Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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notparticipated,indeed,wasunawareofitsexistence.Thereisnoagreement

thatcannotbepickedtodeathbyprofessionalsnotinvolvedinnegotiatingit.The

GermandeskoftheStateDepartmentdidnotgoquitethisfar;afterall,the

BritishandFrenchambassadorshadacceptedthetextoftheagreement.Rogers

simplycalledRushbackforAtwo‐weekconsultationsothattheDepartment

couldconductan“intensivereview.”



Wewereinaseriousquandary.Wehadtoconvincethenearly paranoid

Sovietsthatthedelaywasnotsignificant,yettheStateDepartmentcouldscarcely

betoldthatithadnorighttoreviewanagreementofsuchimportance.Wecould

notguaranteethatsomebureaucraticnitpickermightnotforceustoreopen

issuessettledalreadytwicewiththeSoviets,firstintheRush‐Bahr‐Falinmeetings

andthenagainintheFour‐PowerambassadorialtalkswithAbrasimov.Frenzied

phonecallsamongthePresident,Rogers,Haldeman,andMitchell(asRush’sold

friend)fo llowed.AsusualHaldemanwasassignedthetaskoffixingthings.

Brandt—atmysuggestion—weighedinwithastronglettertoNixonendorsing

theagreementasa“majorachievement”;thiswouldbeusefulwithRogers.Nixon

hadageniusforthinkingupexplanationsforafaitaccompli.Heappealedforthe

supportofhisSecretaryofStateonthegroundthattheEuropeansweresoupset

byNixon’seconomicmeasuresofAugust15imposinga10percentsurtaxon

importsthatweneededtoletthemhavetheirwayforachange(implyingthathe

hadhadnothingto dowithconcludingtheagreement).AfterameetingwithRush

onAugust25,Rogersbegantocomearound.Thefinalactoftheplaywasa

PresidentialinvitationtoRushtoSanClementeonAugust27.Thisculminatedina

pressconferenceduringwhichRushannouncedthathehadcompletedafinal

reviewwiththePresidentandthattheagreementwasa“majortriumphforthe

foreignpolicyofPresidentNixon.”Thatendedourinternalbickering.



Therewasonemorebizarrediversion,anotherlittleCommunistgamewith

translations:TheEastGermansproducedatextthatwasatconsiderablevariance

notonlywiththeEnglishandRussianversionsbutalsowiththeWestGerman

one.TheFrench,however,refusedtojoininpressureontheRussianstogetthe

EastGermanstoconform—theFrenchAmbassador,JeanSauvagnargues, stormed

outofonemeeting.TheFrenchpositionwasbasedontheirrefusaltogive

Germanthestatusofanofficiallanguage.WhileheartwarmingtoFrenchmen,it

representedaninterestingapproachtoanagreementdealinglargelywith

Germanmatters.Butasoftenhappensindiplomacyanessentiallyabsurdformula

endedthecontroversy.OnlytheFrench,Soviet,andEnglishtextswere

considered“official.”Thenegotiation endedwiththeanomalythatthereisno

authoritativeGermantextofanagreementthatdefinesthestatusoftheformer

capitalofGermanyandwhoseimplementationistoagreatdegreeinthehands

ofGermans.



TheQuadripartiteAgreementonBerlinwasofficiallysignedonSeptember

3,1971.KennethRush,whoseskillfuleffortshadmadeitpossible,paidtheprice

ofhisexertionswithaphysicalcollapsefromwhichittookhimseveralweeksto

recover.IftheBerlinnegotiationhasahero,itisRush.Hekeptfaithwithour

allies;hecurbedBahr’simpatience;heco nductednegotiationswithtwosetsof

Sovietambassadors(inBerlinandinBonn)withgreatabilityandtotaldiscretion.

Withouthim,oureffortcouldneverhaveachieveditsdramaticsuccess.



TheunsentimentalapproachtoSovietrelationswasnowclearlybeginning

topayoff.Wewerebeginningtodemonstratethatcalculationsofnational

interestwerebettersolventsofEast‐Westdeadlocksthanappealstoachangeof

heart.Linkagewasworkingevenifrejectedbytheorists;wehadkeptSALTand

Berlinintandemandsubstantiallyachievedourgoals.And,ofcourse,theSoviets

werereasonablysatisfiedbyBrandt’sconcessions;onlyamateursbelieveinone‐

sideddeals.



