Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.



OnNovember25,too,welearnedreliablythatMrs.Gandhihadtold

colleaguesthatIndiawouldcontinueitsattacksandescalatethem.Her

commanderswereasgoodasherword.OnNovember26newIndiana ttacks

werelaunchedintheJessorearea.TheSovietUnionblockedaJapanesefeelerto

callaSecurityCouncilmeeting.AmbassadorBeamwastoldthattheSovietUnion

wouldsupportanendtomilitaryoperationsonlyiftherewereapoliticalsolution

satisfactorytoIndia.NixonphonedBritishPrimeMinisterHeathtotellhimofhis

fearthatIndianobjectivesmightwellgobeyondEastPakistan.Hereceived

generalexpressionsofagreementbutaclearindicationthatBritainwouldstay

aloof.



OnNovember26FarlandmanagedtoseeYahya,whoacceptedFarland’s

suggestionthatherequesttheUNtosendobserverstothePakistanisideofthe

line.HewouldalsoasktheUNtotakeovertherefugeefacilitiesinEastPakistan

andwouldconsiderallowingBengalioppositioniststomeetwiththestill

imprisonedMujib.InNewDelhiKeatingsawMrs.Gandhiinthecontextofavisit

bySenatorsfrankChurchandWilliamSaxbe.Herlinehadhardenedevenfurther.

Sherepeatedthecomplaintthattherehadbeennopoliticalprogresssinceher

talkswithNixon.TheissueinanyeventwasnolongerEastPakistanbutIndia’s

nationalsecurityinthefaceofunstableneighbors,shesaid.Playingtotheend

theroleofapeace‐lovingmoderateoverwhelmedbyevents,Mrs.Gandhisaid

thatshewasbarelyabletoresisttremendousdomesticpressureforevenmore

drasticaction—thoughitwasnotobviouswhatmoreIndiamightdotoharass,

injure,andinvadeherneighbor.



Nixon’sinstinct,again,wastoreplytoMrs.Gandhiwithacutoffofaid.I

urgedhimtowaitforthenextIndianmove.Wewouldbebetteroffreacting

whentheprovocationwasunambiguousandthefactsuncontestable.TheState

DepartmentcameforwardwiththeideaofPresidentialletterstoYahya,Mrs.

Gandhi,andKosygin,againurgingtroopwithdrawals,thoughwithoutany

indicationthattherewasapenaltyforrefusingus.ThoughPresidentiallettershad

grownsofrequentastodebasethecurrency,Iwentalongbecausetheycoulddo

nodamageandcouldprovideaplatformlaterforstrongeraction.



ThePresident’slettertoMrs.GandhiinformedherofYahya’swillingnessto

permitUNobserversonthePakistanisideoftheborderandremindedherof

Pakistan’sstandingofferofunilateralwithdrawal.Notingheradmissionthat

IndianforceswereengagedonPakistaniterritory,theletterstressedthat“the

AmericanpeoplewouldnotunderstandifIndianactionsledtobroadscale

hostilities.”



ThemessagetoKosygincalledonceagainforSovietcooperationin

promotingapeacefulresolutiontothecrisisandurgedtheSovietUniontopress

NewDelhiontroopwithdrawals.Itwasafutilegesture.TheSovietdefinitionof

anacceptablesolutionwasidenticalwithIndia’s.



