarbetterthanthepersonalone.



WhateverNixon’spersonalqualmsaboutitsPrimeMinister,India

continuedthroughouthisfirstAdministrationtoenjoyasubstantialconstituency

intheCongressandwithintheUSgovernment.Mrs.Gandhihadnotyet

disillusionedAmericansbyhernucleartestandassumptionofauthoritarianrule.

Emotionaltieswiththeworld’smostpopulousdemocracyremained. Large

annualaidappropriationswerepropo sedbytheAdministrationandpassedby

Congresswithlittleopposition.Between1965and1971Indiareceived$4.2billion

ofAmericaneconomicaid,about$1.5billionofitduringtheNixonyears.



IfIndiabaskedinCongressionalwarmthandwassubjecttoPresidential

indifference,Pakistan’ssituationwasexactlythereverse.Pakistanwasoneofthe

countrieswhereNixonhadbeenreceivedwithrespectwhenhewasoutofoffice;

heneverforgotthis. Andthebluff,directmilitarychiefsofPakistanweremore

congenialtohimthanthecomplexandapparentlyhaughtyBrahminleadersof

India.Ontheotherhand,PakistanhadneverfoundthesympathyinAmericathat

Indiaenjoyed,atleastamongopinion‐makinggroups.Itdidnotrepresent

principleswithwhichAmericanscouldidentifyasreadilyaswiththe“progressive”

slogansandpacifist‐soundingmoralityoftheworld’slargestdemocracy.

Moreover,Indiawasmuchlargerandhadfourorfivetimesthepopulationof

Pakistan.Therewerethushardheadedreasonsforthepriorityattachedtoour

relationswithIndia.



Nixonmadefew changesinthepoliciesheinheritedonthesubcontinent

excepttoadoptasomewhatwarmertonetowardPakistan.HeandI—astheonly

seniorofficialswhoknewthefacts—wereprofoundlygratefulforPakistan’srole

asthechanneltoChina.ItwasaserviceforwhichPakistan’sleaders,totheir

lastinghonor,neversoughtanyreciprocityorspecialconsideration.Theonly

concretegestureNixonmade—anditwasalsotomaintainthepromiseofhis

predecessor—wastoapproveinthesummerof1970asmallpackageofmilitary

equipmentforPakistan.Thiswastobea“one‐timeexception” totheUSarms

embargo.Itincludedsometwentyaircraftand300armoredpersonnelcarriers,

butnotanksorartillery.Thepackageamountedto$40to $50million(or

somewhatmore,dependingonthetypeofaircraftchosen).India,whichwas

increasingitsmilitaryprocurementattheaveragerateof$350millionayear—

nearlytentimesthisamount—raisedastormofprotest.AtthesametimeIndia

wasaccusingusofinterferinginitsdomesticaffairsbecausesomeofourembassy

personnel—inperhapsthemostoverstaffedembassyofourdiplomaticservice—

occasionallysawoppositionleaders.ThiswasnotfulfillingaWashington‐designed

strategybutwasanaturalactivityinacountrywithfreeinstitutions;itwasanodd

accusationfortheleadersofademocracytomake.Butthestormsoonblewover.



By1971ourrelationswithIndiahadachievedastateofexasperatedly

strainedcordiality,likeacouplethatcanneitherseparatenorgetalong.Our

relationswithPakistanweremarkedbyasuperficialfriendlinessthathadlittle

concretecontent.Onthesubcontinent,atleast,alliancewith theUnitedStates

hadnotbeenshowntoproducesignificantbenefitsovernonalignment.



Atthebeginningof1971noneofourseniorpolicymakersexpectedthe

subcontinenttojumptothetopofouragenda.Itseemedtorequireno

immediatedecisionsexceptannualaidprogramsandreliefeffortsinresponseto

tragicnaturaldisastersinlate1970.Itappearedtobetheidealsubjectforlong‐

rangestudies.Iorderedthreeoftheseinlate1970.TwoaddressedSovietnaval

strengthintheIndianOceananditsimplications;thethirdexaminedourlong‐

termpolicytowardIndiaandPakistan,includingtheobjectivesoftheSoviet

UnionandCommunistChinaandtheinterplaybetweenthem.Eachofthese

studieswasgivenaduedatefarahead;noseriouscrisiswasexpected.