<<Contents>>



****



TheSummitfinally



B

oththeSALTandBerlinnegotiationshadastheircontrapuntalmotifthe

attempttoarrangeasummitmeeting.Wehadraisedtheissuein1970but

hadbeenableto advanceitsprospectsnofurtherthanageneralsuggestionfirst

presentedbyDobryninonSeptember25,1970,laterreinforcedbyGromykoto

Nixon,thatasuitabledatewouldbesometimeinthelatesummerof1971.

Gromykohad,however,stoppedwellshortofiss uingaformalinvitation,and

Dobryninhadcontinuedtoevadesettingadate.Obviously,theSoviets

consideredtheprospectofmeetingtheirleadersanirresistibleboontous,

worthyofbeingsoldoverandoveragainatahighprice. 



ItwasnotuntilJanuary23,1971,whenIagreedtodiscussBerlininthe

DobryninChannel,thatsummitpreparationsspeededup.Dobryninbegantobe

morespecificaboutthetiming,whilealwaysavoidingultimateconcreteness.

Clearly,ifIlinkedBerlintoSALT,theSovietslinkedBerlinto asummit.The

problemwithMoscow’sstrategywasthatatthesametimewewerealsoquietly

arranginganothersummitwithPeking,andthismadeourbargainingposition

muchstrongerthanitcanhaveappeared.



DobrynincamebacktothesummitafewmoretimesinFebruary1971,

reaffirminganautumndate,buthewasnotpreparedtodiscussany

arrangements.Afterward,thesummitdisappearedfromouragendabecausethe

Sovietleadershipwasallegedlypreoccupiedbyitstwenty‐fourthPartyCongress.

AttheendofMarchDobryninleftforoneofhisfrequentconsultationsin

Moscow,sothattheautumngrewagainelusive;aguardianangelmusthavebeen

watchingoverusbecausewewerefarfrompreparedforasummit.



ThePartyCongressestablishedBrezhnev’spreeminentposition.Iwrotethe

Presidentinmid‐AprilthatinmyviewBrezhnevhademergedasthedominant

personality.Idrewfromthatmixedprospects:



…inthemajorsubstantiveissuesbetweenus,Brezhnevalmostcertainlyseeshimselfas

operatingfromconsiderablestrength.Hispropensityforconcessionsislikelytobelimited

accordinglysincehewillexpecttobeabletowaitusoutandtoletthe“peaceissue”doits

workhereastheelectionapproaches.



Nevertheless,areasonablenetjudgmentwouldbe(a)thatBrezhnevhassomeroomfor

genuinenegotiation,and(b)hasanincentiveforsomestabilizationwithustohelphim

accomplishhisdomesticgoalsandcontroldivisivetendenciesinhisempire.



Nixonwroteinthemargin:“wewillhavetheanswerinthirtydays.”The

answer,however,showedthattheSovietswerenomorepreparedtomakea

clear‐cutdecisionunderthenewleadershipthanundertheold:Theywanteda

summitbuttheyalsowishedtoreinsurethemselvesbyusingittoputtheheaton

usduringtheBerlinnegotiations.Theywantedanewrelationshipbutdidnot

trustusenoughtorelyonourcompletinganegotiationwhichwasinbothour

interestsandonwhichbothsideshadinvestedagreatdealoftheireffort,time,

andprestige.ThusonApril23DobryninsuggestedSeptemberbutlinkedthe

summitexplicitlytoaBerlinagreement.Ireactedsharply,insistingthatwewould

acceptnoconditions(thiswasnotalittledisingenuous,fromoneofthechief

exponentsofthelinkagetheory).Dobrynin,usingmyownlinkagearguments

againstme,insistedthatMoscowwastalkingaboutreality,notconditions.Iwas

lessthangratefulthatDobryninshouldpresenthimselfassoaptastudent.On

April26—thedaybeforethefinalconfirmationofPeking’sinvitation—Iwarned

Dobryninnottoplaywiththesummit;thenexttimewediscusseditheshouldbe

preparedtomakeanannouncement.



ThenexttimeturnedouttobeJune8atCampDavid,towhichIhadinvited

DobryninforageneralreviewofUS‐Sovietrelations.Dobryninasserted

ingratiatinglythathecountedonNixon’sreelection,andthenusedthisargument

tosuggestthattherewasnohurryaboutasummit.Itwouldcomeaboutnaturally

aftertheBerlinnegotiationswerecompleted.Itwasapettyandunnecessary

maneuverbecauseGromykomusthaveknown—despiteFalin’sepicfairytales—

thatweweremovingtoanearlyconclusion.



