Kissinger Henry. White House Years

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

penwecouldsendanotheroneafterwereturnedtoAmerica.IfinallytoldChou

thatwewouldallbebetteroffifthesubjectweredropped.



AtlastChouandIgotaroundtoreviewingthecommuniqué.Threematters

requiredfurtherdiscussion.Thetwosides’statementsonIndiaandPakistan,

draftedonmyOctobertrip,hadbeenovertakenbythecrisisinNovemberand

December;weforesawnoproblemsinrevision.Theslimsectionontradeand

exchanges,inourview,requiredexpansion;itwasonecriterionbywhichthe

Americanpublicwouldmeasureprogress.ThesectiononTaiwan,finally,was

incomplete.Onthis,neitherside’scurrentdraftwasacceptabletotheother.

ChouandIagreedthatmuchnegotiationlayahead.



Thefirstofficialmeetingofthefulldelegationofeachsideoccurredata

briefplenarysessiononMondayafternoon,February21.Tacitcooperationwas

welladvancedwheneachoftheleaderscould,seeminglyspontaneously,propose

aschemethoughtupbytheother.Chouputforwardashisownideathevery

workprogramIhadoutlinedtohimnothalfanhourearlier,thustakingthe

responsibilityforsettingupaseparategroupfortheForeignMinistersand

sparingusmuchinternalanguish.Nottobeoutdone,Nixonproclaimedhis

oppositionto“weasel‐worded”communiqués.Inmeetingsofsuchimportance,

hedeclared,leadersshowedtheirstrengthbybeingunafraidtoavowtheir

differences.Chouhappilyagreedthatthecommuniquéshou ldfollowaformathe

hadoriginallyproposedinOctober.Thebureaucraticbooksthushavingbeen

cleared,themeetingconcludedonthehighnoteofNixon’sdeclarationthathe

groupedcountriesnotbyideologybutbytheforeignpolicytheyconducted.



Thenextmeetingtookplacewithmorerestrictedattendanceandgotdown

toseriousbusiness.OnTuesdayafternoon,Nixonskillfullyandsuccinctly

describedtoChouEn‐laitheoutlinesofAmericanpolicy.Herepeatedthathis

diplomacywasbasedonothernations’foreignpolicies,nottheirdomestic

structures.HisKansasCityremarksofJuly1971,whileextemporaneous,had

reflectedhiswell ‐consideredconvictionthatanewworldorderwasemerging,

basedonthefivepowercentersoftheUnitedStates,SovietUnion,China,Japan,

andWesternEurope.AmericahadnoterritorialdesignsinAsia,andhewas

convincedthatChinahadnoneonus.Thebasisofacooperativerelationshipthus

existed.OurfriendshipandalliancewithJapanwereinChina’sinterest,Nixon

pointedout,fortheyguaranteedthatwewouldbeamajorfactorintheWestern

Pacifictobalancethedesignsofothers,andwouldkeepJapanfrompursuingthe

pathofmilitaristicnationalism.ThatwaswhyourpresenceinthePhilippinesand

evenSouthKoreacontributedtoChina’ssecurity,bymaintainingabalanceof

powerinareasclosetoChina.Nixonsummedupoureffortstonegotiatea

settlementinVietnam.WewouldnotimposeapoliticalsolutiononVietnam,as

Hanoiwanted.Ifwedid,nocountrywouldevertrustusagain—implyingthatour

reliabilitywasrelevantalsotoChinesesecurityconcerns.Hewarnedthatwe

wouldreactviolentlyifHanoilaunchedanothermajoroffensivein1972.



WithrespecttoTaiwan,Nixonelaboratedsomefundamentalprinciples

thatIhadalreadyforeshadowedtoChou:thatwewouldnotencouragea“two‐

Chinas”solution,ora“one‐China,one‐Taiwan”solution,orencourageother

countriestoreplaceourmilitarypositionontheisland.Nixonexpressedhishope

ofcompletingthe“normalization”processduringhissecondterm.Hedidnot

stateourconditionsforthis,butheleftnodoubtthathewouldinsistona

peacefulresolution.Andhemadeclearthatthewithdrawalofourforces

dependedonthestateoftensionsinthearea.Nixonrepeatedlyaffirmedthathe

couldmakeno“secretdeals”onTaiwan;hemadenone.



