Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

statementsduringtheweek,rangingfromthespeechbyGeorgeBushcharging

IndianaggressiontoaStateDepartmentstatementavowingstrictneutrality.

Whatshouldtheybelieve?Itoldhimthatitwasnosecretthattherewere

disagreements;therewasequallynosecretwhereNixonandIstood,andthe

WhiteHousemadethefinaldecisions.Itwashisobligationtocooperatewith

thoseofuswhowantedtosaveWestPakistan;wecouldnotletourdomestic

opponentsachievetheirgoalsbyconfusingourfriends.BhuttoandIfinally

agreedthatifwedidnothearfromMoscowbynoonthenextdaywewould

returntheissuetotheSecurityCouncil,takingasapretexttheimmine ntendof

hostilitiesinEastPakistan.Wewouldbeginbydemandingacease‐fireandIndian

withdrawal,butwewouldsettleforasimplecease‐fireinplace,ineffect

acceptingtheIndianfaitaccompliinBengal.IhadtocountonBhuttotomake

suretheChineseunderstoodourposition.



ReturningtoWashington,IcalledVorontsovtosaythathehaduntilnoon

onDecember12orwewouldproceedunilaterally.Vorontsovtoldmethat

DeputyForeignMinisterVasilyKuznetsovhadbeendispatchedtoNewDelhito

arrangeforasatisfactoryoutcomeandtourgeIndianrestraint .ItoldNixonthat

thiswasprobablytrue;theIndiansneedednoSovietvisitortostrengthentheir

determinationtodestroyPakistanandKuznetsovwasknowntousasamoderate

professional. ButwhethertheSovietswerepressingforacease‐fireoreggingon

theIndians,ourcoursehadtobethesame:wehadtoincreasethepre ssureuntil 

wewereassuredbyIndiathattherewouldbeacease‐fireandnoannex ationin

theWest.



Indiawasnotyetpreparedforeithercontingency.Foreign MinisterSingh,

nowinNewYork,objectedtoreturningtheissuetotheUnitedNations;andin

theabsenceofaUNdecisiontherecouldbenorelevantcease‐fireresolution.He

forsworeanyterritorialambitionsinWestPakistanbutthenconspicuously

exceptedAzadKashmirasnotrecognize dbyIndiaaspartofPakistan.

AmbassadorJhaatlastreturnedareplytoUnderSecretaryIrwin’squeryoftwo

daysearlierastoIndianintentions.He,too,deniedterritorialambitions,buthe

alsoleftopenIndia’soptionsoverKashmir.Kashmir,heargued,belongedtoIndia

andthePakistanipartofitwasillegallyheld.Whenallthesoothingphraseswere

assembled,theyamountedto carefulevasions.IndiaandtheSovietUnionstill

refusedtorecognizetheterritorialstatusquointheWest;theydeliberatelykept

openthepossibilityofthekindofannexationachievableonlybythetotal

destructionofthePakistaniarmyandtheconsequentdisintegrationofPakistan.



SuchwasthesituationwhenNixon,Haig,andImetintheOvalOfficeon

Sundaymorning,December12,justbeforeNixonandIweretodepartforthe

AzorestomeetwithFrenchPresidentPompidou.Therewasasenseofurgency.

WeexpectedsomeChinesereactiontomyconversationwithHuangHua.Itwas

symptomaticoftheinternalrelationshipsoftheNixonAdministrationthatneither

theSecretaryofStatenorofDefensenoranyotherrepresentativeoftheir

departmentsattendedthiscrucialmeeting,where,asitturnedout,thefirst

decisiontoriskwarinthetriangularSoviet‐Chinese‐Americanrelationshipwas

taken.



RogershadbeenataNATOmeetingwhenthewarhadspreadtoWest

Pakistan.UponhisreturnhehadmadeplainhisdispleasurewiththePresident’s

policybyprohibitingJoeSiscofromappearingontelevisiontodefendit.Asusual,

Nixonwaspreparedneithertoconfronthisoldfriendnortooverrulehim.And

Rogerswasnoteagertogetinvolved:Theoutcomeofthecrisiswasnotlikelyto

beglorious;successwouldbetheavoidanceofcatastrophe,hardlyan

achievementthatinvitesacclaim.



