Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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reportsthatsomeIndianofficialswerespeakingoftheprobabilityofwarbefore

theendofthemonth.Theyprovedtobeoffbyonlyaweek.



IcalledaWSAGmeetingonNovember12.TheStateDepartmentproposed

topressYahyaforanothermaximumpoliticalprogramasawayof“helping [him]

outofaboxshortofwar,”asonestatereprese ntativenoted.Unfortunately,the

onlyconcessionshehadnotyetmadeweretheimmediatereleaseofMujiband

theproclamationoftheindependenceofhalfhiscountry—concessionshe

consideredhumiliatingandthereforedeferredtothesoontobeinstalledcivilian

government.Therewasnothingtosuggestthatthiscouldbeachievedintimeto

avertIndia’sheadlongrushintoconflict.Thesingleapproachthathadaslight

chanceofworkingwouldhavebeenathreateningdemarchetoNewDelhi;no

onewaswillingtoputthisforward.Itoldmycolleaguesagainthatwewould

encouragepoliticalevolution,butwewouldnotsupporttheIndianstrategyofso

forcingthepacethatWestPakistancouldnotsurvive:



IfMrs.Gandhiwantsawayout,weshouldtrytogiveittoher.Butwehavebrokenour

backstohelpherandwhathasshedone?Shehasn’tacceptedonethingwe’veoffered.Shehas

saidfriendlythingsaboutthePresident,buttheywerenotrelatedtowhathesaid.She’s

merelytryingtojockeyusintopositionasthevillainofthepiece.Thequestionishowarewe

restrainingherbygivinghertwo‐thirdsofwhatshewantsandlettingherusethatasabasisfor

thenextmove?



Thetimeforrecrimination,however,hadpassed.Wefacedacrisiswithfew

toolssaveremonstrance.So wewentbacktothecablemachine.Wewould

furthertestYahya’sflexibilitywithrespecttoMujib.Statealsosentitsdispatches

counselingrestraint.Indiahardlybotheredtorespond;itcomplainedthatour

demarchesputitonthesamelevelasPakistan.Indiandiplomacy,having

obtainedmostoftheconcessionsithadaskedfor,wasnowconfinedtohavingits

Ambassadorinquireintothestatusoftheoneconditionitknewtobeunfulfillable

intheshortrun:thereleaseofMujibandhisrecognitionassolenegotiat orwith

Pakistan.



IdidmypartinameetingwithPakistaniForeignSecretarysultanKhan,

whowasvisitingWashington,onNovember15.Thisdecentandablemanhad

seenmeoffatIslamabadforPekingonlyfourmonthspreviously.Inowhadto

urgehimastactfullyasIcouldtoshowtheutmostflexibilityoverMujib.He

repliedthatinhisviewthepresentmilitarygovernmenthadreachedthelimitsof

concession.Onceaciviliangovernmentwereformed,however,somesixweeks

hence,theissuewouldbereconsidered.Yahyahimselfmadethesamepointto

AmbassadorFarlandonNovember18,emphasizingthathismainobjectivewasto

implementhistimetableforaciviliangovernment:“Iftheciviliangovernment

thenwantstodealwithBangladeshthroughMujiborotherwise,thatwillbethe

businessoftheciviliangovernmentandofnoconcerntome.Iwillhave

accomplishedmyobjectiveofturningthepowerbacktothepeople.”



ItalkedtoDobrynintwice,onNovember15and18.Onbothoccasions I

warnedthatthecontinuingSovietairliftofarmswasaddingtothetensions.

DobryninsuavelyrepliedthatinfacttheSovietUnionwascounselingrestraint.

OnNovember19Idiscusse d withJhaatimetableaccordingtowhichfull

autonomywouldbeachievedinEastBengalbyMarch.Heshruggeditoff.