<<Contents>>

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

TwoCyclones



versinceithadcomeintobeing,Pakistanhadsoughtasustainedlegitimacy.

nogovernmentafterthedeat hofthefounderofthestatehadservedoutits

term.everychangehadoccurredthroughsomesortofcoup;militaryandcivilian

governmentsalternated,withthemilitarydominant.Theyear1970wasexpected

toseeaconstitutionalgovernment.electionswouldfinallytakeplacein

December.Pakistan’sPresidentYahyaKhanvisitedNixoninOctoberduringthe

UnitedNations’twenty‐fifthanniversarycelebration,whenNixongavehimthe

messagetoChouEn‐laialreadydescribed.ItooktheopportunitytoaskYahya

whatwouldhappentothepowersofthePresidentaftertheelection.Yahyacould

nothavebeenmoreconfident.Heexpectedamultiplicityofpartiestoemergein

bothWestandEastPakistan,whichwouldcontinuallyfighteachotherineach

wingofthecountryandbetweenthetwowings;thePresidentwouldtherefore

remainthearbiterofPakistan’spolitics. 



BeforehispredictioncouldbetestedadevastatingcyclonestruckEast

PakistanoverNovember12‐13.Bymostaccounts,IwroteNixon,thiswasthe

greatestdisasterofthecenturyintermsofdestructionofpropertyandhuman

life;over200,000werethoughttohavedied.Theall‐outreliefprogramthat

Nixonorderedcouldonlytouchthesurfaceofthesuffering.Recoveryefforts

werechaoticandineffective.TheoppositionchargedtheYahyagovernmentwith

grossincompetenceandworse.Thepoliticalstormturnedoutintheendtobe

evenmoredestructivethanthenaturalone.



Whetherthecyclonecrystallizedoppositiontothecentralgovernmentand

enhancedEastPakistan’ssenseofgrievanceandidentity,orwhetherYahyahad

misjudgedthemoodallalong,theelectionsheldonDecember7,1970,turned

intoaplebisciteonYahya’shandlingofthecrisisandproducedacatastrophefor

themilitaryrulers.TheAwamileague,dedicatedtoEastPakistaniautonomy,won

167outof169seatscontestedintheEast,givingitamajorityofthe313seatsin

thenationalAssembly.Itsleader,sheikhMujiburRahman(knownasMujib),was

thusboundtobeanunchallengeablefigureinEastPakistanandapowerful

influenceintheentirecountry.Toheightenthepoliticaldrama,ZulfikarAli

Bhutto,leaderofthePakistanPeople’sParty,emergedinacomparablydominant

positioninWestPakistan.Whileopposedtomilitaryrule,Bhuttowasanadvocate

ofastrongcentralgo vernmentandofaunitedPakistan;hefiercelyresisted

Mujib’sinsistenceonEastPakistaniautonomyandinthishewascertaintobe

supportedbythemilitary.(Indeed,hemaywellhaveadoptedthispositionin

ordertobecomemoreacceptabletothemilitary.)TheAwamileaguehadput

forwardasix‐pointprogramforfullprovincialautonomyforEastPakistanthatleft

thecentralgovernmentsomevagueresponsibilityonlyinthefieldsofforeign

policyanddefense.EachofthetwoconstituentunitsofPakistan,itproposed,

wouldhaveitsowncurrency,keepitsownseparateaccountforforeignexchange,

raiseitsowntaxes,setitsownfiscalpolicy,andmaintainitsownmilitiaand

paramilitaryunits.YahyaandBhutto rejectedthisastantamountto secession.A

stalemate—orcrisis—wasimminent.



OnFebruary16,1971,Irequestedaninteragencystudyofthealternatives

shouldEastPakistantrytomakeabreak;onFebruary22,Isentmyownanalysis

tothePresident:



[MujibandBhutto]havefailedsofartoforgeeventhebeginningofaninformal

consensusonthenewconstitution.PresidentYahyaremainscommittedtoturninghismilitary

governmentovertothecivilianpoliticians,butmaintainsthathewillnotpresideoverthe

splittingofPakistan…[Mujib]isnowplanningtostickwithhisdemandsforthevirtual

autonomyofEastPakistanandifhedoesnotgethisway—whichisverylikely—todeclareEast

Pakistanindependence.