SoNixonandIandHaigmetintheOvalOfficeinthesolitudethatenvelops

allcrises,amidsttheconflictingpressuresandconjecturesandgraduallybuilding

tensionsthatoneknowswillsoonbreak,thoughnotyetinwhatdirection.

Vorontsovinterruptedwithaphonecallat10:05a.m. TotellusthattheSoviet

replywasontheway.ItassuredusthatIndiahadnoaggressivedesignsinthe

West—butagainwassilentonthekeypoint:itste rritorialaimsinKashmir.Itwas

ascompatiblewithamaneuvertogaintimeforafurtherfaitaccompliaswitha

genuinedesiretosettle.Wedecidedthatthebestwaytostresshowgravelywe

tookthecrisiswasforustotakeittotheUnitedNations.Thiswouldgiveusan

opportunitytostresstheurgencyofthesituationaswellasputforwardour

proposalofastandstillcease‐fire.



Thereforeat11:30a.m.Wesentamessage,draftedbyHaigandme,onthe

HotlinetoMoscowtokeepupthepressure.ThiswasthefirstuseoftheHotline

bytheNixonAdministration.[

BrezhnevlatermadeuseoftheHotlineduringthealertin

theOctober1973MiddleEastwar.

]Actually,weknewthatthisMoscow‐Washington

telegraphiclinkworkedmoreslowlythandidthecommunicationsoftheSoviet

embassy.ButitconferredasenseofurgencyandmightspeedupSovietdecisions.

Theone‐pageHotlinemessagedeclaredthatafterwaitingseventy‐twohoursfor

aSovietresponsetotheconversationswithVorontsovandMatskevich,the

Presidenthad“setin traincertainmoves”intheUNSecurityCouncilthatcould

notbereversed.“ImustalsonotethattheIndianassurancesstilllackany

concreteness.Iamstillpreparedtoproceedalongthelinessetforthinmyletter

ofDecember10”—inotherwords,astandstillcease‐fireandimmediate

negotiations.Nixon’smessageconcluded:“Icannotemphasizetoostronglythat

timeisoftheessencetoavoidconsequencesneitherofuswant.”



JustwhenwehadfinisheddispatchingtheHotlinemessagetoMoscow,we

receivedwordthatHuangHuaneededtoseemewithanurgentresponsefrom

Peking.Itwasunprecedented,theChinesehavingpreviouslyalwayssavedtheir

messagesuntilweaskedforameeting—thiswasoneofthecharmingMiddle

Kingdomlegacies.Weassumedthatonlyamatterofgravitycouldinducethem

intosuchadeparture.Weguessedthattheywerecomingtothemilitary

assistanceofPakistan,asIthoughtHuangHua,forty‐eighthoursearlier,had

hintedtheymight.Ifso,wewereonthevergeofapossibleshowdown.Forif

Chinamovedmilitarily,theSovietUnion—accordingtoallourinformation—was

committedtouseforceagainstChina.Wewouldthenhavetodecidewhetherto

assistacountrythatuntilayearearlierhadbeenconsideredourmostimplacable

enemy.



NixonunderstoodimmediatelythatiftheSovietUnionsucceededin

humiliatingChina,allprospectsforworldequilibriumwoulddisappear.He

decided—andIfullyagreed—thatiftheSovietUnionthreatenedChina wewould

notstandidlyby.Acountrywhichwedidnotrecognizeandwithwhichwehad

hadnexttonocontactfortwodecadeswould,atleastinthiscircumstance,

obtainsomesignificantassistance—theprecisenaturetobeworkedoutwhen

thecircumstancesarose.Nixonmadethisdecisionwithoutinformingeitherhis

SecretaryofStateorSecretaryofDefense;itwasnotanidealwaytomanage

crises.SinceNixonandIwerebothleavingfortheAzores,AlHaigandwinLord

wouldhavetogotoNewYorktoreceivetheChinesemessage.Ifthemessage

containedwhatwebothsuspec tedandfeared,Haigwasinstructedtoreplytothe

ChinesethatwewouldnotignoreSovietintervention.Toprovidesomemilitary

meanstogiveeffecttoourstrategyandtoreinforcethemessagetoMoscow,

NixonnoworderedthecarriertaskforcetoproceedthroughtheStraitofMalacca

andintotheBayofBengal.