ThelettertoYahyasoughttodiscouragehimfromseekingtorelievethe

pressureonbeleagueredEastPakistanbyattackingIndiafromtheWest,where

thebulkofthePakistaniarmywaslocated.Eventhoughsuchamovewasalso

doomedtofailure,desperateleadersmightfeelitrequiredbytheirhonor.We

wereconcernedthataPakistaniattackintheWestwouldmerelysupplythefinal

pretextforIndiato completethedisintegrationofallofPakistan.TheNixonletter

listedourvariousfutileeffortstourgere straint onIndia;nevertheless,itwarned

againstexpansionofthewar.YahyareceivedFarlandonNovember27.Hewas

desperateandcooperative.HeofferedtoasktheUnitedNationsimmediatelyto

furnishobserversforthePakistanisideofthebordertoguaranteePakistan’s

defensiveintent.HeofferedtopermitFarlandtomeetwithMujib’slawyer.(As

thewarescalatedYahyalaterwithdrewhisoffer.)Andhereaffirmedhis

willingnessforcontactswithmembersoftheprovisionalBangladeshgovernment 

inCalcuttaand“theywillnotfindmeunresponsive.”



Thewinningsideinawarisrarelyeagerfornegotiations;thelongerthe

battlelasts,thebetterwillbeitsbargainingposition.Theonlyrestraintisthefear

thatifitoverplaysitshanditwilltriggeroutsideforcesthatmightdepriveitofthe

fruitsofitsvictory.Mrs.GandhiattheendofNovemberwasridingthewavesof

success,andtheactionsofneithertheUnitedStatesnorChinagavehermuch

reasonforcaution.TheNixonAdministrationwasbeingpressedtoturnon

Pakistan;ChinaattheendofitsCulturalRevolutionprovedtobemilitarily

unpreparedandhadjustsurmountedadomesticcrisisinvolvingtheloyalty ofits

military.



Meanwhile,theStateDepartmentspokesmansurfacedwithacomment

thatshowedhowhardhiscolleaguesfoundittofollowtheWhiteHousestrategy

ortobreakwiththreedecadesofsentimentalattachmenttoIndia.AformerUS

AmbassadortoPakistan,BenjaminH.Oehlert,Jr.,hadwrittenalettertotheNew

YorkTimes,publishedonNovember3,totheeffectthattheUnitedStateshad

commitmentstocometoPakistan’said“evenwithourarmsandmen,ifshe

shouldbeattackedbyanyothercountry.”TheStateDepartmentspokesman

repliedtoaquestiononNovember26thattherewerenosuchsecret

commitmentsbindingtheUnitedStatestocometoPakistan’said.Ifenough

emphasiswereplacedonthephrase“armsandmen”andifasharplawyerwere

permittedtodefinethemeaningof“binding,”thisstatementwasatthevery

edgeoftruth.Italsohappenedtobeexactlythewrongsignalifwesoughtto

restrainanIndianassaultonanalliedcountry.



Mrs.GandhiwasunavailabletoreceivethePres ident’sletter.Shehad

decidedtovisithertroopsneartheborder.Sheblastedthesuperpowers

(meaningtheUnitedStates)forhavingthenervetocomplain“becausewehave

takenactiontodefendourborders.”Thisspeechwaslittlelikelytoturnthe

thoughtsofthemilitarycommanders,whonowhaddiscretiontocrossthe

frontier,towardpeace.ThatsamedayIndianDefenseMinisterJagjivanRam

disclosedtoacheeringcrowdatapoliticalrallyinCalcuttathatIndianforceshad

beenauthorizedtoadvanceintoPakistanto“silence”Pakistaniartillery.Atthe

samerallyaspeakerdeclared,“IndiawillbreakPakistantopieces.” AndanIndian

coloneltoldareporteronNovembe r28whatpartoftheUSgovernmentwasstill

unwillingtoacknowledge—that“ourtroopswentinbecausetheMuktiBahini

calledforhelp.”



KeatingfinallycaughtupwithMrs.GandhionNovember29andwas

receivedwithanotherfrostyrecitalofIndia’scomplaints.Yahya’sproblems,she

pointedoutnotinaccurately,wereself‐createdand“wearenotinapositionto

makethiseasierforhim.”Shecouldnotcontinuetotellherpeopletowaitand

addedominously,“Ican’tholdit.”WhenKeatingtriedtoraisetheissueofborder

incursionsintoPakistan,Mrs.Gandhicuthimoff:“wecan’taffordtolistento

advicewhichweakensus.”