Yahyawascaughtbetweenhisreluctancetomakecommoncausewith

Bhuttoandhisresistancetothequasi‐independenceofEastPakistandemanded

byMujib.HepostponedtheconveningofthenationalAssemblysetforearly

Marchtogivethepoliticalleadersmoretimetosortouttheirdifferences,butthis

movefurtherantagonizedtheEast.YahyaultimatelyrescheduledtheAssembly

forMarch25,gamblingthatthetwocivilianantagonists,facedwithadeadlock

thatmightbreakupthecountry,wouldchoosetocompromise.Inthisjudgment,

too,Yahyaprovedtobemistaken.Bhuttowasundoubtedlythemostbrilliantman

inPakistanipolitics;hewasalsoarrogantandstrong‐willed.Lateronhewould

presideovertherecoveryofhisdismemberedcountrywithstatesmanshipand

courage.Inearly1971hefearedthatcompromisewouldbringdownonhimthe

wrathoftheverymassesinWestPakistanwhosesupporthadswepthimtothe

thresholdofpower.Mujib,forhispart,couldnotarresttheforceshehad

unleashed.HewasfarlessinclinedtodosothanBhutto,andmoreproneto

believeinhisownrhetoric.LikefiguresinaGreektragedy,eachofthesetwo

popularPakistanileadersrefusedtolettheothercrossthethresholdbeyond

whichlaypowerforbothofthem;theywouldyieldtonecessitybutnottoeach

other.



Asthetensionincreased,ourgovernmentrevieweditsoptions.TheSenior

ReviewGroupmetonMarch6toconsidertheinteragencystudyIhadrequested

onFebruary16.OurconsensuswasthatPakistanwouldnotbeabletoholdthe

Eastbyforce.ImadeitcleartotheagenciesthatthePresidentwouldbereluctant

toconfrontYahya,butthattheWhiteHousewouldnotobjecttoothercountries’

effortstodissuadehimfromusingforce.IfPakistanbrokeup,itshouldbethe

resultofitsinternaldynamics,notofAmericanpressures.Allagenciesagreedthat

theUnitedStatesshouldnotgetinvolved.ThiswasalsothepolicyofGreat

Britain,whichhadamuchlongerhistoricalrelationship.



DuringMarchweexperiencedtheconfusionsthatmarktheonsetofmost

crises.InamajorspeechonMarch7,Mujibstoppedshortofatotalbreakwith

WestPakistan,buthedemandedanendtomartiallawandareturntopopular

rule,makingclearhisgoalremainedthe“emancipation”oftheEast.Yahya

announcedthathewasflyingtoDacca,capitalofEastPakistan,tonegotiatewith

MujibonMarch15.Meanwhile,inIndiainearlyMarch,PrimeMinisterGandhi

scoredanenormousvictoryintheIndiangeneralelections.Untiltheneventsin

Pakistanhadbeentheinternalproblemsofafriendlycountry;wemighthaveour

viewbuttheywerenotaforeignpolicyissue.Busy withtheelectioncampaign

anditsimmediate aftermath,Mrs.Gandhiadoptedahands‐offpolicy.Aslateas

themiddleofMarch,thepermanentheadoftheIndianforeignOffice,T.N.Kaul,

toldourAmbassadorinnewDelhi,KennethKeating,thatIndiawantedPakistanto

remainunited.OnMarch17theIndianAmbassadorinWashington,theskillfull.

K.Jha,spokeinthesamesenseto me.Neithergavetheslightestindicationthat

IndiawouldconsiderthetroublesinneighboringEastPakistanasaffectingitsown

vitalinterests.



Butsometimesthenervesofpublicfiguressnap.Incapableofabiding

events,theyseektoforcethepaceandlose theirbalance.SoitwasthatYahya

Khan,withlessthan40,000troops,decidedtoestablishmilitaryrule overthe75

millionpeopleofEast Pakistan,tosuppresstheAwamileague,andtoarrest

sheikhMujiburRahman.



ThecrisisinPakistanthenbecameinternational.



<<Contents>>



* * * *



MilitaryCrackdown



hatpromptedYahyatohisrecklesssteponMarch25isnotfullyknown.No

doubttheBengalipopulationtauntedthePakistanisoldiersdrawnalmost

exclusivelyfromtheWest.Mujib’sversionofautonomyseemedindistinguishable

fromindependence.Almostallnationswillfightfortheirunity,evenifsentiment

inthedisaffectedareaisoverwhelminglyforsecession.SoitwasduringourCivil

war,withNigeriatowardBiafra,andwiththeCongo towardKatanga.Pakistan

wasunique,however,inthatthesecedingprovincewasseparatedfromWest

PakistanbyathousandmilesofIndianterritory.Therewasnolikelihoodthata

smallmilitaryforceowingloyaltytotheonewingofthecountrycouldindefinitely

holddownapopulationof75millionoftheother.OnceindigenousBengali

supportforaunitedPakistanevaporated,theintegrityofPakistanwasfinished.