TheprospectsforpeacediminishwhenapotentialaggressorseesaPrize

closeathand,enjoysoverwhelmingsuperiorityontheground,andperceivesthe

intendedvictimtobeisolated,demoralized,anddisarmed. OnNovember22,the

firststageoffull‐scalewarbrokeoutonthesubcontinent,thoughnearlyaweek

passedbeforeIndia admitteditandbeforeallofouragencieswerepreparedto

faceitsimplications.



<<Contents>>

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

WarbetweenIndiaandPakistan



nNovember22IreportedtoNixon:



ThePakistanistodayclaiminradiobroadcaststhatIndia“withoutaformaldeclaration

ofwar,haslaunchedanall‐outoffensiveagainstEastPakistan.”…TheIndiansclaimthatthese

reportsare“absolutelyfalse.”…Atthispoint,wehavenoindependentevidencebutitseems

apparentthattherehadbeenamajorincident.

O



Crisesalwaysstartasconfusion,thisonemorethanmost.ThePakistani

Ambassadorhadnoinformation;secretaryRogers,whohadnobettersources

thanI,couldonlynotetheconflictingreports.Nixonwasraringtocarryouthis

threat,reiteratedsinceMay,thathewouldterminateaidtoIndia.Toheadoff

domesticcriticismhewantedtoannounc ethisasacutoffofaidtoboth

belligerents,knowingthataidtoPakistanwasalreadybeingdriedup.I

recommendedthathedelayadecisionuntilafteraWSAGmeetingcalledforthe

afternoon.IwasskepticalevenofannouncingacutoffforPakistanifitturnedout

thatIndiawastheaggressor.Itwasjusttoocynical;itmightbemisunderstoodin

Peking.NixonwasforwhatevercoursewouldhurtIndiamore.



IhadnodoubtthatwewerenowwitnessingthebeginningofanIndia‐

PakistanwarandthatIndiahadstartedit.Despitepopularmyths,largemilitary

unitsdonotfightbyaccident;somecommandsetsthemintomotion.Noamount

ofobfuscationcouldoffsettheimprobabilitythat70,000Pakistanisoldiers

engagedinaguerrillawarwouldattack200,000Indiantroops,orthatthe

PakistaniairforceoftwelveplanesinEastPakistanwouldhavetakenonthe200

Indianplanesrangedagainstit.Therewasnopretenseoflegality.Therewasno

doubtinmymind—aviewheldevenmorestronglybyNixon—thatIndiahad

escalateditsdemandscontinuallyanddeliberatelytopreventasettlement.Tobe

sure,PakistanirepressioninEastBengalhadbeenbrutalandshortsighted;and

millionsofrefugeeshadimposedenormousstrainontheIndianeconomy.But

whathadcausedthewar,inNixon’sviewandmine,wentbeyondtherefugee

problem;itwasIndia’sdeterminationtousethecrisistoestablishits

preeminenceonthesubcontinent.



Butourparamountconcerntranscendedthesubcontinent.TheSoviet

UnioncouldhaverestrainedIndia;itchosenotto.Ithad,infact,actively

encouragedwarbysigningtheFriendshipTreaty,giving diplomaticsupportto

India’smaximumdemands,airliftingmilitarysupplies,andpledgingtoveto

inconvenientresolutionsintheUNSecurityCouncil.TheSovietsencouragedIndia

toexploitPakistan’stravailinparttodeliverablowtooursystemofalliances,in

evengreatermeasuretodemonstrateChineseim potence.Sinceitwasacommon

concernaboutSovietpowerthathaddrivenPekingandWashingtontogether,a

demonstrationofAmericanirrelevancewouldseverelystrainourprecariousnew

relationshipwithChina.Hadwefollowed theadviceofourcritics—massivepublic

dissociationfromPakistanandconfrontationwithitinitsmomentof

desperation—wewouldhavebeenoperatingpreciselyastheUS‐Soviet

condominiumsodreadedbyPeking;thisalmostsurelywouldhaveundoneour

Chinainitiative.Iheardoccasionalcommentsintheinteragencymeetings

implyingthatwewereobsessedwithpreservingthetriptoChina.ButasIsaidto

Nixon,“Thesepeopledon’trecognizethatwithoutaChinatripwewouldn’thave

hadaMoscowtrip.”