Chou,asalways,wasimpassiveduringNixon’spresentationsandincisivein

hisown.HeleftnodoubtthathefearedSovietexpansionismaboveall.South

Asiawasbutthemo strecentexample,thoughIndianimperialistdesignswere

welldevelopedevenbeforetheSovietUnionstokedthefireofconflict.The

primaryproblem,asChinasawit,wastomaintaintheworldbalanceofpower.He

regardedtheestrangementbetweentheUnitedStatesandthenewChinaas

ended.Thetasknowwasjointoppositiontohegemonicaspirations.



Chou’streatmentofVietnamwasamasterpieceofindirection.Herebutted

Nixonmoreinsorrowthaninanger.Heindicated“sympathy”fortheNorth

Vietnamesebutdidnotallegeacommunityofinterest.Hederivedtheobligation

tosupportHanoinotfromideologicalsolidarity,muchlessfromcongruent

nationalinterests,butfromanhistoricaldebtowedtoVietnamfromChina’s

imperialpast.Chinawouldexpressnoviewonthecontinuingnegotiations.He

reiteratedthatdifferencesbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateswouldbesettled

peacefully.WeinterpretedthistomeanthatChinawouldnotintervenemilitarily

inVietnam;thatNorthVietnamwasnotanextensionofChinesepolicy;andthat

ChoutreatedVietnamlargelyinthecontextoflong‐termSovietaspirationsin

southeastAsia.Hisprincipalargumentforendingthewarquicklywasthatit

boggeddowntheUnitedStatesanddef lectedourenergiesfrommoreimportant

partsoftheglobe.Choucriticizedournegotiatingpositioninonlythemost

perfunctorymanner.HeurgedourmilitarywithdrawalfromVietnam;henever

reallypushedforHanoi’s—andourcritics’—politicalprogramofcoalition

governmentandtheoverthrowofThieu.



WithrespecttoTaiwan,ChourepeatedlyemphasizedtheChineseintention

to“liberate”Taiwanpeacefully,thoughhecontinuedtoinsistthattheprocess

wasChina’sinternalaffair.TheoverwhelmingimpressionleftbyChou,asbyMao,

wasthatcontinuingdifferencesoverTaiwanweresecondarytoourprimary

mutualconcernovertheinternationale quilibrium.Thediverg enceofviewson

Taiwanwouldnotbeallowedtodisturbthenewrelationshipthathadevolvedso

dramaticallyandthatwasgroundedingeopoliticalinterests.Thebasicthemeof

theNixontrip—andtheShanghaiCommuniqué—wastoputofftheissueof

Taiwanforthefuture,toenablethetwonationstoclosethegulfoftwentyyears

andtopursueparallelpolicieswheretheirinterestscoincided.



Suchwasthedistilledessenceofmanyconversationsconducted,especially

ontheChineseside,withextraordinaryindirectionandsubtlety.Therewereno

reciprocalcommitments,notevenanattempttodefinecoordinatedaction.A

strangesortofpartnershipdeveloped,all themoreeffectualforneverbeing

formalized.IthadbegunonmysecrettripinJulyandcontinuedonmyinterim

visitinOctober.Itculminatedinandwaslegitimized byNixon’sskillfulandlucid

presentationsinChina.Anditwasthenelaboratedinmysubsequentsixvisits.

Twogreatnationssoughtcooperationnotthroughformalcompactsbutby

harmonizingtheirrespectiveunderstandingofinternationalissuesandtheir

interestsinrelationtothem.Cooperationthusbecameapsychological,not

merelyalegal,necessity.