AnindependentBengalistatewascertaintoemerge,evenwithoutIndian

intervention.Theonly questionwashowthechangewouldcomeabout.



Wewantedtostayalooffromthisifwecould,asdidBritain.Weeven

receivedreportsofWestPakistanisuspicionsthatwemightfavoranindependent

EastPakistan,butneithertheBritishnorwewishedtobemadescapegoatsfor

thecountry’sbreakup.Wehadfewmeanstoaffectthesituation.Wehad,

moreover,everyincentiveto maintainPakistan’sgoodwill.Itwasourcruciallink

toPeking;andPakistanwasoneofChina’sclosest allies.Wehadsentamessage

inDecemberthroughPakistanacceptingtheprincipleofanAmericanemissaryin

Peking.InMarchandAprilthesignsweremultiplyingthataChineseresponsewas

imminent.AprilwasthemonthofPing‐Pongdiplomacy.



InthisfirststageofthecrisistheconsensusoftheUSgovernmentwasto

avoidprecipitateactionevenamongthosewhoknewnothing ofourChina

initiative.AtaWSAGmeetingonMarch26Irepeatedmyownviewthatthe

prognosiswasforcivilwarleadingtoindependencefairlyquickly.AState

DepartmentrepresentativenotedthatBritainwasunwillingtoengageitselfin

pressingPakistan.Itoldmycolleagues:“ItalkedtothePresidentbrieflybefore

lunch.Hisinclinationisthesameaseverybodyelse’s.Hedoesn’twanttodo

anything.Hedoesn’twanttobeinthepositionwherehecanbeaccusedof

havingencouragedthesplit‐upofPakistan.Hedoesnotfavoraveryactive

policy.”



Yetpressuresforanactivepolicybegantomount.Therewasgeneraland

justifiedoutrageasduringAprilreportsbegantocomeinofPakistaniatrocitiesin

Bengal.OurConsulGeneralinDaccawassendingcablestoWashingtonurginga

publicAmericanstandagainstPakistanirepression;othermembersofthe

consulatestaffsignedasimilarmessageinearlyApril.SecretaryRogerstoldme

hefoundit“outrageous”thathisdiplomatswerewritingpetitionsratherthan

reports.Butinafavoritedeviceofsubordinatesseekingtoforeclosetheir

superiors’options,thecablesweredeliberatelygivenalowclassificationand

hencewidecirculation.LeakstotheCongressandpresswereinevitable.A

PakistanieditorwhovisitedEastPakistanwroteafirsthandaccountofarmy

killingsfortheLondonSundayTimes.OurAmbassadorinnewDelhi,Kenneth

Keating,reportedtoWashingtonthathewas“deeplyshockedatthemassacre”

andwas“greatlyconcernedattheUnitedStates’vulnerabilitytodamaging

associationwithareignofmilitaryterror.”HeurgedthattheUnitedStates

promptly,publicly,andprominentlydeplore“thisbrutality,”privatelyintervene

withYahyaKhan,abrogateour“one‐timeexception,”andimmediatelysuspend

allmilitarydeliveriestoPakistan.



Wefacedadilemma.TheUnitedStatescouldnotcondoneabrutalmilitary

repressioninwhichthousandsofcivilians werekilledandfromwhichmillionsfled

toIndiaforsafety.Therewasnodoubtaboutthestrong‐armtacticsofthe

Pakistanimilitary.ButPakistanwasoursolechanneltoChina;onceitwasclosed

offitwouldtakemonthstomakealternativearrangements.Theissuehit

Washington,moreover,inthemidstofanotherofthecyclicupheavalsover

Vietnam.AmassivecampaignofdisobediencewasplannedforMay1.Tosomeof

ourcriticsoursilenceoverPakistan—thereasonforwhichwecouldnotexplain—

becameanothersymptomofthegeneralmoralinsensitivityoftheirgovernment.

Theycouldnotacceptthatitmightbetornbetweenconflictingimpe ratives;some

hadavestedinterestinunderminingtheirgovernment’sstandingonwhatever

issuecametohandinthebeliefthatthiswouldcollapseoureffortinVietnam.