Norwerewedefendingonlyabstractprinciplesofinternationalconduct.

Thevictimoftheattackwasanally—howeverreluctantmanyweretoadmitit—

towhichwehadmadeseveralexplicitpromisesconcerningpreciselythis

contingency.Cleartreatycommitmentsreinforcedbyotherundertakingsdated

backto1959.Onecoulddebatethewisdomoftheseundertakings(andmuchof

ourbureaucracywassoeagertoforgetaboutthemthatforatimeitprovednext

toimpossibleevenfortheWhiteHouse toextractcopiesofthe1962

communications),butwecouldnotignorethem.Todosowouldhave

disheartenedallieslikeIranandTurkey,whichsympathizedwithPakistan,hadthe

samecommitmentfromus,andlookedtoourreactionasatokenofAmerican

steadinessinpotentialcrisesaffectingthem.Highstakeswerethereforeinvolved.

OnDecember5ItoldNixonthattheIndia‐Pakistanconflict wouldturnintoa

dressrehearsalfortheMiddleEastinthespring.ImadethesamepointtoJohn

ConnallybeforeandaftertheDecember6NSCmeeting.



Therewasnoquestionof“saving”EastPakistan.BothNixonandIhad

recognizedformonthsthatitsindependencewasinevitable;warwasnot

necessarytoaccomplishit.WestrovetopreserveWestPaki stanasan

independentstate,sincewejudgedIndia’srealaimwastoencompassits

disintegration.WesoughttopreventademonstrationthatSovietarmsand

diplomaticsupportwereinevitablydecisiveincrises.OnDecember4ItoldNixon

thatpreciselybecausewewereretreatingfromVietnamwecouldnotpermitthe

impressiontobecreatedthatallissuescouldbesettledbynakedforce.Thoughit

wasnowtoolatetopreventwar,westillhadanopportunity—throughthe

intensityofourreaction—tomaketheSovietspausebeforetheyundertook

anotheradventuresomewhereelse.AsItoldNixononDecember5,wehadto

becomesufficientlythreateningtodiscouragesimilarmovesbySovietfriendsin

otherareas,especiallytheMiddleEast.Andifweactedwithenoughdaring,we

mightstoptheIndianonslaughtbeforeitengulfedandshatteredWestPakistan.



Itwasnearlyimpossibletoimplementthisstrategybecauseour

departmentsoperatedondifferentpremises.Theywereafraidofantagonizing

India;theysawthatPakistanwasboundtolosethewarwhateverwedid;they

knewourcoursewasunpopularintheCongressandtheme dia. AndNixon,while

heunderstoodthestrategicstakes,couldnotbringhimselftoimposethe

disciplinerequiredtoimplementtheoperationaldetails.



TheForeignServiceisasplendidinstrument,highlytrained,dedicated,and

able.WhenIwasSecretaryofStateIgrewtoadmire itasaninstitution,to

respectitsmembers,andtodevelopaclose friendshipwithmanyofthem.Butit

requiresstrongleade rshiptoimposecoherenceontheparochialconcernsofthe

variousbureauswhicharemostconsciousofthedailypressures;thisisespecially

trueifthepolicytobepursuedisunpopularoratvariancewithlong‐held

predilections.Thatsenseofdirectionmustbesuppliedbytheseventhfloor—the

officeoftheSecretaryofStateandofhisimmediateentourage.Unfortunately—

tothecreditofneitherofus—myrelationswithRogershaddeterior atedtothe

pointthattheyexacerbatedourpolicydifferencesandendangeredcoherent

policy.Hewaslikelytoopposeanyrecommendationofminesimplyasan

assertionofprerogative;Itriedtobypasshimasmuchaspossible.(Whichcame

firstmustbedeterminedbymoreneutralhistorians.)Rogerswasconvincedthat

ourcoursewasmistakenandthatNixontookitonlybecauseofmybaneful

influence.IbelievedthatRogershadnograspofthegeopoliticalstakes.The

resultwasabureaucraticstalemateinwhichWhiteHouseandStateDepartment 

representativesdealtwitheachotherascompetingsovereignentities,not

membersofthesameteam,andthePresidentsoughttohavehiswaybyan

indirectionthatcompoundedtheinternalstressesofourgovernment.