ItnowbecameurgenttodetermineSovietintentionsandatthesametime

convincethemthatwemeantbusiness.At11:45a.m.IphonedVorontsovtotell

himoftheHotlinemessageandoftheprojectedfleetmovements,butalsoof

ourcontinuedwillingnesstocooperatealongthelinesofthePresident’sletterto

Brezhnev—thatistosay,acceptastandstillcease‐fire.Wewerereturningthe

issuetotheSecurityCouncilbutwerepreparedtoconducttheUNdebateina

conciliatorymanner.ThechoicewasuptotheSovietUnion.Vorontsovsuggested

that,basedonhisreportsfrom Kuznetsov,wewereworkingforthesame

objectives.HehopedthatbythetimetheSecurityCouncilmettheSovietefforts

inNewDelhiwouldhavebornefruit.Itoldhimthattimewasrunningout.



Atnoon,RonZieglerannouncedthatinviewofIndia’scontinuingdefiance

oftheoverwhelmingGeneralA ssemblycallfora cease‐fire,theUnitedStateswas

nowreturningtheissuetotheSecurityCouncil.Hewarned:“withEastPakistan

virtuallyoccupiedbyIndiantroopsacontinuationofthewarwouldtakeon

increasinglythecharacterofarmedattackontheveryexistenceofamember

stateoftheUnitedNations.”



Intheevent,theChinesemessagewasnotwhatweexpected.Onthe

contrary,itacceptedtheUNprocedureandthepoliticalsolutionIhadoutlinedto

HuangHuaforty‐eighthoursearlier—askingforaceasefireandwithdrawal,but

settlingforastandst illcease‐fire.ChouEn‐lai’sanalysiswasthesameasours.

Amazingly,Pakistan,China,and—ifVorontsovcouldbebelieved—theSoviet

Union,werenowworkinginthesamedirectionunderouraegis.ButNixondid

notknowthiswhenhemadehislonelyandbravedecision.Hadthingsdeveloped

asweanticipated,wewouldhavehadnochoicebuttoassistChinainsome

manneragainsttheprobableopposition ofmuchofthegovernment,themedia,

andtheCongress.AndwewerestillinthemiddleoftheVietnamwar.History’s

assessmentofNixon,whateveritsconclusions,mustnotoverlookhiscourageand

patriotisminmakingsuchadecision,atrisktohisimmediatepoliticalinterest,to

preservetheworldbalanceofpowerfortheultimate safetyofallfreepeoples.



WhenwereceivedtheChinesemessageweheldupthefleet’smovement

fortwenty‐fourhourstogiveMoscowanopportunitytoreplytoourHotline

message.Itcamein,alsoovertheHotline,at5a.m.OnDece mber13whilethe

PresidentandIwereintheAzores.ItrepeatedwhatVorontsovhadalreadytold

us:TheSovietswere“conductingaclarificationofallthecircumstancesinIndia.”