TheAdministrationreactedinthesameungenerousspirit;therewassomemerit

tothechargeofmoralinsensitivity.NixonorderedourConsulGeneraltransferred

fromDacca;heridiculedKeatingforhavingbeen“takenoverbytheIndians.”A

tragicvictimofthewarinVietnamwasthepossibilityofrationaldebateon

foreignpolicy.



TheStateDepartmentmovedonitsown topreemptthedecisions.Ignorant

oftheChinainitiative,heavilyinfluencedbyitstraditionalIndianbias,inearly

April—withoutclearancewiththeWhiteHouse—theDepartme ntmovedtoward

anewarmsembargoonPakistan:Itsuspendedissuanceofnewlicensesforthe

saleofmunitionsandrenewalofexpiredlicenses;itputaholdonthedeliveryof

itemsfromDefenseDepartmentstocksandheldinabeyancethe“one‐time

exception”packageof1970.Some$35millioninarmsto Pakistanwascutoff,

leavingsome$5milliontricklingthroughthepipeline.(This$5millionbecamea

contentiousissuewiththeCongressinearlyJuly.)TheStateDepartmentalso

begantothrottleeconomicaidtoPakistan,againwithoutWhiteHouseclearance,

bytheingeniousdeviceofclaimingthatourexistingprogramscouldnolongerbe

madeeffectivethroughouttheentirecountrybecauseofthecivilwar.MyNSC

staffexpertHalSaunderswrotemethattheStateDepartmentwasmovingfroma

postureofdetachmenttooneofdissociationfromthePakistanigovernment,but

“theyarenotacknowledgingtothemselvesthatthisiswhattheyaredoing.They

arejustifyingtheirmoveontechnicalgrounds.”



AnyonefamiliarwithNixon’sattitudescouldnotdoubtthatthiswas

contrarytohiswishes;thoseunfamiliarshouldhavecheckedwiththeWhite

House.ThepreemptionofPresidentialprerogativesgoesfartoexplainNixon’s

(andmy)attitudelaterthatyear.ThroughoutAprilmymajortaskwastoget

controlofthegovernmentalprocess,withtwoobjectives:topreservethechannel

toPekingandtopreservethepossibilityofapoliticalsolutioninPakistan.By

then,Islamabadwasnotonlyapointofcontactbutalsomylikelyplaceof

departureforChina.AndsignsbegantoappearthatIndia’sproposedsolutionto

theundoubtedburdenofmillionsofBengalirefugeeswasnotsomuchtoenable

themtoreturnastoacceleratethedisintegrationofPakistan(oratanyrateto

identifyoneobjectivewiththeother).OnMarch31theIndianParliament

unanimouslyexpresseditswholehearted“sympathyandsupport”forthe

Bengalis.AsearlyasApril1,IreportedtothePresidentthat“the Indiansseemsto

beembarkingonacourseofpublicdiplomaticandcovertactionsthatwill

increasethealreadyhighleveloftensioninthesubcontinentandruntheriskof

touchingoffabroaderandmoreseriousinternationalcrisis.”OnApril14a

BangladeshgovernmentinexilewasestablishedinCalcutta. Bythemiddleof

AprilwereceivedreportsthatIndiawastrainingBengalirefugeestobecome

guerrillafightersinEastPakistan(theso‐calledMuktiBahini).BytheendofApril

welearnedthatIndiawasabouttoinfiltratethefirst2,000oftheseguerrillasinto

EastPakistan.



Iconsideredapolicyofrestraintcorrectonthemerits,aboveandbeyond

theChinaconnection.Forbetterorworse,thestrategyoftheNixon

Administrationonhumanitarianquestionswasnottolaydownachallengeto

sovereigntythatwouldsurelyberejected,buttoexertourinfluencewithout

publicconfrontation.InretrospectIbelievethatwesometimescarriedthis

basicallycorrectapproachtopedanticlengthswhichantagonizedpotential

supporters.InthecaseofPakistanitseemedappropriatebecauseitsgovernment

wasanallythat,wewereconvinced,wasboundsoontolearnthefutilityofits

course.WeundertooktopersuadeYahyaKhantomovetowardautonomy,

advisinghimasafriendtotakestepsthathewouldalmostsurelyhaverejected

hadwedemandedthempublicly.AsIwrotethePresidentonApril29,thecentral

government“mayrecognizetheneedtomovetowardgreaterEastPakistani

autonomyinordertodrawthenecessaryBengalicooperation.Whatweseemto

face,therefore,isaperiodoftransitiontogreaterEastPakistaniautonomyand,

perhaps,eventualindependence.”Yet,Inoted,India’spolicywasboundtowork

againstsuchasettlement:“BytrainingandequippingarelativelysmallBengali

resistanceforce,Indiacanhelpkeepactiveresistancealiveandincreasethe

chancesofaprolongedguerrillawar.Fromallindications,theIndiansintendto

followsuchacourse.”