ThisiswhyChouspentalmostallofhistimewithNixondiscussingneither

thecommuniqué(whichcameuponlybrieflyandtangentially)noroperational

decisions.Thefocusofthediscussion—duringNixon’svisitasinmyownseparate

encounterswithMaoorChouorTengHsiao‐p’ingorChineseambassadors—was

ontherequirementsofthebalanceofpower,theinternationalorder,andlong‐

termtrendsofworldpolitics.Bothsidesunderstoodthatiftheyagreedonthese

elements,astrategyofparallelactionwouldfollownaturally;ifnot,tactical

decisionstakenindividuallywouldproveephemeralandfruitless.



<<Contents>>



****



TheShanghaiCommuniqué



nfact,ourperceptionsgrewcoldly congruent.Yettheparallelstrategiesdid

requiresometangibleexpression.Thecommuniquéconcludingthevisitwould

beasymboltotheworldandourtwopeoples.Itwouldalsoguidethetwo

bureaucracies(whowouldnothaveaccesstoalltheexchanges)inthenew

directionofpolicy.Itwouldthusbecomeatouchstoneoftherelationship

betweentwocountrieswhosediplomatictieswouldremainunconventionalas

longasWashingtoncontinuedofficiallytorecognizeTaipeiastheseatofthe

governmentofallofChina.



Onmanycontroversialtopicsmostofthetext,asIhavesaid,hadbeen

settledduringmyvisitinOctober,includingtheunprecedentedformatofstating

conflictingpointsofview.Theseopposingpresentationsgaveaddedemphasis

andcredibilitytothosemattersonwhichwewereabletoendorseacommon

position,especiallywithrespecttoopposing“hegemony”(thenewcodewordfor

Sovietexpansionism). Thecommuniquéwasthuslesssubjecttomisinterpretation

orinconsistentelaborationbythetwosidesthanisthecasewiththenormal

documentthattends tofudgedisagreementsaswellasagreements;theformer

toconveyanimpressionofharmony,thelattertoavoidthechargeofcollusion.It

wasmorereassuringtoourrespectivealliesandfriends.



Taiwan,however,wasathornyproblem.DuringmyOctober visitwehad

agreedthateachside,asonotherissues,wouldstateitsownposition.Pekinghad

setoutitsclaimtobethesolelegalgovernmentofChinaanditsinsistencethat

TaiwanwasaprovinceofChina.IthadsaidthatthefutureofTaiwanwasan

internalaffair.ForourownstatementIhadagreednottochallengetheviewheld

byChineseonbothsidesoftheTaiwanstrait:“TheUnitedStatesacknowledges

thatallChineseoneithersideoftheTaiwanStraitmaintainthereisbutoneChina

andthatTaiwanisaprovinceofChina.TheUnitedStatesdoesnotchallengethat

position.”Peking,foritspart,hadagreednottoattack—oreventomention—our

defensetreatywithTaiwaninthestatementofitsownpositionwhilecallingfor

theevacuationofAmericanforces.ButwhenNixonarrivedinPeking,westill

differedovertheconsequencestobedrawnfromtheagreedstatementon

China’sunity.TheChinesewantedustostatethatapeacefulsolutionwasour

“hope.”WeinsistedonaffirmingitasanAmericaninterest,indeed,on

“reaffirming”it,implyingthatitwasacontinuingcommitment.TheChinese

wantedustocommitourselvesunconditionallytothetotalwithdrawalof

AmericanforcesfromTaiwan.Wewerewillingtogonofurtherthantodescribe

ourwithdrawalasanobjective,andeventhenweinsistedonlinkingitbothtoa

peacefulsolutionoftheTaiwanproblemandtotheeasingoftensionsinAsiain

general.