AtthefirstWSAGmeetingafterthewarbegan,onNovember22,theState

Departmentarguedthatwedidnothaveenoughfactstomakeanydecision.It

recommendedthatwepressPakistanforfurtherpoliticalconcessions.Though

thewarwasaclearviolationoftheUNCharter,theDepartmentwasambivalent

aboutgoingtotheUN;determinednottoclashwith India,itsawmeritingoing to

theUNnotinordertoinvokeCharterprovisionsagainstarmedattackbutonlyto

washourhandsoftheentireaffair.Iasked—Ifearnonetoopatiently—what

sensetherewasinrewardingIndiaforitsaggressionbypressingfornew

concessionsfromPakistan.WasitunreasonabletoaskIndiatowaitforfour

weekstoseehowthetransfertocivilian authoritywouldcomeout?Asforgoing

totheUN,IaskedStatetoprepareascenariobytheopeningofbusinessthenext

day.ThatsameeveningthePresidentsentmeaninstructionthatstrongcables

cautioningagainstwarbesenttoNewDelhi,Moscow,andIslamabad.Nixon

wantedMoscow,inparticular,tobewarnedaboutitssupplyofarmstoIndia.



Themilitaryoutcomewasbecomingobvious.Pakistantoldusthattwo

IndianbrigadeswereoperatinginsideEastPakistan.OnNovember23Nixon

receivedaletterfromYahyadescribingIndianmilitarydispositionsasineffecta

noosearoundthegovernmentforcesinEastPakistanthatwasbeingtightened

throughlargeandunprovokedattacks.AssuringNixonofhisdesiretoavoidwar

evenatthislatestage,YahyaappealedforNixon’s“personalinitiativeatthe

presentjuncture”which“couldstillprovedecisiveinavertingacatastrophe.”



Onthesameday—November23—wereceivedaletterfromMrs.Gandhi,

inexplicablydatedNovember18.Speakingasifaddressing apartnerinajoint

enterprise,Mrs.Gandhigaveherselfhighmarksforrestraint,whichsheascribed

tofaiththatjusticewouldprevailandwhichhadbeen“sustainedbythe

discussionI hadwithyou.”WhileIndianunitswereroamingoveraneighboring

country,Mrs.GandhiadvisedagainstconveningtheSecurityCouncil,arguingthat

“suchamovewouldobstructthepathofthesolutionswhichwejointlyseek.”It

wasaninterestingdoctrineofinternationallawthatrecoursetotheUnited

Nationsmightobstructthesolutionofamilitaryconflict.Andtheimplicationthat,

nowthatIndiahadattackeditsneighbor,wewereseeking“jointsolutions”did

littletocalmthePresidentialtemper.Mrs.GandhiappealedtoNixontousehis

“greatcourage”toinspireasolutionandexpressedthehopeforbetterrelations

betweentheUnitedStatesandIndia.Shedidnot vouchsafewhatsolutionshe

wasaimingfororwhatbetterrelationsbetweenIndiaandtheUnitedStates

wouldconsistof.Butitwasclearshedidnotwanttobecalledtodefendand

justifyIndia’spolicybeforetheworldcommunityattheUN.



TheWSAGmeetingofNovember23shednolightonthedirectioninwhich

Americaninfluence—nowrequestedbybothsides—couldbebroughttobear.