Followingourcustomaryprocedure,IaskedtheStateDepartmentinApril

tosuggestoptionsinpreparationforadecisionbythePresidentastowhatour

policyshouldbeinlightoftheunfoldingcrisis.Abroadpolicydecisionwould

providetheframeworkforhandlingthespecificeconomicandmilitaryaidissues

withPakistan;itwasespeciallyneededinviewofthefactthatstatehadalready

begunmovinginitsowndesireddirection. Asusual,theDepartmentplacedits

preferredoptionbetweenalternativessoabsurdthattheycouldnotpossibly

serveasabasisofpolicy.(Oneproposal,forexample,wasall‐outsupportfor

Yahya.ThiswasneithertheWhiteHouseconvictionnorafeasiblecourseof

action.)Idistilledarecommendationfromtherangeofoptions thatstate

proposed.TorespondtoCongressionalandpublicdesiresIproposedthatthe

PresidentratifytheStateDepartment’sunauthorizedactionofearlyAprilshutting

downthemilitarysupplypipeline,allowingonlysomesparepartsandnonlethal

equipmenttomove.Ialsourgedthateconomicaidbeusedasacarrottoinduce

politicalconcessions,“tomakeaseriouseffortto helpYahyaendthewarand

establishanarrangementthatcouldbetransitionaltoEastPakistaniautonomy.”

Nixonapprovedmyrecomme ndationonMay2,andaddedahandwrittennote:

“Toallhands.Don’tsqueezeYahyaatthistime.RN.”



Butweranupagainstthreeobstacles:thepolicyofIndia,ourownpublic

debate,andtheindisciplineofourbureaucracy.



OnMay18—whenwewerealreadyintheadvancedstageofpreparingthe

secrettriptoPekingwithIslamabad—Mrs.GandhiwarnedPakistaninapublic

speechthatIndiawas“fullypreparedtofightifthesituationisforcedonus.”

IndianambassadorsalertedBritainandFrancethatIndia“maybeforcedtoactin

itsnationalinterest”inviewofthefloodofrefugees,bythenanestimated2.8

million.

Theburdenofrefugeeswasindeedmonumental;thedangerof

communalriotscouldnotbedismissed.Butastheweekspassed,webegan

increasinglytosuspec tthatMrs.Gandhiperceivedalargeropportunity.As

Pakistangrewmoreandmoreisolatedinternationally,sheappearedtoseek

aboveallPakistan’shumiliation,perhapstryingtospreadthecentrifugal

tendenciesfromEasttoWestPakistan.WhentheUnitedStatesagreedtoassume

themajorcostofrefugeerelief,Indiaswitchedtoinsistingthattherefugee

problemwasinsolublewithoutapoliticalsettlement.ButIndia’stermsfora

settlementescalatedbytheweek.WhentheUnitedStatesofferedtoalleviate

famineinEastPakistan,India—togetherwithmanyintheUnitedStates—

demandedthatthereliefprogramberunbyaninternational agency.Thereason

wasostensiblytoensureitsfairdistr ibution, butitwouldalsopreventthe

Pakistanigovernmentfromgainingcreditwithitsownpopulation.



InMay1971welearnedfromsourcesheretoforereliablethatMrs.Gandhi

hadorderedplansforalightning“Israeli‐type”attacktotakeoverEastPakistan.

AndwehadhardevidencethatIndiawasdispersingaircraftandmovingcombat

troopsandarmortotheborder. Nixontookthereportsseriouslyenoughtoorder

onMay23thatifIndialaunchedsuchanattack,USeconomicaidtoIndiawasto

becutoff.IassembledtheWSAGonMay26toreviewourpolicyintheeventofa

war.AroundthistimewelearnedthatIndianmilitaryleadersthoughtMrs.

Gandhi’sproposalofanattackonEastPa kistanwastoorisky.Theyfeare d

Chineseintervention,thepossibilityofothercountries’militaryaidtoPakistan

(especiallyIran’s),theuncertaintyofresupplyofSovietweapons,andthe

likelihoodthatallofPakistanmighthavetobeoccupiedtobringthewartoa

conclusion.TheIndiancommandersinsisted,ataminimum,onwaitinguntil