Bythen,planningformyPekingtripwaswelladvanced.AtCampDavidon

June8IwasmoreconcernedthattheSovietswouldtiedownthesummit

prematurelythanIwaswithfindingamutuallyagreeabledate.ThelastthingI

wantedwasthepublicannouncementofa US‐Sovietagreementtoasummit

whileIwasenroutetoPeking.IthereforeaskedDobryninto letmehavea

definitiveanswerbytheendofJune(IwastoleaveonJuly1formytwelve‐day

Asiantrip);otherwiseSeptemberwouldprovenolongerfeasible.Dobryninno

doubtthoughtthedeadlinerevealedanimpatiencethatitwouldbeapitynotto

exploit.Itwas,infact,areflectionofprudentreinsuranceinagamewhosenature

theSovietshadnotyetgrasped.



OnJuly5,whileIwasinBangkokandfourdaysfromarrivinginPeking,

MoscowturneddowntheSeptemberdateithadoriginallyproposed.Dobrynin’s

deputy,Vorontsov,broughtinareplytoHaig,whocalledLordat3:00a.m.,

speakingindouble‐talk(whichanilliteratechildcouldhavedeciphered).The

Sovietnotenotonlyputoffthesummitbutintroducedmoreconditions. It

admittedthattherehadlatelybeenmovementinthediscussionofsome

questions(meaningBerlin).“Atthesametimethereisyetnofullcertainty

whetheragreementscouldbereachedassoonasdesired.”TheSovietsproposed

amutuallyacceptabletimeclosertotheendof1971.Thedateforan

announcementwastobe“pinpointed”inadditionaltalks—inotherwords,

anotherstall.Attheendofthemessagetherewasaparagraphthatsuggested

theSovietsweremakingthesummitconditionalnotonlyonBerlinbutalsoon

Americanrestraintingeneral(perhapsthinkingofVietnam):“Itisnecessarythat

bothsideswillallowintheiractivitiesnothingthatwouldmakethesituation

unfavorableforthepreparationandholdingofthemeetingandwouldweaken

thechancesofgettingpositiveresultsatsuchameeting.”



IcabledHaigthatVorontsov’snotehaditsadvantages.Wecouldnow

completethesummitsinourpreferredorder.TheSovietUnionwouldfindit

moredifficulttoaccuseusofbadfaithinouropeningtoPeking(notadecisive

factor,buthelpful).AndiftheSovietsstillwantedtogoaheadwithaMoscow

summit—asIthoughtprobable—itwouldtakeplaceincircumstanceswherethe

balanceofinterestswasmorevisible.Asalreadyindicated,IalsoinstructedKen

RushinBonntoslowdowntheBerlintalksfortwoweeks.



Wecouldnotcompletelyignoretheadviceofallleadinggovernmental

expertsontheSovietUniontotheeffectthatanopeningtoChinamightcause

Sovietpolicytoturntoahardline.WhileIdisagreedwiththisjudgment,Ithought

itnecessarytotakeoutinsuranceincase Iprovedmistaken.OnJuly15,about

forty‐fiveminutesbeforetheannouncementofmytriptoPeking,wesenta

messagetotheSovietleadersthroughVorontsov,coylyremindingtheSoviet

governmentof“thesequenceofeventswhichprecededtheannouncement.”We

reaffirmedourwillingnesstocontinueimprovingrelations.Westressedthatthe

July15announcementwasnotaimedatanycountry;however,wewere

preparedforallconsequences.



Therewasnoneedforconcern,asourownpreviousanalysisofSoviet

motivationsshouldhavetaughtus.Sovietleadersdonotchallengeobjective

factors;theyadjusttothem.Theywerenotabouttodriveusirrevocablytothe

Chineseside.Theycalculatedinsteadthattheyhadmoretooffer.Inshort,the

Kremlinplayeditspartinthetriangularrelationshipgrudgingly,nodoubtwaiting

foranopportunitytogeteven,butgivennochoicebythelogicofevents.



WhenIsawDobryninonJuly19,fourdaysaftertheworldhadlearnedthat

NixonwasgoingtoPeking,hewasathisingratiatingbest.Hewasnowallfora

Moscowsummit.Thequestionwas,couldittakeplacebeforetheoneinPeking?I

putitasmypersonalopinionthatthesummitsshouldbeheldintheorderin

whichtheyweredecidedupon—exactlythesamepointIhadmadeinPeking.