InthetwentyhoursCh’iaoKuan‐huaandIneededtoresolvethese

conflictingapproaches,justasonmysec rettrip,eachsidepushedtheother

againstthetimelimittotestwhoseresiliencywasgreater.Determinationwas

maskedbyextremeaffability.Thebestmeansofpressureavailabletoeachside

wastopretendthattherewasnodeadline.Conciliatoryconductwouldheighten

thesenseofurgencywithoutproducingpersonalstrain.Yetwhilepressureis

inescapableinanynegotiation,thetalkswerealsoconductedwithunusual

delicacy.Eachsidetookcarenottomakeirrevocabledemandsortobargainasif

amovebyonerequiredaconcessionbytheother.FordifferentreasonsTaiwan

involvedissuesofprincipleforbothcountries.Andtosuggestthatprincipleshave

apricecanbeoffensive.Thisiswhythetwosidesconductedthemselvesasifwe

hadtosolveacommonproblemnotbyasharpbargainbutbyajoint

understanding.Wetookpainstoexplainourdomesticnecessitiestoeachother

withgreatfrankness,becauseweknewthatthecommuniquéwouldnotsurviveif

negotiatedthroughtrickeryorfoundunacceptableathome.Werecognizedthat

onsomeissuestheonlythingnegotiatorscanachieveistogaintimewithdignity.

OnTaiwanitwastoleavetheultimate outcometoafuturethatinturnwouldbe

shapedbytherelationshipwhichwouldevolvefromtherestofthecommuniqué

andbythemannerinwhichitwasnegotiated.



WhileNixonattendedtoWhiteHousebusiness,Ch’iaoandIspentthefirst

dayofnegotiation goingthroughtheexistingdraftlinebylinetoconfirmwhat

wasalreadyagreed.IexplainedourrequirementsonTaiwan;Ch’iaoindicated

thathehadnoauthoritytochangetheexistingChineseproposal.Idecidedtolet 

matterslieforadayandusedthesecondday’s“negotiatingse ssion”—on

February23—tobrieftheChineseontheagreementsweplannedtoreachatthe

Moscowsummit.



TheChinesewereclearlynothappywithourpolicytowardMoscow,but

theywouldhavetoadjusttothisrealityoftriangulardiplomacy.Weandtheyhad

acommoninterestinpreventingtheSovietUnionfromupsettingtheglobal

balanceofpowerbyanymeans,includinganattackonChina.Butwehadno

vestedinterestinpermanenthostilitywithMoscowunlessMoscowchallenged

theinternationalequilibrium.Asnuclearsuperpowers,wehadindeedan

obligationtoreducethethreatofnuclearconfrontat ion.Pekingwouldnodoubt

havepreferredasimplerpatternofoverthostilitybetweenWashingtonand

Moscow.Thiswouldhaveeaseditscalculationsandimproveditsbargaining

position.Ournecessitiesweremorecomplicated.Peking’sdomesticimperatives

pushedittowardconfrontation;ourimperativewastodemonstratetoourpublic

andtoouralliesthatwewerenotthecauseofconflict,orelsetheCongress

woulddismantleourdefensesandourallieswoulddissociatefromus.Onlyfrom

aconciliatoryplatformcouldwerallysupportforfirmactioninacrisis.Wewere

preparedtoconfrontSovietexpansion.Butwewerenotwillingtoforeclosethe

optionofagenuineeasingoftensionswithMosco w ifthatcouldintimebe

achieved.ThuswehadtomakesurethatChinaunderstoodourpurposesand

wouldnotbesurprisedbyouractions.WekeptPekingassiduouslyinformedof

ourmoves.Wesoughttoavoidanyimplicationofcondominium.Whatwecould

notdowastogivePekingavetooverourrelationshipwithMoscowanymore

thanwewouldgiveavetototheSovietsoverourrelationswithChina.Itwasa

three‐dimensionalgame,butanysimplificationhadthemakingsofcatastrophe.If

weappearedirresoluteorleaningtowardMoscow,Pekingwouldbedrivento

accommodationwiththeSovietUnion.IfweadoptedtheChineseattitude,

however,wemightnotevenhelpPeking;wemight,infact,temptaSoviet

preemptiveattackonChinaandthusbefacedwithdecisionsofenormous

danger.