Theywouldinformusoftheresultswithoutdelay.Thus,theissuewasleftexactly

asGeorgeBushhaddefinedit,onourinstructions,intheSecurityCouncilthe

nightbefore:



ThequestionnowarisesastoIndia’sfurtherintentions.Forexample,doesIndiaintend

tousethepresentsituationtodestroythePakistanarmyintheWest?DoesIndiaintendtouse

asapretextthePakistancounterattacksintheWesttoannexterritoryinWestPakistan?Isits

aimtotakepartsofPakistan‐controlledKashmircontrarytotheSecurityCouncilresolutionsof

1948,1949,and1950?IfthisisnotIndia’sintention,thenapromptdisavowalisrequired.The

worldhasarighttoknow:whatareIndia’sintentions?Pakistan’saimshavebecomeclear:It

hasacceptedtheGeneralAssembly’sresolutionpassedbyavoteof104to11.Mygovernment

hasaskedthisquestionoftheIndianGovernmentseveraltimesinthelastweek.Iregretto

informtheCouncilthatIndia’sreplieshavebeenunsatisfactoryandnotreassuring.



OurfleetpassedthroughtheStraitofMalaccaintotheBayofBengaland

attractedmuchmediaattention.WerewethreateningIndia?Wereweseekingto

defendEastPakistan?Hadwelostourminds?Itwasinfactsobercalculation.We

hadsomeseventy‐twohourstobringthewartoa conclusionbeforeWest

Pakistanwouldbesweptintothemaelstrom. ItwouldtakeIndiathatlongtoshift

itsforcesandmountanassault.OncePakistan’sarmyandairforcewere

destroyed,itsimpotencewould guaranteethecountry’seventualdisintegration.

WehadtogivetheSovietsawarningthatmattersmightgetoutofcontrolonour

sidetoo.WehadtobereadytobackuptheChineseifatthelastmomentthey

cameinafterall,ourUNinitiativehavingfailed.TheKremlinneededanexcuseto

acceleratethepressuresitclaimeditwasexertingonIndia.Howeverunlikelyan

AmericanmilitarymoveagainstIndia,theothersidecouldnotbesure;itmight

notbewillingtoaccepteventheminorriskthatwemightactirrationally.Itwas

alsothebestmeanstosplittheSovietUnionandIndia.Moscowwaspreparedto

harassus;itwasinourjudgmentnotpreparedtorunmilitaryrisks.Movingthe

carriertaskforceintotheBayofBengalcommittedustonofinalact,butit

createdpreciselythemarginofuncertaintyneededtoforceadecisionbyNew

DelhiandMoscow.



OnDecember14at3:00a.m.,VorontsovcameintohandAlHaigaformal

Sovietnote.Anine‐pagehandwrittenmemorandumprofessedtoseea

“considerablerapprochementofourpositions.”Itreported“firmassurancesby

theIndianleadershipthatIndiahasnoplansofseizingWestPakistaniterritory.”

Thiswassomesmallprogressbutitstillbeggedtheprincipalquestionofwhether

IndiaconsideredPakistani‐heldKashmirasPakistaniterritory.Anditwassilenton

thesubjectofacease‐fire.NorwasanythingheardfromIndia.Andiftherewas

notacease‐firesoon,theIndianarmywouldbeinapositiontoturnonWest

Pakistanandthusmakeallourdiscussionsacademic.



ThisiswhyonthereturnflightfromtheAzoresIsaidonbackgroundtothe

presspoolonAirforceOnethatSovietconductonthesubcontinentwasnot

compatiblewiththemutualrestraintrequiredbygenuinecoexistence.Ifit

continued,wewouldhavetoreevaluateourentirerelationship,includingthe

summit.IhadnotclearedthatlastpointspecificallywithNixon.Ihadassumedit

reflectedhisthinkingsincehehadhimselfmentionedthistomeonDecember8.

ThethreattocancelthesummitcausedtheWashingtonPosttobreakthe

backgroundrulesandidentifymeasthespeaker,inthenameofthe“people’s

righttoknow.”Thiswasa temporaryfitofdoctrinalpuritanismfromwhichthe

Postafterwardrecoveredinordertobeinvitedtolaterbackgrounders.