ThismovedmattersbacktotheWSAG,whichonNovember29debated

inconclusivelywhetherIndiahadmadeadecisiontoattackbeforeorafterthe

Nixon‐Gandhitalks.Theissuewasasirrelevantastheanswerwasself‐evident.

Clearly,Mrs.Gandhihadplanneditwellinadvanceandusedhertripnotasa

meanstoseekasolutio nbutasasmokescreenforheractions.Therewasnoway

bywhichtheIndiandeploymentcouldhavebeencompletedintheten‐dayperiod

betweenMrs.Gandhi’sreturnandthefirstcross‐borderoperations.TheWSAG

hadatlastreconcileditselftothefactthatthePresidentmeanttocutoffsome

aidtoIndia,buttheStateDepartmentfoughta doggedrearguardactiontokeep

thereductiontoaminimumandthedirectivesufficientlyvagueto permitthe

maximumadministrativediscretion.Mattersreachedsuchapointofconfusion

concerningwhatcategoriesofarmswemightcutoffthatIsaid,“wehave

contractswithoutlicensesandlicenseswithoutcontracts,”askingwhichwewere

toterminate.Ittranspiredthatwhatwasfavoredwasarefusaltograntnew

licenses—undoubtedlyonthetheorythatthisdecisioncouldalwaysbereversed

afterthewarwhenpassionshadcooled.Ishouldhaveknownfromtheeasewith

whichinteragencyagreementwasobtainedthattheamountsinvolvedweresmall

(around$17million).Thefirststep,abanonnewlicensesformilitaryequipment

forIndia,wasannounced bystateonDecember1.



OnNovember29IinformedPekingviatheParischannelofallour

overturestoothercountriesandtheirresponses.



ByNovember30Mrs.Gandhiraisedpressuresanothernotch.Speakingto

herParliament,shesarcasticallywelcomedthecallfortroopwithdrawalsbut“the

troopsthatshouldbewithdrawnstraightawayarethePakistanitroopsin

Bangladesh.”ShethrewcoldwateronanynegotiationswithPakistanonthe

groundthatonlytheelectedrepresentativesofBangladeshcoulddecideits

futureandthatinherviewtheywouldnotsettleforanythinglessthan

“liberation.”Thus,therewasnothingtonegotiatewithPakistanotherthanits

dismemberment.



SotheWSAGmetagainonDecember1todiscusswhether,overaweek

afterthestartofhostilities,thetimehadcomeforaUNSecurityCouncilmeeting

andwhatadditionalstepscouldbetakentoimplementanarmscutofftoIndia.

TherewassurprisinginternationalunanimitynottogototheSecurityCouncil.

IndiadidnotwantaSecurityCouncilmeetingbecausehypocrisycouldnotbe

stretchedeveninthatbodytoavoidtheadmissionthataninvasionofasovereign

memberoftheUNhadtakenplace.Itwouldbeabletoescapecondemnation

onlybythepromisedSovietveto.PakistandidnotwantaSecurityCouncil

discussionbecauseitfearedthatitmightbroadenintoageneralcriticismofthe

repressioninEastBengal;also,itwantedtokeepthespotlightonitsinvitation

thatUNobserversbestationedonthePakistanisideoftheborder—apro posal

thathadalreadybeenformallysubmittedtotheUNSecretary‐General.TheSoviet

Unionwasnoteagertobeforcedtoinvokeitsveto;HuangHuahadtoldmethat

ChinawouldbackwhateverPakistanwanted.WithinourgovernmenttheState

DepartmentwasnoteagertogototheSecurityCouncilbecauseitfearedthe

“tilt”ofWhiteHouseinstructions.IwasreluctantbecauseIwasloathtotakeon

thedomesticbrawlthatourinstructionswouldevoke.Itwasasadcommentary

onthestateoftheUnitedNationswhenafull‐scaleinvasionofamajorcountry

wastreatedbyvictim,ally,aggressor,andothergreatpowersastoodangerousto

bringtotheformalattentionof theworldbodypledgedbyitsChartertohelp

preservethepeace.