ThedeadlineCh’iaoandIfacedwasNixon’sdeparturefromPekingfor

HangchowonthemorningofFebruary26.Therewouldbelittleopportunity to

negotiatewhiletraveling,anditwouldbedifficultfortheChineseleadersto

assembletheirPolitburotoratifytheoutcome.Onthethirddayofour

negotiation,February24,Nixonandhispartyweresight‐seeingattheGreatWall.

Withonlysomethirty‐sixhourslefttherealnegotiationbetweenCh’iaoandme

nowbegan.Inatwo‐and‐a‐half‐hoursessionthatmorningCh’iaoputforward

onceagaintheformulathattheUnitedStates“hoped”forapeacefulTaiwan

solution.Heaskedustoassert—unrelatedtoanyotherconditions—thatthe

UnitedStates“willprogressivelyreduceandfinallywithdrawalltheUStroopsand

militaryinstallationsfromTaiwan.”Irejectedtheformulation,sayingthatit

jeopardizedtheentirerelationshipbecauseAmericanpublic opinionwouldnever

standforit.Ch’iaoandImetbrieflyintheafternoontopermitmetooffera

compromise,whichwasinfactaslightlymodifiedversionofouroriginalproposal.

Wetiedwithdrawalstothe“premise”ofapeacefulresolutionoftheTaiwan

questionandreductionoftensionsintheFarEast(therebycreatingalinkageto

Vietnam).Ch’iaopromisedtostudytheproposal.Aftermidnight,following

anotherbanquet,Ch’iaorejectedit.Withonlyabouteighteenhoursof

negotiatingtimeleft,wewerestuck.OnFriday,February25,Ch’iaoandImet

againforninetyminutesinthemorningwhileNixontouredtheForbiddenCity.

Neitherofusshowedmuchsenseofurgency.Wetossedideasaround,“thinking

outloud,”enablingbothsidestopretendthattheywerenotcommitted.Iinsisted

onsomeformofconditionalityforAmericanwithdrawals,especiallythepremise

ofapeacefulsolution.Thatafternoon,Ch’iaoandImettwicemore,whileNixon

wasresting.At2:35p.m.Ch’iaocameforwardwithaformulationwhichforthe

firsttimemetourbasicprinciple.Chinawouldnolongerobjectifweaffirmedan

interestinthepeacefulsolutionoftheTaiwanissuesolongasitalsoincludeda

referencetototalwithdrawalofUnitedStatesforces.I promisedhimaquick

reply.



AfterIconferredwithmyassociatesandthenwiththePresident,wemet

againatabout3:30p.m.Ihadhitupontheideaofseparatingthetwoproblems—

thefinalobjectiveoftotalwithdrawalandourwillingnesstowithdrawtroops

graduallyintheinterval,whichuptonowhadbeeninthesamesentence.My

proposalwastotiethefinalwithdrawaltothepremiseofpeacefulsettlement,

andtolinktheprogressivereductionofforcestothegradualdiminutionof

“tensioninthearea.”Ch’iaoshowedsomeinterest.Hecameupwithavariation.

Hepreferredtospeakofthe“prospect”ofapeacefulsettlement,ratherthan

“premise,”claimingthatithadamoreactiveandmorebilateralconnotation;

“premise”soundedlikeaunilateralimpositionbyWashington.Ithoughtthis,if

anything,betterfromourpointofview;itimpliedsomedegreeofChinese

commitment.Inanyevent,IdidnotbelievethatthefateofTaiwanwouldbe

determinedbysuchsupersubtleshadesofmeaning.Ch’iaowasnotyetprepared

toacceptlinkingourwithdrawaltoourotherrequirement,thediminutionof

“tensioninthearea.”



Iwasconvincedthatwehadmadeourbreakthrough.Ineverynegotiationa

pointisreachedwherebothsideshavegonetoofarto pullback.Accumulated

mutualconcessionscreatetheirownmomentum;atsomestageretreatputsinto

questionthejudgmentofthenegotiators.Maohadputthissameprincipleinhis

usualindirectfashionwhilepretendingtoNixonthatagreementwasnot

essential:“…ifwefailthefirsttime,thenpeoplewillaskwhywearenotableto

succeedthefirsttime?Theonlyreasonwouldbethatwehavetakenthewrong

road.Whatwilltheysayifwesucceedthesecondtime?”Maowasquiteright.An

initialfailurewasboundtoblightalatersuccess:“whatuseisthereifwestandin

deadlock?”