TheresultinghullabaloooccupiedmuchofDecember15.Thoughthere

werefranticdisavowalsatstateandevensomepublicbacktrackingbyRon

Ziegler,themessagegotthroughtoMoscow,whichhadbythenlearnedthatmy

voicereflectedtheprobablecourseofthePresident’sthinking.(Indeed,ifmy

criticsinthebureaucracyhadanalyzedthesituation,theywouldhaveknownthat

Icouldnothavesurvived,muchlessprevailed,onanyothercondition.)Vorontsov

appearedseveraltimeswithincreasinglyurgent,soothing commentsand

requestsforreassurances.Bythenextmorning,December16,wewerereceiving

reliablereportsthatKuznetsovwasinfactpressingNewDelhitoacceptthe

territorialstatusquointheWest,includinginKashmir.



LateinthedayonDecember15,thecommanderoftheoutnumbered

PakistaniforcesintheEastagainofferedacease‐fire.Hehadheldoutfivedays

longerthanwethoughtpossiblewhenthefirstcease‐fireofferwasputforward

onDecember10.Theresistanceofhisforceshadgivenusthetimetomountthe

pressuresthatpreventedtheonslaughtonWestPakistan.



NextdayMrs.Gandhiofferedanunconditionalcease‐fireintheWest.

ThereisnodoubtinmymindthatitwasareluctantdecisionresultingfromSoviet

pressure,whichinturngrewoutofAmericaninsistence,includingthefleet

movementandthewillingnesstoriskthesummit.Thisknowledgestoodusin

goodsteadwhenVietnamexplodedfourmonthslater.ItwasalsoChouEn‐lai’s

judgment,ashelatertoldBhutto,thatwehadsavedWestPakistan.Thecrisiswas

over.Wehadavoidedtheworst—whichissometimesthemaximumstatesmen

canachieve.



<<Contents>>



****



TheAftermath



heIndia‐Pakistanwarof1971wasperhapsthemostcomplexissueofNixon’s

firstterm.NotthatemotionsranashighasonVietnam,orthatitseffects

wereverylong‐lasting,thoughthe“tilttowardPakistan”enteredthepolemic

folkloreasacasehistoryofpoliticalmisjudgment.Whatmadethecrisisso

difficultwasthatthestakesweresomuchgreaterthanthecommonperception

ofthem.TheissueburstuponuswhilePakistanwasouronlychanneltoChina;

wehadnoothermeansofcommunicationwithPeking.AmajorAmerican

initiativeoffundamentalimportancetotheglobalbalanceofpowercouldnot

havesurvivedifwecolludedwiththeSovietUnioninthepublichumiliationof

China’sfriend—andourally.Thenakedrecoursetoforcebyapartnerofthe

SovietUnionbackedbySovietarmsandbuttressedbySovietassurances

threatenedtheverystructureofinternationalorderjustwhenourwholeMiddle

Eaststrategydependedonprovingtheinefficacyofsuchtacticsandwhen

America’sweightasafactorintheworldwasalreadybeingundercutbyour

divisionsoverIndochina.TheassaultonPakistanwasinourviewamost

dangerousprecedentforSovietbehavior,whichhadtoberesistedifwewerenot

totemptescalatingupheavals.Hadweacquiescedinsuchapowerplay,we

wouldhavesentawrongsignaltoMoscowandunnervedallourallies,China,and

theforcesforrestraintinothervolatileareasoftheworld.Thiswas,indeed,why

theSovietshadmadetheIndianassaultonPakistanpossibleinthefirstplace. 

T



Butanessentiallygeopoliticalpointofviewfoundnounderstandingamong

thosewhoconductedthepublicdiscourseonforeignpolicyinourcountry.(By

“geopolitical”Imeananapproachthatpaysattentiontotherequirementsof

equilibrium.)Thisdramatizedoneoftherootdilemmasoftheforeignpolicyof

theNixonAdministration.NixonandIwantedto foundAmericanforeignpolicy

onasoberperceptionofpermanentnationalinterest,ratherthanonfluctuating

emotionsthatinthepasthadledustoexcessesofbothinterventionand

abdication.WejudgedIndiabytheimpactofitsactions,notbyitspretensionsor

bythelegacyoftwentyyearsofsentiment.Butour assessmentsdependedon

conjectureaboutthewiderconsequencesofIndia’sassault.Toshapeeventsone

mustactonthebasisofassessmentsthatcannotbeprovedcorrectwhenthey

aremade.Allthejudgmentswereachedabouttheimplicationsofanassaulton

Pakistanwereundemonstrable.Bythetimetheimplicationswereclearitwould

betoolate;indee d,theremightthenbeanotherdispute astowhathadactually

producedthem.