<<Contents>>



* * * *



TheWarSpreads



nDecember2PakistaniAmbassadorRazadeliveredaletterfromYahyato

PresidentNixoninvokingArticleIofthe1959bilateralagreementbetween

theUnitedStatesandPakistanasthebasisforUSaidtoPakistan.

TheAmerican

obligationtoPakistanwasthusformallyraised.TheStateDepartmentwas

eloquentinarguingthatnobindingobligationexisted;itregularlyputoutitsview

atpublicbriefings.ItpointedoutthatArticleIspokeonlyof“appropriateaction”

subjecttoourconstitutionalprocesses;it didnotspecifywhatactionshouldbe

taken.TheDepartmentalsoclaimedthattheobligationwasqualifiedbyits

context,the1958MiddleEast“EisenhowerDoctrine”resolution,which,itwas

argued,intendedtoexcludeanIndia‐Pakistanwar.Statesimplyignoredallother

communicationsbetweenourgovernmentandPakistan.

O



Theimageofagreatnationconductingitselflikeashysterlookingfor

legalisticloopholeswasnotlikelytoinspireotherallieswhohadsignedtreaties

withusorreliedonourexpressionsinthebeliefthatthewordsmeant

approximatelywhattheysaid.ThetreatywithPakistanwasidenticaltoseveral

otherbilateralandmultilateralagreements—allofwhichourpronouncements

seemedtocastintodoubt.AndithadbeenbuttressedinthecaseofPakistanby

manyadditionalassurancesofsupport.Thefactwasthatoverthedecadesofour

relationshipwithPakistan,therehadgrownupacomplexbodyof

communicationsbytheKennedyandJohnsonadministrations,goingbeyondthe

1959pact,someverbal,someinwriting,whoseplainimportwasthattheUnited

StateswouldcometoPakistan’sassistanceifshewasattackedbyIndia.

Tobe

sure,theirpurposehadbeentoevadePakistanirequestsforarmsaftertheIndian

attackonGoaofDecember1961andtheIndia‐Pakistanwarof1965.Assura nces

offutureUSsupportwerethesubstituteforimmediatematerialaid.Butif

anything,thismademattersworse.ItmadeitappearasiftheUnitedStates

avoidedsupplyingweaponstoanallyfirstbypromisinglatersupportifthethreat

materializedandthenbywelshingonitspromisesbysupercleverlegalexegesis.



Iamnotsuggestingthatweshouldhaveblindlysetourpolicysolely

becauseofwhatourpredecessorshadsaid.Thedecisionsofagreatpowerwillbe

shapedbytherequirementsofthenationalinterestasperceivedatthemoment

ofdecision,notonlybyabstractlegalobligationswhethervagueorprecise.No

countrycanbeexpectedtorungraverisksifitsinterestsandobligationshave

cometobeattotalvariancewitheachother.Butequallyanationthat

systematicallyignoresitspledgesassumesaheavyburde n;itsdiplomacywilllose

theflexibilitythatcomesfromareputationforreliability;itcannolongersatisfy

immediatepleasfromalliesbypromisesoffutureaction.Pakistan,moreover,was

anallyofotherallies—Iran,Turkey—andafriendofSaudiArabiaandJordan,then

isolatedinastilllargelyradicalMiddleEast.AnditwasafriendofChinaandin

closetouchwithaPekingthatwasgingerlyfeelingitswaytowardanew

relationshipwithusbasedonthehopethatwecouldmaintaintheglobal

equilibrium.Areputationforunreliabilitywasnot somethingwecouldafford.



NixonwasensconcedinKeyBiscayne;wetalkedfrequently.Hehadno

intentionofbecomingmilitarilyinvolved,buthewasdeterminedthatsomething

bedone.HeorderedthattheremaininglicensesforIndianarmsbeterminated.