Dobrynin—nodoubtindeeptroubleinMoscowfornothavingforeseenour

move—regrettedthatwehadnotgivenhimanyadvancewarning.Onreflection

headmittedthatthiswouldhavebeenaskingtoomuch.Andhekeptinquiring

abouttheimpactofSovietrejectionoftheSeptemberdateforaNixonvisit

(probablytoshiftsomeoftheblametohissuperiors).Histoneanddemeanorhad

changedsincetheannouncementofmyChinavisit.Nowthatweclearlyhad

otheroptions,theannoyingalternationofcarrotandstickdisappeared.Wehad

totallymisunderstoodtheirJuly5message,heaverred.Itwasproducedonlyby

schedulingdifficulties;itreflectednolackofinterestinhigh‐levelmeetings.Since

theSovietleaderswerevisitingFranceinOctober,thesuggestionofNovemberor

Decemberhadbeenlargelyaproceduralpreference.Ichosenottoremindhimof

theconditionsorofthecat‐and‐mousegamethathadextendedoverfourteen

months.



ThenewSoviettacticwasobvious.Itwastodemonstrate,asI havesaid,

thatinatrilateraldiplomacyPekinggaveusamovebutnotastrategy;Moscow

couldofferconcretebenefits.AsBrezhnevwastoputitlater,Nixonwent“to

PekingforbanquetsbuttoMoscowtodobusiness.”BythisapproachMoscow

attemptedtobringhometoPekingthatithadnorealoptions:Hostilityto

Moscowhadledtoamassivebuildupontheborder;anattempttoopenchannels

towashingtonwouldonlyleadMoscowtodemonstrateonceagainthatitwasthe

sidewiththegreaterassets.



Therewasnoreasontodisabus etheSovietsoftheirbelief.Tohavethetwo

Communistpowerscompetingforgoodrelationswithuscouldonlybenefitthe

causeofpeace;itwastheessenceoftriangularstrategy.Ourroadthroughthis

mazewastoplayitstraightwithalltheparties.Geopolitically,itwasagainstour

interesttohavetheSovietUniondominateChina orforChinatobedrivenback

towardMoscow.Wewoulddonothing,therefore,tofurtherSovietdesignsto

establishChina’simpotence.Indeed,iftheworstweretohappen,Iwasconvinced

thatwecouldnotstandidlybyincaseofaSovietattackonChina—aviewfewof

mycolleaguesshared.



Ontheotherhand,wecouldnotwishtoprovokethatcontingency.Sino‐

Soviettensionsfollowedtheirownlogic;theywerenotcreatedbyusnorcould

theybemanipulatedbyusdirectly.EachoftheCommunistantagonistswas

certaintobeaffectedbyouractions;eachwouldseektonudgeusinthedirection

itfavored;eachwoulddetermineitsrelationtotheotherinpartintermsofits

assessmentofourintentionsandactions.Buttoseektomanipulatethemwasto

makeustheirprisoner.Wehadnocapacitytofuelaconflictofwhoseoriginwe

hadbeenunaware,andtheattempttodosowaslikelytotemptthetwosidesto

blackmailusseriatim.



Wehadtowalkanarrowpath.Wewouldmakethoseagreementswiththe

SovietUnionwhichweconsideredinournationalinterest.Butwewouldgiveno

encouragementtovisionsofcondominium,andwewouldresistanyattemptsby

MoscowtoachievehegemonyoverChinaorelsewhere.WewouldkeepChina

informedofournegotiationswiththeSovietUnionandinconsiderabledetail;we

wouldtakeaccountofPeking’sviews.Wewouldconcludenoagreementaimedat

Chineseinterests.ButwewouldnotgivePekinga vetooverouractions.We

followedtheseprinciplestowardbothsidesscrupulouslyfrom thebeginningof

thetriangularrelationship—althoughsinceMoscowwasthestrongerpartywe

briefeditmuchlesspreciselyorfrequently.



InearlyAugust1971IrecommendedtothePresidenttoopendirect

communicationswithBrezhnev.Untilthentherareexchangesbetweenthetop

leadershadbeenwithKosygin.ButthePartyCongresshadmadeclear—and

Dobryninhademphasized—thathenceforthBrezhnevwouldtakeanincreasing

interestinforeignpolicy.OnAugust5,therefore,aletterwassentfromNixonto

Brezhnev—draftedbymystaffandme—outliningthebasicelementsofourpo licy

towardtheSovietUnion.ItreiteratedthethemewehadstressedsinceNixon’s

Inauguration:thatprogressinourrelationsrequiredconcretesolutions,ofwhich

SALTwasoneofthemostimportant.Itthensketchedourviewsonotherissues

alongwell‐establishedlines.It stressedthatwewouldproceedwiththe

normalizationofre lationswithChina notasapolicyaimedattheSovietUnion

butinpursuitofourconceptionofastableworldorder.