Themajorityofinformedopinionsoughttojudgetheconfrontationonthe

subcontinentonthemeritsoftheissuesthathadproducedthecrisis.Pakistan

hadunquestionablyactedunwisely,brutally,andevenimmorally,thoughona

matterwhichunderinternationallawwasclearlyunderitsdomesticjurisdiction.

Butevenhere,Iwouldhavetosaywehadanassessmentofthefactsdifferent

fromthatofourcritics.IremainconvincedtothisdaythatMrs.Gandhiwasnot

motivatedprimarilybyconditionsinEastPakistan;manysolutionsto itsinevitable

autonomyexisted,severalsuggestedbyus.Rather,encouragedbytheisolationof

Pakistan,thediplomaticandmilitarysupportoftheSovietUnion,thedomestic

strainsinChina,andthedivisionsintheUnitedStates,theIndianPrimeMinister

decidedinthespringorsummerof1971tousetheopportunitytosettleaccounts

withPakistanonceandforallandassertIndia’spreeminenceonthe

subcontinent.HerdelayuntilNovemberwastoallowmilitarytrainingand

preparationstobecompletedandtowaituntilwintersnowsintheHimalayas

complicatedChineseaccess.Afterthatdecision,everyconcessionbyPakistanwas

usedasastartingpoint foranewdemandescalatingtherequirementsand

shorteningthetimespanforaresponsetothepointthatsho wdownwas

inevitable.Wehadnonationalinteresttopreventself‐determinationforEast

Pakistan—indeed,weputforwardseveralschemestobringitabout—butwehad

astakeintheprocessbywhichitoccurred.Wewantedittobeachievedby

evolution,notbyatraumaticshocktoacountryinwhosesurvivaltheUnited

States,China,andtheworldcommunity(asshowninrepeatedUNvotes)didfeel

astake,orbyaplainviolationoftherulesbywhichtheworldmustconductitself

ifitistosurvive.IndiastruckinlateNovember;bythetimetablethatweinduced

Yahyatoaccept,martiallawwouldhaveendedandaciviliangovernmentwould

havetakenpowerattheendofDecember.Thiswouldalmostsurelyhaveledto

theautonomyandindependenceofEastPakistan‐probablywithouttheexcesses

ofbrutality,including publicbayoneting,inwhichtheIndian‐trainedguerrillas,

theMuktiBahini,engagedwhentheyinturnterrorizedDacca.



Ifshortsightedandrepressivedomesticpoliciesareusedtojustifyforeign

militaryintervention,theinternationalorderwillsoonbedeprivedofall

restraints.Inthenameofmoralitywewerelambastedforhavingsupportedthe

losingsideandoffendedthewinner—aninteresting“moral”argument,notto

mentionthat,historically,prudenceandequilibriumusuallysuggestsidingwith

theweakertodeterthestronger.Afterthreeyearsofharassmentforinsufficient

dedicationtopeace,wewerenowchallengedbyoneliberalcolumnistwiththe

mind‐bogglingargumentthatwarcouldnotalwaysbeconsideredanevilbecause

sometimesitwastheinstrumentforchange.

Theprincipleseemedtobethatif

RichardNixonwasforpeace,warcouldnotbeallbad.