Hewantedacompletecutoffofeconomic aid(thisIknewwouldneverhappen,

giventhebiasesofourbureaucracy).HewantedaStateDepartmentstatement

castigatingIndianintransigence.“Iftheydon’twantto,Zieglerwilldoitfrom

Florida,anditwillbeablast.”Itransmittedtheseinstructionstoan

unenthusiasticRogers,whobegantryingtofigureoutwaysto makethe

announcementsolateinthedaythatthescopeofpresscoveragewouldbe

reduced.



Oncemoreeventsinthesubcontinentovertookus.Yahyahadatlastbeen

corneredbyhissubtlyimplacableopponentinNewDelhi.Throughoutthecrisis,

longperiodsofparalyzinginactivitybyYahyahadbeensucceededbysudden

spasmsashesoughttoadjusttohispredicament—usuallytoolate.Foreleven

dayshehadstoodbywhileIndianforcespresseddeeperanddeeperintoEast

Pakistan,ineffectdismemberinghiscountry.Forhismainforcestoremain

inactiveonthebordersofWestPakistanwouldamounttoabdication;yetto

respondwouldbetofallintotheIndiantrapandprovideapretextforanall‐out

onslaughtonEastandeventuallyWestPakistan.Yahyachosewhatheconsidered

thepathofhonor.OnDecember3helaunchedhisarmyintoanattackinthe

Westthathemusthaveknownwassuicidal.Insimple ‐mindedsoldierlyfashion

hedecided,asItoldNixon,thatifPakist anwouldbedestroyedordismemberedit

shouldgodownfighting.



ThereactioninourgovernmentwastousethePakistaniattackasaperfect

excusetodeferthestatementattackingIndiantransgressions,whichNixonhad

orderedthedaybefore,onthepretextthatonceagainwedidnothaveallthe

facts.ThisledtorepeatedargumentsbetweenmeandRogers,whotooktheview

thatthewarhavingspread,amovetotheSecurityC ouncilwas nowinevitable.

CriticizingIndiaintheseconditionswouldbeassumingforourselvesa judicialrole

betterlefttotheworldorganization;inotherwords,wewouldactasjudges,not

asanallyorevenasasuperpowerwithinterestsandcommitments.Having

opposedrecoursetotheSecurityCouncilearlier,statenowfavoreditasapretext

toavoidaunilateralUnitedStatesresponseandtodelayourhavingtotakeany

positionatall.IfinallyacquiescedandlettheDepartmentslideoffthe

condemnationofIndiathatNixonhadordered.NowthattheSecurityCouncil

wouldaddresstheissueoftheexpandedwarwecouldmakeourcasethere.AndI

knewthatGeorgeBush,ourableUNAmbassador,wouldcarryoutthePresident’s

policy.Aftermuchpullingandhauling,statefinallyannouncedonDece mber3the

cutoffofremaininglicensesonarmstoIndia—hardlyanoverwhelmingresponse

totheoutbreakoffull‐scalehostilitiesonthesubcontinent.



BynowNixonwasinhighgear.Asalways,hisattitudewaswovenofmany

strands.HewantedtopreservehisChinainitiative,andheunderstoodthat

“even‐handedness”wouldplayintoIndia’shands.Hewantedtodeflectblamefor

whatwashappeningfromhimself.HedreadedconflictwithRogers.Buthewas

insistentontakingastronglineattheSecurityCouncil.Hisinitiativescame

cascadingintomyoffice,specificinindicatingdirections,lesssoindefiningthe

methods.



InthisatmospheretheWSAGassembledonDecember3tochartacourse.