TheStateDepartmenthadnoobjectiontothecablestoMoscowandIslamabad

urgingrestraint(inthelattercase,nooneconsidereditoddtoaskthevictim ofa

militaryattacktoshowrestraint).ItwasthecabletoNewDelhithatwasgiving

trouble.UnderSecretaryofStateIrwinrecommendeddelayinguntilwehad

“independent”confirmationofanIndianattack.“wecanplaythischaradeonlyso

long,”Ireplied.



NorwasStatereadytocutoffmilitaryaidtoIndia,asNixondemanded.Its

representativesquestionedwhetheracutoffwasconsistentwithoureffortsto

restrainMrs.Gandhianddoubteditseffectiveness.Thiswasexactlytheopposite

ofwhathadbeenallegedformonthswithrespecttoPakistan!Andaftermonths

ofdemonstratingenormousingenuityindryingupthePakistanipipeline,they

seemedtotallyatalossonhowtoaccomplishitwithIndia,pleadingthedifficulty

oftracingequipmentalreadylicensed.Italsoturnedoutthatendingeconomicaid

tobothsideswouldhurtPakistanmorethanIndia.Ipointedoutwhatshould

havebeenaxiomatic:thatitmadenosensetorefrainfromcuttingoffmilitary

equipmenttotheattackingcountrywhenwehadalreadydonesotothevictim.



November23wasalso thedayofmyfirstsecretmeetingwiththeChinese

inNewYork.HuangHuawasnowPermanentRepresentativeofthePeople’s

RepublicofChinatotheUnitedNations.Pekinghadagreedthatwecoulduse

HuangHuainNewYorkasacontactonUNmattersorforemergencymessages;

therestofourbusinesswastobeconductedthroughParisasheretofore.I

thoughtitimportanttokeepPekingmeticulouslyinformedofourmo ves;ata

minimum,theChineseleadershadtounderstandthatwewerenotincollusion

withtheSovietUnion.Pekingneededtoappreciateourdeterminatio ntoresist

expansionismaswellasthelimitsonourpracticalpossibilitiesinthiscase.



HuangHuaandImetatasecretlocation inNewYorkCityintheEast

Thirties,aseedylittleapartmentinanoldbrownstonethattheCIAhadusedasa

safehouse.Onerequirementwasthatithavenodoormanandfewother

occupants.Otherwisewewouldbetemptingfateiftoomanysharp‐eyedNew

YorkerscouldseethreeChinesediplomatswearingMaosuitswalkintoabuilding,

tobefollowedbyHenryKissinger.(Laterwemovedourmeetingplacetoan

equallyseedyifslightlymorepretentious establishmentintheEastseventies.)At

thispointIcoulddolittlemorethanbriefHuangHuaonthemilitarysituation.I

showedhimthedraftresolutionwewouldsubmit totheSecurityCouncilifthe

issueweretakenupthere,indicatingwehadnotmadeafinaldecision.Huang

HuaemphasizedthatChinawouldsupportPakistanintheSecurityCouncil,but

wouldfollowPakistan’sleadastowhethertotaketheissuethere.



OnNovember24,Mrs.GandhiacknowledgedforthefirsttimethatIndian

troopshadcrossedthePakistaniborder.Theyhaddonesoonlyonce,shesaid,on

November21.And,sheinformedtheIndianParliament,Indiantroopshadacted

intheirrightofself‐defense.Futuredecisionstocrosstheborderwouldbeleftto

the“manonthespot”—agroupofcommanderseagertodemonstratetheir

prowess.



Inthefaceofallthisevidence,theWSAGmeetingonNovember24marked

timeasweawaitedtheresponsestoourdemarchesinNewDelhi,Islamabad,and

Moscow.IaskedthedepartmentswhethertherewasanydoubtthatIndian

regularforceshadinvadedEastPakistan.Mostagreed,but—inspiteofMrs.