ThereisinAmericaanidealistictraditionthatseesforeignpolicyasa

contestbetweenevilandgood.Thereisa pragmatictraditionthatseekstosolve

“problems”astheyarise.Thereisalegalistictraditionthattreatsinternational

issuesasjuridicalcases.Thereisnogeopoliticaltradition.Allthestrandsofour

internationalexperiencerancountertowhatweweretryingtoaccomplishonthe

subcontinentintheautumnof1971.Indiahadmuchsympathyastheworld’s

mostpopulousdemocracy;theproblemtobe“solved”wasself‐determinatio nfor

EastPakistan;the“case”shouldbeturnedovertotheUnitedNations,asRogers

nevertiredofpointingout.Ourgeopoliticalconcernsweregivennocredenceand

wereattributedtopersonalpique,anti‐Indianbias,callousnesstowardsuffering,

orinexplicableimmorality. 



Hadwefollowedtheserecommendations,Pakistan,afterlosingitsEastern

wing,wouldhavelostKashmirandpossiblyBaluchistanandotherportionsofits

Westernwing—inotherwords,itwouldhavetotallydisintegrated.We

maneuveredwithsomeskill—andconsideringthefewcardsweheld,

considerabledaring—toavertdisasters.Wesucceededinconfiningtheimpactof

theconflicttothesubcontinent.TheIndianpowerplaydidnotshakethe

foundationsofourforeignpolicyandwreckourChinainitiativeasitwellmight

have,andastheSovietsundoubtedlyhoped itwould.Butsincetherewasno

generalrecognitionofthesedangers,wecouldexpectlittleunderstandingofour

motivation.



Instead,attentionfocusedoncosts.Webelievedtheywouldproveas

temporaryastheywereunavoidable.Wedidnotthinkthatwehadpermanently

jeopardizedourrelationswithIndiaordrivenIndiairrevocablytotheSovietside,

aswassooftenandpassionatelyclaimed.Norcouldweeverhavecompetedwith

whattheSovietUnionofferedIndiaforthiscrisis:sixyearsofweaponrywhilewe

embargoedarmstobothsides,militarythreatsagainstPekingtodeterChinese

interference,andtwovetoesintheSecurityCouncilblockingacease‐fireandUN

peacekeepingefforts.WecouldnothaveoutbidtheUSSRinthisdimension—nor

doIrecallanyofourdomesticcriticsrecommendingthatweattempttodoso.

JustasourwooingfortwodecadeshadnotmanagedtotemptIndiaoutofits

nonalignment,soIndiawasunlikelytomoveirrevocablytoonesideasaresultof

ourdefendingourowninterests.NonalignmentenabledIndiatonavigatethe

internationalpas sagewithamaximumnumberofoptions.Forthatreasonwe

wereconvincedthatIndiawouldsoonerorlaterseekarapprochementwithus

againifonlytokeepMoscowfromtakingitforgranted.Whentheimmediate

crisiswasoverIremindedDobryninofacommentbytheAustrianminister

SchwarzenbergafterRussiantroopshadhelpedputdowntheHungarianrevoltof

1848:“somedaywewillamazetheworldbythedepthofouringratitude.”



Andthisisexactlywhathappened.Afterthecrisis,US‐Indianrelations

returnedquiterapidlytotheirpreviousstateoffrustratedincomprehension

withinaframeworkofcompatibleobjectives.Wewerenotsofortunateastobe

sparedtheusualhectoring,butwithinthreeyearsUS‐Indianjointcommissions

wereworkingoncooperativeprojectsinavarietyofeconomicandculturalfields.

T.N.Kaul,theForeignSecretarywhovenomouslypushedthepolicyof

confrontationin1971,wassenttoWashingtonasAmbassadorwiththe

assignmenttorepairrelations—atasktowhichhedevotedhimselfwiththesame

single‐mindednessthathadcharacterizedIndia’simplacabledismembermentof

Pakistanin1971.



NixonputitwellwhenhetoldPrimeMinisterHeathinBermudaon

December20,afterthecrisiswasover,whatwehadtriedtoaccomplish:



Ifeltthatifitwastruethather[Mrs.Gandhi’s]goalwastoforcePakistantosurrender

intheWest,therewouldbeseriousrepercussionsontheworldscene.Itcouldbealessonfor