Afterthatthepaceofrelationsaccelerated.ThetoneofSoviet

communicationseasedconsiderably.Goneweretheconditionsoftheprevious

threemonthsortheescapeclausesgearedtogeneralAmericanconduct.On

August10theSovietsextendedaformalinvitationtoPresidentNixontovisit

MoscowinMayorJune1972.TheSovietnoteindicatedthattheUSSR

“welcomed”thenormalizationofrelationsbetweenPekingandwashingtonwith

thecaveatthateverythingdependedonhowtheserelationswouldbedeveloped.

Whistlingpastthegraveyard,thenoteassertedthattheSovietswerenotswayed

“bytransitorycalculationsnomatterhowimportant thelattermayseem.”But

justaswecouldruinthetrilateralrelationshipbyseemingtoexploitit,sothe

Sovietscouldnotescapeitsconsequencesbyproclaimingitsirrelevance.



ThatMoscow,whateveritprofessed,understoodrealitybecameapparent

inallthatfollowed.AftertheannouncementofthePresident’striptoPekingthe

unsettledissuesonBerlinwereresolvedinoneweektooursatisfaction.The

accidental‐waragreement,providingforrapidcommunicatio n incaseoftechnical

malfunctionbutstrippedofallanti‐Chineseimplications,wasconcludedbythe

endofAugust.ItwassignedonSeptember30inwashingtonduringGromyko’s

annualvisittotheUnitedStatesfortheUNGeneralAssembly.Thetoneinallour

otherdealingschangeddramatically.Coexistence—atleastforatime—was

comingabout,notbecauseofsuddenmoralinsightsbutthroughthenecessities

oftheinternationalbalancethatwehadhelpedtoshape.



OnAugust17ItoldDobryninthatweacceptedthesummitinvitation.The

restofthemonthwasspentindraftinganannouncementthat,liketheonein

Peking,soughttoavoidhavingeithersideappearasthesupplicant.Dobryninand

IonSeptember7fi nallysettledonaneutralformulationthatindicatedenough

progresshadbeenmadeinUS‐Sovietrelationsfortheleadersofthetwo

countriestomeetinthesecondhalfofMay1972inMoscow.Theannouncement

wastobemadeOctober12afterGromyko’svisittowashington.



GromykoarrivedattheOvalOfficeonSeptember29,1971,exuding

joviality,thedoublenegativesallpointinginapositivedirection.Heannounced

thatMoscowconsideredtheUS‐Sovietrelationshipcentraltoworldpeace;

Brezhnevwouldhaveitunderhispersonalcare.Heindicatedanewapproachto

theMiddleEast;theSovietUnionwouldbepreparedtowithdrawitscombat

forcesfromEgyptincaseofafinalsettlement(discussedmorefullyinChapter

XXX).HewentsofarastooffertoconveyamessagetoHanoi.Heaverredhis

interestinarapidandsuccessfulconclusionoftheSALTnegotiations.



Justastheyearbefore,itwasarrangedpriortothemeetingthatNixon

wouldtakeGromykotohishideawayintheExecutiveOfficeBuilding.Itwasvital

thathedosobecausenooneinourbureaucracyasyetknewthatasummithad

beenagreedto,muchlessthetextofanannouncement.Nixonreturned,

beaming,fromtheprivatemeetingtotellhisSecretaryofStatethatheand

GromykohadjustsettledplansfortheMoscowsummit,creatingtheimpression

thatGromykohadbroughttheinvitation,thatNixonhadaccepteditonthespot,

andthatthetwoofthemhadjointlynegotiatedtheannouncement.(Thishadthe

addedadvantageofcastingNixonintheroleoftheprincipalnegotiatorand

reducingtherebythetensionsbetweenRogersandme.)Gromykoplayedhispart

insomebafflementbutwiththepokerfaceandaplombthathadseenhim

throughdecadesoftheinfinitelymorelethalKremlinpolitics.