Gandhi’sadmission—theStateDepartmentrepresentativestillregardedthe

evidenceasinconclusive.Theoperationaladviceofferedwas,again,topress

Pakistanforfurtherpoliticalco ncessions.Iftherewasa“tilt”intheUS

governmentatthisstage,objectivelyitwasonthesideofIndia.Bureaucratic

paralysishadthepracticaleffectofcooperatingwiththedelayingactionthat

Indiawasconductingonthediplomatic front.



AtnoononNovember24NixonmetwithRogersandmeintheOvalOffice.

ThepositionsfollowedthoseoftheWSAG,withRogersarguingthatwedidnot

haveenoughevidenceforaSecurityCouncilmove.Unfortunately,theimmediate

issueswereallextremelytechnical—phraseologyforpossibleUNresolutionsand

methodstoachievevariousdegreesofaidcutoff.Nixonhatedthissortofdetail;

discussingitmadehimvisiblynervous.Overrulinghisoldfriendwentagainsthis

graininanyevent.Sothemeetingendedinconclusively,withNixonafterward

frettingtomeabouthowtodealwithhisSecretaryofState;heplayedwiththe

ideaofgettingJohnMitchelltoreininRogersbutintheenddidnothing.



Theoutcomewasthateveryonewenthisownmerryway.TheState

Departmenthadpublicizeditsviewbyhavingitsspokesmandeclareatapress

briefingthattheUnitedStateshadnoevidencetochargeIndiawithaggression.

WhenthePakistaniAmbassadorprotestedtothesecretary,Rogersreiterated

thatwehad“noindependentinformationtoconfirmordeny”Indiancomplicityin

armedattack.RogersexplainedthatWashingtondidnotwanttobeinaposition

totakesidesastothetruthofconflictingreports.Ofcourse,thelocationofthe

battlelinedeepinsidePakistaniterritorywouldhavegivenusaprettygoodclue

astowhowasprobablydoingtheattacking.



BureaucraticinfightingcausedathirddaytopasswithoutanyseriousUS

reaction.Ihavepointedoutinpreviouschaptersthatcrisescanbemanagedonly

iftheyareoverpoweredearly.Oncetheygainmomentumthecommitmentsof

thepartiestendtodrivethemoutofcontrol.AsternwarningtoIndiaonthefirst

day,coupledwithaplausiblethreatofanaidcutoffbrutallyimplemented,might

possiblyhavegivenMrs.Gandhipausebeforesheescalated.(Itwould,ofcourse,

havebeenevenbettertodosobeforetheattack.)Doubtsaboutwhohad

attackedwerelargelyspurious.Guerrillaforcesdonotoperatetanksand

airplanesacrosshundredsofmilesofterritory.Plaintiveappealsforrestraintonly

revealedourhesitation;theymayhavespurredIndianmilitaryactionins teadof

restrainingit.



AmbassadorKeating’sexperiencewithSwaranSinghonThanksgiving Day,

November25,revealedthatIndia wasimplacable.Inastormyreplytoourplea

forrestraint,Singhcomplainedthattherehadbeennopoliticalprogresssince

Mrs.Gandhi’svisit.Hedidnottellushowitcouldhavebeenmade,sincehis

PrimeMinisterhadneverdeignedtoreacttoourproposalsanddidnot

communicatewithusuntilNovember23,forty‐eighthoursearlier. Hesaidthatif

Pakistanunilaterallywithdrewitstroops,thiswouldcreateanewsituation,but

herefusedtotelluswhetherIndiawouldfollowsuit.ItwasPakistanthat

threatenedIndia,saidSingh,nottheotherwayaround.WhenKeatingreferredto

IndiantroopsonPakistaniterritory,Singhblithelyrepliedthisdidnottallywith

thefactsasheknewthem.EvenKeating,whostronglysupportedtheIndianpoint

ofview,lobbiedforitinCongress,andfrequentlycastigatedbothNixonandme

privately,foundhimselfobligedtoadmitinanunderstatementthatSinghwas

“lessthancompletelyfrankwithmewithregardtoIndianmilitarypersonnel

insideEastPakistan.”