Choujoinedthenegotiatio nforhalfanhourthatafternoon,aclear

indicationofhisconfidencethatwewouldnotfailthefirsttime.Chouwasnot

neededtoconfirmanimpasse;hispresenceshowedthathewouldtakethe

responsibilityfortherequisitecompromise.Iexplainedonceagainthatwecould

makenounconditionalcommitmenttowithdrawandthattheconditionsofeven

apartialwithdrawalhadtoberealisticandexplicableto ourpublic.Wedidhave

aninterestinapeacefulsolutionoftheTaiwanissue,andthewarinSoutheast

AsiawouldinfactinfluenceourdeploymentsonTaiwan.Bystatingthese

concernshonestlywewouldbeabletodefendthecommuniquéinAmerica.If

not,wewouldbeforcedintostatingthesameconditionsunilaterally,

underminingthemutualconfidencethatwasthemostcrucialpurposeofthe

negotiationsandthevisit.Chousaidthathewouldthinkmyargumentsover.



Therewas,infact,anincongruitybetweentheintensityofthediscussion

anditsintrinsicimportance.ChouknewwellenoughthattheTaiwanissuecould

notberesolvedduringthePresident’svisit.Indeed,anyattempttodoso would

runcountertoChina’sobjectiveofestablishingacooperativerelationship.It

wouldeitherraiseadomesticstorminAmericaorproduceadeadlockinPeking;

eithercontingencywouldstiflethenewtiesintheirinfancy.Thefundamental

objectiveofbothsideswasnotterritorialbutgeopolitical.Eachhadconcluded

thatitneededtheotherformaintainingthebalanceofpower.China’sneedwas

somewhatgreaterfromthepointofviewofsecurity,oursfromthepointofview

ofpsychology.Werequiredmaneuveringroomforourdiplomacyandtogive

hopetoourpeopleafteratormenteddecadeathomeandabroad.



Matterswouldnodoubthavebeenconcludedthenandtherehadwenot

beenobligedtoadjournforabriefNixon‐Choumeeting,whichwasfollowedby

anotherbanquet.ChouEn‐lai’stoastwasratherbrief,andnotedthe“great

differencesofprinciplebetweenourtwosides.”ThoughNixon’sandChou’s

standardrhetorichadrepeatedthissamepointallweek,andthoughChouEn‐lai

attheendofhistoasthailedtheChinesecommitmenttofriendshipwiththe

UnitedStates,somerestlessnewsmenthoughttheyhaddetectedasudden

“tension”inthenegotiationsbecauseofthenuancesofthetoastandbecausethe

generalmoodatthebanquetseemeddeflatedcomparedwiththeeuphoriaof

thefirstnight.Ofcourse,sincebothsideshadagreedtokeepthesubstanceof

theconversationssecret,thepress,havinghadlittleguidance,mustbeforgiven

foremphasizingthemostdramaticpossibilities. Thefactwasthatbythetimeof

thebanquetthebackofthecommuniquéwasbroken—exceptforso mebickering

withinourdelegation.NixonandChouintheirone‐hourmeetingonFriday

afternoondidnotevendiscussthecommuniqué.Ifconversationseemedtoflag

attheheadtable,itwaspartlybecauseofthegeneralexhaustionproducedby

successivelate‐nightsessions,especiallyamongthenegotiators,andpartly

becausewewereallseatedinprotocolorder,whichmeantthatwefound

ourselvesnexttothesamepeopleatba nquetafterbanquet.Inevitablywehadby

thenexploredeveryconceivableavenueofsmalltalk.TheAmericanpressself‐

centeredlyassumedthatitspresence,indeedtheintensivemediacoverage,made

NixonvulnerabletoChinese“pressure”becauseheneededasuccessful

outcome—asiftheChinesedidnothaveanequalifnotgreaterstake.Whatever

thecause,thereweresensationalheadlinesthat“BanquetToastsHintTrouble”

(intheWashingtonStar)or“Nixon‐ChouTalksAppearDeadlocked”(inthe

WashingtonPost)andelaborateaccountsofimpassebasedonnoparticular

information.