Itwasameetingmemorializedintranscriptsthatwereleakedtothecolumnist

JackAnderson.OutofcontextthesesoundedasiftheWhiteHousewerehell‐

bentonpursuingitsownbiases,buttheycanonlybeunderstoodagainstthe

backgroundoftheseveralprecedingmonthsoffrustratingandfuriousresista nce

bythebureaucracytothePresident’sexplicitdecisions.“I’vebeencatching

unshirtedhelleveryhalf‐hourfromthePresidentwhosayswe’renottough

enough,”IcommentedinwhatI thoughtwastheprivacyofthesituationRoom.

“Hereallydoesn’tbelievewe’recarryingouthiswishes.Hewantstotilttoward

Pakistanandhebelievesthateverybriefingorstatementisgoingtheotherway.”

Thatwasofcourseaplainstatementofthefacts.



Mysarcasmdidnothingtoaffectdepartmentalproclivities.WhenI

transmittedthePresident’sinstructiontocutoffeconomicaidtoIndia,State

suggestedasimilarsteptowardPakistan—inspiteofthePresident’sviewthat

Indiawastheguiltypartyforitsbellicos ity.Thisprovokedmeinexasperationinto

another“tilt”statement:“It’shardtotilttowardPakistan,asthePresident

wishes,ifeverytimewetakesomeactioninrelationtoIndiawehavetodothe

samethingforPakistan.JustholdthisinformallyuntilIgettothePresident.”



TheStateDepartmentrepresentativesat interagencymeetingswereinan

extremelyuncomfortableposition.Castigatedsarcasticallybymeforfoot‐

dragging,pressedbytheirownchieftobemoreassertiveinopposingtheWhite

House,theyhadtonavigateintreacherousshoals. JoeSisco,forexample,was

orderedbytheWhiteHouseonDecember4tobriefthepressinformallyto

explainourcriticismofIndianpolicy.Thishedidloyallyandably,totheintense

displeasureofhisSecretaryofState,whosubsequentlyprohibitedhimfrom

appearingontelevisiontorepeatthesamepointsontherecord.The

responsibilityfortheconditionsIdescribemustfallonthepersonalitiesatthe

top,includingmyself.Ihaverecountedthebureaucraticbattlesnottoassess

blamebuttoilluminatethepublicrecord,whichisincomprehensiblewithout

them.



TheissuehingedonthegeopoliticalperspectiveoftheWhiteHouseas

againsttheregionalperspectiveoftheStateDepartment,andontherelative

weighttobegiventoChinaandIndiaintheconductofourfo reignpolicy.The

WhiteHouseviewedtheconflictasa ruthlesspowerplaybywhichIndia,

encouragedbytheSoviets,usedtheineptitudeofthePakistanigovernmentand

thefragilityofthePakistanipoliticalstructuretoforceasolutionoftheEast

Pakistancrisisbymilitarymeanswhenapolit icalalternativeseemedclearly

available.Whetherourofficialslikeditornot,Pakistanwasanallytowhichwe

hadtreatycommitmentsbackedupbyprivateassurances;itsfatewouldthus

affecttheattitudesofseveralkeycountriesthathadrestedtheirsecurityon

Americanpromises.ItwouldbewatchedcarefullybyChina.Andthosecountries

intheMiddleEasteagertosettletheissuebyforcecouldeasilybetemptedto

adoptmilitarymeans.Andifitspolicyinthesubcontinentsucceededtooeasily,

theSovietUnionmightresorttocomparabletacticsinothervolatileareas—as

indeeditlaterdidwhenWatergatehadsappedexecutiveauthority.The

dismembermentofPakistanbymilitaryforceanditseventualdestructionwithout

anyAmericanreactionthuswouldhaveprofoundinternationalrepercussions.