ImetwithGromykothenextdayattheSovietembassy.Theatmosphere

couldnothavebeenmorecordial.There wasnolongeranyfoot‐draggingabout

therelationshipbetweenoffensiveanddefensivelimitationsonSALT;onthe

contrary,GromykoleftlittledoubtthatMoscowwoulddoitsutmosttocomplete

bothagreementsintimeforthesummit.Gromykovolunteeredthata

forthcomingvisitbySovietPresidentPodgornytoHanoihadnotbeeninitiatedby

MoscowbuthadcomeaboutattheurgentrequestoftheNorthVietnamese.He

wonderedwhetherwemightsettlefora“neutral”government inSaigon,

excludingCommunistsaswellasThieu.Irepliedthatwewouldnotoverthrow

Thieuaspartofasettlementbutthatwewereopentoapoliticalprocessinwhich

allforcescouldparticipateafterasettlementhadbeenachieved.Gromyko

pretendedthatthisrepetitionofourformalpositionwasnewsworthyofbeing

transmittedtoHanoi.GiventhefactthatwehaddirectchannelstotheNorth

Vietnamese,IsawnopointinaSovietmediationinwhichwecouldneverbesure

whetherthemediatorunderstoodallthesubtletiesorhadthesameinterestas

wedidinconveyingaccurateinformation.Ididre vivetheideabehindtheVance

missionoftwoyearsearlier;IofferedtogotoMoscowforhigh‐levelnegotiations

withaseniorNorthVietnameseifHanoisawsomeprospectofarapidsettlement.



Thisofferwascaughtupina bureaucraticdilemma.Eversincemysecret

triptheSovietswereeagerformetovisitMoscowtopreparethesummit,

wantingabsoluteparityoftreatmentwithPeking.(sinceIhadmadeasecrettrip

toPeking,theywantedmetomakeasecrettriptoMoscow!)Gromykobrought

thefirstinvitation;itwasrepeatedinwritingonDecember1.Italsoreflecteda

realneed.Summitsarenotoriouslypooroccasionsfornegotiation.Theyhavea

built‐indeadline,protocolreigns,andiftheyaretosucceed,anymajoragreement

needstobeworkedoutinadvance.Andgiventheorganizationofour

government,Iwastheinterlocutorwhocouldbemostdecisive.



NixonagreedwiththeprincipleofmyvisittoMoscow,butsawnowayto

implementitandkeepontermswithRogers.Inthisjudgmenthewasquiteright.

Ishareditandneverurgeda visituntilmuchlater,whentheNorthVietnamese

offensivebrokeuponussevenweeksbeforetheprojectedsummitandmade

immediatecontactwithBrezhnevimperative.Nixonhadkept Rogersfromvisiting

Moscowfornearlythreeyears,partlybecausehewantedtobethefirstsenior

Americantogothere,partlybecauseastimewentonheandRogersrarely

exploredeachother’smindontheissues.Buttosendme—untilevents

demanded—wouldhavebeenunnecessa rilywounding.



Theproposalforhigh‐leveltalksonVietnaminMoscowwasnomore

successfulthantheinitiativeoftheVancemission—exceptthatthistimewe

receivedanofficialreply.OnOctober16wewereofficiallytoldbyDobryninthat

HanoipreferredtodealwithusdirectlyratherthanthroughMoscow.



Duringthecourseof1971wehadfendedoffcontinualurgingsfromour

economicagenciestoeaserestrictionsontradewiththeUSSR.Ourstrategywas

tousetradeconcessionsasa politicalinstrument,withholdingthemwhenSoviet

conductwasadventurousandgrantingtheminmeasureddoseswhentheSoviets

behavedcooperatively.Ingeneral,wefavoredprojectsthatrequiredenoughtime

tocompleteforustohavecontinuedleverageonSovietconduct.Wesatona

schemeforanAmericanfirmtosellgear‐cuttingmachineryforaSovietcivilian

truckplantontheKamaRiverfortwoyearsinthefaceofmassivepressuresfrom

oureconomicagenciesandtheCongress;wereceivedmanythreateningletters

fromindividualsstaunchlyanti‐Communistuntiltheysawprofitsinjeopardy.

AftertheSovietsagreedtotheMay20compromiseonSALT,theplantwas

quicklyapproved.SomeotherprojectsrelatedtotheKamaRiverplantwereheld

upuntiltherewasabreakthroughonBerlinaftertheannouncementofmyChina

trip.Partwasheldupagainduring theIndia‐Pakistancrisis.PeterG.Peterson,

thenAssistanttothePresidentforInternationaleconomicAffairs,workedout

effectivecoordinationthatsubjectedallsucheconomicdecisionstoourforeign

policystrategy.Hecarriedoutthesamerolewithabilityandfinesseafterhe

becamesecretaryofCommercein1972.