Ch’iaoandImetagainat10:30p.m.AfterthisFridaybanquetandsettled

thekeyissueinfifteenminutes.HeimmediatelyacceptedalltheAmerican

formulationsasIhadexplainedthemtoChou.Intheprocess,wesecuredCh’iao’s

agreementtostatingthatweacknowledgedTaiwanasa“part”ratherthana

“province”ofChina,thuseliminating asuggestionofsubordination.Therelevant

paragraphnowreadasfollows:



TheU.S.sidedeclared:TheUnitedStatesacknowledgesthatallChineseoneithersideof

theTaiwanStraitmaintainthereisbutoneChinaandthatTaiwanisapartofChina.TheUnited

StatesGovernmentdoesnotchallengethatposition.Itreaffirmsitsinterestinapeaceful

settlementoftheTaiwanquestionbytheChinesethemselves.Withthisprospectinmind,it

affirmstheultimateobjectiveofthewithdrawalofallU.S.forcesandmilitaryinstallationsfrom

Taiwan.Inthemeantime,itwillprogressivelyreduceitsforcesandmilitaryinstallationson

Taiwanasthetensionintheareadiminishes.



IhadtheTaiwanparagraphtypedandtookittoNixonintheadjoining

guesthouse.Asinallnegotiations,oncewehadagreedonourgeneralobjectives,

Nixonhadlefttheconductofthetalkstome.Hetooknospecialinterestinthe

variousformulationsuntilthereexistedaversionrequiringhisfinalapproval.At

onepointIaskedhimtowriteamarginalcommentononeoftheTaiwandrafts

whichIthenshowedCh’iaotolendemphasistomyinsistenceonconditionality

forourwithdrawals.Nowthepointofdecisionhadbeenreached.Wehadadraft

thatIconsideredacceptable.At10:50p.m.FridaynightNixonandI revieweditin

detail.Acomparisonwithearlierdraftsindicatedthatwehadachievedourbasic

objective.Wewouldreaffir mourinterestinapeacefulsolutionoftheTaiwan

question.Ouragreementtotheprincipleoftotalwithdrawalofourmilitaryforces 

fromTaiwanwasstatedasanultimateobjectivelinkedtotheprospectofa

peacefulsettlementoftheTaiwanissue(implyingthattherewassomegroundfor

expectingit);withdrawalsuntilthenwoulddependonareductionoftensionsin

thearea.BothsidesunderstoodthattheAmericanroleinthedefenseofTaiwan

didnotdependonthefewforcesonTaiwan,whichweremostlycommunications

personnelforouroperationsinSoutheastAsia.TherealAmericansecurityroleon

Taiwanwasdefinedbythe1955mutualdefensetreaty.Neithersidementioned

thisintheShanghaiCommuniqué,anditscontinuedvalidityhadbeenreaffirmed

inthePresident’sforeignPolicyReportpublishedaweekbeforehisdeparturefor

Peking.Furthermore,nottheleastanomalousaspectoftheChinatripwasthat

ourdefensecommitmenttoTaiwanwasreaffirmedyetagain,thistimeon

ChinesesoilwhenIlaterbriefedthepressinShanghaionFebruary27.



TheTaiwanparagraphofthecommuniquéwasnota“victory”byoneside

overtheother;noconstructiverelationshipcanbebuiltonthatbasis.Inajoint

enterpriseofsovereignstatesonlythoseagreementsendurewhichbothsides

haveaninterestinmaintaining.Rather,itputtheTaiwanissueinabeyance,with

eachsidemaintainingitsbasicprinciples.Despitethecontinuingdifferenceover