Theopposingviewwasthatwewereneedlesslysacrificingthefriendshipof

India,thatnothingcouldbedonetosaveEastPakistan,andthatitwould,inany

event,beundesirabletodoso.Weweretakingthe“Chineseposition,”Rogers

complained.Wewereactingimpetuously.Werananeedlessriskofinvolving

ourselvesmilitarily.Indiawasacountryofhugepotentialthatweneededasa

friend.ButNixonandI werenotbeingimpetuous.WewereconvincedthatIndia’s

nonalignmentderivednotfromaffectionfortheUnitedStatesbutfromits

perceptionofitsnat ionalinterest;thesecalculationswerelikelytoreassert

themselvesassoonastheimmediatecrisiswasover.Theissue,tous,wasthe

assaultoninternationalorderimplicitinSoviet‐Indiancollusion.ItoldtheWSAG

onDecember4that“everyoneknowswewillendupwithIndianoccupationof

EastPakistan.”Butwehadtoactwithdeterminationtosavelargerinterestsand

relationships.Wewereplayingaweakhand,butonemustnevercompound

weaknessbytimidity.“Iadmitit’snotabrilliantposition,”IsaidtoNixonon

December5,“butifwecollapsenowtheSovietswon’trespectusforit;the

Chinesewilldespiseusandtheothercountrieswilldrawtheirownconclusions.”



OncethewarhadspreadtotheWest,moreover,atissuewasnotthe

methodforestablishingBangladeshbutthesurvivalofPakistanitself.India’s

militarypowerwasvastlysuperiortoPakistan’s,partlytheresultofthesix‐year

Americanembargoonarmssalestobothsides,whichhurtmainlyPakistan.

BecauseofIndia’saccesstoSovietarmsandalargearmsindustryofitsown,India

wasboundtocrushPakistan’sarmedfo rces. TheStateDepartment’slegal

advisersmightfindawaytodemonstratethatwehadnobindingobligationto

Pakistan,butthegeopoliticalimpactwouldbenolessseriousforit.Ourminimum

aimhadtobetodemonstratethatwewouldnotcompoundourweaknessby

fatuousness.Wehadtoactinamannerthatwouldgive pausetopotentialSoviet

adventureselsewhere,especiallyintheMiddleEast,whereEgypt’sPresidenthad

nowproclaimed1972asanotheryearofdecision.



Ourweaknessonthegroundforcedustoplayaboldgame;whentheweak

actwithrestraintitencouragesfurtherpressuresandbringshometo their

opponentsthestrengthoftheirposition.Ihadnoillusionaboutourassets;but

sometimesinsituationsofgreatperilleadersmustmakeboldnesssubstitutefor

assets.“wearerunningatremendousbluffinasituationinwhichweareholding

nocards,”ItoldHaldemanonDecember11,pleadingwithhimtogetthe

Presidentforoncetoinsistonsomedisciplineinourgovernment.“Unlesswecan

settleonastrategy,”IsaidinanappealtomyfractiouscolleaguesontheWSAG

onDecember9,“speakwiththesamevoice,andstopputtingoutallthese

conflictingstoriesfromthevariousagenciesandallthisleaking,wedon’tdeserve

tosucceed.”



Itwasimpossibletokeeptheg overnmentunitedandnoteasytogetitto

actwithanycoherence.MostofDecember4wasexpendedingettingtheState

DepartmenttoagreetoaspeechbyGeorgeBushchallenging India’sresortto

armsandsupportingaSecurityCouncilresolutioncallingforbothacease‐fireand

withdrawalofforces(thatis,Indian).



Bushintroducedaresolutionalong theselinesonDecember4.TheSecurity

Councilsupportedourposition,withelevenmembersfavoringourresolution.But

itfailedofadoptionbecauseitwasvetoedbytheSovietUnion.(Britainand

Franceabstained—anotherexampleofthetendencyofourWestEuropeanallies

toletuscarrytheburdenofglobalsecurityalone.)WiththeSecurityCouncil

stalematedbytheSovietvetowetookthecasetotheGeneralAssemblyunder

theUnitingforPeaceresolution.Weprevailedinthatbodybyavoteof104to11

onDecember7.OurpositionwasopposedonlybytheSovietblocandIndia.